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THE

HISTORY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earlieſt Accounts till the

Diviſion of the Macedonian Empire in the Eaſt.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY O

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL.D. F.R.S. & A.S.

Εκ μεν τοιγε της απαντων προς αλληλα συμπλοκης και παραθεσεως, ετι δε ομοιοτητος και διαφορας, μονως αν τις εφικοιτο και δυνηθειη κατοπτευσας, αμα και το χρησιμον και το τερπνον εκ της ιστοριας λαβειν. POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

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THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE.

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Conſequences of the Athenian Misfortunes in Sicily.—Formidable Confederacy againſt Athens.—Peculiar Reſources of free Governments.—Naval Operations.—Battle of Miletus.—Intrigues of Alcibiades.—The Athenian Democracy ſubverted.—Tyrannical Government of the Four Hundred.—Battle of Eretria.—Democracy re-eſtabliſhed in Athens.—Naval Succeſs of the Athenians.—Triumphant Return of Alcibiades.—The Eleuſinian Myſteries—and Plynteria.

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Extent of the Athenian misfortunes in Sicily.

IN the populous and extenſive kingdoms of modern Europe, the revolutions of public affairs ſeldom diſturb the humble obſcurity of private life; but the national tranſactions of Greece involved the intereſt of every family, and deeply affected the fortune and happineſs of every individual.

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dual. Had the arms of the Athenians proved ſucceſsful in Sicily, each citizen would have derived from that event an immediate acceſſion of wealth, as well as of power, and have felt a proportional increaſe of honour and ſecurity. But their proud hopes periſhed for ever in the harbour of Syracuſe. The ſucceeding diſaſters ſhook to the foundation the fabric of their empire. In one raſh enterpriſe they loſt their army, their fleet, the prudence of their experienced generals, and the flouriſhing vigour of their manly youth[1]—Irreparable diſaſters! which totally diſabled them to reſiſt the confederacy of Peloponneſus, reinforced by the reſentment of a new and powerful enemy. While a Lacedæmonian army inveſted their city, they had reaſon to dread that a Syracuſan fleet ſhould aſſault the Piræus; that Athens muſt finally yield to theſe combined attacks, and her once proſperous citizens deſtroyed by the ſword, or dragged into captivity, atone by their death or diſgrace for the cruelties which they had recently inflicted on the wretched republics of Melos and Scioné.

The news brought to Athens. Olymp. xci. 4. A.C. 413.

The dreadful alternative of victory and defeat, renders it little ſurpriſing that the Athenians ſhould have rejected intelligence, which they muſt have received with horror. The firſt meſſengers of ſuch ſad news were treated with contempt: but it was

[1] Thucydid. l. vii. p. 557. Cicero goes farther. Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, commeatus, depreſſæque ſunt: in hoc portu Athenienſium nobilitatis, imperij, gloriæ naufragium factum exiſtimatur. Cicer. in Verrem, v. 37.

impoſſible

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impoſſible long [2] to with-hold belief from the miſerable fugitives, whoſe ſqualid and dejected countenances too faithfully atteſted the public calamity. Such evidence could not be refuſed; the arrogance of incredulity was abaſhed, and the whole republic thrown into conſternation, or ſeized with deſpair. The venerable members of the Areopagus expreſſed the majeſty of ſilent ſorrow; but the piercing cries of woe extended many a mile along the lofty walls which joined the Piræus to the city; and the licentious populace raged with unbridled fury againſt the diviners and orators, whoſe blind predictions, and ambitious harangues, had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country [3].

Combination in Greece againſt Athens.

The diſtreſs of the Athenians was too great to admit the comfort of ſympathy; but had they been capable of receiving, they had little reaſon to expect, that melancholy conſolation. The tidings ſo afflicting to *them* gave unſpeakable joy to their neighbours; many feared, moſt hated, and all envied a people who had long uſurped the dominion of Greece. The Athenian allies, or rather ſubjects, ſcattered over ſo many coaſts and iſlands,

[2] The calamity was ſo great that the boldeſt imagination had never dared to conceive its exiſtence. Their minds being thus unprepared, the Athenians, ſays Thucydides, diſbelieved και τοις παντ[illegible] των ςρατιωτων εξ αυτης της ιςγω διαπεφευγοσι· even thoſe ſoldiers who eſcaped from this melancholy buſineſs. The ſtories of Plutarch in Nicia, of Athenæus, &c. may be ſafely rejected as fictions, ſince they are inconſiſtent with Thucydides's narrative.

[3] Thucyd. l. viii. p. 558, & ſeqq.

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prepared to assert their independence; the confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracusans justly assumed the first rank, were unsatisfied with victory, and longed for revenge: even those communities, which had hitherto declined the danger of a doubtful contest, meanly solicited to become parties in a war, which they expected must finally terminate in the destruction of Athens [4].

Abetted by the resentment of Persia.

Should all the efforts of such a powerful confederacy still prove insufficient to accomplish the ruin of the devoted city, there was yet another enemy behind, from whose strength and animosity the Athenians had every thing to fear. The long and peaceful reign of Artaxerxes king of Persia, expired four hundred and twenty-five years before the Christian æra. The two following years were remarkable for a rapid succession of kings, Xerxes, Sogdianus, Ochus; the last of whom assumed the name of Darius, to which historians have added the epithet of Nothus, the bastard, to distinguish this effeminate prince from his illustrious predecessor [5]. The first years of Darius Nothus were employed in confirming his disputed authority, and in watching the dangerous intrigues of his numerous kinsmen who aspired to the throne. When every rival was removed that could either disturb his quiet or offend his suspicion, the monarch sunk into an indolent security, and his voluptuous court was governed by the feeble ad-

4 Thucydid. l. viii. p. 558, & seqq. Diodor. l. xii. p. 348.

5 Diodor. l. xii. p. 322. Ctesias, Persic. c. xlv. & seqq.

mi[illegible]istration

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miniſtration of women and eunuchs[6]. But in the ninth year of his reign Darius was rouſed from his lethargy by the revolt of Egypt and Lydia. The defection of the latter threatened to tear from his dominion the valuable provinces of Aſia Minor; a conſequence which he determined to prevent by employing the bravery of Pharnabazus, and the policy of the crafty Tiſſaphernes, to govern reſpectively the northern and ſouthern diſtricts of that rich and fertile peninſula. The abilities of theſe generals not only quelled the rebellion in Lydia, but extended the arms of their maſter towards the ſhores of the Ægean, as well as of the Helleſpont and Propontis; in direct oppoſition to the treaty which forty years before had been ratified between the Athenians, then in the height of their proſperity, and the unwarlike Artaxerxes. But the recent misfortunes of that ambitious people flattered the Perſian commanders with the hope of reſtoring the whole Aſiatic coaſt to the great king[7], as well as of inflicting exemplary puniſhment on the proud city, which had reſiſted the power, diſmembered the empire, and tarniſhed the glory of Perſia.

The terror of ſuch a formidable combination might have reduced the Athenians to deſpair; and our ſurpriſe that this conſequence ſhould not immediately follow, will be increaſed by the following reflection. Not to mention the immortal trophies

The Athenian allies prepare to revolt.

[6] Cteſias, c. xlvii.

[7] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 560. & Cteſias, Perſic. c. li.

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of Alexander, or the extenſive ravages of Zingis Khan, Tamerlane, and the Tartar princes of their race; the Spaniards, the Portugueſe, and other nations of modern Europe, have, with a handful of men, marched victorious over the effeminate or barbarous coaſts of the eaſtern and weſtern world. The hardy diſcipline of Europe eaſily prevailed over the unwarlike ſoftneſs of India and the ſavage ignorance of America. But the rapid ſucceſs of all theſe conquerors was owing to their military knowledge[8] and experience. By the ſuperiority of their arms and of their diſcipline, the Romans ſubdued the nations of the earth. But the Athenians afford the only example of a people, who, by the virtues of the mind alone, acquired an extenſive dominion over men equally improved with themſelves in the arts of war and government. They poſſeſſed, or were believed to poſſeſs, ſuperior courage and capacity to the nations around them; and this opinion, which ſhould ſeem not intirely deſtitute of foundation, enabled them to maintain, by very feeble garriſons, an abſolute authority in the iſlands of the Ægean, as well as in the cities of the Aſiatic coaſt. Their diſaſters and diſgrace in Sicily deſtroyed at once the real and the ideal ſupports of their power; the loſs of one third of their citizens made it impoſſible to ſupply, with freſh recruits, the exhauſted ſtrength of their

[8] If that of the Tartars ſhould be doubted, the reader may conſult Monſ. de Guignes's Hiſt. des Huns, and Mr. Gibbon's admirable deſcription of the manners of the paſtoral nations, v. ii.

garriſons

garriſons in foreign parts; the terror of their fleet was no more; and their multiplied defeats, before the walls of Syracuſe, had converted into contempt that admiration in which Athens had been long held by Greeks and Barbarians. CHAP. XXI.

But in free governments there are many latent reſources which public calamities alone can bring to light; and adverſity, which, to individuals endowed with inborn vigour of mind, is the great ſchool of virtue and of heroiſm, furniſhes alſo to the enthuſiaſm of popular aſſemblies the nobleſt field for the diſplay of national honour and magnanimity. Had the meaſures of the Athenians depended on one man, or even on a few, it is probable that the ſelfiſh timidity of a prince, and the cautious prudence of a council, would have ſunk under the weight of misfortunes, too heavy for the unſupported ſtrength of ordinary minds. But the firſt ſpark of generous ardour, which the love of virtue, of glory, and the republic, or even the meaner motives of ambition and vanity, excited in the aſſembled multitude, was diffuſed and increaſed by the natural contagion of ſympathy; the patriotic flame was communicated to every breaſt; and the ſocial warmth, reflected from ſuch a variety of objects, became too intenſe to be reſiſted by the coldneſs of caution and the damps of deſpair. Peculiar reſources of free governments.

With one mind and reſolution the Athenians determined to brave the ſeverity of fortune, and to withſtand the aſſaults of the enemy. Nor did this noble deſign evaporate in uſeleſs ſpeculation; the Prudent and vigorous meaſures of the Athenians.

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wiſeſt meaſures were adopted for reducing it to practice. The great work began, as national reformation ought always to begin, by regulating the finances, and lopping off every branch of ſuperfluous expence. The clamour of turbulent demagogues was ſilenced; aged wiſdom and experience were allowed calmly to direct the public councils; new levies were raiſed; the remainder of their fleet was equipped for ſea; the motions of the colonies and tributary ſtates were watched with an anxious ſolicitude, and every proper expedient was employed that might appeaſe their animoſity, or render it impotent[9]. Yet theſe meaſures, prudent and vigorous as they were, could not, probably, have ſuſpended the fall of Athens, had not ſeveral concurring cauſes facilitated their operation. The weak, dilatory, and ineffectual proceedings of the Spartan confederacy; the temporiſing, equivocal, and capricious conduct of the Perſian governors; above all, the intrigues and enterpriſing genius of Alcibiades, who, after involving his country in inextricable calamities, finally undertook its defence, and retarded, though he could not prevent, its deſtiny.

The Peloponneſians and Perſians prepare to act againſt the Aſiatic dependencies of Athens.

In the year following the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Spartans prepared a fleet of an hundred ſail, of which twenty-five allies were furniſhed by their own ſea-ports; twenty-five by the Thebans; fifteen by the Corinthians; and the remainder by Locris, Phocis, Megara, and the

9 Thucydid. l. viii. p. 559. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 349.

maritime

maritime cities on the coaſt of Peloponneſus. This armament was deſtined to encourage and ſupport the revolt of the Aſiatic ſubjects of the Athenians. The iſlands of Chios and Leſbos, as well as the city Erythræ on the continent, ſolicited the Spartans to join them with their naval force. Their requeſt was enforced by Tiſſaphernes, who promiſed to pay the ſailors, and to victual the ſhips. At the ſame time, an ambaſſador from Cyzicus, a populous town ſituate on an iſland of the Propontis, entreated the Lacedæmonian armament to ſail to the ſafe and capacious harbours which had long formed the wealth and the ornament of that city, and to expel the Athenian garriſons, to which the Cyzicenes and their neighbours reluctantly ſubmitted. The Perſian Pharnabazus ſeconded their propoſal; offered the ſame conditions with Tiſſaphernes; and ſo little harmony ſubſiſted between the lieutenants of the great king, that each urged his particular demand, with a total unconcern about the important intereſts of their common maſter[10]. The Lacedæmonians held many conſultations among themſelves, and with their allies; heſitated, deliberated, reſolved, and changed their reſolution; and at length were perſuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tiſſaphernes and the Ionians to that of the Helleſpontines and Pharnabazus.

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Olymp. xcii. 1. A. C. 412.

Dilatory meaſures of the confederates.

The delay occaſioned by this deliberation was the principal, but not the only cauſe, which hin-

The Athenians diſcover and

[10] Thucydid. p. 561 & 562.

dered

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defeat the designs of the Corinthians and the Chians. Olymp. xcii. 1. A.C. 412.

dered the allies from acting expeditiously, at a time when expedition was of the utmost importance. A variety of private views diverted them from the general aim of the confederacy; and the season was far advanced before the Corinthians, who had been distinguished by excess of antipathy to Athens, were prepared to sail. They determined, from pride perhaps, as well as superstition, to celebrate[21], before leaving their harbours, the Isthmian games, consecrated to Neptune, the third of the Grecian festivals in point of dignity and splendour. From this ceremony the Athenians, though enemies, were not excluded by the Corinthian magistrates; nor did they exclude themselves, though oppressed by the weight of past misfortunes, and totally occupied by the thoughts of providing against future evils. While their representatives shared the amusements of this sacred spectacle, they neglected not the commission recommended by their country. They secretly informed themselves of the plan and particular circumstances of the intended revolt, and learned the precise time fixed for the departure of the Corinthian fleet. In consequence of this important intelligence, the Athenians anticipated the designs of the rebels of Chios, and carried off seven ships as pledges of their fidelity. The squadron which returned from this useful enterprise, intercepted the

[21] "Πριν τα Ισθμια διοςταξωσι." The scholiast justly observes, the force of the "δια," "thoroughly, completely," *i. e.* until they had celebrated the games, the complete number of days, appointed by antiquity. Vid. Æ. Port. ad loc. p. 563.

Corin-

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Corinthians as they ſailed through the Saronic gulph; and having attacked and conquered them, purſued and blocked them up in their harbours[12].

Meanwhile the Spartans and their allies ſent to the Ionian coaſt ſuch ſquadrons as were ſucceſſively ready for ſea, under the conduct of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Aſtyochus. The firſt of theſe commanders ſailed to the iſle of Chios, which was diſtracted by contending factions. The Athenian partiſans were ſurpriſed, and compelled to ſubmit; and the city, which poſſeſſed forty gallies, and yielded in wealth and populouſneſs to none of the neighbouring colonies, became an acceſſion to the Peloponneſian confederacy. The ſtrong and rich town of Miletus followed the example: Erythræ and Clazomené ſurrendered to Chalcideus; ſeveral places of leſs note were conquered by Aſtyochus.

Succeſsful operations of the confederates.

When the Athenians received the unwelcome intelligence of theſe events, they voted the expenditure of a thouſand talents, which, in more proſperous times, they had depoſited in the citadel, under the ſanction of a decree of the ſenate and people, to reſerve it for an occaſion of the utmoſt danger. This ſeaſonable ſupply enabled them to increaſe the fleet, which ſailed, under Phrynichus and other leaders, to the iſle of Leſbos. Having ſecured the fidelity of the Leſbians, who were ripe for rebellion, they endeavoured to recover their authority in Miletus, anciently regarded as the

Battle of Miletus. Olymp. xcii. 2. A.C. 412.

[12] Thucydid. p. 564.

capital

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capital of the Ionic coaſt. A bloody battle was fought before the walls of that place, between the Athenians and Argives on one ſide, and the Peloponneſians, aſſiſted by the troops of Tiſſaphernes and the revolted Mileſians, on the other. The Athenian bravery defeated, on this occaſion, the ſuperior numbers of Greeks and Barbarians to whom they were oppoſed; but their Argive auxiliaries were repulſed by the gallant citizens of Miletus: ſo that, in both parts of the engagement, the Ionic race, commonly called the leſs warlike, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and enemies. Elevated with the joy of victory, the Athenians prepared to aſſault the town, when they were alarmed by the approach of a fleet of fifty-five ſail, which advanced in two diviſions, the one commanded by the celebrated Hermocrates, the other by Theramenes the Spartan. Phrynichus prudently conſidered, that his own ſtrength only amounted to forty-eight gallies, and refuſed to commit the laſt hope of the republic to the danger of an unequal combat. His firmneſs deſpiſed the clamours of the Athenian ſailors, who inſulted [13], under the name of cowardice, the caution of their admiral; and he calmly retired with his whole force to the iſle of Samos, where the popular faction having lately treated the nobles with ſhocking

The Athenian fleet retires.

[13] Like Fabius,

"Non ponebat enim rumores ante ſalutem."

ENNIUS apud Cic.

which Thucydides expreſſes with more vigour, "ἀλλ' ποτε τῳ αισχρῳ ονειδει εἰξας αλοσιτως διακινδυνευσειε," p. 574.

injuſtice

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injuſtice and cruelty, too frequent in Grecian democracies, were ready to receive with open arms the patrons of that fierce and licentious form of government.

The Athenian affairs retrieved by Alcibiades.

The retreat of the Athenian fleet acknowledged the naval ſuperiority of the enemy; a ſuperiority which was alone ſufficient either to acquire or to maintain the ſubmiſſion of the neighbouring coaſts and iſlands. In other reſpects too, the Peloponneſians enjoyed the moſt deciſive advantages. Their gallies were victualled, their ſoldiers were paid by Tiſſaphernes, and they daily expected a reinforcement of an hundred and fifty Phœnician ſhips, which, it was ſaid, had already reached Aſpendus, a ſea-port of Pamphylia. But, in this dangerous criſis, fortune ſeemed to reſpect the declining age of Athens, and, by a train of accidents, ſingular and almoſt incredible, enabled Alcibiades, ſo long the misfortune and the ſcourge, to become the defence and the ſaviour, of his country.

His intrigues.

During his long reſidence in Sparta, Alcibiades aſſumed the outward gravity of deportment, and conformed himſelf to the ſpare diet, and laborious exerciſes, which prevailed in that auſtere republic; but his character and his principles remained as licentious as ever. His intrigue with Timea, the ſpouſe of king Agis, was diſcovered by an exceſs of female levity. The queen, vain of the attachment of ſo celebrated a character, familiarly gave the name of Alcibiades to her ſon Leotychides; a name which, firſt confined to the privacy of her female

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female companions, was ſoon ſpread abroad in the world. Alcibiades puniſhed her folly by a moſt mortifying but well-merited declaration, boaſting that he had ſolicited her favours from no other motive but that he might indulge the ambitious deſire of giving a king to Sparta. The offence itſelf, and the ſhameleſs avowal, ſtill more provoking than the offence, excited the keeneſt reſentment in the breaſt of the injured huſband [14]. The magiſtrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a ſtranger, readily ſympathiſed with the misfortune, and encouraged the revenge of Agis; and, as the horrid practice of aſſaſſination ſtill diſgraced the manners of Greece, orders were ſent to Aſtyochus, who commanded in chief the Peloponneſian forces in Aſia, ſecretly to deſtroy Alcibiades, whoſe power defied thoſe laws which in every Grecian republic condemned adulterers to death [15]. But the active and ſubtle Athenian had ſecured too faithful domeſtic intelligence in the principal families of Sparta to become the victim of this execrable deſign. With his uſual addreſs he eluded all the ſnares of Aſtyochus: his ſafety, however, required perpetual vigilance and caution, and he determined to eſcape from a ſituation, which ſubjected him to ſuch irkſome conſtraint.

His conference with Triſaphernes.

Publicly baniſhed from Athens, ſecretly perſecuted by Sparta, he had recourſe to the friendſhip

[14] Plutarch, ii. 49. in Alcibiad.

[15] Lyſias in defence of Euphiletus, &c. p. 419

of

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of Tiſſaphernes, who admired his accompliſhments, and reſpected his abilities, which, though far ſuperior in degree, were ſimilar in kind to his own. Tiſſaphernes was of a temper the more readily to ſerve a friend, in proportion as he leſs needed his ſervices. Alcibiades, therefore, carefully concealed from him the dangerous reſentment of the Spartans. In the ſelfiſh breaſt of the Perſian no attachment could be durable unleſs founded on intereſt; and Alcibiades, who had deeply ſtudied his character, began to flatter his avarice, that he might enſure his protection. He informed him, that by allowing the Peloponneſian ſailors a drachma, or ſeven-pence ſterling, of daily pay, he treated them with an uſeleſs and even dangerous liberality: that the pay given by the Athenians, even in the moſt flouriſhing times, amounted only to three oboli; which proceeded, not from a diſinclination to reward the ſkill and valour of their ſeamen, but from an experience, that if they received more than half a drachma each day, the ſuperfluity would be ſquandered in ſuch profligate pleaſures as enfeebled and corrupted their minds and bodies, and rendered them equally incapable of activity and of diſcipline. Should the ſailors prove diſſatisfied with this equitable reduction, the Grecian character afforded an eaſy expedient for ſilencing their licentious clamours. It would be ſufficient to bribe the naval commanders and a few mercenary orators, and the careleſs and improvident ſeamen would ſubmit, without ſuſpicion, the rate of their pay, as well as every other concern, to the influence

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and authority of thoſe who were accuſtomed to govern them [16]

Perſuades him to diminiſh his ſubſidies to the Peloponneſians.

Tiſſaphernes heard this advice with the attention of an avaricious man to every propoſal for ſaving his money; and ſo true a judgment had Alcibiades formed of the Greeks, that Hemocrates the Syracuſan was the only officer who diſdained, meanly and perfidiouſly, to betray the intereſt of the men under his command: yet through the influence of his colleagues, the plan of œconomy was univerſally adopted, and on a future occaſion, Tiſſaphernes boaſted that Hermocrates, though more coy, was not leſs corruptible than others, and that the only reaſon for which he undertook the patronage of the ſailors, was to compel his own reluctance to comply with the exorbitance of his demands. This reproach illuſtrates the opinion entertained by foreign nations of Grecian virtue; but it is probably an aſperſion on the fame of the illuſtrious Syracuſan.

Alienates him from the intereſt of Sparta.

The intrigues of Alcibiades had ſown jealouſy and diſtruſt in the Peloponneſian fleet: they had alienated the minds of the troops both from Tiſſaphernes and their commanders: the Perſian was ready to forſake thoſe whom he had learned to deſpiſe; and Alcibiades profited of this diſpoſition to inſinuate that the alliance of the Lacedæmonians was equally expenſive and inconvenient for the great king and his lieutenants. "That theſe haughty republicans were accuſtomed to take arms

16 Thucydid. p. 584, & ſeqq.

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to defend the liberties of Greece, a deſign totally inconſiſtent with the views of the Perſian court. If the Aſiatic Greeks and iſlanders aſpired at independence, and hoped to deliver themſelves from Athenian governors and garriſons, without ſubmitting to pay tribute to Perſia, they ought to carry on the war at their own expence, ſince they would alone reap the benefit of its ſucceſs. But if Tiſſaphernes purpoſed to recover the ancient poſſeſſions of his maſter, he muſt beware of giving a decided ſuperiority to either party, eſpecially to the warlike Spartans. By an attention to preſerve the balance even, between the hoſtile republics, he would force them to exhauſt each other. Amidſt their domeſtic conteſts an opportunity would ſoon arrive, when Darius, without danger or expence, might cruſh both, and vindicate his juſt hereditary claim to the dominion of all Aſia."

Alcibiades, in order to pave the way for his return to Athens, conſpires againſt the democracy.

Theſe artful repreſentations produced almoſt an open breach between Tiſſaphernes and his confederates. The advantage which Athens would derive from this rupture might have paved the way for Alcibiades to return to his country: but he dreaded to encounter that popular fury, whoſe effects he had fatally experienced, and whoſe mad reſentment no degree of merit could appeaſe; he therefore applied ſecretly to Piſander, Theramenes, and other perſons of diſtinction in the Athenian camp. To them he deplored the deſperate ſtate of public affairs, expatiated on his own credit with Tiſſaphernes, and inſinuated that it might be yet poſſible to prevent the Phœnician fleet at Aſpendus

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dus from ſailing to aſſiſt the enemy. Aſſuming gradually more boldneſs, as he perceived the ſucceſs of his intrigues, he finally declared that the Athenians might obtain not merely the neutrality, but perhaps the aſſiſtance of Artaxerxes, ſhould they conſent to aboliſh their turbulent democracy, ſo odious to the Perſians, and entruſt the adminiſtration of government to men worthy to negociate with ſo mighty a monarch.

This meaſure had been already in agitation both in the city and in the camp.

When the illuſtrious exile propoſed this meaſure, it is uncertain whether he was acquainted with the ſecret cabals which had been already formed, both in the city and in the camp, for executing the deſign which he ſuggeſted. The misfortunes, occaſioned by the giddy inſolence of the multitude, had thrown the principal authority into the hands of the noble and wealthy, who, corrupted by the ſweets of temporary power, were deſirous of rendering it perpetual. Many prompted by ambition, ſeveral moved by inconſtancy, a few directed by a juſt ſenſe of the incurable defects of democracy, were prepared to encounter every danger, that they might overturn the eſtabliſhed conſtiturion. In the third and moſt honourable claſs was Antiphon, a man of an exalted character, and endowed with extraordinary talents. The irreſiſtible energy of his eloquence was ſuſpected by the people. He appeared not in the courts of juſtice, nor in the aſſembly; but his artful and elaborate compoſitions often ſaved the lives of his friends. *He* was the inviſible agent who governed all the motions of the conſpiracy; and when compelled, after the ruin of

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his party, to ſtand trial for his life, he diſcovered an activity and force of mind that aſtoniſhed the moſt diſcerning of his contemporaries [17]. Piſander, Theramenes, and the other leaders of the ariſtocratical party, warmly approved the views of Alcibiades. The Athenian ſoldiers likewiſe, though they deteſted the impiety, admired the valour, of the illuſtrious exile, and longed to ſee him reſtored to the ſervice of his country. All ranks lamented the dangerous ſituation of Athens; many thought that their affairs muſt become deſperate, ſhould Tiſſaphernes command the Phœnician fleet to cooperate with that of Peloponneſus; and many rejoiced in the proſpect of a Perſian alliance, in conſequence of which they would enter at once into the pay of that wealthy ſatrap [18].

[17] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 600. A few lines above, Thucydides deſcribes the character of Antiphon with expreſſive energy: ανηρ Αθηναιων των καθ' εαυτον αρετη τε δευτερος, και κρατιστος ενθυμηθηναι γενομενος, και α γνοιη, ειπειν. "An Athenian, in virtue ſecond to no man then living, endowed with the greateſt vigour of thought, and the greateſt power of expreſſion." Plutarch in the very inaccurate and imperfect work, intitled, The Lives of the Ten Orators, tells us, that Antiphon was the firſt who wrote inſtitutions of oratory; and that his pleadings were the moſt ancient that had come down to poſterity. The character given by Plutarch of the writings of Antiphon agrees with the high commendation of Thucydides.

[18] What influence this conſideration muſt have had, may be conjectured from the information of Andocides, Orat. iii. who ſays, that in the courſe of this war the Spartans received, from their Perſian allies, ſubſidies to the amount of five thouſand talents, about a million ſterling. The ſum is prodigious, conſidering the value of money in that age.

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Phrynichus counterplots Alcibiades.

One man, the perſonal enemy of Alcibiades, alone oppoſed the general current. But this man was Phrynichus, whoſe prudent firmneſs as a commander we have already had occaſion to remark. The courage with which he invited dangers many have equalled, but none ever ſurpaſſed the boldneſs with which he extricated himſelf from difficulties. When he perceived that his colleagues were deaf to every objection againſt recalling the friend of Tiſſaphernes, he ſecretly informed the Spartan admiral Aſtyochus, of the intrigues which were carrying on to the diſadvantage of his country. Daring as this treachery was, Phrynichus addreſſed a traitor not leſs perfidious than himſelf. Aſtyochus was become the penſioner and creature of Tiſſaphernes, to whom he communicated the intelligence. The Perſian again communicated it to his favourite Alcibiades, who complained in ſtrong terms to the Athenians of the baſeneſs and villany of Phrynichus. The latter exculpated himſelf with conſummate addreſs; but as the return of Alcibiades might prove fatal to his ſafety, he ventured, a ſecond time, to write to Aſtyochus, gently reproaching him with his breach of confidence, and explaining by what means he might ſurpriſe the whole Athenian fleet at Samos; an exploit that muſt for ever eſtabliſh his fame and fortune. Aſtyochus again betrayed the ſecret to Tiſſaphernes and Alcibiades; but before *their* letters could be conveyed to the Athenian camp, Phrynichus, who, by ſome unknown channel, was informed

informed of this ſecond treachery, anticipated the dangerous diſcovery, by appriſing the Athenians of the enemy's deſign to ſurpriſe their fleet. They had ſcarcely employed the proper means to counteract that purpoſe, when meſſengers came from Alcibiades to announce the horrid perfidy of a wretch who had baſely ſacrificed to private reſentment the laſt hope of his country. But the meſſengers arrived too late; the prior information of Phrynichus, as well as the bold and ſingular wickedneſs of his deſign, which no common degree of evidence was thought ſufficient to prove, were ſuſtained as arguments for his exculpation; and it was believed that Alcibiades had made uſe of a ſtratagem moſt infamous in itſelf, but not unexampled among the Greeks, for deſtroying a man whom he deteſted [19].

Progreſs of the conſpiracy againſt the democratical government.

The oppoſition of Phrynichus, though it retarded the deſigns of Alcibiades, prevented not the meaſures of Piſander and his aſſociates for aboliſhing the democracy. The ſoldiers at Samos were induced, by the reaſons above mentioned, to acquieſce in the reſolution of their generals. But a more difficult taſk remained; to deprive the people of Athens of their liberty, which, ſince the expulſion of the family of Piſiſtratus, they had enjoyed an hundred years. Piſander headed the deputation which was ſent from the camp to the city to effect this important revolution. He acquainted the extraordinary aſſembly, ſummoned on that oc-

[19] Thucydid. p. 587—590.

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caſion in the theatre of Bacchus, with the meaſures which had been adopted by their ſoldiers and fellow-citizens at Samos. The compact band [20] of conſpirators warmly approved the example; but loud murmurs of diſcontent reſounded in different quarters of that ſpacious theatre. Piſander aſked the reaſon of this diſapprobation. "Had his opponents any thing better to propoſe? If they had, let them come forward and explain the grounds of their diſſent: but, above all, let them explain how they could ſave themſelves, their families, and their country, unleſs they complied with the demand of Tiſſaphernes. The imperious voice of neceſſity was ſuperior to law; and when the actual danger had ceaſed, they might re-eſtabliſh their ancient conſtitution." The opponents of Piſander were unable or afraid to reply: and the aſſembly paſſed a decree, inveſting ten ambaſſadors with full powers to treat with the Perſian ſatrap.

Negociation with Tiſſaphernes. Olymp. xcii. 1. A.C. 412.

Soon after the arrival of the Peloponneſian fleet on the coaſt of Aſia, the Spartan commanders had concluded, in the name of their republic, a treaty with Tiſſaphernes; in which it was ſtipulated, that the ſubſidies ſhould be regularly paid by the king of Perſia, and that the Peloponneſian forces ſhould employ their utmoſt endeavours to recover, for

[20] Or rather bands, according to Thucydides. Piſander was at pains to gain over to his views τας ξυνωμοσιας, αἱπερ συγχυθεισαι πρότερον ἐν τῃ πολει ἐσαν ἐπι δικαις και ἀρχαις· "The factions or juntos already formed in Athens, with a view to thruſt themſelves into the ſeats of judicature and the great offices of ſtate." Thucydid. p. 592.

that

that monarch, the dominions of his anceſtors, which had been long unjuſtly uſurped, and cruelly inſulted, by the Athenians. This treaty ſeemed ſo honourable to the great king, that his lieutenant could not venture openly to infringe it. It is poſſible, that in the interval between his intrigues with Alcibiades, and the arrival of the Athenian ambaſſadors at Magneſia, the place of his uſual reſidence, Tiſſaphernes might receive freſh inſtructions from his court to make good his agreement with the Spartans. Perhaps the crafty ſatrap never entertained any ſerious thoughts of an alliance with the Athenians, although he ſufficiently reliſhed the advice given him by Alcibiades to weaken both parties. But whatever motive determined him, it is certain that he ſhewed a diſinclination to enter into any negociation with the Athenian ambaſſadors. Alarmed at the decay of his influence with the Perſians, on which he had built the flattering hopes of returning to his country, Alcibiades employed all the reſources of his genius to conceal his diſgrace. By ſolicitations, intreaties, and the meaneſt compliances, he obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. As the agent of Tiſſaphernes, he then propoſed the conditions on which they might obtain the friendſhip of the great king. Several demands were made, demands moſt diſgraceful to the name of Athens: to all of which the ambaſſadors ſubmitted. They even agreed to ſurrender the whole coaſt of Ionia to its ancient ſovereign. But when the artful Athenian (fearful leſt they ſhould, on any terms, admit the treaty which Tiſ-

Artifices of Alcibiades.

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ſaphernes was reſolved on no terms to grant) demanded that the Perſian fleets ſhould be allowed to ſail, undiſturbed, in the Grecian ſeas, the ambaſſadors, well knowing that ſhould this condition be complied with, no treaty could hinder Greece from becoming a province of Perſia, expreſſed their indignation in very unguarded language, and left the aſſembly in diſguſt. This imprudence enabled Alcibiades to affirm, with ſome appearance of truth, that their own anger and obſtinacy, not the reluctance of Tiſſaphernes, had obſtructed the negociation, which was preciſely the iſſue of the affair moſt favourable to his views [21].

The democracy overturned in Athens. Olymp. xcii. 2. A.C. 411.

His artifices ſucceeded, but were not attended with the conſequences expected from them. The Athenians, both in the camp and city, perceived, by this tranſaction, that his credit with the Perſians was leſs than he repreſented it; and the ariſtocratical faction were glad to get rid of a man, whoſe reſtleſs ambition rendered him a dangerous aſſociate. They perſiſted, however, with great activity, in executing their purpoſe; of which Phrynichus, who had oppoſed them only from hatred of Alcibiades, became an active abettor. When perſuaſion was ineffectual, they had recourſe to violence. Androcles, Hyperbolus [22], and other licentious

[21] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 593.

[22] Thucydides paints his character in few words: Υπερβολον τε τινα Αθηναιων, μοχθηρον ανθρωπον ωστρακισμενον ου δια δυναμεως και αξιωματος φοβον, αλλα δια πονηριαν και αισχυνην της πολεως. "One Hyperbolus, a worthleſs fellow, and baniſhed by the Oſtraciſm, not from fear of his power and dignity, but on account of his extreme

licentious demagogues, were aſſaſſinated. The people of Athens, ignorant of the ſtrength of the conſpirators, and ſurpriſed to find in the number many whom they leaſt ſuſpected, were reſtrained by inactive timidity, or fluctuated in doubtful ſuſpenſe. The cabal alone acted with union and with vigour; and difficult as it ſeemed to ſubvert the Athenian democracy, which had ſubſiſted an hundred years with unexampled glory, yet this deſign was undertaken and accompliſhed by the enterpriſing activity of Piſander, the artful eloquence of Theramenes, the firm intrepidity of Phrynichus, and the ſuperintending wiſdom of Antiphon [23].

Government of the four hundred.

He it was who formed the plan, and regulated the mode of attack, which was carried on by his aſſociates. In a deliberation concerning the means of retrieving the affairs of the public, Piſander propoſed the electing of ten men, who ſhould be charged with the important truſt of preparing and digeſting reſolutions, to be on an appointed day laid before the aſſembly of the people. When the day arrived, the commiſſioners had but one reſolution to propoſe: "That every citizen ſhould be free to offer his opinion, however contrary to law, without fear of impeachment or trial;" a matter eſſential to the intereſts of the cabal, ſince by a ſtrange contradiction in government, the Athe-

treme profligacy, and his being a diſgrace to the city." The Oſtraciſm was thought to be for ever diſgraced by being applied to ſuch an unworthy object, and thenceforth laid aſide. See Plut. in Nicia, and Ariſtoph. in Pac. ver. 680.

[23] Thucydid. ibid. & Lyſias adverſ. Agorat.

nian

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nian orators and ſtateſmen were liable to proſecution[24] before the ordinary courts of juſtice, for ſuch ſpeeches and decrees as had been approved and confirmed by the aſſembly. In conſequence of this act of indemnity, Piſander and his party boldly declared, that neither the ſpirit nor the forms of the eſtabliſhed conſtitution (which had recently ſubjected them to ſuch a weight of misfortunes) ſuited the preſent dangerous and alarming criſis. That it was neceſſary to new-model the whole fabric of government; for which purpoſe five perſons (whoſe names he read) ought to be appointed by the people, to chooſe an hundred others; each of whom ſhould ſelect three aſſociates; and the four hundred thus choſen, men of dignity and opulence, who would ſerve their country without fee or reward, ought immediately to be inveſted with the majeſty of the republic. They alone ſhould conduct the adminiſtration uncontrouled, and aſſemble, as often as ſeemed proper, five thouſand citizens, whom they judged moſt worthy of being conſulted in the management of public affairs. This extraordinary propoſal was accepted without oppoſition: the partiſans of democracy dreaded the ſtrength of the cabal; and the undiſcerning multitude, dazzled by the impoſing name of five thouſand, a number far exceeding the ordinary aſſemblies of Athens, perceived not that they ſurrendered their liberties to the artifice of an ambitious faction[25].

[24] By the γραφη παρανομων. See Vol. I. Chap. xiii.

[25] Thucydid. & Lyſias, ubi ſupra.

But

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But the conduct of the four hundred tyrants (for hiſtorians have juſtly adopted the language of Athenian reſentment) ſoon opened the eyes and underſtanding of the moſt thoughtleſs. They aboliſhed every veſtige of ancient freedom; employed mercenary troops levied from the ſmall iſlands of the Ægean, to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate, in ſome inſtances to deſtroy, their real or ſuſpected enemies. Inſtead of ſeizing the opportunity of annoying the Peloponneſians, enraged at the treachery of Tiſſaphernes, and mutinous for want of pay and ſubſiſtence, they ſent ambaſſadors to ſolicit peace from the Spartans on the moſt diſhonourable terms. Their tyranny rendered them odious in the city, and their cowardice made them contemptible in the camp at Samos. Their cruelty and injuſtice were deſcribed, and exaggerated, by the fugitives who continually arrived in that iſland. The generous youth, employed in the ſea and land ſervice, were impatient of the indignities offered to their fellow-citizens. The ſame indignities might be inflicted on themſelves, if they did not vindicate their freedom. Theſe ſecret murmurs broke out into loud and licentious clamours, which were encouraged by the approbation of the Samians. Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, two officers of high merit and diſtinction, though not actually entruſted with a ſhare in the principal command[26], gave activity and boldneſs to

Their tyranny renders them odious.

Their partiſans at Samos deſtroyed by Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus.

[26] Neither generals nor admirals; for Thraſybulus only commanded a galley; and Thraſyllus ſerved in the heavy-armed infantry,

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to the inſurgents. The abettors of the new government were attacked by ſurpriſe: thirty of the moſt criminal were put to death, ſeveral others were baniſhed, democracy was re-eſtabliſhed in the camp, and the ſoldiers were bound by oath to maintain their hereditary government againſt the conſpiracy of domeſtic foes, and to act with vigour and unanimity againſt the public enemy.

The former conducts Alcibiades to the Athenian camp.

Thraſybulus, who headed this ſucceſsful and meritorious ſedition, had a mind to conceive, a tongue to perſuade, and a hand to execute, the moſt daring deſigns. He exhorted the ſoldiers not to deſpair of effecting in the capital the ſame revolution which they had produced in the camp. But ſhould they fail in that deſign, they ought no longer to obey a city which had neither wealth nor wiſdom, neither ſupplies nor good counſel to ſend them. They were themſelves more numerous than the ſubjects of the four hundred, and better provided in all things neceſſary for war. They poſſeſſed an iſland which had formerly contended with Athens for the command of the ſea, and which, it was hoped, they might defend againſt every foe, foreign and domeſtic. But were they compelled to forſake it, they had ſtill reaſon to expect that, with an hundred ſhips of war, and with ſo many brave men, they might acquire an eſtabliſhment not leſs valuable elſewhere, in which they would enjoy, undiſturbed, the invalu-

fantry, whether as an officer, or in the ranks, the expreſſion leaves uncertain. The ſcholiaſt, however, conſiders οπλιτευοντι as ſynonimous with τω ὁπλιτικω αρχοντι. Thucydid. p. 604.

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able poſſeſſion of liberty. Their moſt immediate concern was to recal Alcibiades, who had been deceived and diſgraced by the tyrants, and who not only felt with peculiar ſenſibility, but could reſent with becoming dignity, the wrongs of his country and his own. The advice of Thraſybulus was approved; ſoon after he ſailed to Magneſia, and returned in company with Alcibiades.

He addreſſes his countrymen.

Near four years had elapſed ſince the eloquent ſon of Clinias had ſpoken in an Athenian aſſembly. Being preſented by Thraſybulus to his fellow-citizens, he began by accuſing his fortune, and lamenting his calamities. "Yet his baniſhment ought not to affect him with permanent ſorrow, ſince it had furniſhed him with an opportunity to ſerve the cauſe of his country. This event, otherwiſe unfortunate, had procured him the acquaintance and friendſhip of Tiſſaphernes; who, moved by his entreaties, had withheld the ſtipulated pay from the Peloponneſian forces, and who, he doubted not, would continue his good offices to the Athenians, ſupply them with every thing requiſite for maintaining the war, and even ſummon the Phœnician fleet to their aſſiſtance." Theſe were magnificent but flattering promiſes. In making them, Alcibiades however did not conſult merely the dictates of vanity. They raiſed his credit with the army, who immediately ſaluted him general[27]; they widened the breach between

[27] Μετα των προτερων—They aſſociated him with the former commanders. But Thucydides immediately adds, και τα πραγματα παντα ανετιθεσαν, and referred every thing to his management, p. 609.

Tiſſa-

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Tiſſaphernes and the Spartans; and they ſtruck terror (when his ſpeech got abroad) into the tyrants of Athens, who had provoked the reſentment of a man capable to ſubvert their uſurpation.

His meſſage to the tyrants.

Alcibiades left the care of the troops to his colleagues Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, and withdrew himſelf from the applauſes of his admiring countrymen, on pretence of concerting with Tiſſaphernes the ſyſtem of their future operations. But his principal motive was to ſhew himſelf to the Perſian, in the new and illuſtrious character with which he was inveſted; for having raiſed his authority among the Athenians by his influence with the ſatrap, he expected to ſtrengthen this influence by the ſupport of that authority. Before he returned to the camp, ambaſſadors had been ſent by the tyrants, to attempt a negociation with the partiſans of democracy, who, inflamed by continual reports of the indignities and cruelties committed in Athens, prepared to ſail thither to protect their friends and take vengeance on their enemies. Alcibiades judiciouſly oppoſed this raſh reſolution, which muſt have left the Helleſpont, Ionia, and the iſlands, at the mercy of the hoſtile fleet. But he commanded the ambaſſadors to deliver to their maſters a ſhort but pithy meſſage: "That they muſt diveſt themſelves of their illegal power, and reſtore the ancient conſtitution. If they delayed obedience, he would ſail to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives [28]."

[28] Thucydid. ibid. & Plut. ii. 54. in Vit. Alcibiad.

When

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Tumults in Athens.

When this meſſage was reported at Athens, it added to the diſorder and confuſion in which that unhappy city was involved. The four hundred, who had acted with unanimity in uſurping the government, ſoon diſagreed about the adminiſtration, and ſplit into factions, which perſecuted each other as furiouſly as both had perſecuted the people [29]. Theramenes and Ariſtocrates condemned and oppoſed the tyrannical meaſures of their colleagues. The perfidious Phrynichus was ſlain: both parties prepared for taking arms; and the horrors of a Corcyrean ſedition were ready to be renewed in Athens, when the old men, the children, the women, and ſtrangers, interpoſed for the ſafety of a city which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Perſia, and the admiration of the world [30].

Mutiny in the Peloponneſian camp.

Had the public enemy availed themſelves of this opportunity to aſſault the Piræus, Athens could not have been ſaved from immediate deſtruction. But the Peloponneſian forces at Miletus, long clamorous and diſcontented, had broken out into open mutiny, when they heard of the recall of Alcibiades, and the hoſtile intentions of Tiſſaphernes. To the duplicity of the ſatrap, and the treachery of their own captains, they juſtly aſcribed the want of pay and ſubſiſtence, and all the misfortunes which they felt or dreaded. Their reſentment was violent and implacable. They deſtroyed the Perſian fortifications in the neighbourhood of

[29] Lyſias adv. Agorat.

[30] Thucydid. p. 610.

Miletus;

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Miletus; they put the garriſons to the ſword; their treacherous commander Aſtyochus, ſaved his life by flying to an altar; nor was the tumult appeaſed until the guilty were removed from their ſight, and Myndarus, an officer of approved valour and fidelity, arrived from Sparta to aſſume the principal command [31].

Amidſt the tumults in Athens, the Peloponneſian fleet appears on the coaſt.

The dreadful conſequences which muſt have reſulted to the Athenians, if, during the fury of their ſedition, the enemy had attacked them with a fleet of an hundred and fifty ſail, may be conceived by the terror inſpired by a much ſmaller Peloponneſian ſquadron of only forty-two veſſels, commanded by the Spartan Hegeſandridas. The friends of the conſtitution had aſſembled in the ſpacious theatre of Bacchus. Meſſengers paſſed between them and the partiſans of Antiphon and Piſander, who had convened in a diſtant quarter of the city. The moſt important matters were in agitation, when the alarm was given that ſome Peloponneſian ſhips had been ſeen on the coaſt. Both aſſemblies were immediately diſſolved. All ranks of men haſtened to the Piræus; manned the veſſels in the harbour; launched others; and prepared thirty-ſix for taking the ſea. When Hegeſandridas perceived the ardent oppoſition which he muſt encounter in attempting to land, he doubled the promontory of Sunium, and ſailed towards the fertile iſland of Eubœa, from which, ſince the fortification of Decelia, the Athenians had derived

[31] Thucydid. p. 611.

far

ſar more plentiful ſupplies than from the deſolated territory of Attica. To defend a country which formed their principal reſource, they ſailed in purſuit of the enemy, and obſerved them next day near the ſhore of Eretria, the moſt conſiderable town in the iſland.

Battle of Eretria.

The Eubœans, who had long watched an opportunity to revolt, ſupplied the Peloponneſian ſquadron with all neceſſaries in abundance; but inſtead of furniſhing a market to the Athenians, they retired from the coaſt on their approach. The commanders were obliged to weaken their ſtrength, by detaching ſeveral parties into the country to procure proviſions; Hegeſandridas ſeized this opportunity to attack them: moſt of the ſhips were taken; the crews ſwam to land; many were cruelly murdered by the Eretrians, from whom they expected protection; and ſuch only ſurvived as took refuge in the Athenian garriſons ſcattered over the iſland [32].

Democracy re-eſtabliſhed in Athens. Olymp. xcii. 2. A. C. 411.

The news of this misfortune were moſt alarming to the Athenians. Neither the invaſion of Xerxes, nor even the defeat in Sicily, occaſioned ſuch terrible conſternation. They dreaded the immediate defection of Eubœa; they had no more ſhips to launch; no means of reſiſting their multiplied enemies: the city was divided againſt the camp, and divided againſt itſelf. Yet the magnanimous firmneſs of Theramenes did not allow the friends of liberty to deſpair. He encouraged them

[32] Thucydid. p. 622.

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to diſburden the republic of its domeſtic foes, who had ſummoned, or who were at leaſt believed to have ſummoned, the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonian fleet, that they might be enabled to enſlave their fellow-citizens. Antiphon, Piſander, and others moſt obnoxious, ſeaſonably eſcaped; the reſt ſubmitted. A decree was paſſed, recalling Alcibiades, and approving the conduct of the troops at Samos. The ſedition ceaſed. The democracy, which had been interrupted four months, was reſtored; and ſuch are the reſources of a free government, that even this violent fermentation was not unproductive of benefit to the ſtate. The Athenians completed whatever had been left imperfect in former reformations [33]; and determined to defend, to the laſt extremity, the ancient glory of the republic.

The Athenians victorious at ſea. Olymp. xcii. 2. A.C. 411.

By the imprudent or perfidious conduct of their commanders, and the ſeditious ſpirit of their troops, the Peloponneſians loſt a ſeaſonable opportunity to terminate the war with equal advantage and honour; and having neglected the proſperous current of their fortune, they were compelled long and laboriouſly to ſtrive againſt an unfavourable ſtream.

33 The government was brought back to its original principles, as eſtabliſhed by Solon. Among other ſalutary regulations, it was enacted, that no one ſhould receive a ſalary for any public magiſtracy. "And now," ſays Thucydides, "for the firſt time, in the preſent age at leaſt, the Athenians modelled their government aright: and this enabled Athens again to raiſe her head." Thucydid. p. 623. It is remarkable, that neither Diodorus, Plutarch, nor any of the orators, make the leaſt mention of thoſe ſalutary regulations, which, however, laſted not long after the return of Alcibiades.

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The doubtful Tiſſaphernes heſitated between the part of an open enemy, or a treacherous ally; the Spartans, who had formerly rejected the friendſhip, now courted the protection, of his rival Pharnabazus; to whoſe northern province they ſailed with the principal ſtrength of their armament, leaving only a ſmall ſquadron at Miletus, to defend their ſouthern acquiſitions. The Athenians, animated by the manly counſels of Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, the generous defenders of their freedom, proceeded northwards in purſuit of the enemy; and the important ſtraits, which join the Euxine and Ægean ſeas, became, and long continued, the ſcene of conflict. In the twenty-firſt winter of the war, a year already diſtinguiſhed by the diſſolution and revival of their democracy, the Athenians prevailed in three ſucceſſive engagements, the event of which became continually more deciſive. In the firſt, which was fought in the narrow channel between Seſtos and Abydus, the advantages were in ſome meaſure balanced, ſince Thraſybulus took twenty Peloponneſian ſhips, with the loſs of fifteen of his own. But the glory remained entire to the Athenians, who repelled the enemy, and offered to renew the battle [34]. Not long afterwards, they intercepted a ſquadron of fourteen Rhodian veſſels, near Cape Rhegium. The iſlanders defended themſelves with their uſual bravery. Myndarus beheld the engagement from the diſtance of eight miles, while he performed his morning devotions to Mi-

34 Thucydid. l. viii. p. 626.

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nerva in the lofty temple of Ilium. Alarmed for the ſafety of his friends, he ruſhed from that ſacred edifice, and haſtened with great diligence to the ſhore, that he might launch his ſhips, and prevent, by ſpeedy aſſiſtance, the capture or deſtruction of the Rhodians [35]. The principal Athenian ſquadron attacked him near the ſhore of Abydus. The engagement was fought from morning till night, and ſtill continued doubtful, when the arrival of eighteen gallies, commanded by Alcibiades, turned the ſcale of victory. The eſcape of the Peloponneſians was favoured by the bravery of Pharnabazus, who, at the head of his Barbarian troops, had been an impatient ſpectator of the combat. He gallantly rode into the ſea, encouraging his men with his voice, his arm, and his example. The Spartan admiral drew up the greateſt part of his fleet along the ſhore, and prepared to reſiſt the aſſailants; but the Athenians, ſatisfied with the advantages already obtained, ſailed to Seſtos, carrying with them a valuable prize, thirty Peloponneſian gallies, as well as fifteen of their own, which they had loſt in the former engagement. Thraſyllus was ſent to Athens, that he might communicate the good news, and raiſe ſuch ſupplies of men and money as could be expected from that exhauſted city [36].

Alcibiades ſurpriſes, and takes the whole

The Spartans yielded poſſeſſion of the ſea, which they hoped ſoon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbours of Cyzicus, to repair their ſhat-

35 Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. Diodor. xiii. p. 354. 36 Id. ibid.

tered

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tered fleet; while the Athenians profited of the fame of their victory, and the terror of their arms, to demand contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. The ſeveral diviſions returned to Seſtos, having met with very indifferent ſucceſs in their deſign; nor, without obtaining more deciſive and important advantages, could they expect to intimidate ſuch ſtrongly fortified places as Byzantium, Selembria, Perinthus, on the European, or Lampſacus, Parium, Chalcedon, on the Aſiatic, coaſt. It was determined therefore, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the enemy at Cyzicus; for which purpoſe they ſailed, with eighty gallies, to the ſmall iſland of Proconneſus, near the weſtern extremity of the Propontis, and ten miles diſtant from the ſtation of the Peloponneſian fleet. Alcibiades ſurpriſed ſixty veſſels in a dark and rainy morning, as they were manœuvring at a diſtance from the harbour, and ſkilfully intercepted their retreat. As the day cleared up, the reſt ſailed forth to their aſſiſtance; the action became general; the Athenians obtained a complete victory, and their valour was rewarded by the capture of the whole Peloponneſian fleet, except the Syracuſan ſhips, which were burned, in the face of a victorious enemy, by the enterpriſing Hermocrates. The circumſtances and conſequences of this important action were related in few, but expreſſive words, to the Spartan ſenate, in a letter written by Hippocrates, the ſecond in command, and intercepted by the Athenians: "All is loſt; our

Peloponneſian fleet.

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our ſhips are taken; Myndarus is ſlain; the men want bread; we know not what to do [37]."

The Athenians diligently improve their advantages. Olymp. xcii. 3. A.C. 410.

The fatal diſaſter at Cyzicus prevented the Peloponneſians from obſtructing, during the following year, the deſigns of the enemy, who took poſſeſſion of that wealthy ſea-port, as well as of the ſtrong city Perinthus; raiſed a large contribution on Selembria; and fortified Chryſopolis, a ſmall town of Chalcedonia, only three miles diſtant from Byzantium. In this new fortreſs they placed a conſiderable body of troops; and guarded the neighbouring ſtrait with a ſquadron of thirty ſail, commanded by Theramenes and Eubulus, and deſtined to exact, as tribute, a tenth from all ſhips which ſailed through the Boſphorus into the Euxine ſea [38]. The Peloponneſians were aſſiſted by Pharnabazus in equipping a new fleet; but were deprived of the wiſe counſels of Hermocrates, whoſe abilities were well fitted both to prepare and to employ the reſources of war. The ſucceſs of the Aſiatic expedition had not correſponded to the ſanguine hopes of his countrymen; the inſolent populace accuſed the incapacity of their commanders; and a mandate was ſent from Syracuſe, depriving

37 Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. & Plut. p. 60. in Alcibiad.

38 It is well known, that Mahomet the Second obtained the ſame end, by fortifying two caſtles, one on the Aſiatic, and another on the European ſide. That near to Chryſopolis is called by the modern Greeks Neocaſtron; but the name of the town itſelf is now changed to Scutari, a place deemed by the Turks one of the ſuburbs of Conſtantinople.

TOURNEFORTE, Lettre 15.

them

them of their office, and puniſhing them with baniſhment. The conduct of Hermocrates is worthy of admiration. Having called an aſſembly, he deplored his hard fortune, but recommended the moſt ſubmiſſive obedience to the authority of the republic. He then exhorted the ſailors to name temporary commanders, till the arrival of thoſe who had been appointed by their country. But the aſſembly, eſpecially the captains and pilots, tumultuouſly called out, "That he and his colleagues ought to continue in the command." Hermocrates then conjured them "not to rebel againſt the government. When they ſhould return home, they would then enjoy a fair opportunity to do juſtice to their admirals, by recounting the battles which they had won, by enumerating the ſhips which they had taken, and by relating how their own courage, and the conduct of their commanders, had entitled them to the moſt honourable place in every engagement by ſea and land." At the earneſt and unanimous entreaty of the aſſembly, he conſented, however, to retain his authority, till the arrival of his ſucceſſors. His colleagues imitated the example; and ſoon after this memorable ſcene, Demarchus, Myſco, and Potamis, the admirals named by the ſtate, took the command of the Syracuſan forces. Yet the ſoldiers and ſailors would not allow their beloved leaders to depart, before taking in their preſence a ſolemn oath to revoke their unjuſt baniſhment, whenever they themſelves returned to Syracuſe. On Hermocrates in particular, the captains and pilots beſtowed many

Admirable behaviour of Hermocrates the Syracuſan.

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diſtinguiſhed tokens of their affection and reſpect, which his behaviour had juſtly merited; for every morning and evening he had called them together, communicated his deſigns, aſked their opinion and advice, reviewed the paſt, and concerted the future, operations of the war; while his popular manners and condeſcending affability ſecured the love of thoſe who reſpected his ſkill, his vigilance, and his courage [39].

Thraſyllus, at firſt ſucceſsful, is defeated in the battle of Epheſus. Olymp. xcii. 4. A.C. 409.

Meanwhile Thraſyllus obtained at Athens the ſupplies which he had gone to ſolicit; ſupplies far more powerful than he had reaſon to expect. They conſiſted in a thouſand heavy-armed men, an hundred horſe, and fifty gallies, manned by five thouſand experienced ſeamen. That the ſailors might be uſefully employed on every emergence at ſea or land, they were provided with the ſmall and light bucklers, the darts, ſwords, and javelins, appropriated to the Grecian targeteers, who, uniting ſtrength and velocity, formed an intermediate and uſeful order between the archers and pikemen. With theſe forces, Thraſyllus ſailed to Samos, hoping to render the twenty-third campaign not leſs glorious than the preceding; and ambitious to rival, by his victories in the central and ſouthern parts of the Aſiatic coaſt, the fame acquired by Alcibiades and Thraſybulus in the north. His firſt operations were ſucceſsful. He took Colophon, with ſeveral places of leſs note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia, burning the corn

39 Xenoph. p. 431.

and

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and villages; and returned to the ſhore, driving before him a numerous body of ſlaves, and other valuable booty. His courage was increaſed by the want of reſiſtance on the part of Tiſſaphernes, whoſe province he had invaded; of the Peloponneſian forces at Miletus; and of the revolted colonies of Athens. He reſolved, therefore, to attack the beautiful and flouriſhing city of Epheſus, which was then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionic coaſt. While his ſoldiers, in ſeparate diviſions, were making their approaches to the walls of that place, the enemy aſſembled from every quarter to defend the majeſty of Epheſian Diana. A vigorous ſally of the townſmen increaſed the ſtrength of Tiſſaphernes and the Peloponneſians, the latter of whom had been ſeaſonably reinforced by a conſiderable ſquadron from Sicily. The Athenians were defeated, with the loſs of three hundred men; and retiring from the field of battle, they ſought refuge in their ſhips, and prepared to ſail towards the Helleſpont [40].

His ſoldiers regain their honour before the walls of Abydus.

During the voyage thither, they fell in with twenty Sicilian gallies, of which they took four, and purſued the reſt to Epheſus. Having ſoon afterwards reached the Helleſpont, they found the Athenian armament at Lampſachus, where Alcibiades thought proper to muſter the whole military and naval forces: but, on this occaſion, the northern army gave a remarkable proof of pride or ſpirit. They, who had ever been victorious,

[40] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 434.

refuſed

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refuſed to rank with the ſoldiers of Thraſyllus, who had been ſo ſhamefully foiled before the walls of Epheſus. They ſubmitted, however, though not without reluctance, to live in the ſame winter-quarters; from whence they made a conjunct expedition againſt Abydus. Pharnabazus defended the place with a numerous body of Perſian cavalry. The diſgraced troops of Thraſyllus rejoiced in an opportunity to retrieve their honour. They attacked, repelled, and routed the enemy. Their victory decided the fate of Abydus, and their courage was approved by the army of Alcibiades, who embraced them as fellow-ſoldiers and friends.

Alcibiades takes Byzantium. His ſucceſs by ſea and land. Olymp. xciii. 1. A.C. 408.

For ſeveral years the meaſures of the Athenians had been almoſt uniformly ſucceſsful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was diſtinguiſhed by peculiar favours of fortune. The invaſion of Sicily by the Carthaginians prevented that iſland from ſending any effectual aſſiſtance to their Peloponneſian allies. The dangerous revolt of the Medes withheld the Perſian reinforcements, which were neceſſary to ſupport the arms of Pharnabazus[41]. Both nations were repeatedly defeated by the Athenians, driven from their encampments and fortreſſes near the ſhore, and purſued into the inland country, which was plundered and deſolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which ſtill declined ſubmiſſion; an undertaking in which Alcibiades diſplayed the wonderful reſources of his extraordinary genius.

[41] Diodorus, l. xiii.

By

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By gradual approaches, by ſudden aſſaults, by ſurpriſe, by treaſon, or by ſtratagem, he in a few months became maſter of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at laſt of Byzantium itſelf. His naval ſucceſs was equally conſpicuous. The Athenians again commanded the ſea. The ſmall ſquadrons fitted out by the enemy ſucceſſively fell into their power; and theſe multiplied captures, which were made with little difficulty, accumulated the trophies of the well-fought battles which we have already deſcribed. It was computed by the partiſans of Alcibiades, that, ſince aſſuming the command, he had taken or deſtroyed two hundred Syracuſan and Peloponneſian gallies; and his ſuperiority of naval ſtrength enabled him to raiſe ſuch contributions, both in the Euxine and Mediterranean, as abundantly ſupplied his fleet and army with every neceſſary article of ſubſiſtence and accommodation [42].

His triumphant return to Athens. Olymp. xciii. 2. A.C. 407.

While the Athenian arms were crowned with ſuch glory abroad, the Attic territory was continually haraſſed by king Agis and the Lacedæmonian troops poſted at Decelia. Their bold and ſudden incurſions frequently threatened the ſafety of the city itſelf; the deſolated lands afforded no advantage to the ruined proprietors; nor could the Athenians venture without their walls, to celebrate their accuſtomed feſtivals. Alcibiades, animated by his foreign victories, hoped to relieve the domeſtic ſufferings of his country; and after an abſence of many years, diſtinguiſhed by ſuch a

[42] Xenoph. Hellen. Diodor. l. xiii. Plut. in Alcibiad.

variety

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variety of fortune, eagerly longed to revisit his native city, and to enjoy the rewards and honours usually bestowed by the Greeks on successful valour. This celebrated voyage, which several ancient historians judiciously decorated with every circumstance of naval triumph[43], was performed in the twenty-fifth summer of the war. Notwithstanding all his services, the cautious son of Clinias, instructed by adversity, declined to land in the Piræus, until he was informed that the assembly had repealed the decrees against him, formally revoked his banishment, and prolonged the term of his command. Even after this agreeable intelligence, he was still unable to conquer his well-founded distrust of the variable and capricious humours of the people; nor would he approach the crowded shore, till he observed, in the midst of the multitude, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the universal acclamations of the spectators, who, unattentive to the naval pomp, and regardless of the other commanders, fixed their eyes only on Alcibiades. Next day an extraordinary assembly was summoned, by order of the magistrates, that he might explain and justify his apparent misconduct, and receive the rewards due to his acknowledged merit. The public anticipated his apology, by contrasting the melancholy situation of affairs when Alcibiades assumed the command, with the actual condition of the republic. "At the former

[43] Duris apud Plut. in Alcibiad.

period

period Athens yielded the command of the ſea: the enemy were every where victorious; the ſtate was oppreſſed by foreign war, torn by ſedition, without reſources, and without hope. The addreſs and dexterity of Alcibiades was alone capable to have reunited the councils, to have weakened and afterwards repelled the efforts, of a powerful confederacy; his activity and courage could alone have animated the dejection of the citizens to purſue the meaſures of offenſive war: his abilities, his virtue, and his fortune, could alone have rendered thoſe meaſures ſucceſsful." CHAP. XXI.

Before judges ſo favourably diſpoſed to hear him, Alcibiades found no difficulty to make his defence; but it was difficult both for him and his friends to moderate the exceſſive tranſports of the people, who would have loaded their favourite with honours incompatible with the genius of a free republic, and which might, therefore, have proved dangerous to his future ſafety. He received, with pleaſure, the crowns and garlands, with other accuſtomed pledges of public gratitude and admiration; but he reſpectfully declined the royal ſceptre, expreſſing a firm reſolution to maintain the hereditary freedom of his country[44]. Athens required not a king, but a general with undivided power, capable of reſtoring the ancient ſplendour of the commonwealth. To this illuſtrious rank, which had been filled by Themiſtocles and Cimon, the ſon of Clinias might juſtly aſpire. He was His reception there.

[44] Com. Iſocrat. Orat. pro Alcibiad. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

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appointed commander in chief by ſea and land[45]. An hundred gallies were equipped, and tranſports were prepared for fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

The Eleuſinian myſteries.

Several months[46] had paſſed in theſe preparations, when the Eleuſinian feſtival approached; a time deſtined to commemorate and to diffuſe the temporal and ſpiritual gifts of the goddeſs Ceres, originally beſtowed on the Athenians, and by them communicated to the reſt of Greece[47]. Corn, wine, and oil, were the principal productions of Attica; each of which had been introduced into that country by the propitious intervention of a divinity, whoſe feſtival was diſtinguiſhed by appropriated honours. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was regarded as far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable ſolemnities. Various alſo were the profeſſions of gratitude expreſſed, in ſtated days of the ſpring and autumn, to the gene-

45 Αναιρηθεις απαντων ηγεμων αυτοκρατωρ. "He was choſen abſolute commander of all." Xenoph. p. 440.

46 From the feſtivals Plynteria and Eleuſinia, mentioned in the text, it appears that he arrived in July, and ſailed in November.

47 Meurſius, apud Gronov. Theſaur. has collected all the paſſages in ancient writers reſpecting this feſtival. It is ſaid to have been celebrated in the month Boedromion, which, according to Father Petaut, anſwers to our November. But as the Attic year was lunar, the months of that year could not exactly correſpond to thoſe of ours. In the computation of their months, the Greeks agreed not with other nations, nor even among themſelves. Vid. Plut. in Vit. Romul. & Ariſtid.

rous

rous author of the vine. The worſhip of Ceres returned, indeed, leſs frequently; but was partly, on that account, the more ſolemn and awful; and partly, becauſe diſtinguiſhed by the Eleuſinian myſteries, thoſe hidden treaſures of wiſdom and happineſs, which were poured out on the initiated in the temple of Eleuſis. Fourteen [48] centuries before the Chriſtian æra, the goddeſs, it is ſaid, communicated theſe invaluable rites to Eumolpus and Keryx, two virtuous men, who had received her in the form of an unknown traveller with pious hoſpitality [49]. Their deſcendants, the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, continued the miniſters and guardians of this memorable inſtitution, which was finally aboliſhed by the great Theodoſius, after it had laſted eighteen hundred years [50]. The candidates for initiation were prepared by watching, abſtinence, ſacrifice, and prayer; and before revealing to them the divine ſecrets, the moſt awful ſilence was enjoined them. Yet enough tranſpired among the prophane vulgar to enable us ſtill to collect, from impartial [51] and authentic teſtimony, that the myſteries

48 Marb. Arund. Epoch. 14.

49 Diodor. l. v. Iſocrat. Panegyr. Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

50 Zozim. Hiſt. l. iv.

51 I ſay *impartial*, becauſe Iſocrates, the ſcholar of Socrates, cannot be ſuppoſed to exaggerate the merit of ceremonies, which his maſter is ſaid to have deſpiſed. The paſſage is remarkable: "Though what I am going to relate may be diſfigured by tradition and fable, the ſubſtance of it is not the leſs deſerving of your regard. When Ceres travelled to Attica in queſt of her daughter, ſhe received the moſt hoſpitable treatment, and thoſe particular good offices which are known to the initiated. The goddeſs was not

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ſteries of Ceres expreſſed by external ſigns the immortality of the human ſoul, and the rewards prepared in a future life for the virtuous ſervants of heaven. The ſecrecy enjoined by her miniſters, ſo unworthy the truths which they taught, might juſtify the indifference of Socrates [52], whoſe doctrines, not leſs divine, were inculcated with unreſerved freedom. But the fate of Socrates may juſtify, in its turn, the circumſpection of the hierophants of Ceres.

Alcibiades conducts the Eleuſinian proceſſion.

Beſides the myſterious ceremonies of the temple, the worſhip of that bountiful goddeſs was celebrated by vocal and inſtrumental muſic, by public ſhows, and exhibitions, which continued during ſeveral days, and above all, by the pompous proceſſion, which marched for ten miles along the ſacred road leading from Athens to Eleuſis [53]. This important part of the ſolemnity had formerly been intermitted, becauſe the Athenians, after the loſs of Decelia, were no longer maſters of the road, and were compelled, contrary to eſtabliſhed cuſtom, to proceed by ſea to the temple of Ceres. Alcibiades determined to wipe off the ſtain of impiety

not ungrateful for ſuch favours, but in return conferred on our anceſtors the two moſt valuable preſents which either heaven can beſtow, or mankind can receive; the practice of agriculture, which delivered us from the fierce and precarious manner of life, common to us with wild animals; and the knowledge of thoſe ſacred myſteries which fortify the initiated againſt the terrors of death, and inſpire them with the pleaſing hopes of an happy immortality. See Panegyr. p. 24. & Euſeb. Præpar. Evang. l. iii.

52 Laert. in Diogene.

53 Herodot. l. viii. c. lxv. & Plut. in Alcibiad.

which

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which had long adhered to his character, by renewing, in all its luſtre, this venerable proceſſion. He prepared to defend, by an armed force, the peaceful miniſters and votaries of the gods, perſuaded that the Spartans would either allow them to paſs undiſturbed, which muſt leſſen the military fame of that people, or, if they attempted to interrupt the ceremony, muſt be expoſed not only to the dangerous reſiſtance of men animated by enthuſiaſm, but to the diſgraceful charge of irreligion, and the general deteſtation of Greece. The prieſts, the heralds, and the whole body of the initiated, were appriſed of his intention, and requeſted to hold themſelves in readineſs by the appointed day. Early in the morning the cavalry explored the adjoining country; the eminences were occupied by the light infantry and targeteers; and, after ſufficient garriſons had been left to defend the Athenian walls and fortreſſes, the whole body of heavy-armed troops were drawn out to protect the Eleuſinian proceſſion, which marched along the uſual road to the temple, and afterwards returned to Athens, without ſuffering any moleſtation from the Lacedæmonians; having united, on this occaſion alone, all the ſplendour of war with the pomp of ſuperſtition [54].

His glory clouded by the inauſpicious return of the Plynteria.

Soon after this meritorious enterpriſe, Alcibiades prepared to ſail for Leſſer Aſia, accompanied by the affectionate admiration of his fellow-citizens, who flattered themſelves that the abi-

54 Plut. in Alcibiad.

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lities and fortune of their commander would ſpeedily reduce Chios, Epheſus, Miletus, and the other revolted cities and iſlands. The general alacrity, however, was ſomewhat abated by the reflection, that the arrival of Alcibiades in Athens coincided with the anniverſary of the Plynteria[55], a day condemned to melancholy idleneſs, from a ſuperſtitious belief that nothing undertaken on that day could be brought to a proſperous concluſion. The celebrated Parthenon, whoſe remains ſtill atteſt the magnificence of Pericles, was conſecrated by the preſence of a goddeſs, who realized the inſpirations of Homer, as far as they were capable of being expreſſed by the genius of Phidias. Minerva, compoſed of gold and ivory, and twenty-ſix cubits high, was repreſented with the caſque, the buckler, the lance, and all her uſual emblems; and the warm fancy of the Athenians, enlivened and tranſported by the graceful majeſty of her air and aſpect, confounded the painful production of the ſtatuary with the inſtantaneous creation of Jupiter. To confirm this uſeful illuſion, the crafty prieſts of the temple carefully waſhed and brightened the image, whoſe extraordinary luſtre increaſed the veneration of the multitude. The Plynteria, during which this ceremony was performed, required uncommon ſecrecy and circumſpection. The eyes and imagination of the vulgar might have become too

55 Πλυνειν, to waſh; πλυντης, πλυντηριος; and in the plural neuter, "the ceremony of ablution."

familiar

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familiar with their revered goddeſs, had they beheld her ſtripped of her accuſtomed ornaments, and obſerved every part of her form brightening into new beauty under the plaſtic hands of the prieſts. To prevent this dangerous conſequence, the Plynteria was veiled in myſtic obſcurity; the doors of the temple were ſhut; that ſacred edifice was ſurrounded on all ſides to intercept the approach of indiſcretion or profanity; and the return of Alcibiades, the favourite hope of his country, happening on the inauſpicious day when Minerva hid her countenance, was believed by many to announce the dreadful calamities which ſoon afterwards befel the republic [56].

[56] Xenoph. p. 438. & Plut. in Alcibiad.

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Character of Lyſander.—His Conference with Cyrus.—He defeats the Athenian Fleet.—Diſgrace of Alcibiades.—Lyſander ſucceeded by Callicratidas.—His Tranſactions with the Perſians—with the Spartan Allies.—Battle of Arginuſſæ.—Trial of the Athenian Admirals.—Eteonicus Checks a Mutiny of the Peloponneſian Troops.—Lyſander reſumes the Command.—Battle of Ægos Potamos.—Spartan Empire in Aſia.—Siege and Surrender of Athens.—Humiliation of the Athenians.

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Lyſander takes the command of the Peloponneſian forces in the Eaſt. Olymp. xciii. 2. A.C. 407.

WHILE the ſuperſtitious multitude trembled at the imaginary anger of Minerva, men of reflection and experience dreaded the activity and valour of Lyſander, who, during the reſidence of Alcibiades at Athens, had taken the command of the Peloponneſian forces in the Eaſt. The forms of the Spartan conſtitution required a rapid ſucceſſion of generals; a circumſtance, which, amidſt the numerous inconveniencies with which it was attended, enlarged the ſphere of military competition, and multiplying the number of actors on the theatre of war, afforded an opportunity for the diſplay of many illuſtrious characters, which muſt otherwiſe have remained in obſcurity. In the rotation

rotation of annual elections, offices of importance and dignity will often be entrusted to men unworthy to fill them; but in the vast variety of experiments, abilities of the most distinguished order (if any such exist in the community) must some time be called into exertion, honoured with confidence, and armed with authority.

His character.

Such abilities the Spartans finally discovered in Lysander; a shoot of the Herculean stock, but not descended from either of the royal branches. He had been educated with all the severity of Spartan discipline; and having spent his youth and his manhood in those honourable employments [1] which became the dignity of his birth, he approached the decline of life, when his superior merit recommended him to the chief command in a season of public danger. Years had added experience to his valour, and enlarged the resources, without abating the ardour, of his ambitious mind. In his transactions with the world, he had learned to soften the harsh asperity of his national manners; to gain by fraud what could not be effected by force; and, in his own figurative language, to "eke out the lion's with the fox's skin [2]." This mixed character admirably

[1] He had served in the army and navy; had been employed as ambassador in foreign states, &c. Plut. in Lysand.

[2] This was said, in allusion to the lion's skin of Hercules, to one who asked Lysander, "How he, who sprang from that hero, could condescend to conquer his enemies by fraud?" His character is diffusely described by Plutarch, t. iii. p. 4—15.

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ſuited the part which he was called to act. His enterpriſing courage was ſucceſsfully exerted in the hoſtile operations againſt the Greeks; his ſubtile and inſinuating addreſs gave him an aſcendant in every negotiation with the Perſians; and the reunion of thoſe various qualities enabled him, in a few years, finally to terminate the war, and to produce an important and permanent revolution in the affairs of Athens, of Sparta, and of Greece.

His conference with Cyrus, Olymp. xciii. 2. A.C. 407.

Since the deciſive action at Cyzicus, the Peloponneſians, unable to reſiſt the enemy, had been employed in preparing ſhips on the coaſt of their own peninſula, as well as in the harbours of their Perſian and Grecian allies. The moſt conſiderable ſquadrons had been equipped in Cos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Epheſus; in the laſt of which the whole armament, amounting to ninety ſail, was collected by Lyſander. But the aſſembling of ſuch a force was a matter of little conſequence, unleſs proper meaſures ſhould be taken for holding it together, and for enabling it to act with vigour. It was neceſſary, above all, to ſecure pay for the ſeamen; for this purpoſe, Lyſander, accompanied by ſeveral Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors, repaired to Sardis, to congratulate the happy arrival of Cyrus, a generous and valiant youth of ſeventeen, who had been entruſted by his father Darius with the government of the inland parts of Leſſer Aſia; or, in the language of the Perſian court, with the command of the numerous troops who rendezvouſed in the plains of Kaſtolus,

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Kaſtolus[3]. Lyſander complained to the young and magnanimous prince, "of the perfidious duplicity of Tiſſaphernes, by which the Athenians had been enabled to re-aſſume that aſcendant in the Eaſt, which had formerly proved ſo dangerous and diſgraceful to the Perſian name. That ſatrap ſeemed, on one occaſion indeed, to have diſcovered the fatal tendency of his meaſures; and had attempted to check the victorious career of thoſe ambitious republicans, by ſeizing the perſon of Alcibiades[4]. Pharnabazus had more effectually ſerved the cauſe of his maſter, by his active valour in the field; by detaining the Athenian ambaſſadors, who had been ſent to ſurpriſe the unſuſpecting generoſity of Darius[5]; and by ſupplying the Peloponneſians, after the unfortunate engagement at Cyzicus, with the means of pre-

3 This was the ſtyle of the letter, confirmed by the royal ſeal. Καταπεμπω Κυρον καρανον των ες Καυλον αθροιζομενων. Xenoph. p. 438.

4 This event, which happened in the twenty-firſt year of the war, is related by Xenophon, p. 429. It was omitted in the text, becauſe Alcibiades ſoon effected his eſcape; and the treachery of Tiſſaphernes only diſplayed his own worthleſſneſs, without hurting his enemies.

5 This diſhonourable tranſaction was approved even by Cyrus, which ſhews the diſregard of the Perſians to the laws of nations. He begged Pharnabazus to put the Athenians in his hands; at leaſt, not to ſet them at liberty, that their countrymen might be ignorant of the meaſures in agitation againſt them. But a remorſe of conſcience ſeized Pharnabazus, who had ſworn, either to conduct the ambaſſadors to the great king, or to ſend them to the Ionian coaſt; in conſequence of which, the Athenians were releaſed. Xenoph. p. 438.

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paring a new fleet, and with the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life, while they were employed in this uſeful undertaking. But Tiſſaphernes was unwilling, and Pharnabazus was perhaps unable, to diſcharge the ſtipulated pay, without which the Grecian ſeamen and ſoldiers could not be kept together, or engaged to act with vigour againſt the common enemy." Cyrus replied, "That he had been commanded by his father to aſſiſt the Lacedæmonians, and to pay their troops with the moſt exact punctuality. That, for this purpoſe, he had carried with him five hundred talents (near an hundred thouſand pounds ſterling); and if ſuch a ſum ſhould be found inſufficient, he would willingly expend his private fortune, and even melt down and coin into money the golden throne on which he ſat [6]."

The pay of the Grecian ſailors, and complement of their ſhips.

This diſcourſe gave extraordinary ſatisfaction to his Grecian auditors; and Lyſander endeavoured to avail himſelf of what, judging by his own character, he imagined might be nothing more than a ſudden tranſport of generoſity, by requeſting, that the ſeamen's pay might be raiſed from three oboli to an Attic drachma a day. Cyrus anſwered, "That, on this ſubject too, he had received expreſs orders from his father [7]. That the pay ſhould continue

[6] Και τον θρονον κατακοψειν, εν ᾧ εκαθητο, οιτα αργυρου και χρυσου. Literally, "that he would cut in pieces the throne on which he ſat," which was compoſed of ſilver and gold.

[7] Xenophon makes Cyrus anſwer with more art than truth, "ὁ δε καλως μεν εφη αυτους λεγειν, ου δυνατον δε ειναι παρ' ὰ βασιλευς επει-

continue on the ancient footing, and the Peloponneſians regularly receive thirty minæ (above ninety pounds ſterling) a month, for every ſhip which they fitted out." Lyſander acquieſced with ſome reluctance, determining to ſeize the firſt favourable opportunity to renew his petition. But this inſtructive converſation may enable us to diſcover an important matter of fact omitted by hiſtorians. As the military and naval officers of the Greeks were not diſtinguiſhed above the common men by the exceſſive inequality of their appointments, we may compute, from the monthly ſum of thirty minæ, diſtributed at the rate of three oboli of daily pay, that the complement of each ſhip amounted to about two hundred and forty ſailors; ſo that a fleet of ninety ſail employed twenty-one thouſand and ſix hundred men.

Lyſander is entertained at Sardis by the Perſian prince.

Before Lyſander returned to Epheſus, he was invited by the Perſian prince to a magnificent entertainment, at which, according to the cuſtom of the age, the moſt ſerious matters were diſcuſſed amidſt the freedom and intemperance of the table. This was a ſeaſonable occaſion for diſplaying the arts of inſinuation and flattery, in which the Spartan was a complete maſter. He repreſented, without moderation, and without decency, the injuſtice and incapacity of Tiſſaphernes, who, as he was naturally the rival, might be ſuſpected ſoon to be-

επιτειλαν αυτον αλλα ποιειν." Cyrus anſwered, "that *they* (Lyſander and the Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors) ſpoke very reaſonably, but that *he* could not act otherwiſe than he was commanded by his father."

come

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come the perſonal enemy of Cyrus. He magnified the beauty, the ſtrength, and the courage, of the young prince. His addreſs in military exerciſes, and the extraordinary endowments of his mind (the fame of which had reached the moſt diſtant countries), were extolled with the moſt elaborate praiſe. It is not improbable that he might find a topic of panegyric in a quality of which Cyrus was not a little vain; the capacity of bearing, without intoxication, a greater quantity of liquor than any of his equals [8]; and he might poſſibly ſuggeſt, that of all the ſons of Darius, Cyrus was the beſt qualified to ſucceed his father, to fill with dignity the Perſian throne, and to emulate the glory of that illuſtrious hero whoſe name he bore, the immortal founder of the monarchy. But whatever were the topics of which he made uſe, it is certain that he excited the warmeſt emotions of friendſhip in the youthful breaſt of Cyrus, who drinking his health, after the Perſian faſhion, deſired him to aſk a boon, with full aſſurance that nothing ſhould be denied him. Lyſander replied, with his uſual addreſs, "That he ſhould aſk what it would be no leſs uſeful for the prince to give, than for him to receive; the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners; an augmentation which, by inducing the Athenian crews to deſert, would not only increaſe their own ſtrength, but enfeeble the common enemy." Struck with the apparent diſintereſtedneſs of this ſpecious propoſal, Cyrus or-

His addreſs in procuring an addition to the ſeamen's pay.

[8] Plut. Sympoſ.

dered

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dered him immediately ten thouſand Daricks (above five thouſand pounds ſterling); with which he returned to Epheſus, diſcharged the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, raiſed their daily allowance, and ſeduced innumerable deſerters from the Athenian fleet [9].

Defeats the Athenian fleet in the abſence of Alcibiades. Olymp. xciii. 2. A.C. 407.

While Lyſander was uſefully employed in manning his ſhips, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the ſmall iſland of Andros. The reſiſtance was more vigorous than he had reaſon to expect; and the immediate neceſſity of procuring pay and ſubſiſtence for the fleet, obliged him to leave his work imperfect. With a ſmall ſquadron he ſailed to raiſe contributions on the Ionian or Carian coaſt [10], committing the principal armament to Antiochus, a man totally unworthy of ſuch an important truſt [11]. Even the affectionate partiality of Alcibiades ſeems to have diſcerned the unworthineſs of his favourite, ſince he gave him ſtrict orders to continue, during his own abſence, in the harbour of Samos, and by no means to riſk an engagement. This injunction, as it could not prevent the raſhneſs, might perhaps provoke the vain levity of the vice-admiral, who, after the depar-

[9] Plut. tom. iii. p. 7. Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 441. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 360.

[10] Xenophon ſays, "Alcibiades ſailed to Phocæa," which is in Ionia; Plutarch ſays, "to the coaſt of Caria."

[11] Diodorus gives his character in few words: "Ὁ δὲ Ἀντιοχος ὢν τῇ φυσει προχειρος, και σπευδων δια ἑαυτου τι πραξαι λαμπρον. Antiochus, naturally precipitate, and deſirous, by himſelf, to perform ſome ſplendid exploit."

ture

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ture of his friend, ſailed towards Epheſus, approached the ſterns of Lyſander's ſhips, and with the moſt licentious inſults challenged him to battle. The prudent Spartan delayed the moment of attack, until the preſumption of his enemies had thrown them into ſcattered diſorder [12]. He then commanded the Peloponneſian ſquadrons to advance. His manœuvres were judicious, and executed with a prompt obedience. The battle was not obſtinate, as the Athenians, who ſcarcely expected any reſiſtance, much leſs aſſault, ſunk at once from the inſolence of temerity into the deſpondency of fear. They loſt fifteen veſſels, with a conſiderable part of their crews. The remainder retired diſgracefully to Samos; while the Lacedæmonians profited of their victory by the taking of Eion and Delphinium. Though fortune thus favoured the prudence of Lyſander, he declined to venture a ſecond engagement with the ſuperior ſtrength of Alcibiades, who, having reſumed the command, employed every artifice and inſult that might procure him an opportunity to reſtore the tarniſhed luſtre of the Athenian fleet.

Alcibiades accuſed and diſgraced.

But ſuch an opportunity he could never again find. The people of Athens, who expected to hear of nothing but victories and triumphs, were mortified to the laſt degree, when they received intelligence of ſuch a ſhameful defeat. As they could not ſuſpect the abilities, they diſtruſted the fidelity, of their commander. Their ſuſpicions

12 "Διεσπασμεναις ταις ναυσι." Xenoph. p. 441.

were

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were increaſed and confirmed by the arrival of Thraſybulus [13], who, whether actuated by a laudable zeal for the intereſt of the public ſervice, or animated by a ſelfiſh jealouſy of the fame and honours that had been ſo liberally heaped on a rival, formally impeached Alcibiades in the Athenian aſſembly. "His miſconduct had totally ruined the affairs of his country. A talent for low buffoonery was a ſure recommendation to his favour. His friends were, partially, ſelected from the meaneſt and moſt abandoned of men, who poſſeſſed no other merit than that of being ſubſervient to his paſſions. To ſuch unworthy inſtruments the fleet of Athens was entruſted; while the commander in chief revelled in debauchery with the harlots of Abydus and Ionia, or raiſed exorbitant contributions on the dependent cities, that he might defray the expence of a fortreſs on the coaſt of Thrace, in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, which he had erected to ſhelter himſelf againſt the juſt vengeance of the republic."

[13] Thraſybulus, we have ſeen, had a principal ſhare in bringing about the recal of Alcibiades. Nor was the latter ungrateful to his benefactor. When the Athenians committed to him their whole military and naval force, "ἁπασας τας δυναμεις," and allowed him to name his own colleagues, or rather ſubſtitutes, he named Thraſybulus and Adimantus. Diod. l. xiii. p. 368. Conſidering this interchange of good offices between Alcibiades and Thraſybulus, it is remarkable that no Greek writer aſſigns any reaſon for the animoſity that ſoon afterwards broke out between them. Plutarch ſays, that Thraſybulus was the bittereſt of Alcibiades's enemies, and imputes his accuſation of him to enmity, not to patriotiſm.

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Ten commanders appointed in his ſtead.

Were it neceſſary to prove by examples the deceitful emptineſs of popular favour, this ſubject might be copiouſly illuſtrated from the hiſtory of the Athenians. The ſame man, whom a few months before they found it impoſſible ſufficiently to reward, was actually expoſed to the rage of diſappointment and the fury of revenge. They regretted the loſs of every moment which intervened between the rapid progreſs of their reſentment, and the execution of their vengeance. In the ſame aſſembly, and on the ſame day, Alcibiades was accuſed, and almoſt unanimouſly condemned; and, that the affairs of the republic might not again ſuffer by the abuſe of undivided power, ten commanders were ſubſtituted in his room; among whom were Thraſyllus, Leon, Diomedon, whoſe approved valour, and love of liberty, juſtly recommended them to public honours; Conon, a character as yet but little known, but deſtined, in a future period, to eclipſe the fame of his contemporaries; and Pericles, who inherited the name, the merit, and the bad fortune, of his illuſtrious father. The new generals immediately ſailed to Samos; and Alcibiades ſought refuge in his Thracian fortreſs [14].

Callicratidas ſent to command the Peloponneſian fleet. Olymp. xciii. 3. A.C. 406.

They had ſcarcely aſſumed the command, when an important alteration took place in the Peloponneſian fleet. Lyſander's year had expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of a very oppoſite character, was ſent to ſucceed him. The active, ambi-

14 Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. ſub fin. Diodor. xiii. 67—74.

tious,

tious, and intriguing temper of the former had employed as much aſſiduous and ſyſtematic policy during the ſhort term of his precarious power, as if his authority had never been to end. Though endowed with uncommon vigour of mind, and with conſummate prudence (if prudence can belong to a character deficient in juſtice and humanity), he poſſeſſed not thoſe amiable and uſeful qualities which alone deſerve, and can alone obtain, public confidence and reſpect. Lyſander, ſenſible of this imperfection, had recourſe to the ordinary expedient by which crafty ambition ſupplies the want of virtue. He determined to govern by parties[15]. The boldeſt of the ſailors were attached to his perſon by liberal rewards and more liberal promiſes. The ſoldiers were indulged in the moſt licentious diſorders. In every city and in every iſland, Lyſander had his partiſans, whom he flattered with the hopes of obtaining the ſame authority over their fellow-citizens, which the Spartans enjoyed over the inferior ranks of men in Laconia[16].

His inſolent reception.

It was the general expectation at Epheſus, that the Spartans would, for once, depart from eſtabliſhed practice, in order to prolong the command of ſuch an able and ſucceſsful officer. An univerſal clamour aroſe, when Callicratidas diſ-

[15] His maxims breathed the odious party ſpirit. "That it is impoſſible to do too much good to friends, or *too much evil to enemies*. That children are to be deceived by trinkets, men by oaths; and others equally flagitious." Plut. in Lyſand.

[16] Idem, ibid. & Xenoph. Hellen.

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played his commiſſion in the council of the confederates. The friends of Lyſander affirmed, "That it was equally imprudent and ungenerous to check the victorious career of a deſerving and fortunate commander; that the important charge of the fleet ought not to be entruſted to men who were deſtitute of experience, and perhaps of abilities; nor would it be juſt to ſacrifice the intereſt of ſuch a numerous and powerful confederacy to a punctilious obſervance of the Lacedæmonian laws." Lyſander maintained a decent ſilence concerning the character of his ſucceſſor, only obſerving that he reſigned to him a fleet which commanded the ſea. The noiſy acclamations of the aſſembly confirmed his aſſertion.

His honeſty and firmneſs confounds the partiſans of Lyſander.

But Callicratidas had a heart untainted with reproach, and incapable of fear. Unabaſhed by the ſeditious turbulence of his opponents, he replied, That he muſt withhold his aſſent to the magnified ſuperiority of the Peloponneſian fleet, unleſs Lyſander ſhould ſet ſail from Epheſus, coaſt along the iſle of Samos (where the Athenians then lay), and ſurrender his victorious ſquadrons in the harbour of Miletus. The pride of Lyſander might have been confounded by this judicious and ſolid obſervation; but his ingenuity ſuggeſted a plauſible or rather an eluſive reply, "That he was no longer admiral."

Callicratidas then addreſſed the aſſembly, with the manly ſimplicity of an honeſt heart, which diſdains the artifice of words, defies the inſolence of power, and defeats the intrigues of policy. "Lacedæ-

cedæmonians, and allies, I ſhould have been contented to ſtay at home; nor does it greatly affect me that Lyſander, or any other, ſhould be held a better ſeaman than myſelf. Hither I have been ſent by my countrymen to command the fleet, and *my* chief concern is to execute their orders, and to perform my duty. It is my earneſt deſire to promote the public intereſt; but you can beſt inform me whether I ought to continue here, or to return to Sparta." Wonderful is the power of honeſt intentions and unaffected firmneſs. The aſſembly liſtened with admiration; the partiſans of Lyſander were abaſhed; none ventured to object; and, after a conſiderable pauſe, all unanimouſly acknowledged that it became both Callicratidas and themſelves to obey the orders of the Spartan government [17].

He meets the arrogance of the Perſians with equal contempt.

Lyſander, not a little mortified by the language of the aſſembly, reluctantly reſigned his employment; but determined to render it painful, and, if poſſible, too weighty for the abilities of his ſucceſſor. For this purpoſe he returned to the court of Cyrus, to whom he reſtored a conſiderable ſum of money ſtill unexpended in the ſervice of the Grecian fleet, and to whom he miſrepreſented, under the names of obſtinacy, ignorance, and ruſticity, the unaffected plainneſs, the downright ſincerity, and the other manly, but uncomplying, virtues of the generous Callicratidas. When that commander repaired to Sardis to demand the

[17] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. v. & ſeqq. & Plut. in Lyſand.

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ſtipulated pay, he could not obtain admiſſion to the royal preſence. The firſt time that he viſited the palace, he was told that Cyrus was at table. It is well, ſaid the unceremonious Spartan, I will wait till he has dined. The ſimplicity of this proceeding, confirmed the opinion which Lyſander had given the Perſians of his character; and his honeſt frankneſs, which was conſtrued into low breeding, ſeemed a proper object of ridicule to the proud retainers of the court. He returned on another occaſion, but without being admitted to ſee the young prince. The injuſtice of this treatment might have deſerved his reſentment, but it chiefly excited his contempt. He left the royal city, deſpiſing the pride and perfidy of his Perſian allies, whoſe accidental importance depended on the precarious advantage of riches, and lamenting the domeſtic diſſenſions of the Greeks, which obliged them to court the favour of inſolent Barbarians.

Obtains voluntary contributions from the Ionians.

But Callicratidas could not, with honour or ſafety, return to the fleet at Epheſus, without having collected money to ſupply the immediate wants of the ſailors. He proceeded, therefore, to Miletus and other friendly towns of Ionia; and having met the principal citizens, in their reſpective aſſemblies, he explained openly and fully the mean jealouſy of Lyſander, and the diſdainful arrogance of Cyrus[18]. "The unjuſt behaviour of

[18] It will appear, in the ſequel, that Callicratidas had formed a very falſe opinion of the Perſian prince, whoſe neglect of a worthy man was occaſioned by the perfidious ſuggeſtions of his retainers, the friends or creatures of Lyſander.

both

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both compelled him, much againſt his inclination, to have recourſe to the confederate cities (already too much burdened) for the money requiſite to ſupport the war. But he aſſured them, that, ſhould his arms prove ſucceſsful, he would repay their favours with gratitude. Their own intereſt required a cheerful compliance with his demands, ſince the expedition had been principally undertaken to vindicate their freedom. He had, however, ſent meſſengers to require effectual ſupplies from Sparta; but until theſe ſhould arrive, it became the Greeks in general, but eſpecially the Ionians, who had ſuffered peculiar injuries from the uſurping tyranny of the great king, to prove to the world that, without the ſordid aſſiſtance of *his* boaſted treaſures, they could proſecute their juſt deſigns, and take vengeance on their enemies." By thoſe judicious and honourable expedients, Callicratidas, without fraud or violence, obtained ſuch conſiderable, yet voluntary contributions, as enabled him to gratify the importunate demands of the ſailors, and to return with honour to Epheſus, in order to prepare for action [19].

He takes Methymna.

His firſt operations were directed againſt the iſle of Leſbos, or rather againſt the ſtrong and populous towns of Methymna and Mitylené, which reſpectively commanded the northern and ſouthern diviſions of that iſland. Beſides the numerous citizens of an age to bear arms, Methymna was defended by an Athenian garriſon. The place

[19] Xenoph. Hellen. p. 444.

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made a brave reſiſtance; but the perſevering efforts of Callicratidas exhauſted its ſtrength: Methymna was taken by ſtorm, and ſubjected to the depredations of the Peloponneſian troops. The garriſon and the ſlaves were treated as part of the booty. The confederates adviſed, that the Methymneans alſo ſhould be ſold into ſervitude; but Callicratidas aſſured them, that, while *he* enjoyed the command, there ſhould not any Grecian citizen be reduced to the condition of a ſlave, unleſs he had taken arms to ſubvert the public freedom

Takes thirty ſhips, and blocks up the reſt of the fleet in the harbour of Mitylené.

Meanwhile Conon, the moſt active and enterpriſing of the Athenian commanders, had put to ſea with a ſquadron of ſeventy ſail, in order to protect the coaſt of Leſbos. But this deſign was attempted too late; nor, had it been more early undertaken, was the force of Conon ſufficient to accompliſh it. Callicratidas obſerved his motions, diſcovered his ſtrength, and, with a far ſuperior fleet, intercepted his retreat to the armament of Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coaſt of Mitylené, but were prevented from entering the harbour of that place by the reſentment of the inhabitants, who rejoiced in an opportunity to puniſh thoſe who had ſo often conquered, and ſo long oppreſſed, their city. In conſequence of this unexpected oppoſition, the Athenian ſquadron was overtaken by the enemy. The engagement was more ſharp and obſtinate than might have been expected in ſuch an inequality of ſtrength. Thirty

[20] Xenoph. ubi ſupra. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 373.

empty

empty ſhips (for moſt of the men ſwam to land) were taken by the Peloponneſians. The remaining forty were haled up under the walls of Mitylené: Callicratidas recalled his troops from Methymna, received a reinforcement from Chios, and blocked up the Athenians by ſea and land [21]. CHAP. XXII.

The condition of Conon was moſt diſtreſsful. He was ſurrounded on all ſides by a ſuperior force; the town of Mitylené was hoſtile; his men were deſtitute of proviſions, incapable of reſiſtance, yet unwilling to ſurrender. In this melancholy ſituation he attempted the only enterpriſe which could promiſe a hope of relief. The braveſt and moſt experienced ſeamen were embarked in two ſwift-ſailing veſſels, one of which eluding the vigilance of the enemy, eſcaped in ſafety to the Helleſpont, and informed the Athenians of the misfortunes and blockade at Leſbos. The intelligence was immediately communicated to Samos and to Athens; and the importance of the object, which was no leſs than the ſafety of forty ſhips, and above eight thouſand brave men, excited uncommon exertions of activity. The Athenians reinforced their domeſtic ſtrength with the aſſiſtance of their allies; all able-bodied men were preſſed into the ſervice; and, in a few weeks, they had aſſembled at Samos an hundred and fifty ſail, which immediately took the ſea, with a reſolution to encounter the enemy. The Athenians fit out a new fleet.

Callicratidas did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty ſhips to guard the harbour of Battle of Arginuſſæ, in which Callicratidas

[21] Xenoph. ubi ſupra. Diodor. lib. xiii. p. 373.

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is defeated and ſlain. Olymp. xciii. 3. A.C. 406.

Mitylené, he proceeded with an hundred and twenty to Cape Malea, the moſt ſouthern point of Leſbos. The Athenians had advanced, the ſame evening, to the iſlands, or rather rocks, of Arginuſſæ, four miles diſtant from that promontory. The night paſſed in bold ſtratagems for mutual ſurpriſe, which were rendered ineffectual by a violent tempeſt of rain and thunder. At the dawn both armaments were eager to engage; but Hermon and Megareus, two experienced ſeamen, and the chief counſellors of Callicratidas, exhorted him not to commit the weakneſs of the Peloponneſians with the ſuperior ſtrength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan deſpiſed danger and death in compariſon of glory; but either his magnanimity had not overcome the laſt imperfection of virtuous minds, and was averſe to ſacrifice perſonal glory to public utility, or he imagined that this utility could not be ſeparated from an inflexible adherence to the martial laws of Lycurgus. He anſwered the prudent admonitions of his friends in theſe memorable words, which, according to the conſtruction that is put on them [22], deſerve

[22] Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. xxiv. takes the unfavourable ſide. "Inventi autem multi ſunt, qui non modo pecuniam, ſed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati eſſent: iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem poſtulante; ut Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuiſſet Peloponneſiaco bello, multaque feciſſet egregie; vertit ad extremum omnia, cum conſilio non paruit eorum, qui claſſem ab Arginuſſis removendam, nec cum Athenienſibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille reſpondit, Lacedæmonios, claſſe illa amiſſa aliam parare poſſe; ſe fugere ſine ſuo dedecore non poſſe." Notwithſtanding the reſpectable authority of

deſerve our admiration or our pity. "My death cannot be deſtructive to Sparta, but my flight would be diſhonourable both to Sparta and myſelf." So ſaying, he gave the ſignal for his ſhips to advance. The fight was long and bloody; paſſing, ſucceſſively, through all the different gradations, from diſciplined order and regularity to the moſt tumultuous confuſion. The Spartan commander was ſlain charging in the centre of the braveſt enemies. The hoſtile ſquadrons fought with various fortune in different parts of the battle, and promiſcuouſly conquered, purſued, ſurrendered, or fled. Thirteen Athenian veſſels were taken by the Peloponneſians; but, at length, the latter gave way on all ſides; ſeventy of their ſhips were captured, the reſt eſcaped to Chios and Phocæa[23]. CHAP. XXII.

The Athenian admirals, though juſtly elated with their good fortune, cautiouſly deliberated concerning the beſt means of improving their victory. Several adviſed that the fleet ſhould ſteer its courſe to Mitylené, to ſurpriſe the Peloponneſian ſquadron which blocked up the harbour of that city. Diomedon recommended it as a more immediate and eſſential object of their care to recover the bodies of the ſlain, and to ſave the wreck of twelve veſſels which had been diſabled in the engagement. Stratagem of Eteonicus;

of Cicero, whoever attentively conſiders the laws of Lycurgus and the character of Callicratidas, will be diſpoſed to believe, that an undeviating principle of duty, not the fear of loſing his glory, formed the ſublime motive of that accompliſhed Spartan.

[23] Xenoph. p. 446. & Diodor. p. 384.

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Thraſybulus obſerved, that by dividing their ſtrength, both purpoſes might be effected. His opinion was approved. The charge of preſerving the dying, and collecting the bodies of the dead, was committed to Theramenes and Thraſybulus. Fifty veſſels were deſtined to that important ſervice, doubly recommended by humanity and ſuperſtition. The remainder ſailed to the iſle of Leſbos, in queſt of the Peloponneſians on that coaſt, who narrowly eſcaped deſtruction through the well-conducted ſtratagem of Eteonicus, the Spartan vice-admiral. Soon after the engagement a brigantine arrived at Mitylené, acquainting him with the death of Callicratidas, as well as with the defeat and flight of the Peloponneſian fleet. The ſagacity of Eteonicus immediately foreſaw the probable conſequences of thoſe events. The Athenians would naturally ſail from Arginuſſæ to purſue their good fortune, and Conon, who was ſhut up at Mitylené, would be encouraged to break through the harbour, that he might join his victorious countrymen.

which ſaves the Peloponneſian ſquadron at Mitylené.

In order to anticipate thoſe meaſures, and to facilitate his own retreat, the Spartan commander ordered the brigantine privately to leave the harbour, and to return, at the diſtance of a ſhort time, with joyous acclamations and muſic, the rowers crowned with garlands, and calling out that Callicratidas had deſtroyed the laſt hope of Athens, and obtained a glorious and deciſive victory. The contrivance ſucceeded; the Spartans thanked heaven for the good news by hymns and ſacrifices; the ſailors

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ſailors were enjoined to refreſh themſelves by a copious repaſt, and to profit of a favourable gale to ſail to the iſle of Chios; while the ſoldiers burned their camp, and marched northward to Methymna, to reinforce the garriſon there, which was threatened by a ſpeedy viſit of the enemy [24].

Diſappointment of the Athenian admirals.

While the prudent foreſight of Eteonicus ſaved the Peloponneſian ſquadron at Mitylené, the violence of a ſtorm prevented Theramenes and Thraſybulus from ſaving their unfortunate companions, all of whom, excepting one of the admirals and a few others who eſcaped by their extraordinary dexterity in ſwimming, were overwhelmed by the waves of a tempeſtuous ſea; nor could their dead bodies ever be recovered. The Athenians were likewiſe diſappointed of the immediate advantages which ought to have reſulted from the engagement. Methymna was too ſtrongly fortified to be taken by a ſudden aſſault; they could not ſpare time for a regular ſiege; and when they proceeded to Chios in queſt of the Peloponneſian fleet, they found it carefully ſecured in the principal harbour of that iſland, which had been put in a vigorous poſture of defence. Theſe unforeſeen circumſtances were the more diſagreeable and mortifying to the commanders, becauſe, immediately after the battle, they had ſent an advice-boat to Athens, acquainting the magiſtrates with the capture of ſeventy veſſels [25]; mentioning their intended expeditions to

[24] Xenoph. Hellen. & Diodor. p. 384.

[25] Xenoph. ſays ſixty-nine; Diodorus, ſeventy-ſeven.

Mitylené,

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Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios, from which they had reaſon to hope the moſt diſtinguiſhed ſucceſs; and particularly taking notice that the important charge of recovering the bodies of the drowned or ſlain had been committed to Theramenes and Thraſybulus, two captains of approved conduct and fidelity.

Diſcontents in Athens.

The joy which the Athenians received from this flattering intelligence was converted into diſappointment and ſorrow, when they underſtood that their fleet had returned to Samos, without reaping the expected fruits of victory. They were afflicted beyond meaſure with the total loſs of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the ſacred rites of funeral; a circumſtance viewed with peculiar horror, becauſe it was ſuppoſed, according to a ſuperſtition conſecrated by the belief of ages, to ſubject their melancholy ſhades to wander an hundred years on the gloomy banks of the Styx, before they could be tranſported to the regions of light and felicity. The relations of the dead lamented their private misfortunes; the enemies of the admirals exaggerated the public calamity; both demanded an immediate and ſerious examination into the cauſe of this diſtreſsful event, that the guilty might be diſcovered and puniſhed.

Amidſt the ferment of popular diſcontents, Theramenes ſailed to Athens, with a view to exculpate himſelf and his colleague Thraſybulus. The letter ſent thither before them had excited their fear and their reſentment; ſince it rendered them

them responsible for a duty which they found it impossible to perform. Theramenes accused the admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save the perishing, and to recover the bodies of the dead; and, after the opportunity of this important service was irrecoverably lost, of having devolved the charge on others, in order to skreen their own misconduct. The Athenians greedily listened to the accusation, and cashiered the absent commanders. Conon, who during the action remained blocked up at Mitylené, was intrusted with the fleet. Protomachus and Aristogenus chose a voluntary banishment. The rest returned home to justify measures which appeared so criminal [26].

Trials of the admirals.

Among the inestimable rules of jurisprudence, invented by the wisdom of Athens, we may remark that beneficial institution which subjects the life, the character, and the fortune of individuals, not to the capricious will of an arbitrary judge, but to the equitable decision of the public. In every case, civil and criminal, the rights of an Athenian citizen were entrusted to the judgment of his peers; who, according as the question was more or less important, consisted of a committe, more or less numerous, of the popular assembly. But, in order to unite the double advantages of law and liberty, the nine archons, or chief magistrates, men of approved wisdom and fidelity, respectively presided in the several courts of justice, received

[26] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. vii. & seqq. Diodor. xiii. 76—97.

complaints,

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complaints, examined the parties, directed proceſs, and regularly conducted the ſuit through its various ſteps and ſtages. In matters of general concernment, ſuch as the treaſon, perfidy, or malverſation of men in power, the ſenate of the five hundred, or rather the Prytanes, who preſided in the ſenate, performed the functions of the magiſtrate, and the whole body of the people, convened in full aſſembly, executed the office of judge and jury. It belonged to the Prytanes to preſcribe the form of action or trial, and to admit the accuſer to implead or impeach his antagoniſt. The cauſe was then referred to the people, who, as judges of the fact, gave their verdict, and, as judges of the law, paſſed their ſentence or decree. Such were the regulations which reaſon had eſtabliſhed, but which paſſion and intereſt commonly rendered ineffectual.

Artifices of their accuſers.

Archedemus, an opulent and powerful citizen, and Callixenus, a ſeditious demagogue, partly moved by the intreaties of Theramenes, and partly excited by perſonal envy and reſentment, denounced the admirals to the ſenate. The accuſation was ſupported by the relations of the deceaſed, who appeared in mourning robes, their heads ſhaved, their arms folded, their eyes bathed in tears, piteouſly lamenting the loſs and diſgrace of their families, deprived of their protectors, who had been themſelves deprived of thoſe laſt and ſolemn duties to which all mankind are entitled. A falſe witneſs ſwore in court, that he had been ſaved almoſt by miracle, from the wreck, and that his

his companions, as they were ready to be drowned, charged him to acquaint his country how they had fallen victims to the cruel neglect of their commanders. During theſe proceedings it happened that the people had met to celebrate the Apatouria, or feſtival in January, ſo named becauſe the Athenians then preſented their ſons, who had reached their ſeventh year, to be inſcribed in the regiſter of their reſpective tribes. Callixenus preſuming on the evidence given in the ſenate, and on the actual diſpoſition of the aſſembly, propoſed the following reſolution: "That the cauſe of the admirals ſhould be immediately referred to the people; that the ſuffrages ſhould be given by tribes, in each of which the criers ſhould make proclamation, having prepared two urns to receive the white and black beans; if the latter were more numerous, the admirals ſhould be delivered to the eleven men, the executioners of public juſtice, their eſtates confiſcated, and the tenth part conſecrated to Minerva."

Informality of the trial.

This unjuſt decree, which deprived the commanders of the benefits of a ſeparate trial, of an impartial hearing, and of the time as well as the means neceſſary to prepare a legal defence, was approved by a majority of the ſenate, and received with loud acclamations by the people, whoſe levity, inſolence, pride, and cruelty, all eagerly demanded the deſtruction of the admirals. In ſuch a numerous aſſembly, two men alone, Euryptolemus and Axiochus, defended the cauſe of law and juſtice. The former impeached Callixenus for propoſing a reſo-

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reſolution inconſiſtent with all the forms of legal procedure. But the rabble made a violent uproar, calling out that none ſhould attempt, with impunity, to abridge their ſovereign power. The Prytanes, who attended, as uſual, to direct and controul the proceedings of the multitude, endeavoured to moderate the ferment: but they were licentiouſly told, that if they did not concur with the opinion of the majority, they ſhould be involved in the ſame accuſation with the admirals. This abſurd menace (ſuch was the popular frenzy) might be carried into immediate execution. The ſenators were intimidated into a reluctant compliance with meaſures which they diſapproved, and by which they were for ever to be diſgraced. Yet the philoſophic firmneſs of Socrates diſdained to ſubmit. He proteſted againſt the tameneſs of his colleagues, and declared that neither threats, nor danger, nor violence, could compel him to conſpire with injuſtice for the deſtruction of the innocent.

They are condemned and executed.

But what could avail the voice of one virtuous man amidſt the licentious madneſs of thouſands? The commanders were accuſed, tried, condemned, and with the moſt irregular precipitancy, delivered to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedon addreſſed the aſſembly in a ſhort but ever-memorable ſpeech. "I am afraid, Athenians! leſt the ſentence which you have paſſed on us prove hurtful to the republic. Yet I would exhort you to employ the moſt proper means to avert the vengeance of heaven. You muſt carefully

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fully perform the ſacrifices which, before giving battle at Arginuſſæ, we promiſed to the gods in behalf of ourſelves and of you. Our misfortunes deprive us of an opportunity to acquit this juſt debt, and to pay the ſincere tribute of our gratitude. But we are deeply ſenſible that the aſſiſtance of the gods enabled us to obtain that glorious and ſignal victory." The diſintereſtedneſs, the patriotiſm, and the magnanimity of this diſcourſe, muſt have appeaſed (if any thing had been able to appeaſe) the tumultuous paſſions of the vulgar. But their headſtrong fury defied every reſtraint of reaſon or of ſentiment. They perſiſted in their bloody purpoſe, which was executed without pity: yet their cruelty was followed by a ſpeedy repentance, and puniſhed by the ſharp pangs of remorſe, the intolerable pain of which they vainly attempted to mitigate by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on the worthleſs and deteſtable Callixenus [27].

Character of their ſucceſſors.

The removal of the Athenian admirals, and the defeat and death of the Spartan Callicratidas, ſuſpended for ſeveral months the military and naval operations on both ſides. The behaviour of Philocles and Adimanthus, who had been joined in authority with Conon, were better fitted to obſtruct than promote the meaſures of that brave and prudent commander. The former was a man of a violent and impetuous temper, unaccuſtomed to reflection, deſtitute of experience, and incapable of governing others, or himſelf. The latter poſ-

[27] Xenoph. & Diodor. ibid.

ſeſſed

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ſeſſed perhaps the virtue of humanity, but was deſtitute of ſpirit and activity, qualities ſo uſual in his age and country. Though ready with his tongue, he was ſlow with his hand, careleſs of diſcipline, negligent of duty, and ſuſpected of a treaſonable correſpondence with the public enemy.

Eteonicus checks a mutiny among the Peloponneſian troops.

Eteonicus, who commanded the Spartans and their confederates, was a man of a very different character. But the diſtreſsful ſituation of affairs prevented him from diſplaying his abilities in any important enterpriſe. His armament was inferior in ſtrength; his ſailors were diſheartened by defeat; he had not money to pay them; even their ſubſiſtence at Chios was very ſparing and precarious. Theſe vexatious circumſtances increaſed the mutinous ſpirit by which the confederates were too naturally animated. They reproached the ungenerous parſimony of the Chians, whom they had taken arms to defend; they ſpurned the authority of their commander; and, in order to obtain thoſe advantages which their ſervices deſerved, and which had been unjuſtly denied them, they determined to become rich at once by ſeizing and plundering the large and wealthy capital of that flouriſhing iſland. The deſign, though ſecretly formed, was avowed with open boldneſs. The conſpirators, whoſe numbers ſeemed to promiſe ſucceſs, or at leaſt to ſecure impunity, aſſumed a badge of diſtinction, that they might encourage each other, and intimidate their opponents. Eteonicus was juſtly alarmed with the progreſs of ſedition. It was dangerous to attack the inſurgents by force: if he deſtroyed

ſtroyed them by fraud, he might be expoſed to the reproach and obloquy of Greece. The conduct which he purſued was conceived with an enterpriſing courage, and executed with a reſolute firmneſs. With only fifteen faithful and intrepid followers, armed with concealed daggers, he patrolled the ſtreets of Chios. The firſt man whom they met diſtinguiſhed by a reed (for that was the badge of conſpiracy) was put to death, and a crowd collecting to know why the man had been ſlain, they were told it was for wearing a reed on his caſque. The report was immediately ſpread through every quarter of the city. The reed-men (as they were called) were confounded at diſcovering a conſpiracy more ſecret and more formidable than their own. They dreaded that every man whom they met might know and kill them; and, as they had not time to aſſemble for their mutual defence, they haſtily threw away the reeds, which expoſed them to the dangerous aſſault of their unknown enemies. CHAP. XXII.

The character of Eteonicus, as far as we can judge from his actions, juſtly entitled him to the command; but the partiality both of Cyrus and of the confederates eagerly ſolicited the return of Lyſander. The Spartans, though inclined to gratify them, were perplexed by an ancient law enacted in the jealouſy of freedom to prohibit the ſame perſon from being twice entruſted with the fleet. That they might not violate the reſpect due to the laws, while at the ſame time they complied with the requeſt of their powerful allies, they inveſted Lyſander reſumes the command, and takes Lampſacus. Olymp. xciii. 3. A. C. 406.

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Aracus, a weak and obſcure man, with the name of admiral, and ſent out Lyſander as ſecond in command. The latter was received at Sardis by the Perſian prince, with the warmeſt demonſtrations of joy. He was ſupplied with money to ſatisfy the immediate wants of the troops; and, as Cyrus at that time happened to make a journey into Upper Aſia, the revenues of his wealthy province were conſigned, in his abſence, to the management of his Spartan friend. Such powerful reſources could not long remain unemployed in the active hands of Lyſander. His emiſſaries aſſiduouſly engaged or preſſed the Ionian and Carian ſeamen. The harbours of Aſia Minor, particularly the port of Epheſus, glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and in a few months Lyſander ſailed to the Helleſpont with an hundred and fifty gallies, and attacked the important town of Lampſacus. The place, though vigorouſly defended by the natives as well as by the Athenian garriſon, was at length taken by ſtorm; and according to the barbarous practice of the age, abandoned to the licentious rapacity, the avarice, the luſt, and the fury, of the conquerors [28].

The Athenian commanders prepare to give him battle.

The languid and imprudent meaſures of the Athenians at Samos accuſe the abilities of Tydeus, Menander, and Cephiſodotus, who had been lately joined in command with Conon and his unworthy colleagues. They ſailed too late to ſave Lampſacus, but as they poſſeſſed an hundred and eighty

[28] Plut. in Lyſand.

gallies,

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gallies, a force ſuperior to Lyſander's, they anchored on the oppoſite, or European ſide of the Helleſpont, at the diſtance of fifteen furlongs, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement. Their unfortunate ſtation was the mouth of the Ægos Potamos, or river of the goat, diſtinguiſhed by that name on account of ſome ſmall iſlands, which riſing high above the ſurface of the waters, exhibit to a lively imagination the appearance of that animal. This place was injudiciouſly choſen, ſince it afforded very inſecure riding; and was diſtant two miles from Seſtos, the neareſt town from which the fleet could be provided with neceſſaries. Alcibiades, who in his Thracian retirement was unable to withdraw his attention from the war in which he had long acted ſuch a diſtinguiſhed part, modeſtly admoniſhed his countrymen of their imprudence; but he was arrogantly reproached for preſuming, while an exile and an outlaw, to give advice to the admirals of Athens. Their ſubſequent conduct too faithfully correſponded with this inſolence and folly. Deſpiſing the inferiority of the Peloponneſian fleet, they advanced in order of battle to the harbour of Lampſacus; and when the enemy moved not from their ſtation, they returned in triumph as acknowledged maſters of the ſea. The prudence of Lyſander perceived and indulged their preſumption. During four days he bore, with extraordinary patience, their repeated inſults, affecting the utmoſt diſinclination to an engagement, carefully retaining his fleet in a place of ſecurity, and regularly diſpatching a few ſwift-ſailing

Their imprudence and inſolence.

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veſſels to obſerve the motions and behaviour of the Athenians when they returned from their daily cruiſe to the road of Ægos Potamos.

Deciſive battle of Ægos Potamos, in which the Athenians loſe their fleet. Olymp. xciii. 4. A.C. 405. December.

The fifth day they again bore up with the Peloponneſians, and provoked them to battle by more daring menaces than on any former occaſion. As they flattered themſelves with an undoubted proſpect of ſucceſs, they yielded without reſerve to all the petulance of proſperity, and debated in what manner they ſhould treat the Lacedæmonian priſoners who had the misfortune to fall into their power. The cruel Philocles propoſed to cut off their right hands, that thoſe enemies of Athens might be equally incapable to manage the oar and to brandiſh the ſpear; and this bloody reſolution, though oppoſed by Adimantus, was approved by the majority of his colleagues. After inſulting the enemy in a manner the moſt mortifying and diſgraceful, they retired with an air of exultation mingled with contempt. The Peloponneſian ſpy-boats followed them as uſual at a convenient diſtance, and obſerved that they had no ſooner reached their ſtations than the ſeamen landed, ſtraggled about the ſhore, advanced into the inland country in queſt of proviſions or amuſement, indulged in indolence, or revelled in diſorder. The advice-boats returned with uncommon celerity to convey the welcome intelligence to Lyſander, who had embarked the troops, cleared his ſhips, and made every neceſſary preparation to avail himſelf of the favourable opportunity to effect by ſtratagem what it might have been dangerous

gerous to attempt by force. When his ſcouts approached the middle of the channel, they hoiſted their ſhields (for that was the appointed ſignal), and at the ſame moment the Peloponneſian ſquadrons were commanded to ſet ſail that they might ſurpriſe the hoſtile fleet, and indulge that reſentment and animoſity which had been rendered more violent and furious by the long and prudent reſtraint of their commander. The victory was complete, if that can be called a victory where there was ſcarcely any reſiſtance. The vigilant activity of Conon endeavoured ſeaſonably to aſſemble the ſtrength of the Athenians; but his advice was diſdained by officers incapable and unworthy of command, and his orders were deſpiſed by ſeamen unaccuſtomed and unwilling to obey. At length they became ſenſible of the danger when it was too late to avoid it. Their ſhips were taken, either altogether empty, or manned with ſuch feeble crews as were unable to work, much leſs to defend them. The troops and ſailors who flocked to the ſhore from different quarters, and with diſordered precipitation, were attacked by the regular onſet and diſciplined valour of the Peloponneſians. Thoſe who fought were ſlain; the remainder fled into the inmoſt receſſes of the Cherſoneſus, or took refuge in the Athenian fortreſſes which were ſcattered over that peninſula. When Lyſander reviewed the extent of his well-merited ſucceſs, he found that of a fleet of an hundred and eighty ſail, only nine veſſels had eſcaped, eight of which were conducted by Conon to the friendly iſland of

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Cyprus, while the ninth carried to Athens the melancholy news of a diſaſter equally unexpected and fatal. An hundred and ſeventy-one gallies, and three thouſand priſoners (among whom were Philocles and Adimantus), rewarded the patience and fortitude of Lyſander, who returned with his invaluable ſpoil to Lampſacus, amidſt the joyous acclamations of naval triumph [29].

The Athenian priſoners executed.

Before purſuing the natural conſequences of an event the moſt important that had hitherto happened in all the Grecian wars, it was neceſſary for Lyſander to decide the fate of the Athenian priſoners, againſt whom the confederates were animated by all that unrelenting hatred which is congenial to the ſtern character of republicans exaſperated by continual provocation and recent inſult. The injuſtice and cruelty of that ambitious people

[29] Xenoph. p. 456, & ſeqq. & Plut. in Lyſand. By the battle of Ægos Potamos the Athenians loſt the *empire* of the ſea, which they had acquired by the conſent of their maritime allies in the fourth year of the ſeventy-fifth Olympiad. They enjoyed, therefore, that ſovereignty, or empire as they ſtyled it, from the year 477 till the year 405 before Chriſt; that is, a period of ſeventy-two years. This important computation is not found in any ancient writer; and no two authors agree in calculating the duration of the Athenian empire. Lyſias in his Funeral Oration, p. 93. ſays, "During ſeventy years in which the Athenians commanded the ſea." Diodorus Siculus (ad Olymp. 95. 1.) ſays, the Athenians commanded the ſea ſixty-five years. Iſocrates in one place (i. p. 174.) agrees with Lyſias; in another (ii. p. 209.) with Diodorus. Andocides (Orat. iii. p. 286.) ſtates it at eighty-five years. Lycurgus (adv. Leoc. p. 145.) at ninety. Dionyſius Halicarnaſſus (Ant. Rom. ſub init.) at ſixty-eight. Demoſthenes, as we ſhall ſee below, ſtates it variouſly at forty-five, ſixty-five, and ſeventy-three years.

were carefully deſcribed and maliciouſly exaggerated in the dreadful tribunal of their enemies. "It would be tedious to enumerate, though it was impoſſible ever to forget, their multiplied and abominable crimes, of which ſo many individuals, and ſo many communities, had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even of late they had deſtroyed without remorſe, and without the ſhadow of neceſſity, the helpleſs crews of a Corinthian and an Andrian veſſel. The gods had averted the atrocious reſolution propoſed by the bloody Philocles, of which the author and the approvers were equally criminal; nor could thoſe deſerve pardon who were incapable of pity." Such diſcourſe, which reſounded from every quarter of the aſſembly, declared, without the neceſſity of a formal vote, the unanimous decree of the confederates. As the priſoners had been ſtripped of their arms, there was nothing to be feared from their numbers and deſpair. They were conducted into the preſence of their armed judges; and, as a prelude to the inhuman maſſacre, Lyſander ſternly demanded of Philocles what he deſerved to ſuffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied with firmneſs, "Accuſe not thoſe whom you are entitled to judge, but inflict on us the ſame puniſhment which we, in a different fortune, would have inflicted on our enemies." The words were ſcarcely ended when Lyſander hacked him in pieces. The Peloponneſian ſoldiers followed the bloody example of their commander. Of three thouſand Athenians, Adimantus alone was ſpared, either becauſe he had op-

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poſed the deteſtable reſolution of Philocles, or becauſe he had engaged in a treacherous correſpondence with the Spartans [30].

Views of Lyſander.

It might be expected, that immediately after an event which gave him the command of the ſea, Lyſander ſhould ſail to the Piræus, and aſſault the unfortunate city, which was already grievouſly oppreſſed by the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the ſagacious Spartan foreſaw the numerous obſtacles that oppoſed his conqueſt of Athens, and prudently reſtrained the eagerneſs of the troops and his own. The ſtrongly-fortified harbours of that capital, the long and lofty walls which ſurrounded the city on every ſide, the ancient renown and actual deſpair of the Athenians, muſt render the ſiege, if not altogether fruitleſs, at leaſt difficult and tedious; and the precious moments waſted in this doubtful enterpriſe might be employed in attaining certain, immediate, and moſt important advantages.

He eſtabliſhes the Spartan empire over the coaſts and iſlands of Aſia and Europe. Olymp. xciii. 4. A. C. 405.

On the coaſt neither of Greece nor of Aſia, nor of any of the intermediate iſlands, was there a naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lyſander, nor any fortified place in all thoſe countries (except the city of Athens alone) ſufficient to reſiſt the impreſſion of his army. It was a deſign, therefore, which might well deſerve his ambition, and which was not condemned by his prudence, to eſtabliſh or confirm the Lacedæmonian empire over thoſe valuable and extenſive coaſts. The populous cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon were

30 Xenoph. Hellen. Plutarch. in Lyſand.

attacked

attacked and taken during the aſtoniſhment and terror occaſioned by the dreadful and irreparable misfortune of their Athenian allies. After theſe important acquiſitions, Lyſander ſailed to the iſland of Leſbos, reduced Mitylené, and confirmed the allegiance of Methymna. While he extended his arms over the neighbouring iſlands, as well as the maritime towns of Lydia and Caria, a powerful ſquadron, commanded by the enterpriſing valour of Eteonicus, ravaged the ſhores of Macedon, ſubdued the ſea-ports of Thrace, and rode victorious in the Helleſpont and Propontis, the Ægean and Euxine ſeas. In ſix or eight months after the Athenian diſaſter at Ægos Potamos, the faireſt portion of the ancient world, the moſt favoured by nature, and the moſt adorned by art, reluctantly ſubmitted to the power, or voluntarily accepted the alliance of Sparta.

His meaſures for the reduction of Athens.

During this long ſeries of triumphs, Lyſander never loſt ſight of the reduction of Athens; an object important in itſelf, and neceſſary to the completion of his extenſive plan. The vigilance of the Peloponneſian ſquadrons prevented the uſual ſupplies of foreign grain from reaching the diſtreſſed city. In all the towns which ſurrendered, or which were taken by ſtorm, the Athenian garriſons were ſaved from immediate death, only on condition that they returned to their native country. By ſuch contrivances the crafty Spartan expected that the ſcarcity of proviſions would ſoon compel the growing multitude of inhabitants to ſubmit to the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But

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the Athenians, who deſpiſed the aſſaults of the enemy, braved the hardſhips of famine. Even after Lyſander had blocked up their harbours with an hundred and fifty ſail, they ſtill defended, with vigour, their walls and ramparts; patiently endured fatigue and hunger; and beheld with obſtinate unconcern, the affliction of their wives and children. Amidſt the ravages of death and diſeaſe, which advanced with increaſing horror, they puniſhed, with the utmoſt ſeverity, the ignoble cowardice of Archeſtratus, who firſt mentioned capitulation, and declared that the ſame moment ſhould put an end to their independence and their lives.

Siege of Athens. Olymp. xciv. 1. A.C. 404.

But notwithſtanding the melancholy firmneſs of the popular aſſembly, a numerous and powerful party in the ſtate was governed rather by intereſt than by honour; and the greateſt enemies of Athenian liberty flouriſhed in the boſom of the republic. The ariſtocratical leven of the Four Hundred had infected the whole body of the ſenate; and not only the inconſtant Theramenes, but ſeveral other men of abilities and influence, who had been moſt active in ſubverting that cruel tyranny, regretted the reſtoration of democracy to a people, who (as they had recently proved in many parts of their conduct) were unable to enjoy, without abuſing, the invaluable gift of freedom. In republican governments, the misfortunes, which ought to bind all ranks of men in the firmeſt and moſt indiſſoluble union, have often little other tendency than to exaſperate the political factions which

which tear and diſtract the community. Amidſt every form of public diſtreſs, the Athenians caballed, clamoured, accuſed, and perſecuted each other; and the faction of the nobles, who acted with ſuperior concert, vigour, and addreſs, deſtroyed, by dark inſinuations, falſe witneſſes, perjury, and every other ſpecies of legal fraud and cruelty, the ſeditious Cleophon, and other turbulent demagogues, who might moſt effectually have oppoſed their meaſures[31]. CHAP. XXII.

When theſe obſtacles were removed, Theramenes (whoſe recent merit prevented the ſuſpicion of the aſſembly) propoſed an embaſſy to Lacedæmon, which ſhould requeſt a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, and obtain, if poſſible, ſome moderate terms of accommodation. He named himſelf, with nine colleagues, as the perſons beſt qualified to undertake this important commiſſion; flattering the people in the cleareſt and leaſt ambiguous terms, with an undoubted proſpect of ſucceſs. A decree was immediately paſſed, inveſting the ambaſſadors with full powers. They aſſumed the ſacred badge of their inviolable character, reached in ſafety the Spartan camp, held a conference with king Agis, and afterwards repaired to the Lacedæmonian capital. During four months they carried on their pretended negociation with the ſenate, the kings, the ephori, and eſpecially with Lyſander, whoſe authority, being unknown to the ancient conſtitution of Sparta, was far more extenſive than that of Negociation of Theramenes with the Spartans;

[31] Lyſias, p. 272.

all

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all the other magiſtrates together. With him, principally, the plan was concerted for compelling the Athenians to ſubmit to terms of peace, which they muſt have regarded as worſe, not only than war, but death [32]. The fortifications of their harbours were to be demoliſhed, as well as the long walls which joined them with the city: they were to ſurrender all their ſhips, but twelve; to reſign every pretenſion to their ancient poſſeſſions in foreign parts; to recal from baniſhment the ſurviving members of the late tyrannical ariſtocracy; to follow the ſtandard of Sparta in war; and, in peace, to mould their political conſtitution after the model which that victorious republic might think fit to preſcribe.

which is confirmed by the Athenians.

When Theramenes produced theſe unexpected fruits of his boaſted negociation, the Athenians had no longer either ſtrength or ſpirit to reſiſt, or even courage to die. During the long abſence of their ambaſſadors, the ſiege had been carried on with redoubled vigour. The Lacedæmonians, reinforced by the Thebans, as well as by their numerous allies of Peloponneſus, had invefted the city on every ſide, the harbours were cloſely blocked up by Lyſander, who had become maſter of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis; iſlands ſo near to Athens that they were almoſt regarded as a part of the Attic territory. The greateſt miſery prevailed within the walls; the famine was intolerable, and the diſeaſes more intolerable than the fa-

[32] Lyſias againſt Eratoſthenes, p. 273.

mine.

mine. The full period of thrice nine years had elapſed, which, if we may credit a moſt accurate and faithful hiſtorian[33], had been aſſigned by repeated oracles and predictions, as the deſtined term of the Peloponneſian war and of the Athenian greatneſs. The principal leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the perfidious ſnares of their opponents, who were prepared to bear a foreign yoke, provided they might uſurp domeſtic tyranny. That odious faction was ready to approve the meaſures of Theramenes, who might intimidate the dejected aſſembly by declaring (a moſt melancholy truth) that the ſeverity of the Lacedæmonians, exceſſive as it ſeemed, was yet moderation and lenity when compared with the furious and unextinguiſhable rage of the Thebans and Corinthians, who maintained that the Athenians deſerved not any terms of accommodation; that their crimes ought to be perſecuted with unrelenting vengeance; their proud city demoliſhed with ſuch perfect deſtruction, that not even its veſtige ſhould remain; and the inſolent inhabitants utterly extirpated from Greece, which they had ſo long diſturbed by their ambition, and provoked by their tyranny and cruelty. Such an argument Theramenes might have

33 The words of Thucydides, l. v. p. 362. are very remarkable. "He remembers, that from the firſt commencement of hoſtilities, it had been conſtantly propheſied that the war would laſt thrice nine years; which, of all predictions, was *alone* firm and ſtable;" or as the idiom of the Greek language will bear, "the moſt firm and ſtable."

employed,

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employed, if it had been neceſſary to employ any argument, to juſtify his negociation with the Spartans, which was confirmed and ratified by the voice of the ariſtocratical cabal, and ſubmitted to, rather than accepted, by the majority of the aſſembly, with the gloomy ſilence of deſpair.

Athens ſurrenders—its humiliation excites the compaſſion of its enemies. Olymp. xciv. 1. A.C. 404.

On the ſixteenth of May, the day on which the Athenians had been accuſtomed to celebrate the anniverſary of the immortal victory of Salamis, the hoſtile armament took poſſeſſion of their harbours; the combined army entered their gates. The walls and fortreſſes of the city of Minerva, which the generous magnanimity of its inhabitants, preferring the public ſafety to their own, had abandoned in defence of Greece to the fury of a barbarian invader, were ungratefully levelled to the ground by the implacable reſentment of the Greeks; who executed their deſtructive purpoſe with all the eagerneſs of emulation, boaſting, amidſt the triumphs of martial muſic, that the demolition of Athens would be regarded, in ſucceeding ages, as the true æra of Grecian freedom. Yet after they had ſatisfied their vengeance, they ſeemed to regret its effects. The day was concluded with a magnificent feſtival, in which the recitation of the poets formed, as uſual, the principal ornament of the entertainment. Among other pieces was rehearſed the Electra of Euripides, and particularly that affecting chorus, "We come, O daughter of Agamemnon! to thy ruſtic and humble roof." The words were ſcarcely uttered, when

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when the whole aſſembly melted into tears, the forlorn condition of that young and virtuous princeſs, expelled the royal palace of her father, and inhabiting a miſerable cottage, in want and wretchedneſs, recalling the dreadful viciſſitude of fortune which had befallen Athens, once miſtreſs of the ſea, and ſovereign of Greece, but deprived, in one fatal hour, of her ſhips, her walls, and her ſtrength, and reduced from the pride of power and proſperity, to miſery, dependence, and ſervitude, without exerting one memorable effort to brighten the laſt moment of her deſtiny, and to render her fall illuſtrious [14].

14 Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. c. i. & ſeqq. Diodor. l. xiii. 104—107. Plut. in Lyſand. p. 438. Lyſias in Eratoſth. & Agorat.

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Rapacity and Cruelty of the Spartan Government.—The Thirty Tyrants in Athens.—Perſecution of Lyſias and his Family.—Theramenes oppoſes the Tyrants.—Sanguinary Speech of Critias.—Death of Theramenes.—Perſecution and Death of Alcibiades.—Thraſybulus ſeizes Phylé—Defeats the Tyrants.—Memorable Speech of Thraſybulus.—Oath of Amneſty—not faithfully obſerved.

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The rapacity and cruelty of the Spartan government.

THE conqueſt of Athens, and the acknowledged dominion of Sparta, terminated the memorable war of twenty-ſeven years. It ſtill remained for Lyſander to reduce the iſland of Samos [1], which enjoys the honourable diſtinction of being the laſt ſettlement in the Eaſt that defied the ambition of Pericles, and the laſt which ſubmitted to the arms of Lyſander. The conquered iſlands and cities ſuffered ſtill greater vexations, under the Spartan, than they had done under the Athenian, empire. Among the hoſtile fac-

[1] Comp. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 461. & Plut. iii. p. 31. in Lyſand. Lyſias adv. Eratoſth. p. 274. & Diodor. p. 396. It is remarkable, that Xenophon and Lyſias, both contemporaries, ſhould differ in a matter of chronology; the one placing the conqueſt of Samos before, and the other after, Lyſander's voyage to Athens.

tions

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tions[2] which ambition or danger had formed in thoſe turbulent republics, Lyſander always preferred that party which poſſeſſed moſt craft and leaſt patriotiſm. At the head of this cabal, he placed a Spartan Harmoſtes, or governor, on whoſe obſequious cruelty he could depend. The citadels were garriſoned by mercenaries; a tyrannical faction inſulted as ſubjects, thoſe whom they had envied as rivals, or dreaded as enemies; and every ſpecies of licence and diſorder was exerciſed, with a preſumption that could be equalled only by the tameneſs with which it was endured[3]. The Aſiatic Greeks regretted the diſhonourable yoke of Perſia; they regretted the ſtern dominion of Athens; both which ſeemed tolerable evils, compared to the oppreſſive cruelty of Sparta and Lyſander. The contributions, of which they had formerly ſo much complained, no longer appeared exorbitant. Lyſander was the firſt and the laſt conqueror who impoſed on thoſe feeble communities the enormous tribute of a thouſand talents[4].

The

[2] Theſe were the συνωμοσίαι επι δικαις και αρχαις, mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon; "aſſociations, or rather conſpiracies, for mutual defence in courts of juſtice, and for mutual aſſiſtance in obtaining offices of power."

[3] Inſtead of the ſweet draught of Liberty, Sparta, according to Theopompus, gave Greece the bitter cup of Slavery. In the city of Miletus, he ſacrificed at once eight hundred men, of the democratical faction, to the implacable rage of their adverſaries. Plut. in Lyſand.

[4] Diodorus, p. 400. ſays, πλειω των χιλιων ταλαντων καθ' ἐνιαυτον, "more than a thouſand talents yearly;" that is, above two hundred thouſand pounds. It may be computed from Plut,

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Cauſes to which aſcribed.

The unrelenting ſeverity of Sparta has uſually been aſcribed to the perſonal character of her general, whoſe natural arrogance and cruelty were heightened and confirmed by the ſudden exaltation of his fortune. From the ſimple citizen of a ſmall, and then unfortunate republic, he became, in a few years, the arbiter of Greece. Athens acknowledged his authority; the ſmaller cities courted his protection; venal poets and orators extolled him with odes and panegyrics; he was honoured with crowns and ſtatues, and worſhipped by hymns and ſacrifices[5]. Yet it is obvious to remark, that whatever might be the temper and manners of Lyſander, his country is juſtly accountable for the wrongs which he was allowed to commit with impunity; and it is uncertain whether another general, placed in the ſame ſituation, would have acted on different principles; ſince the nature of the Spartan inſtitutions, and the ambitious views of the republic, ſeemed to demand and juſtify uncommon exertions of ſeverity. In the adminiſtration of their domeſtic government, five or ſix thouſand Spartans tyranniſed over thirty thouſand Lacedæ-

in Lyſand. & Xenoph. p. 462. that Lyſander ſent home a ſtill larger ſum after the ſurrender of Samos. The law of Lycurgus reſpecting gold and ſilver, which had been long virtually, was now formally aboliſhed. The uſe of the precious metals was allowed to the ſtate, but forbidden to individuals, under pain of death. The prohibition, however, was univerſally diſregarded; many Spartans poſſeſſed abundance of gold and ſilver; none incurred the penalty of the law. Compar. Plut. & Xenoph. loc. citat. & Iſocrat. in Archidam.

5 Plut. in Lyſand.

monians;

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monians; theſe tyranniſed, with ſtill greater rigour, over thrice that number of ſlaves; and it was natural to expect, that when the ſlaves were aſſociated with the troops[6], all theſe deſcriptions of men, Spartans, Lacedæmonians, and Helots, would tyranniſe, with the emulation of cruelty, over their conquered ſubjects.

The deep impreſſion which they made on contemporaries.

The ſcanty materials of ancient hiſtory cannot enable us minutely to explain the humiliation and diſtreſs of the Aſiatic Greeks, oppreſſed by the double tyranny of the Spartans, and of their fellow-citizens. Contemporary writers, who beheld this ſcene of miſery and deſolation, ſeem at a loſs for words to impreſs its horror. Iſocrates endeavours to graſp the amplitude of the ſubject in the vague language of general deſcription; by ſtrokes of exaggeration and hyperbole, he ſupplies the place of clear and poſitive information; but all the copiouſneſs and energy of the Greek tongue ſink beneath the heavy afflictions of that unfortunate people; and the mind of the orator ſeems to labour with a thought which he is unable to expreſs[7]. It is

[6] The Helots then took the title of νεοδαμωδεις, Libertini, δυνανται δε το νεοδαμωδες ελευθερον πη ειναι. Thucydid. l. v. p. 533. From ſome paſſages in Iſocrates (Panegyr. & de Pace), it ſhould ſeem that Lyſander often appointed theſe freed men to offices of great truſt and authority.

[7] See the oration of Iſocrates on the peace, p. 171, &c. In the panegyric of Athens, ſpeaking of the ariſtocratical factions ſupported by Lyſander and the Lacedæmonians, Iſocrates ſays, they conſiſted of wretches, "whoſe cruelty and injuſtice are unexampled in the hiſtory of mankind. From what indignity did they abſtain? Into what exceſſes were they not tranſported? They,

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is not, however, from ſuch rhetorical deſcriptions that we can attain an adequate and ſatisfactory knowledge of the Spartan adminiſtration; hiſtory delights in plain and authentic facts; and the rigorous treatment of the Athenians themſelves, will beſt repreſent the hardſhips inflicted on their Aſiatic colonies and dependencies.

The thirty tyrants in Athens. Olymp. xciv. 1. A.C. 404.

The Athenians had ſurrendered their fleet; their walls and harbours were demoliſhed; their citadel was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garriſon, commanded by Callibius, the friend of Lyſander; and their government was uſurped by thirty men, the dependants and creatures of Sparta. The furious and profligate Critias formed a proper head for this ariſtocratical council, whoſe members have been juſtly branded in hiſtory under the name of the Thirty Tyrants [8]. On pretence of delivering the ſtate from the malice of informers, and the turbulence of ſeditious demagogues, they deſtroyed the moſt valuable portion of the community [9]. Niceratus, the ſon of Nicias, and a ſon who inherited not only the opulence, but the virtues of

They, who regarded the moſt factious as the moſt faithful; the moſt treacherous as the moſt deſerving. Their crimes proved infectious, and changed the mildneſs of human nature into ſavage ferocity," &c. See p. 52, &c.

8 Their names are preſerved in Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 3.

9 Xenoph. p. 462. which Cæſar, ap. Salluſt. de Bello Catil. c. 51. evidently had in view, "Lacedæmonii devictis Athenienſibus, triginta viros impoſuere. . . . . Hi primo cœpere peſſimum quemque, & omnibus inviſum, indemnatum necare. Eo populus lætari, & merito dicere fieri. Poſt ubi paullatim licentia crevit juxta bonos & malos libidinoſe interficere. . . . . Ita civitas, ſervitute oppreſſa, ſtultæ lætitiæ graves pœnas dedit."

his

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his illuſtrious father, was condemned to death; Leon, the moſt public-ſpirited, and Antiphon, the moſt eloquent of his contemporaries, ſhared the ſame fate; Thraſybulus and Anytus were baniſhed. Whoever was known to be powerful, was regarded as dangerous; whoever was ſuppoſed to be rich, was accuſed as criminal. Strangers and citizens were involved in one promiſcuous ruin [10].

Illuſtrated by the perſecution of Lyſias and his family.

Amidſt this general wreck of whatever was moſt worthy and reſpectable, I ſhall ſelect the perſecution of Lyſias and his family, the only tranſaction of that kind, recorded with ſuch circumſtances as anſwer the ends of hiſtory. Cephalus, the father of that ingenious orator, was by birth a Syracuſan. The friendſhip of Pericles perſuaded him to ſettle in Athens, where, under the protection of that powerful ſtateſman, he obtained wealth and honours. His inoffenſive and generous character eſcaped the enmity and perſecution to which the opulent Athenians were commonly expoſed; and he enjoyed the rare felicity of living thirty years in the midſt of continual trials and impeachments, without being obliged to appear as plaintiff or defendant in any litigation. His ſons, Lyſias and Polemarchus, inherited his innocence, his generoſity, and his good fortune. Though poſſeſſed of the moſt valuable accompliſhments, natural and acquired, the brothers prudently kept aloof from the dangerous paths of public life; contented

[10] Xenoph. l. ii. p. 463, & ſeqq.

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with their domeſtic felicity, they aſpired not to the rank of Athenian citizens; but liberally contributed to ſupply the exigencies of the ſtate, from the profits of a flouriſhing manufacture of ſhields, which they carried on by the labour of an hundred and twenty ſlaves. The cruelty of the thirty tyrants, from whoſe rapacious eye neither obſcurity could conceal, nor merit defend, occaſioned the death of Polemarchus, and the immediate miſfortunes, as well as the future glory of Lyſias, who acted a diſtinguiſhed part in overturning that deteſtable tyranny, and in bringing its authors and abettors to condign puniſhment [11].

The orator's account of that matter.

The hiſtory is related by himſelf with perſpicuous preciſion and graceful ſimplicity: "The tyrants Theognis and Piſo acquainted their aſſociates, that many ſtrangers eſtabliſhed at Athens were diſaffected to the government. This was a plauſible pretence for rifling the effects of theſe unhappy men; a meaſure to which the thirty were not only excited by avarice, but prompted by fear. Money was become neceſſary for the preſervation of their power, which, being founded on uſurpation, and tyrannically adminiſtered, could only be maintained by the influence of corruption, and the mercenary aid of foreign troops. The life of man, therefore, they regarded as a matter of little moment; the amaſſing of wealth was the principal object of their deſire; to gratify which, ten ſtrangers were at once devoted to deſtruction. In this num-

[11] See the Life of Lyſias, and the Orations there referred to, p. 110, & ſeqq.

ber,

ber, indeed, were two poor men; a baſe and cruel artifice to perſuade you, Athenians! that the remaining eight had been condemned, not for the ſake of their riches, but in order to preſerve the public tranquillity; as if the intereſt of the public had ever been the concern of that tyrannical cabal! Their infamous deſign was executed with inhuman cruelty. Their victims were taken in their beds, at ſupper, in the privacy of domeſtic retirement. Me they ſeized exerciſing the rites of hoſpitality; my gueſts were rudely diſmiſſed; I was delivered into the cuſtody of the worthleſs Piſo. While his accomplices continued in the workſhop, taking a liſt of our ſlaves and effects, I aſked him, "Whether money could ſave my life?" "Yes, a conſiderable ſum." "I will give you a talent of ſilver." This he conſented to accept, as the price of my ſafety; and to ſuch a melancholy ſituation was I reduced, that it afforded me a momentary conſolation to depend on the precarious faith of a man, who (as I well knew) deſpiſed every law, human and divine. But my comfort was of ſhort duration; for I had no ſooner opened my coffer to pay him the talent, than he ordered his attendant to ſeize the contents, conſiſting of three talents of ſilver, an hundred Daricks, three hundred Cyzicenes, and three ſilver cups. I intreated Piſo to allow me a ſmall ſum to defray the expence of my journey. But he defired me to be thankful to eſcape with my life. Going out together, we met the tyrants Melobius and Mneſitheides, returning from the workſhop. They enquired,

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quired, where we were going? Piſo anſwered, to examine the houſe of my brother Polemarchus. They deſired him to proceed; but commanded me to follow them to the houſe of Damaſippus. Piſo whiſpered me to be ſilent, and to fear nothing, becauſe he would immediately come there. Upon our arrival, we found Theognis guarding ſeveral of my companions in calamity. I increaſed the number of his priſoners; but obtained an opportunity to repreſent my innocence and misfortunes to Damaſippus, intreating him, by our paſt friendſhip, to employ his influence in my behalf. He aſſured me of his intention to intercede with Theognis, whoſe avarice would eaſily perſuade him to betray his truſt. While they converſed on this ſubject, I took advantage of my knowledge of the houſe to eſcape through three ſecret paſſages, which all happened to be open and unguarded; and fortunately reaching the country-houſe of my friend Archimaus, a ſhip-maſter, ſent him to the city, that he might bring me intelligence of my brother. He diſcovered, that the tyrant Eratoſthenes had dragged him from the road, and conducted him to priſon, where he was ordered to drink hemlock. At this melancholy news, I ſailed to Megara, under cover of the night. Our effects became the property of the tyrants, whoſe mean avarice ſpared not the ſmalleſt trifle belonging to us. Even the gold ear-rings of Polemarchus's wife were forcibly torn away by the brutal Melobius [12]."

[12] See the diſcourſes of Lyſias againſt Agoratus and Eratoſthenes, p. 258, & ſeqq.

The

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Theramenes oppoſes the tyrants.

The Thirty juſtified theſe abominable acts of cruelty by the authority of a ſervile ſenate, which they ſtill allowed to ſubſiſt as the inſtrument and accomplice of their tyranny. It could not be expected, however, that in a city accuſtomed to the utmoſt liberty of opinion and freedom of debate, a body of five hundred, or even of thirty men, ſhould continue to agree in the ſame odious and oppreſſive meaſures. The firſt ſeeds of diſcord, or rather the firſt ſymptoms of repentance, appeared in the ſpeeches and behaviour of the bold and active Theramenes; who, though the principal author of the uſurpation, was already diſpoſed by the humanity of his nature, or by the ſingular inconſtancy of his temper [13], to deſtroy the work of his own hands. His ſtrenuous endeavours were uſed to ſave the innocent and unhappy victims whom his furious colleagues daily devoted to deſtruction; under his protection the citizens aſſembled, and expreſſed their reſentment or deſpair; and it was juſtly apprehended that the government of the Thirty might be diſſolved by the ſame means, and by the ſame man, who had ſet on foot and ſubverted the ſhort-lived tyranny of the four hundred. The preſent uſurpation, indeed, was defended by a Lacedæmonian garriſon; but the Thirty dreaded the influence of Theramenes over

[13] Thucydid. viii. 68, & ſeqq. Lyſias adverſ. Eratoſth. Xenophon paints him more favourably; and Ariſtot. apud Plut. iii. 337. & Diodor. p. 350, & ſeqq. ſtill more favourably than Xenophon.

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the foreign troops; they dreaded ſtill more his influence over the Athenian citizens. When they conſidered the precarious tenure of their authority, and the unjuſt violence of their adminiſtration, they reflected on the paſt with pain, and viewed the future with terror. But they had gone too far to retreat, and nothing remained but to prop the tottering fabric of their power by enlarging its baſe. Three thouſand citizens were invited to participate in the advantages and dangers of their government. The reſt were diſarmed and treated with an increaſe of ſeverity.

He is accuſed by Critias.

Theramenes vainly oppoſed the criminal deſigns of his colleagues, who implicitly ſubmitted their opinions to the implacable fury of Critias. He it was who chiefly encouraged them boldly to perſevere, and to remove every obſtacle to the unlimited gratification of their paſſions. The ſafety of Theramenes, he aſſured them, was no longer compatible with their own. His delicacy, real or affected, was totally inconſiſtent with the ſpirit of the preſent adminiſtration; nor could the government of Thirty, any more than that of *one* tyrant, admit of being curiouſly canvaſſed, or faſtidiouſly oppoſed. Theſe ſentiments being received with approbation, we might expect that Theramenes ſhould have been deſtroyed by that ſudden and open violence which had proved fatal to ſo many others. But as the moſt daring violators of the laws of ſociety are obliged to eſtabliſh and obſerve ſome rules of juſtice, in their conduct towards each other, it had been reſolved by the Thirty, that,

that, amidſt the violent and capricious outrages which they committed againſt their ſubjects, none of their own number ſhould be put to death without the benefit of a trial before the ſenate; a privilege extending to the three thouſand intruſted with the uſe of arms, and ſufficiently denoting the miſerable condition of the other citizens. The ſenate was aſſembled to try Theramenes; but this tribunal was ſurrounded by armed men. When the pretended criminal appeared, Critias addreſſed the court in a ſpeech too remarkable ever to be forgotten.

Sanguinary ſpeech of Critias.

"Should you imagine, O ſenators! conſidering the great numbers who have ſuffered death, that we have been guilty of unneceſſary cruelty, you will alter that opinion on reflecting that revolutions of government muſt always be attended with bloodſhed; but particularly when a populous city like Athens, which has been long pampered with liberty, is reduced under the dominion of a few. The actual form of adminiſtration was impoſed by the Lacedæmonians as the condition of the public ſafety. In order to maintain its authority we have removed thoſe ſeditious demagogues, whoſe democratical madneſs hath occaſioned all our paſt calamities. It is our duty to proceed in this uſeful work, and to deſtroy, without fear or compaſſion, all who would diſturb the public tranquillity. Should a man of this dangerous diſpoſition be found in our own order, he ought to be puniſhed with double rigour, and treated not only as an enemy but as a traitor. That Theramenes is liable

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to this accuſation appears from the whole tenour of his conduct. He concluded the treaty with the Lacedæmonians; he diſſolved the popular government; he directed and approved the firſt and boldeſt meaſures of our adminiſtration: but no ſooner did difficulties ariſe than he deſerted his aſſociates, declared his oppoſition to their deſigns, and undertook the protection of the populace. When the weather was fair and favourable, he purſued the ſame courſe with his companions, but, on the firſt change of wind, he thought proper to alter his navigation. With ſuch an irreſolute ſteerſman it is impoſſible to govern the helm of the republic, and to guide the veſſel to her deſtined harbour. This dangerous inconſiſtency ought, indeed, to have been expected from a man to whoſe character perfidy is congenial. He began his political career under the direction of his father Hagnon, a violent partiſan of democracy. He afterwards changed his ſyſtem, in order to obtain the favour of the nobles. He both eſtabliſhed and diſſolved the government of the four hundred; and the whole ſtrain of his behaviour proves him unfit to govern, and unworthy to live [14]."

Therameneſ's defence.

Theramenes made a copious and perſuaſive defence, acknowledging, "That he had often changed his conduct, but denying that he had ever varied his principles. When the democracy flouriſhed, he had maintained the juſt rights, but repreſſed the inſolence, of the people. When it

[14] Xenoph. p. 464—466.

became

became neceſſary to alter the form of the republic, in compliance with the command of the Spartans, he had ſupported the legal power, but oppoſed the tyranny, of the magiſtrates. Under every adminiſtration of government he had approved himſelf the friend of moderation and juſtice, which he ſtill continued, and ever would continue, to recommend and enforce, convinced that thoſe virtues alone could give ſtability and permanence to any ſyſtem of government, whether ariſtocratical or popular."

Theramenes dragged to execution.

The ſenators murmured applauſe, unawed by the preſence of Critias and his aſſociates. But this furious tyrant made a ſignal to the armed men, who ſurrounded the ſenate houſe, to ſhew the points of their daggers; and then ſtepping forward, ſaid, "It is the duty, O ſenators! of a prudent magiſtrate, to prevent the deception and danger of his friends. The countenance of thoſe brave youths (pointing to his armed partiſans) ſufficiently diſcovers that they will not permit you to ſave a man who is manifeſtly ſubverting the government: I, therefore, with the general conſent, ſtrike the name of Theramenes from the liſt of thoſe who have a right to be tried before the ſenate; and, with the approbation of my colleagues, I condemn him to immediate death." Rouſed by this unexpected and bloody ſentence, Theramenes ſtarted from his ſeat, and ſprang to the altar of the ſenate-houſe, at once imploring the compaſſion, and urging the intereſt of the ſpectators, whoſe names, he obſerved, might be ſtruck out, and

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and whoſe lives might be ſacrificed, as unjuſtly and cruelly as his own. But the terror of armed violence prevented any aſſiſtance or interceſſion; and the eleven men (for thus the Athenian delicacy ſtyled the executioners of public juſtice) dragged him from the altar, and hurried him to execution.

His death.

In proceeding through the market-place the unhappy victim of tyranny invoked the favour and gratitude of his fellow-citizens, who had often been protected by his eloquence, and defended by his valour. But the impudent Satyrus, the chief miniſter of vengeance both in authority and cruelty, ſternly told him, that if he continued his lamentations and uproar he ſhould ſoon cry in good earneſt[15]: "And ſhall I not," ſaid Theramenes, "though I remain ſilent?" When he drank the fatal hemlock, he poured a libation on the ground with a health to the honeſt Critias; circumſtances unworthy to relate, if they proved not, that even in his laſt moments, he was forſaken neither by his facetiouſneſs nor by his fortitude[16].

[15] Ὅτι οἰμωξοῖτο, εἰ μὴ σιωπήσειε. Literally, that he would cry out unleſs he were ſilent. The inaccurate language of the executioner furniſhed occaſion to the ſmart reply of Theramenes.

[16] Xenoph. p. 470. The glorious death of Theramenes cancelled the imperfections of his life. That his character was inconſtant, moſt writers allow. Lyſias adverſus Eratoſthen. accuſes him of many deliberate crimes; but he died in a virtuous cauſe, and, however he acted, left the ſcene gracefully. "Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo eſt! Etſi enim flemus, cum legimus, tamen non miſerabiliter vir clarus moritur." Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt.

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The death of Theramenes delivered the tyrants from the only reſtraint which tended to controul their inſolence, and to moderate their cruelty. They might now indulge in all the licentiouſneſs of outrage, without the fear of reproach or the danger of reſiſtance. Their miſerable ſubjects were driven from the city, from the Piræus, from their houſes, their farms, and their villages, which were divided among the deteſtable inſtruments of an odious uſurpation. Nor did the tyrants ſtop here. A mandate was publiſhed, enforced by the authority of the Spartan ſenate, prohibiting any Grecian city to receive the unfortunate fugitives. But this inhuman order was almoſt univerſally diſobeyed; the ſacred laws of hoſpitality prevailed over the terror of an unjuſt decree; Thebes, Argos, and Megara, were crowded with Athenian exiles [17].

Exceſſive cruelty of the tyrants.

In exerciſing thoſe abominable acts of cruelty, the Thirty probably conſulted the immediate ſafety of their perſons, but they precipitated the downfal of their power. The oppreſſed Athenians, whoſe ſufferings ſeemed no longer tolerable, required only a leader to rouſe them to arms, and to conduct them to victory and to vengeance. This danger the tyrants had greater reaſon to apprehend, ſince they could not expect a reinforcement to the garriſon, while the efforts of Lyſander and the Spartans were principally directed towards the extenſion of their Aſiatic conqueſts. The abilities

They dread the machinations of Alcibiades.

[17] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 236.

and

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and reſentment of Alcibiades pointed him out as the perſon beſt qualified to undertake the arduous and honourable deſign of reaſſembling the fugitives, and of animating them with courage to recover their loſt country. That illuſtrious exile had been driven from his Thracian fortreſs by the terror of the Lacedæmonians, then maſters of the Helleſpont, and had acquired a ſettlement under the protection of Pharnabazus, in the little village of Grynium in Phrygia, where, undiſturbed by the dangerous contentions of war and politics, he enjoyed an obſcure happineſs in the boſom of love and friendſhip. But the cruel fears of the tyrants purſued him to this laſt retreat.

His death,

Lyſander told Pharnabazus that the ſacrifice of Alcibiades was neceſſary for the ſafety of that form of goverment which had been recently eſtabliſhed in Athens, and which it was the intereſt both of Sparta and of Perſia to maintain. A private reaſon (which will afterwards appear) prevailed with the ſatrap to pay immediate attention to this bloody advice. A band of armed Phrygians was ſent to ſurpriſe and deſtroy Alcibiades. Such was the fame of his proweſs, that theſe timid aſſaſſins durſt not attack him in broad day, or by open force. They choſe the obſcurity of night to ſurround and ſet fire to his houſe, which, according to the faſhion of the country, was chiefly compoſed of light and combuſtible materials. The crackling noiſe of the flames alarmed Alcibiades, whoſe own treacherous character rendered him always ſuſpicious of

of treachery. He ſnatched his ſword, and, twiſting his mantle round his left arm, ruſhed through the flaming edifice, followed by his faithful Arcadian friend, and by his affectionate miſtreſs Timandra [18]. The cowardice of the Phrygians, declining to meet the fury of his aſſault, covered him with a ſhower of javelins. But even theſe Barbarians ſpared the weakneſs and the ſex of Timandra, whoſe tears and entreaties obtained the melancholy conſolation of burying her unfortunate lover; a man whoſe various character can only be repreſented in the wonderful viciſſitudes of his life and fortune; and who, though eminently adorned with the advantages of birth, wealth, valour, and eloquence, and endowed with uncommon gifts of nature and acquirements of art, yet deficient in diſcretion and probity, involved his country and himſelf in inextricable calamities. CHAP. XXIII. and character.

Although the life of Alcibiades had been highly pernicious to his country, his death, at this particular juncture, might be regarded as a misfortune, had not the Athenian exiles at Thebes been headed by a man who poſſeſſed his excellencies, unmingled with his defects and vices. The enterpriſing courage of Thraſybulus was animated by the love of liberty; and while he generally followed [19] the rules of juſtice and humanity, he had magnanimity to conceive, abilities to conduct, and perſeverance to accompliſh, the boldeſt and moſt Thraſybulus, with a handful of fugitives, ſeizes Phyla.

[18] Corn. Nepos, & Plut. in Alcibiad.

[19] His conduct, as will appear hereafter, was not uniform.

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arduous deſigns. Having communicated his intentions to the unhappy fugitives in Thebes and Megara, he encouraged a body of ſeventy intrepid followers to ſeize the important fortreſs of Phyla, ſituate on the Bœotian and Athenian frontier.

The tyrants baffled in their attempts to diſlodge them.

This daring enterpriſe alarmed the tyrants, who marched forth with the flower of their troops to diſlodge the new garriſon. But the natural ſtrength of the place baffled their aſſault; and, when they determined to inveſt it, the unexpected violence of a tempeſt, accompanied with an extraordinary fall of ſnow [20], obliged them to deſiſt from their undertaking. They returned with precipitation to Athens, leaving behind part of their attendants and baggage, which fell a prey to the garriſon of Phyla; the ſtrength of which continually augmented by the confluence of Athenian exiles, and ſoon increaſed from ſeventy, to ſeven hundred men.

Thraſybulus ſurpriſes and defeats the enemy.

The tyrants had juſt reaſon to apprehend that theſe daring invaders might ravage the ſurrounding country, and even attack the capital. Alarmed by this danger they diſpatched ſeveral troops of horſe, with the greater part of their Lacedæmonian mercenaries, who encamped in a woody country, at the diſtance of fifteen furlongs from Phyla, in order to watch the motions and repreſs the incurſions of the enemy. But theſe forces, which had been ſent to guard the territory and city from ſurpriſe,

[20] Επιγίγνεται της νυκτος χιων παμπληθης. Xenoph. p. 471.

were

were themſelves ſurpriſed by Thraſybulus, who ſilently marched forth in the night, poſted his men amidſt the concealed intricacies of the foreſt, and ſuddenly attacked the Lacedæmonians before they had time to recollect themſelves, or even to ſtand to their arms. The dread of an ambuſh probably prevented the wary general from following them to any great diſtance from the garriſon. An hundred and twenty men were ſlain in the purſuit; a trophy was erected; the baggage and arms were conveyed in triumph to Phyla [21]. CHAP. XXIII.

The news of this diſaſter inſpired the Thirty with ſuch terror that they no longer regarded a demoliſhed city like Athens as proper for their reſidence. They determined to remove to the neighbouring town of Eleuſis, which, in caſe of extremity, ſeemed more capable of defence. The three thouſand, who were entruſted with the uſe of arms, accompanied them thither, and aſſiſted them in treacherouſly putting to death all ſuch of the Eleuſinians as were thought diſaffected to the uſurpation. Under pretence of muſtering the inhabitants, thoſe unhappy men were ſingly conducted through a narrow gate leading to the ſhore, where they were ſucceſſively diſarmed, bound, and executed, by the cruel inſtruments of tyranny [22]. The tyrants remove to Eleuſis.

Meanwhile the garriſon of Phyla continually received new reinforcements. The orator Lyſias, whoſe domeſtic ſufferings have been recently deThraſybulus marches to the Piræus.

[21] Xenoph. p. 471. [22] Id. ibid.

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ſcribed, collected three hundred men to take vengeance on the murderers of his brother, and the authors of his own baniſhment[23]. Theſe uſeful ſupplies encouraged Thraſybulus to attempt ſurpriſing the Piræus, the inhabitants of which, conſiſting chiefly of tradeſmen, merchants, and mariners, bore with great impatience and indignation the injuries of a ſubordinate council of Ten, the obſequious imitators of the Thirty. This enterpriſe was crowned with ſucceſs, although the tyrants brought forth their whole force to oppoſe it. Having intercepted their march to the place, Thraſybulus occupied a riſing ground, which gave him a deciſive advantage in the engagement.

Addreſſes his followers in ſight of the enemy.

Before leading his men to action, he animated their valour and reſentment, by reminding them, that the enemy on the right conſiſted of thoſe Lacedæmonians whom only five days before they had ſhamefully routed and put to flight; that the troops on the left were commanded by the Thirty tyrants, who had unjuſtly driven them into baniſhment, confiſcated their property, and murdered their deareſt friends. "But the gods have finally given us the opportunity (long ardently deſired) to face our oppreſſors with arms in our hands, and to take vengeance on their multiplied wickedneſs and cruelty. When they inveſted us at Phyla, the gods, conſulting our ſafety, ruffled the ſerenity

[23] Juſtin. l. v. c. ix. The compiler, with his uſual inaccuracy, ſays, Lyſias *Syracuſanus* orator.

of

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of the ſky with an unexpected tempeſt. The aſſiſtance of Heaven enabled us, with a handful of men, to raiſe a trophy over our numerous foes; and the ſame divine Providence ſtill favours us with the moſt manifeſt marks of partiality. The enemy are drawn up in a deep and cloſe array; they muſt be obliged to aſcend the eminence; the javelins of their rear cannot reach beyond their van; while, from the reverſe of theſe circumſtances, no weapon of ours needs be diſcharged in vain. Let us avail ourſelves, therefore, of an arrangement evidently produced by the favour of Heaven; each ſoldier remembering, that he never can atchieve a more honourable victory, or obtain a more glorious tomb [24]."

The tyrants defeated.

The revered authority of the prieſt enforced the exhortation of the general. He promiſed them complete ſucceſs, provided they forbore to charge till one of their men were killed or wounded: "Then," added he, "I will conduct you on to victory, though I myſelf ſhall fall." He had ſcarcely ended, when the enemy threw their javelins; upon which, as if guided by a divine impulſe, he ruſhed forward to the attack. Both parts of his prediction were accompliſhed. The battle was neither long nor bloody; but Critias and Hippomachus, the two moſt violent of the tyrants, were left among the ſlain. Thraſybulus judiouſly avoided to purſue the ſcattered fugitives, who be-

[24] Xenoph. p. 473. & Diodor. l. xiv, p. 414.

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ing ſuperior in number, might ſtill rally and renew the battle, if he quitted the advantage of the ground. But having proceeded to the foot of the hill, he ſtopped the ardour of his troops, and commanded the herald Cleocritus to proclaim with a loud voice, "Wherefore, Athenians! would you fly from your countrymen? Wherefore have you driven them from the city? Why do you thirſt for their blood? We are all united by religious, civil, and domeſtic ties. Often, with combined arms, have we fought, by ſea and land, to defend our common country and common freedom. Even in this unnatural civil war, excited and fomented by the ambition of impious and abominable tyrants, who have ſhed more blood in eight months, than the Peloponneſians, our public enemies, in ten years, we have lamented your misfortunes as much as our own; nor is there a man whom you have left on the field of battle, whoſe death does not excite our ſympathy, and increaſe our affliction." The tyrants, dreading the effect of a proclamation well calculated to ſow the ſeeds of diſaffection, led off their troops with great precipitation; and Thraſybulus, without ſtripping the dead, marched to the Piræus [25].

His proclamation to the vanquiſhed.

Next day the Thirty, ſhamefully diſcomfited in the engagement, and deprived of Critias, their furious but intrepid leader, took their melancholy ſeats in council with ſtrong indications of expected ruin. Their unfortunate ſubjects accuſed their

Government of the Decemvirs,

[25] Xenoph. p. 474.

com-

commanders, and each other; a new ſedition aroſe; nor was the ferment allayed, until the tyrants had been deprived of their dignity, and ten magiſtrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their room[26]. The ſurviving tyrants, with thoſe who were too cloſely united with them in guilt, not to be united in intereſt, fled to Eleuſis. CHAP. XXIII.

It might be expected that the Decemvirs, who now aſſumed the government, ſhould have been deterred from injuſtice by the fatal example of their predeceſſors. But in the turbulent republics of Greece, however free in theory, men were little acquainted with the benefits of practical liberty. Whether the nobles, or people, or a prevailing faction of either; whatever party in the ſtate obtained the chief adminiſtration, their authority was almoſt alike oppreſſive and tyrannical. Alternately maſters and ſlaves, thoſe fierce republicans were either unable or unwilling to draw that deciſive and impervious line between the power of government, and the liberty of the ſubject; a line which forms the only ſolid barrier of an uniform, conſiſtent, and rational freedom. as violent as that of the Thirty.

The Ten had no ſooner been inveſted with the enſigns of command, than they ſhewed an equal inclination with the Thirty to obey the Lacedæmonians, and to tyranniſe over their fellow-citizens[27]. After various ſkirmiſhes, which hap- Lyſander marches to the Piræus.

[26] Xenoph. p. 474. & Iſocrat. ii. p. 426.
[27] Lyſias adverſ. Eratoſth. p. 212, & ſeqq.

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pened in the courſe of two weeks, and generally proved honourable to the bravery and conduct of Thraſybulus, the tyrants both in Eleuſis and in Athens diſpatched meſſengers to ſolicit farther aſſiſtance from Sparta and Lyſander. That active and enterpriſing leader employed his uſual diligence to protect the government which he had eſtabliſhed. At the head of a powerful body of mercenaries, he marched to the Piræus, which he inveſted by land; while his brother Libys, who commanded a conſiderable ſquadron, blocked up the harbour [28].

His meaſures thwarted by Pauſanias.

Theſe vigorous exertions reſtored the hopes and courage of the tyrants; nor can it be doubted that Thraſybulus and his followers muſt have ſpeedily been compelled to ſurrender, had the Spartan commanders been allowed to act without controul. But the proud arrogance of Lyſander, and the rapacious avarice of his dependants, provoked the indignation and reſentment of whatever was moſt reſpectable in his country. The kings, magiſtrates, and ſenate, conſpired to humble his ambition; and, leſt he ſhould enjoy the glory of conquering Athens a ſecond time, Pauſanias, the moſt popular and beloved of the Spartan princes, haſtily levied the domeſtic troops, and a conſiderable body of Peloponneſian allies, and marching through the Iſthmus of Corinth encamped in the neighbourhood of Athens; little ſolicitous to in-

[28] Xenoph. p. 476. & Diodor. ubi ſupra.

creaſe

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creaſe the diſſenſions in that city, provided he could anticipate and thwart the meaſures of Lyſander.

Pauſanias eſpouſes the intereſt of Thraſybulus and his adherents. Olymp. xciv. 2. A.C. 403.

While the two Lacedæmonian armies diſcovered, in the diſtance of their encampments, a diſunion of their views and intereſts, an incident happened which determined Pauſanias to undertake the protection of Thraſybulus and his adherents; a reſolution to which he was naturally inclined from oppoſition to an envied and odious rival. Diognotus, an Athenian of an amiable and reſpectable character, brought him the children of Niceratus and Eucrates; the former the ſon, the latter the brother, of the great Nicias, with whom the Spartan king was connected by the hereditary ties of hoſpitality and friendſhip. Having placed the helpleſs infants on his knees, he conjured him, by his religious regard for the memory of their much-reſpected anceſtor, to pity their innocence and weakneſs, and to defend them againſt the cruel tyranny of a worthleſs faction, ambitious to cut off and deſtroy whatever was diſtinguiſhed by birth, wealth, or virtue [29]. This affecting ſcene, had it failed to touch the heart of Pauſanias, muſt at leaſt have afforded him a plauſible pretence for embracing the party of Thraſybulus, which numbered among its adherents the friends and family of Nicias, who had long been ſuſpected of an undue attachment to the Spartan intereſt.

[29] Lyſias adv. Poliuchum, p. 323. and the tranſlation of Lyſias, p. 231.

Before

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Commiſſioners appointed to ſettle the affairs of Athens.

Before he could fully perſuade the enemy of his favourable intentions, ſeveral bloody ſkirmiſhes were fought, in which the partiſans of democracy defended the Piræus with unequal force, but with uncommon reſolution [30]. At length Pauſanias made them underſtand, that, inſtead of deſtroying their perſons, he wiſhed to protect their liberties. In Athens his emiſſaries made known this unexpected revolution, which excited a numerous party to throw off the yoke of the tyrants, and to deſire a reconciliation with their fellow-citizens in the Piræus. The deputies were favourably received by the Spartan king, and ſent, under his protection, to propoſe overtures of accommodation to the ephori and ſenate. The meſſengers of Lyſander and the tyrants endeavoured to traverſe this negociation; but notwithſtanding *their* oppoſition, the Spartans appointed fifteen commiſſioners, who, in conjunction with Pauſanias, were empowered to ſettle the affairs of Athens [31].

This happily effected.

With the approbation, or rather by the command, of thoſe miniſters, the Athenian factions ceaſed from hoſtility; the tyrants were diveſted of their power; the foreign garriſon was withdrawn; and the popular government re-eſtabliſhed. This important revolution was remarkable for its ſingular mildneſs. The authors and inſtruments of the moſt oppreſſive uſurpation recorded in the annals of any people were allowed to retire in ſafety to

[30] Xenoph. Diodor. Lyſias, ubi ſupra.
[31] Xenoph. p. 478.

Eleuſis.

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Eleuſis. Thraſybulus conducted a military proceſſion to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, where the acknowledgments of thanks and ſacrifice were offered to that protecting divinity, who had reſtored the virtuous exiles to their country, and healed the diviſions of the ſtate. The citizens who had been baniſhed, and thoſe who had driven them into baniſhment, joined in this ſolemn exerciſe of religious duty; after which, convening in full aſſembly, they were addreſſed by Thraſybulus in theſe memorable words:

Memorable ſpeech of Thraſybulus.

"The experience of your paſt tranſactions may enable you, men of Athens! to know each other, and to know yourſelves. On what pretence could you, who drove us from the city, abet a tyrannical faction? Why would you have enſlaved your fellow-citizens? On what ſuperiority of merit could you found your claim of dominion? Is it that you are more honeſt and virtuous? Yet the people whom you inſulted never relieved their poverty by unjuſt gain; whereas the tyrants, whom you ſerved, increaſed their wealth by the moſt oppreſſive rapacity. Is it that you are more brave and warlike? Yet this injured people, alone and unaſſiſted, and almoſt unarmed, have overcome your ſuperior numbers, reinforced by the Lacedæmonian garriſon, the powerful ſuccours of Pauſanias, and the experienced mercenaries of Lyſander. As you muſt yield the prize both of probity and of proweſs, ſo neither can you claim the honour of ſuperior prudence and ſagacity. You

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have been not only conquered in war, but overcome in negociation, by the people whom you deſpiſed; to whom your Lacedæmonian maſters have delivered you, like biting curs[32], bound and muzzled, to be juſtly puniſhed for your unprovoked inſolence and audacity. But as to you, my fellow-ſufferers and fellow-exiles! you, who ſhared the hardſhips of my baniſhment, and who now ſhare the triumph of my victorious return, I exhort you to forgive and forget our common injuries. Let the dignity of your ſentiments adorn the ſplendour of your actions. Prove yourſelves ſuperior to your enemies, not only in valour but in clemency, that moderation may produce concord, and concord ſtrength."

The amneſty

The effect of this generous enthuſiaſm, excited and diffuſed by Thraſybulus, appeared in a very extraordinary reſolution of the aſſembly. During the uſurpation of the Thirty, an hundred talents had been borrowed from the Lacedæmonians, to ſupport the rigorous cruelty of a government which had baniſhed five thouſand[33], and put to death, untried, fifteen hundred citizens. The repayment of this ſum was not to be expected from the people at large, againſt whoſe intereſt and ſafety it had been ſo notoriouſly employed. Yet the Athe-

[32] Ὥσπερ τοὺς κακίστους πλοίῳ δησαντες παρα δίδοασιν. Xenoph. Hellen. ii. ſub fin. In their compariſons the ancients, it is well known, regarded juſtneſs more than dignity.

[33] Iſocrat. in Areopag. p. 345. ſays upwards of five hundred. Diodorus ſays the one half of the citizens.

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nians unanimouſly reſolved, on this occaſion, that the money ſhould be charged indiſcriminately on them all[34]. This unexampled generoſity might have encouraged even the enfeebled party of the tyrants to return from Eleuſis. But they were too ſenſible of their guilt to expect forgiveneſs or impunity. Having fortified their inſecure reſidence, in the beſt manner that their circumſtances could permit, they began to prepare arms; to collect mercenaries; and to try, anew, the fortune of war. But their unequal hoſtility, the effect of rage and deſpair, was eaſily defeated by the vigour of the new republic. The moſt obnoxious leaders ſealed, with their blood, the ſafety of their adherents, who ſubmitted to the clemency of Thraſybulus. That fortunate and magnanimous commander generouſly undertook their cauſe, and obtained a decree of the people for reſtoring them to the city, for reinſtating them in their fortunes and privileges, and for burying in oblivion the memory of their paſt offences[35]. The aſſembly even ratified, by oath, this act

34 Iſocrates, ibid. & p. 495. of the tranſlation.

35 Among theſe offences were reckoned the arbitrary laws enacted during their uſurpation. All theſe laws were annulled, and thoſe of Solon, Cliſthenes, Pericles, &c. re-eſtabliſhed. It appears that the Athenians embraced the ſame opportunity of examining their ancient laws, aboliſhing ſuch as no longer ſuited the condition of the times, and enacting ſome new ones. Andocid. Orat. i. de Myſter. p. 212. & Demoſt. adv. Timocrat. p. 469. The year in which the democracy was reſtored, or, in other words, the archonſhip of Euclides, was regarded, therefore, as an important æra in Athenian juriſprudence. The only material alterations on record conſiſt, 1. In the law confining the right of voting in the aſſembly to thoſe born of Athenian mothers.

Former-

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act of amneſty, of which both the idea and the name have been adopted by moſt civiliſed nations, and extolled by all hiſtorians, ancient and modern; who, dazzled by the ſplendour of a tranſaction ſo honourable to Thraſybulus and to Athens, have univerſally forgot to mention, that the conditions of the amneſty were not faithfully obſerved. Yet there is the fulleſt evidence to prove [36], that, when the tyrants were no more, the abettors of their uſurpation were accuſed, convicted, and puniſhed, for crimes of which they had been promiſed indemnity by a ſolemn oath. So true it is, that the Athenians had wiſdom to diſcern, but wanted conſtancy to practiſe, the leſſons of ſound policy, or even the rules of juſtice.

not obſerved.

Formerly it ſufficed that the father was a citizen, the condition of the mother not being regarded. Athenæus, xiii. p. 285. & Mark. in Vit. Lyſiæ, p. 55. 2. In the law of Demophantus, requiring the citizens to take an oath that no perſonal danger ſhould prevent them from doing their utmoſt to deliver their country from tyrants. Vid. Lycurg. adv. Leocr. p. 180. & Andoc. de Myſt. p. 220.

[36] See Lyſias's Orations againſt Agoratus and Eratoſthenes, from p. 233 to p. 280.

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Accuſation of Socrates.—Artifices of his Accuſers.—His Defence.—Condemnation.—Addreſs to the Judges.—His Converſation in Priſon—and Death.—Tranſient Perſecution of his Diſciples.—Writings of Cebes—Æſchines.—State of Philoſophy.—Of the Fine Arts.—Of Literature.—Herodotus—Thucydides—Xenophon.—Tranſition to the public Tranſactions of Greece.—The Spartans invade Elis.—The Meſſenians driven from Greece.—Hiſtory of Cyrene—Of Sicily.—War with Carthage.—Siege of Agrigentum.—Reign of Dionyſius.—Sicily the firſt Province of Rome.

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Accuſation of Socrates. Olymp. xcv. 1. A.C. 400.

IT were well for the honour of Athens, if none but the cruel abettors of an ariſtocratical faction had experienced the unjuſt rigour of its tribunals. But among the firſt memorable tranſactions, after the re-eſtabliſhment of democracy, happened the trial and condemnation of Socrates; a man guiltleſs of every offence but that of diſgracing, by his illuſtrious merit, the vices and follies of his contemporaries. His death ſealed the inimitable virtues of his uſeful and honourable life; it ſeemed to be beſtowed as a favour, not inflicted as a puniſhment; ſince, had Socrates, who

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who had already paſſed his ſeventieth year, yielded to the decays of nature, his fame would have deſcended leſs ſplendid, certainly more doubtful, to poſterity.

Principal cauſes of that meaſure.

The remote cauſe of his perſecution was the ludicrous farce of Ariſtophanes, entitled the Clouds; to which we had occaſion formerly to allude. In this infamous performance, Socrates is introduced denying the religion of his country, corrupting the morals of his diſciples, and profeſſing the odious arts of ſophiſtry and chicane. The envy of a licentious populace, which ever attends virtue too independent to court, and too ſincere to flatter them, gradually envenomed the ſhafts of the poet, and malignantly inſinuated that the pretended ſage was really ſuch a perſon as the petulance of Ariſtophanes had deſcribed him. The calumny was greedily received, and its virulence embittered by the craft of deſigning prieſts and ambitious demagogues, as well as by the reſentment of bad poets and vain ſophiſts, whoſe pretended excellencies the diſcernment of Socrates had unmaſked, and whoſe irritable temper his ſincerity had grievouſly offended [1]. From ſuch a powerful combination it ſeems extraordinary that Socrates ſhould have lived ſo long, eſpecially ſince, during

[1] The cauſes of his perſecution, which are hinted at in Xenophon's Apology for Socrates, are more fully explained in that written by Plato. Vid. Plat. Apolog. Socrat. ſect. vi. From theſe two admirable treatiſes of practical morality, together with the firſt chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato's Phædo, the narrative in the text is principally extracted.

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the democracy, he never diſguiſed his contempt for the capricious levity, injuſtice, and cruelty of the multitude, and during the uſurpation of the Thirty openly arraigned the vices, and defied the authority of thoſe odious tyrants. His long eſcape he himſelf aſcribed to his total want of ambition. Had he intermeddled in public affairs, and endeavoured, by arming himſelf with authority, to withſtand the corruptions of the times, his more formidable oppoſition would have expoſed him to an earlier fate [2]. Notwithſtanding his private ſtation, it ſeems ſtill to have appeared remarkable to his diſciples, that amidſt the litigious turbulence of democracy, his invidious fame and merit ſhould have eſcaped perſecution during a long life of ſeventy years. CHAP. XXIV.

When his enemies finally determined to raiſe an accuſation againſt him, it required uncommon Artifices of his accuſers.

[2] The memorable words of Socrates will for ever brand the ſtern unfeeling ſpirit of democracy. Ευ γωρ ισι ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, ει εγω παλαι επιχειρησα τα πολιτικα πραγματα, παλαι αν απωλωλειν, και ουτε αν υμας ωφελησειν ουδεν ὀτε αν εμαυτον. και τοι μη αχθισθε λεγοντι τ' αληθη, ου γαρ ισιν ὀστις σωθησεται, ουτε υμιν ουτε αλλω ουδεν πληθει γνησιως εναντιουμενος, και διακωλυων πολλα αδικα και παρονομα εν τη πολει γιγνεσθαι· αλλα αναγκαιον ισι τω οντι μαχουμενον ὑπερ του δικαιου, και ει μελλει ολιγον χρονον σωθησεσθαι, ιδιωτευειν, αλλ' μη δημοσιευειν. Plut. Apolog. Socrat. c xiii. "You well know, Athenians! that had I formerly intermeddled in public affairs I ſhould formerly have periſhed, without benefiting either you or myſelf. Be not offended; but it is impoſſible that *he* ſhould live long who arraigns and manfully oppoſes the injuſtice and licentiouſneſs of you, Athenians! or of any other multitude. A champion for virtue, if he would ſurvive but a few years, muſt lead a private life, and not interfere in politics."

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addreſs to give their malignant calumnies the appearance of probability. Socrates converſed in public with every deſcription of men, in all places, and on all occaſions. His opinions were as well known as his perſon, and ever uniform and conſiſtent; he taught no ſecret doctrines; admitted no private auditors; his leſſons were open to all; and that they were gratuitous, his poverty, compared with the exorbitant wealth of the ſophiſts who accuſed him, furniſhed abundant proof. To balance theſe ſtubborn circumſtances, his enemies confided in the hatred of the jury and judges, compoſed of the meaneſt populace, and the perjury of falſe witneſſes, which might be purchaſed at Athens for the ſmall ſum of a few drachmas. They truſted, however, not leſs in the artifices and eloquence of Miletus, Anytus [3], and Lycon; the firſt of whom appeared on the part of the prieſts and poets; the ſecond, on that of the politicians and artiſts; the third, on that of the rhetoricians and ſophiſts [4].

Informality of the trial.

From the nature of an accuſation which principally reſpected religion, the cauſe ought to have been regularly tried in the leſs numerous but more enlightened tribunal of the Areopagus; yet it was immediately carried before the tumultuary aſſem-

3 Some perſonal reaſons are glanced at why Miletus and Anytus ſtepped forth as accuſers. Vid. Andocid. Orat. i. & Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. Libanius has ſwelled to a long ſtory, and ſtrangely disfigured the hint of Xenophon. Apol. Soc. p. 642, & ſeqq.

4 Plato Apol. Soc. c. x.

bly,

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bly, or rather mob of the Heliæa[5], a court, for ſo it was called, conſiſting of five hundred perſons, moſt of whom were liable, by their education and way of life, to be ſeduced by eloquence, intimidated by authority, and corrupted by every ſpecies of undue influence.

Uncomplying integrity of Socrates.

In a degenerate age and nation, few virtuous or able men ever acquired popularity merely by their virtues or abilities. In ſuch a nation, ſhould a perſon, otherwiſe eſtimable, be unfortunately curſed with ambition, he muſt endeavour to gratify it at the expence of his feelings and his principles, and can attain general favour only in proportion as he ceaſes to deſerve it. Uncomplying integrity will meet with deriſion; and wiſdom, diſdaining artifice, will grovel in obſcurity, while thoſe alone will reach fame, or fortune, or honour, who, though endowed with talents juſt beyond mediocrity, condeſcend to flatter the prejudices, imitate the manners, gratify the pride, or adopt the reſentments, of an inſolent populace.

His defence.

The ſuperior mind of Socrates was incapable of ſuch mean compliances. When called to make his

[5] This appears from innumerable circumſtances, ſome of which are mentioned below, though Meurſius, in his Treatiſe on the Areopagus (vid. Gronov. Theſaur. vol. v.), maintains, that Socrates was tried in that court; an opinion which has been generally followed, but which the ſlighteſt attention to the works of the Athenian orators is ſufficient to diſprove. Vid. Iſoc. Orat. Areopag. Lyſias adv. Andocid. p. 108. & Andocid. Orat. i. p. 215. The oath to which Socrates alludes in Xenophon's Apology, c. iv. can only apply to the Heliæa. It is recited at length by Demoſthenes, Orat. contr. Timocrat.

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defence, he honeſtly acknowledged that he himſelf was much affected by the perſuaſive eloquence of his adverſaries; though, in truth, if he might uſe the expreſſion, they had ſaid nothing to the purpoſe[6]. He then obſerved, that the fond partiality of his friend Chærephon, having aſked the Delphic oracle, whether any man was wiſer than Socrates? —the oracle replied, that Socrates was the wiſeſt of men. In order to juſtify the anſwer of that god, whoſe veracity they all acknowledged, he had converſed with every diſtinction of perſons moſt eminent in the republic; and finding that they univerſally pretended to know many things of which they were ignorant, he began to ſuſpect, that in this circumſtance he excelled them, ſince he pretended to no ſort of knowledge of which he was not really maſter. What he did know, he freely communicated, ſtriving, to the utmoſt, to render his fellow-citizens more virtuous and more happy; an employment to which he believed himſelf called by the god, "whoſe authority I reſpect, Athenians! ſtill more than yours."

Provokes the anger of his judges.

The judges were ſeized with indignation at this firm language from a man capitally accuſed, from whom they expected that, according to the uſual practice, he would have brought his wife and children to intercede for him by their tears[7], or even

[6] The ſimplicity of the original is inimitable—Και τοι αληθες γε, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, ουδεν εγηκασι. Plut. Apol.

[7] Theſe circumſtances, which are mentioned both by Xenophon and Plato, prove that Socrates was tried before a popular tribunal.

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even have employed the elaborate diſcourſe which his friend Lyſias the orator had compoſed for his defence; a diſcourſe alike fitted to detect calumny, and to excite compaſſion. But Socrates, who conſidered it as a far greater misfortune to commit, than to ſuffer an injuſtice, declared, that he thought it unbecoming his fame, and unworthy his character, to employ any other defence than that of an innocent and uſeful life. Whether to incur the penalties of the delinquency with which he was falſely charged ought to be regarded as an evil, the gods alone knew. For his part he imagined that he ſhould have no reaſon for ſorrow at being delivered from the inconveniencies of old age, which were ready to overtake him, and at being commanded to quit life [8] while his mind, ſtill active and vigorous, was likely to leave behind him the moſt agreeable impreſſion in the remembrance of his friends.

Socrates is condemned.

The firm magnanimity of Socrates could not alter the reſolution of his judges; yet ſuch is the aſcendancy of virtue over the worſt of minds, that he was found guilty by a majority of only

nal. It is well known that the Areopagus rigorouſly proſcribed all ſuch undue methods of biaſſing the judgment and ſeducing the paſſions. Vid. Demoſth. in Neær. & Ariſtocrat. Æſchin. in Timarch. Lucian. Hermotim. & Iſocrat. Areopag.

[8] Xenophon ſays, that he writes Socrates's Defence, after ſo many others, who had already executed that taſk with ſufficient ſkill and fidelity, in order to illuſtrate one point much inſiſted on by Socrates, "That it was better for him to die than to live." Xenoph. Apol. ſub init.

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three voices[9]. The court then commanded him, agreeably to a principle which betrays the true ſpirit of democratical tyranny, to paſs ſentence of condemnation on himſelf, and to name the puniſhment which ought to be inflicted on him.—The puniſhment, ſaid Socrates, which I deſerve for having ſpent my whole life in endeavouring to render my fellow-citizens wiſer and better, and particularly in ſtriving to inſpire the Athenian youth with the love of juſtice and temperance, is, "To be maintained, during the remainder of my life, in the Prytanæum; an honour due to *me*, rather than to the victors in the Olympic games, ſince, as far as depended on me, I have made my countrymen more happy in *reality*; they only in *appearance*." Provoked by this obſervation, by which they ought to have been confounded, the judges proceeded to paſs ſentence, and condemned Socrates to drink hemlock[10].

His addreſs to the judges who voted in his favour.

This atrocious injuſtice excited the indignation of his numerous friends and diſciples, moſt of whom had accompanied him to the court; but it awakened no other paſſion in the illuſtrious ſage than that of pity for the blind prejudices of the Athenians. He then addreſſed that part of the court who had been favourable to him, or rather to themſelves, ſince they had avoided the misfortune of paſſing an unjuſt ſentence, which would have diſgraced and embittered the lateſt moment

[9] Plato Apol. [10] Idem, ibid.

of

of their lives. "He conſidered them as friends with whom he would willingly converſe for a moment, upon the event which had happened to him, before he was ſummoned to death. From the commencement of the proſecution, an unuſual circumſtance, he obſerved, had attended all his words and actions, and every ſtep which he had taken in the whole courſe of his trial. The dæmon, who on ordinary occaſions had ever been ſo watchful to reſtrain him, when he prepared to ſay or do any thing improper or hurtful, had never once withheld him, during the whole progreſs of this affair, from following the bent of his own inclination. For this reaſon he was apt to ſuſpect that the fate which the court had decreed him, although they meant it for an evil, was to him a real good. If to die was only to change the ſcene, muſt it not be an advantage to remove from theſe pretended judges to Minos, Rhadamanthus, and other real judges, who, through their love of juſtice, had been exalted by the divinity to this important function of government? What delight to live and converſe with the immortal heroes and poets of antiquity! It becomes you alſo, my friends, to be of good comfort with regard to death, ſince no evil, in life or death, can befal virtuous men, whoſe true intereſt is ever the concern of Heaven. For my part, I am perſuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and therefore am not offended with my judges. I intreat you all to behave towards my ſons, when they attain the years of reaſon, as I have done to you, not ceaſing to

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blame and accuſe them, when they prefer wealth or pleaſure, or any other frivolous object, to the ineſtimable worth of virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, while in fact it is of little value, reproach them ſeverely, Athenians! as I have done you. By ſo doing you will behave juſtly to me and to my ſons. It is now time for us to part. I go to die, you to live; but which is beſt, none but the Divinity knows [11].'

The execution of the ſentence deferred on account of the Delian feſtival.

It is not wonderful that the diſciples of Socrates ſhould have believed the events of his extraordinary life, and eſpecially its concluding ſcene, to be regulated by the interpoſition of a particular providence [12]. Every circumſtance conſpired to evince his unalterable firmneſs, and diſplay his inimitable virtue. It happened, before the day of his trial, that the high-prieſt had crowned the ſtern of the veſſel, which was annually ſent to Delos, to commemorate, by grateful acknowledgments to Apollo, the triumphant return of Theſeus from Crete, and the happy deliverance of Athens from a diſgraceful tribute [13]. This ceremony announced the commencement of the feſtival, which ended with the return

[11] Plato Apol. ſub fin.

[12] According to Plato, nothing happened in this tranſaction ανευ θειας μοιρας. Plat. Apol. Yet in the Phædo. ſub init. he ſays, τυχη τις αυτω, ω Ελεξατες! συνιεσι. But τυχη here refers not to the cauſe, but to the effect; not to blind chance, but to an unaccountable diſpoſition of events produced by a particular interpoſition of the divinity. In this ſenſe the word is uſed not only by philoſophers but orators, particularly Demoſthenes, as we ſhall ſee below.

[13] See vol. i. p. 32.

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of the veſſel; and during the intervening time, which was conſecrated to the honour of Apollo, it was not lawful to inflict any capital puniſhment. Contrary winds protracted the ceremony thirty days, during which Socrates lay in priſon, and in fetters. His friends daily viſited him, repairing, at the dawn, to the priſon gate, and impatiently waiting till it opened. Their converſation turned on the ſame ſubjects which had formerly occupied them; but afforded not that pure unmixed pleaſure which they uſually derived from the company of Socrates. It occaſioned, however, nothing of that gloom which is naturally excited by the preſence of a friend under ſentence of death. They felt a certain pleaſing melancholy, a mixed ſenſation of ſorrow and delight, for which no language has aſſigned a name[14].

He refuſes to eſcape from priſon.

When the fatal veſſel arrived in the harbour of Sunium, and was hourly expected in the Piræus, Crito, the moſt confidential of the diſciples of Socrates[15], firſt brought the melancholy intelli-

[14] This is admirably deſcribed by Plato: Αλλα ατεχνως ατοπον τι μοι παθος παρην, και τις ανθης κρασις—απο τε της ηδονης συγκικραμενη ομου και της λυπης. The following circumſtances are inimitable: Και παντες οι παροντες σχεδον τι ουτω διεκειμεθα, ποτε μεν γελωντες, ενιοτε δε δακρυοντες· εις δε ημων διαφερεντως Απολλωδορος· οισθα γαρ που ανδρα και τον τροπον αυτου. Phædo, viii. c. ii. Socrates alone felt none of theſe ſenſations; but as Montaigne, who had ſeized his true character, ſays, Et qui ne reconnoiſſe en luy, non ſeulement de la fermeté & de la conſtance (c'étoit ſon aſſiette ordinaire que celle là) mais je ne ſçay quel contentement nouveau & une allegreſſe enjouée en ſes propos & façons dernieres.

[15] Finding Socrates in a profound ſleep, he repoſed himſelf by his ſide till he awoke. Plat. ibid.

gence;

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gence; and, moved by the near danger of his admired friend, ventured to propoſe a clandeſtine eſcape, ſhewing him at the ſame time that he had collected a ſufficient ſum of money to corrupt the fidelity of his keepers. This unmanly propoſal, which nothing but the undiſtinguiſhing ardour of friendſhip could excuſe, Socrates anſwered in a vein of pleaſantry, which ſhewed the perfect freedom of his mind, "In what country, O Crito! can I eſcape death? where ſhall I fly to elude this irrevocable doom, paſſed on all human kind?" To Apollodorus, a man of no great depth of underſtanding, but his affectionate and zealous admirer, who ſaid, "That what grieved him beyond meaſure was, that ſuch a man ſhould periſh unjuſtly," he replied, ſtroking the head of his friend, "And would you be leſs grieved, O Apollodorus! were I deſerving of death [16]?" When his friends, and Crito eſpecially, inſiſted, "That it would be no leſs ungenerous than imprudent, in compliance with the haſty reſolution of a malignant or miſguided multitude, to render his wife a widow, his children orphans, his diſciples for ever miſerable and forlorn, and conjured him, by every thing ſacred, to ſave a life ſo ineſtimably precious;" Socrates aſſumed a tone more ſerious, recalled the maxims which he profeſſed, and the doctrines which he had ever inculcated, "That how unjuſtly ſoever we were treated, it could never be our intereſt to practiſe injuſtice, much leſs to retort

[16] Xenoph. & Plat. ibid.

the

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the injuries of our parents or our country; and to teach, by our example, diſobedience to the laws." The ſtrength of his arguments, and ſtill more, the unalterable firmneſs and cheerful ſerenity that appeared in his looks, words, and actions [17], ſilenced the ſtruggling emotions of his diſciples. The dignity of virtue elevated their ſouls; they parted with tears of inexpreſſible admiration, and with a firm purpoſe to ſee their maſter earlier than uſual on the fatal morning.

His behaviour during the laſt day of his confinement.

Having arrived at the priſon-gate, they were deſired to wait without, becauſe the Eleven (ſo the delicacy of Athens ſtyled the executioners of public juſtice) unlooſed the fetters of Socrates, and announced to him his death before the ſetting of the ſun. They had not waited long, when they were deſired to enter. They found Socrates juſt relieved from the weight of his bonds, attended by his wife Xantippé, who bore in her arms his infant ſon. At their appearance, ſhe exclaimed, "Alas! Socrates, here come your friends, whom you for the laſt time behold, and who for the laſt time behold you!" Socrates, looking at Crito, deſired ſome one to conduct her home. She departed, beating her breaſt, and lamenting with that clamorous ſorrow natural to her ſex [18] and her character.

[17] Καὶ ἐμμασι καὶ σχημασι καὶ ϛαδισμασι φαιδρος. Xenoph. Apol.

[18] Βωσαν τε καὶ κοπτομενην; and a little above, "ὁια δη πωθασι αἱ ϛναικες." Phædo, ſect. iii.

Socrates,

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His converſation with his diſciples.

Socrates, meanwhile, reclining on the couch with his uſual compoſure, drew his leg towards him, and gently rubbing the part which had been galled by the fetters, remarked the wonderful connection between what men call pleaſure, and its oppoſite, pain. The one ſenſation, he obſerved (as juſt happened to his leg after being delivered from the ſmart of the irons), was generally followed by the other. Neither of them could long exiſt apart; they are ſeldom pure and unmixed; and whoever feels the one, may be ſure that he will ſoon feel the other. "I think, that had Æſop the fabuliſt made this reflection, he would have ſaid, that the Divinity, deſirous to reconcile theſe oppoſite natures, but finding the deſign impracticable, had at leaſt joined their ſummits; for which reaſon pleaſure has ever ſince dragged pain after it, and pain pleaſure."

Why he compoſed verſes in priſon, having never done it before.

The mention of Æſop recalled to Cebes, the Theban, a converſation which he had recently had with Euenus of Paros, a celebrated elegiac poet, then reſident in Athens [19]. The poet aſked Cebes, "Why his maſter, who had never before addicted himſelf to poetry, ſhould, ſince his confinement, have written a hymn to Apollo, and turned into verſe ſeveral of Æſop's fables?" The Theban ſeized the preſent opportunity to ſatisfy himſelf in this particular, and to acquire ſuch information as

[19] The following narrative, to the death of Socrates, is entirely borrowed from the Phædo, to which it is therefore unneceſſary at every moment to refer.

might

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might ſatisfy Euenus, who, he aſſured Socrates, would certainly repeat his queſtion. The illuſtrious ſage, whoſe inimitable virtues were all tinged, or rather brightened, by enthuſiaſm, deſired Cebes to tell Euenus, "That it was not with a view to rival him, or with a hope to excel his poetry (for *that*, he knew, would not be eaſy), that he had begun late in life this new purſuit. He had attempted it in compliance with a divine mandate, which frequently commanded him in dreams to cultivate muſic. He had, therefore, firſt applied to philoſophy, thinking *that* the greateſt muſic; but ſince he was under ſentence of death, he judged it ſafeſt to try likewiſe the popular muſic, leſt any thing ſhould on his part be omitted, which the gods had enjoined him. For this reaſon, he had compoſed a hymn to Apollo, whoſe feſtival was now celebrating; and not being himſelf a mythologiſt, had verſified ſuch fables of Æſop as happened moſt readily to occur to his memory. Tell this to Euenus—bid him farewel; and farther, that if he is wiſe, he will follow me; for I depart, as it is likely, to-day; ſo the Athenians have ordered it."

His opinion concerning ſuicide, and the immortality of the ſoul.

The laſt words introduced an important converſation concerning ſuicide, and the immortality of the ſoul. Socrates maintained, that though it was better for a wiſe man to die than to live, becauſe there was reaſon to believe that he would be happier in a future than in the preſent ſtate of exiſtence, yet it could never be allowable for him to periſh by his own hand, or even to lay down life without

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without a ſufficient motive, ſuch as that which influenced himſelf, a reſpectful ſubmiſſion to the laws of his country. This intereſting diſcuſſion conſumed the greateſt part of the day. Socrates encouraged his diſciples not to ſpare his opinions from delicacy to his preſent ſituation. Thoſe who were of his mind he exhorted to perſevere. Entwining his hand in the long hair of Phædo: "Theſe beautiful locks, my dear Phædo, you will this day cut off[20]; but were I in your place, I would not again allow them to grow, but make a vow (as the Argives did in a matter of infinitely leſs moment) never to reſume the wonted ornament of my beauty, until I had confirmed the doctrine of the ſoul's immortality."

Concerning death, burial, and the duties of friends to the deceaſed.

The arguments of Socrates convinced and conſoled his diſciples, as they have often done the learned and virtuous in ſucceeding times. "Thoſe who had adorned their minds with temperance, juſtice, and fortitude, and had deſpiſed the vain ornaments and vain pleaſures of the body, could never regret their ſeparation from this terreſtrial companion. And now," continued he, in the language of tragedy, "the deſtined hour ſummons me to death; it is almoſt time to bathe, and ſurely it will be better that I myſelf, before I drink the poiſon, ſhould perform this ceremony, than occaſion unneceſſary trouble to the women after I am dead." "So let it be," ſaid Crito; "but firſt

[20] The ceremony of cutting off the hair at funerals was mentioned above, vol. i. c. vii. p. 324. where the tranſaction of the Argives, alluded to in the text, is related.

inform

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inform us, Socrates, in what we can do you pleaſure, reſpecting your children, or any other concern." "Nothing new, O Crito! but what I have always told you. By conſulting your own happineſs, you will act the beſt part with regard to my children, to me, and to all mankind; although you bind not yourſelves by any new promiſe. But if you forſake the rules of virtue, which we have juſt endeavoured to explain, you will benefit neither my children, nor any with whom you live, although you ſhould now ſwear to the contrary." Crito then aſked him, "How he choſe to be buried?" "As you pleaſe, provided I don't eſcape you." Saying this, he ſmiled, adding, that as to his *body*, they might bury it as ſeemed moſt decent, and moſt ſuitable to the laws of his country.

He bathes;

He then retired into the adjoining chamber, accompanied only by Crito; the reſt remained behind, like children mourning a father. When he had bathed and dreſſed, his ſons (one grown up, and two children), together with his female relations[21], were admitted to him. He converſed with them in the preſence of Crito, and then returned to his diſciples near ſun-ſet, for he tarried long within. Before he had time to begin any new

[21] The οικειαι γυναικες of Plato. This expreſſion ſeems to have given riſe to the abſurd fable, that Socrates had two wives, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, and others; and the abſurd explication of that irregularity, "that the Athenians, after the peſtilence, had allowed polygamy, at leaſt bigamy, to repair the ravages of that dreadful malady."

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is addreſſed by the meſſenger of death.

ſubject, the keeper of the priſon entered, and ſtanding near Socrates, "I cannot," ſaid he, "accuſe you, O Socrates! of the rage and execrations too often vented againſt me by thoſe here confined, to whom, by command of the magiſtrates, I announce that it is time to drink the poiſon. Your fortitude, mildneſs, and generoſity exceed all that I have ever witneſſed; even now I know you pardon me, ſince I act by compulſion; and as you are acquainted with the purport of my meſſage, farewel, and bear your fate with as much patience as poſſible." At theſe words the executioner, hardened as he was in ſcenes of death, diſſolved in tears, and, turning from Socrates, went out. The latter following him with his eye, replied, "And you alſo farewel; as to me, I ſhall obey your inſtructions." Then looking at his diſciples, "How truly polite," ſaid he, "is *the man*[22]! During my confinement, he often viſited and converſed with me; and now, how generouſly does he lament my death! But let the poiſon be brought, that we may obey his orders."

His converſation before drinking the poiſon.

Crito then ſaid, "Still, O Socrates! there is time; the ſun ſtill brightens the tops of the mountains. Many have I known, who have drank the poiſon late in the night, after a luxurious ſupper and generous wines, and laſtly, after enjoying the embraces of thoſe with whom they were enamoured[23].

[22] Ὁ ἀνθρωπος, the term for the executioner.

[23] Συγγενομενους γ' ενιους ὧν αν τυχωσι επιθυμουντες. Phæd. c. xlviii. What an extraordinary picture of Athenian manners!

But

But haſten not; it is yet time." "With good reaſon," ſaid Socrates, "theſe perſons did what you ſay, becauſe they believed thereby to be gainers; and with good reaſon I ſhall act otherwiſe, becauſe I am convinced that I ſhould gain nothing but ridicule by an over-anxious ſolicitude for life, when it is juſt ready to leave me." Crito then made a ſign to the boy who waited; he went, ground the hemlock, and returned with him who was to adminiſter it. Socrates perceiving his arrival, "Tell me," ſaid he, "for you are experienced in ſuch matters, what have I to do?" "Nothing farther than to walk in the apartment till your limbs feel heavy; then repoſe yourſelf on the couch." Socrates then taking the cup in his hand, and looking at him with ineffable ſerenity, "Say, as to this beverage, is it lawful to employ any part of it in libation?" The other replied, "There is no more than what is proper to drink." "But it is *proper*," rejoined Socrates, "and neceſſary, if we would perform our duty, to pray the gods, that our paſſage hence may be fortunate." So ſaying, he was ſilent for a moment, and then drank the poiſon with an unaltered countenance. Mingling gentleneſs with authority, he ſtilled the noiſy lamentations of his friends, ſaying, that in order to avoid ſuch unmanly complaints, he had before diſmiſſed the women. As the poiſon began to gain his vitals, he uncovered his face, and ſaid to Crito, "We owe a cock to Æſculapius; ſacrifice it, and neglect it not." Crito aſked, if he had any

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His prayer and death.

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any thing further to command? But he made no reply. A little after, he was in agony—Crito ſhut his eyes. Thus died Socrates; whom, his diſciples declared, they could never ceaſe to remember, nor remembering, ceaſe to admire. "If any man," ſays Xenophon inimitably, "if any man, a lover of virtue, ever found a more profitable companion than Socrates, I deem that man the happieſt of human kind [24]."

Tranſient perſecution of his diſciples.

The current of popular paſſions appears nowhere more uniform than in the hiſtory of Athens. The factitious reſentment excited againſt Socrates by ſuch improbable calumnies, as even thoſe who were the readieſt to receive and to diſſeminate could never ſeriouſly believe, extended itſelf with rapidity to his numerous friends and adherents. But fortunately for the intereſt of letters and humanity, the endemic contagion was confined within the Athenian frontiers. Plato, Antiſthenes, Æſchines, Critobulus, and other Athenians, wiſely eluded a ſtorm which they had not ſtrength to reſiſt. Some took refuge in Thebes with their fellow-diſciples, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædondas; others found protection in Megara from Euclid and Terpſion. This perſecution of philoſophy, however, was accidental and tranſient. Mingled ſentiments of pity, ſhame, and reſentment, ſoon gave a new direction to the popular

The Athenians repent, and honour the memory of Socrates.

[24] Plato ſpeaks with equal feeling, or rather enthuſiaſm. Και γαρ το μεμνησθαι, και αυτον λεγοντος, και αλλως ακουοντα, εμοιγε αιει παντων ηδιστον. Phæd. c. ii.

fury, which raged with more deſtructive, yet far juſter cruelty, againſt the accuſers and judges of Socrates[25]. Many were driven into exile; many were put to death; ſeveral periſhed in deſpair, by their own hands. The illuſtrious ſage was honoured by ſignal monuments of public admiration[26]; his fame, like the hardy oak, derived vigour from years[27]; and increaſed from age to age, till the ſuperſtition of the Athenians at length worſhipped, as a god[28], him whom their injuſtice had condemned as a criminal. CHAP. XXIV.

The perſecution, the death, and the honours of Socrates, all conſpired to animate the affection, and to increaſe the zeal, of his diſciples. Their number had been great in his lifetime: it became greater after his death; ſince thoſe who followed, and thoſe who rejected his doctrines, alike ſtyled themſelves Socratic philoſophers. His name was thus adopted and prophaned by many ſects, who, while they differed widely from each other, univerſally changed, exaggerated, or perverted the tenets of their common maſter. Among the genuine followers of Socrates, Xenophon, as will appear hereafter, unqueſtionably merits the firſt place. Plato comes next, yet ſeparated by a long The writings of his diſciples.

[25] Plutarch. de Invid. p. 538.

[26] Statues, altars, even a chapel, called Socrateion. Vide Diogen. in Socrat.

[27] Creſcit occulto, velut arbor, ævo
Fama Marcelli—— HORACE.

[28] Or rather as a demi-god; but the boundaries were not very accurately aſcertained, though *that* is attempted by Arrian, in Expedit. Alexand. l. iv. p. 86.

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interval. In the ſame claſs may be ranked Cebes the Theban, Æſchines, Crito, and Simon, Athenians. The table of Cebes, which has been tranſmitted to modern times, contains a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with accuracy of judgment, and illuminated by the ſplendour of ſentiment. Three remaining dialogues of Æſchines breathe the ſame ſublime ſpirit, and abound in irreſiſtible perſuaſions to virtue: "That happineſs is attained, not by gratifying, but by moderating the paſſions; that he alone is rich and powerful, whoſe faculties exceed his deſires; that virtue is true wiſdom, and being attended with the only ſecure happineſs which can be enjoyed in the preſent life, muſt, according to the unalterable laws of Providence, be crowned with immortal felicity hereafter."

Cebes.

Æſchines.

The philoſophers who miſrepreſented his opinions.

The remains of Cebes and Æſchines, and far more, as will appear in the ſequel, the copious writings of Plato and Xenophon, may enable us to diſcriminate the philoſophy of Socrates from that of the various ſects who miſrepreſented or adulterated his opinions. The eſtabliſhment of theſe ſects belongs not to the period of hiſtory now under our review. But the foundation of their reſpective tenets, which had been laid in a former age, was confirmed by the philoſophers who flouriſhed in the time of Socrates. Of theſe, the moſt diſtinguiſhed were Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Ariſtippus of Cyrené, Antiſthenes of Athens. The two firſt reſtored the captious logic of the ſophiſts; Ariſtippus embraced their licentious

Euclid and Phædo, Ariſtippus and Antiſthenes.

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tious morality. While the ſchools of Elis and Megara ſtudied to confound the underſtanding, that of Cyrené laboured to corrupt the heart. Antiſthenes ſet himſelf to oppoſe theſe pernicious ſects, deriding the refined ſubtleties of the ſceptics, and diſdaining the mean pleaſures of the Epicureans [29]. To prefer the mind to the body, duty to intereſt, and virtue to pleaſure, were the great leſſons of Antiſthenes. Yet this ſublime philoſophy he carried to extravagance [30], affecting not only to moderate and govern, but to ſilence and extirpate the paſſions, and declaring bodily pleaſure not only unworthy of purſuit, but a thing carefully to be avoided, as the greateſt and moſt dangerous of evils. His rigid ſeverity of life deceived not the penetration of Socrates. The ſage could diſcern, that no ſmall ſhare of ſpiritual pride lurked under the tattered cloak of Antiſthenes.

State of the fine arts during the period under review.

While philoſophy, true or falſe, thus flouriſhed in Greece, a propitious deſtiny watched over the imitative arts, which continued, during half a

[29] I anticipate theſe names. The *ſcepticiſm* of Pyrrho, as will be explained hereafter, aroſe from the quibbling ſophiſms of the ſchools of Elis and Megara. *Epicurus*, having adopted and refined the ſelfiſh philoſophy of Ariſtippus, had the honour of diſtinguiſhing by his name, the *Epicurean* ſect.

[30] His follower, Diogenes, as will appear in the ſequel, puſhed this extravagance ſtill farther. They both taught in the ſuburb of Athens called the *Cynoſarges*, from which they and their diſciples were called *Cynics*. In a ſubſequent part of this work, it will be explained, how the *Cynical philoſophy* gave riſe to *Stoiciſm*, ſo called, becauſe Zeno and his followers taught at Athens in the "*Stoa* pœcile," the painted portico.

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A. C. 431—404.

century of perpetual wars and revolutions, to be cultivated with equal aſſiduity and ſucceſs. The moſt diſtinguiſhed ſcholars of Phidias were Alcamenes of Athens, and Agoracritus of the iſle of Paros. They contended for the prize of ſculpture in their reſpective ſtatues of Venus; and the Athenians, it is ſaid, too partially decided in favour of their countryman. Agoracritus, unwilling that his work ſhould remain in a city where it had met with ſo little juſtice, ſold it to the borough of Rhamnus. There it was beheld with admiration, and ſoon paſſed for a production of Phidias[31] himſelf. The ſculptor Cteſelaus excelled in heroes. He choſe noble ſubjects, and ſtill farther ennobled them by his art[32]. His contemporary Patrocles diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his ſtatues of Olympic victors, and particularly of celebrated wreſtlers. Aſſiſted by Canachus, he made the greateſt work mentioned during the period now under our review, thirty-one figures of bronze, repreſenting the reſpective commanders of the ſeveral cities or republics, who, under the conduct of Lyſander, obtained the memorable victory of Ægos Potamos. They were erected in the temple of Delphian Apollo, together with the ſtatue of Lyſander himſelf, crowned by Neptune. Inferior artiſts[33] were employed to copy the ſtatues of various divinities, dedicated at the ſame time, and in the ſame place, by the Lacedæmonian conqueror.

31 Vid. Suid. & Heſych. voc. Φειδίας. 32 Plin. l. xxxv.

33 See their names in Pauſan. l. x. p. 625, & ſeqq.

It

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Of literature.

It appears not however that, during the Peloponneſian war, any new ſtyle was attempted either in ſculpture or painting. The artiſts of that period contented themſelves with walking in the footſteps of their great predeceſſors. The ſame obſervation applies to muſic and poetry; but eloquence, on the contrary, received a new form, and flouriſhing amidſt the tumults of war and the contentions of active life, produced that conciſe, rapid, and manly character of compoſition which thenceforth diſtinguiſhed the Attic writers. The works of Homer, Sophocles, and Pindar, left few laurels to be gained by their ſucceſſors. It was impoſſible to excel, it was dangerous to rival them. Great genius was required to ſtart, without diſgrace, in a career where ſuch candidates had run. But great genius is rare, and commonly diſdains imitation; and the firſt poetical prizes being already carried off, men who felt the animation and vigour of their own powers, naturally directed them to objects which poſſeſſed the charms of novelty, and promiſed the hope of excellence.

Principal authors in proſe preceding this period.

Even in proſaic compoſition the merit and fame of Herodotus and Democritus[34] (not to mention authors more ancient) oppoſed very formidable

34 Itaque video viſum eſſe nonnullis Platonis & Democriti locutionem, etſi abſit a verſu, tamen quod incitatius feratur, & clariſſimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poëma putandum, quàm comicorum poëtarum. Cicero ad M. Brutum Orator. c. xx. See alſo de Orator. l. i. c. xi. It is impoſſible to read Lucretius, without fancying, if we recollect Cicero's criticiſms on Democritus, that we are peruſing the long loſt works of that great philoſopher.

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Character of Herodotus as an hiſtorian.

obſtacles to the ambition of their ſucceſſors. In a work no leſs ſplendid than important, the father of prophane hiſtory had deduced the tranſactions between the Greeks and Barbarians, from the earlieſt accounts till the concluſion of the Perſian war; a work including the hiſtory of many centuries, and comprehending the greateſt kingdoms and empires of the ancient world. This extenſive ſubject was handled with order and dignity. The epiſodes were ingeniouſly interwoven with the principal action. The various parts of the narrative were ſo ſkilfully combined, that they mutually reflected light on each other. Geography, manners, religion, laws, and arts, entered into the plan of his work; and it is remarkable that the earlieſt of hiſtorians agrees more nearly, as to the deſign and form of his undertaking, with the enlightened writers of the preſent century, than any hiſtorical author in the long ſeries of intervening ages.

His language was the picture of his mind; natural, flowing, perſuaſive; lofty on great occaſions [35], affecting in ſcenes of diſtreſs [36], perſpicuous in narration, animated in deſcription. Yet this admired writer has ſometimes inſerted reports romantic and incredible. Of many, indeed, of the fables of Herodotus, as ignorance conceited of its knowledge long affected to call them, ſubſequent experience has proved the reality;

35 Longinus cites as an example of the ſublime, Herodot. l. vii. c. lx. The whole expedition of Xerxes is written with an elevation becoming the ſubject.

36 See the affecting ſtory of Adraſtus, l. i. c. xxxv.

modern

modern diſcoveries and voyages ſeem purpoſely directed to vindicate the fame of a writer, whom Cicero [37] dignifies with the appellation of Prince of Hiſtorians. Of other wondrous tales which he relates, his own diſcernment ſhewed him the futility. Whatever is contrary to the analogy of nature he rejects with ſcorn. He ſpeaks with contempt of the Ægepodes, and of the one-eyed Arimaſpi, and of other ridiculous and abſurd fictions which have been adopted, however, by ſome credulous writers even in the eighteenth century. But Herodotus thought himſelf bound in duty to relate what he had heard, not always to believe what he related [38]. Having travelled into Egypt and the Eaſt, he recounts, with fidelity, the reports current in thoſe remote countries. And his mind being opened and enlarged by an extenſive view of men and manners, he had learned to ſet bounds to his diſbelief, as well as to his credulity. Yet it muſt not be diſſembled that the fabulous traditions, in which he too much abounds, give the air of romance to his hiſtory. Though forming, comparatively, but a ſmall part of the work, they aſſume magnitude and importance, when invidiouſly detached from it [39]. It thus ſeems as if this

37 L. ii. de Orator.

38 Εγω δε οφειλω λεγειν τα λεγομενα, πιθεσθαι δε μην ε παντα παρα, οφειλω. Herodot. l. vii. c. clii. p. 433.

39 The reproaches which Juvenal (Satyr. 10.) and Plutarch (in his treatiſe entitled the Malignity of Herodotus) make to this great hiſtorian, are fully anſwered by Aldus Manutius, Camerarius, and Stephanus. Plutarch, forſooth, was offended that his country-

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this moſt inſtructive author had written with a view rather to amuſe the fancy than to inform the underſtanding. The lively graces of his diction tend to confirm this ſuppoſition. His mode of compoſition may be regarded as the intermediate ſhade between epic poetry and hiſtory. Neither conciſe nor vehement, the general character of his ſtyle is natural, copious, and flowing [40]; and his manner throughout breathes the ſoftneſs of Ionia, rather than the active contention of Athens.

Of Thucydides.

In this light Herodotus appeared to the Athenians in the age immediately ſucceeding his own. At the Olympic games he had read his work with univerſal applauſe. Thucydides, then a youth, wept mixed tears of wonder and emulation [41]. His father was complimented on the generous ar-

countrymen made ſo bad a figure in the hiſtory of Herodotus. The criticiſm of Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, a writer of more taſte and diſcernment than Plutarch, does ample juſtice to the father of hiſtory.

[40] Ariſtotle, in his Rhetoric, l. iii. c. ix. diſtinguiſhes two kinds of ſtyle; the continuous and the periodic. The former flows on without interruption, until the ſenſe is complete. The latter is divided, by ſtops, into due proportions of duration, which are eaſily felt by the ear, and meaſured by the mind. The former ſtyle is tireſome, becauſe in every thing men delight to ſee the end; even racers, when they paſs the goal, are quickly out of breath. Herodotus is the moſt remarkable inſtance of the continuous ſtyle. In his time ſcarcely any other was in uſe; but it is now entirely laid aſide. So far Ariſtotle, who ſeems rather unjuſt to Herodotus, ſince many parts of his work are ſufficiently adorned by periods, although the looſe ſtyle in general prevails. But the partiality of his countryman Dionyſius completely avenges the wrongs of Herodotus.

[41] Suidas, Photius, Marcellinus.

dour

dour of a ſon, whoſe early inquietude at another's fame announced a character formed for great deſigns and illuſtrious exertions. But Herodotus had preoccupied the ſubjects beſt adapted to hiſtorical compoſition; and it was not till the commencement of the memorable war of twenty-ſeven years, that Thucydides, amidſt the dangers which threatened his country, rejoiced in a theme worthy to exerciſe the genius, and call forth the whole vigour of an hiſtorian. From the breaking out of this war, in which he proved an unfortunate actor, he judged that it would be the greateſt, the moſt obſtinate, and important that had ever been carried on. He began therefore to collect, and treaſure up, ſuch materials as were neceſſary for deſcribing it; in the ſelection, as well as in the diſtribution of which, he afterwards diſcovered an evident purpoſe to rival and ſurpaſs Herodotus. Too much indulgence for fiction had diſgraced the narrative of the latter: Thucydides profeſſed to be animated purely by the love of truth. "His relation was not intended to delight the ears of an Olympic audience. By a faithful account of the paſt, he hoped to aſſiſt his readers in conjecturing the future. While human nature remained the ſame, his work would have its uſe, being built on ſuch principles as rendered it an everlaſting poſſeſſion, not a contentious inſtrument of temporary applauſe[42]." The execution correſponded with this noble deſign. In his introductory diſcourſe CHAP. XXIV.

[42] Thucydid. in proem.

he

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he runs over the fabulous ages of Greece, carefully ſeparating the ore from the droſs. In ſpeaking of Thrace, he touches, with proper brevity, on the fable of Tereus and Progne [43]; and in deſcribing Sicily, glances at the Cyclops and Leſtrigons. But he recedes, as it were, with diſguſt, from ſuch monſtrous phantoms, and immediately returns to the main purpoſe of his hiſtory. In order to render it a faithful picture of the times, he profeſſes to relate not only what was done, but what was ſaid, by inſerting ſuch ſpeeches of ſtateſmen and generals as he had himſelf heard, or as had been reported to him by others. This valuable part of his work was imitated by all future hiſtorians, till the improvement of military diſcipline on the one hand, and the corruption of manners on the other, rendered ſuch ſpeeches ſuperfluous. Eloquence once ſerved as an incentive to courage, and an inſtrument of government. But the time was to arrive, when the dead principles of fear and intereſt ſhould alone predominate. In moſt countries of Europe, deſpotiſm has rendered public aſſemblies a dramatic repreſentation; and in the few where men are not enſlaved by a maſter, they are the ſlaves of pride, of avarice, and of faction.

Compariſon between them.

Thucydides, doubtleſs, had his model in the ſhort and oblique ſpeeches of Herodotus; but in this particular he muſt be acknowledged far to ſurpaſs his patron. In the diſtribution of his ſubject,

43 Ovid. Metam. l. vi.

how-

however, he fell ſhort of that writer. Thucydides, aſpiring at extraordinary accuracy, divides his work by ſummers and winters, relating apart the events comprehended in each period of ſix months. But this ſpace of time is commonly too ſhort for events deſerving the notice of hiſtory, to be begun, carried on, and completed. His narrative, therefore, is continually broken and interrupted: curioſity is raiſed without being ſatisfied, and the reader is tranſported haſtily and without preparation, from Athens to Corcyra, from Leſbos to Peloponneſus, from the coaſt of Aſia to Sicily. Thucydides follows the order of time; Herodotus, the connection of events: in the language of a great critic, the ſkill and taſte of Herodotus have reduced a very complicated argument into one harmonious whole; the prepoſterous induſtry of Thucydides has divided a very ſimple ſubject into many detached parts and ſcattered limbs of hiſtory, which it is difficult again to reduce into one regular body [44]. The ſame critic obſerves, that Herodotus's hiſtory not only poſſeſſes more art and variety, but diſplays more gaiety and ſplendour. A ſettled gloom, doubtleſs, hangs over the events of the Peloponneſian war: but what is the hiſtory of all wars, but a deſcription of crimes and calamities? The auſtere gravity of Thucydides admirably correſponds with his ſubject. His majeſty is worthy of Athens, when ſhe commanded a thouſand tributary republics. His conciſe, nervous, and energetic ſtyle, his

44 Dionyſ. Halicarn. de Herodot. & Thucydid.

abrupt

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abrupt brevity, and elaborate plainneſs, admirably repreſent the contentions of active life, and the tumult of democratical aſſemblies. Demoſthenes, whom Dionyſius himſelf extols above all orators, tranſcribed eight times, not the elegant flowing ſmoothneſs of Herodotus, but the ſententious, harſh, and often obſcure annals of Thucydides [45].

Tranſition to the military tranſactions of Greece.

Thucydides left his work unfiniſhed in the twenty-firſt year of the Peloponneſian war. It was continued by Xenophon, who deduced the revolutions of Greece through a ſeries of forty-eight years to the battle of Mantinæa; a work which enables us to purſue the important ſeries of Grecian hiſtory.

To a reader accuſtomed to contemplate the uniform and conſiſtent operations of modern policy, it muſt appear extraordinary that, at the diſtance of leſs than two years from the ſubverſion of the Athenian democracy by a Spartan general, the ſame turbulent form of government ſhould have been re-eſtabliſhed with new ſplendour, by the approbation, and even the aſſiſtance, of a Spartan king. The reaſons explained in the preceding chapter may leſſen, but cannot altogether remove, his ſurpriſe; and, in order fully to comprehend the cauſes of this event, it is neceſſary to conſider not only the internal factions which diſtracted the councils of Sparta, but the external objects of ambition or revenge which ſolicited and employed her arms.

45 Dionyſ. Halicarn. de Herodot. & Thucydid.

While

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The Elians incur the displeasure of Sparta.

While the fortune of the Peloponneſian war ſtill hung in doubtful ſuſpenſe, the peaceful inhabitants of Elis often teſtified an inclination to preſerve an inoffenſive neutrality, that they might apply, with undivided attention, to their happy rural labours, to the adminiſtration of the Olympian feſtival, and to the indiſpenſable worſhip of thoſe gods and heroes to whom their territory was peculiarly conſecrated. The continual ſolicitation of Sparta, and the unprovoked violence of Athens, determined the Elians to declare for the former republic; but of all the Spartan allies they were the moſt lukewarm and indifferent. In time of action their aſſiſtance was languid and ineffectual, and when the regular return of the Olympic ſolemnity ſuſpended the courſe of hoſtilities, they ſhewed little partiality or reſpect for their powerful confederates, whoſe warlike and ambitious ſpirit ſeemed incompatible with the enjoyment of their own contemplative tranquillity. This omiſſion of duty was followed by the actual tranſgreſſion of the Elians. In conjunction with the Mantinæans and Argives they deſerted the alliance of Sparta; defended themſelves by arms againſt the uſurpations of that republic; and excluded its members from conſulting the oracle, and from partaking of the games and ſacrifices celebrated at Olympia[46]. Theſe injuries paſſed with impunity until the ſucceſsful iſſue of the war of Peloponneſus diſpoſed the Spartans to feel with ſenſibility, and enabled them ſeverely to chaſtiſe every inſult that had been

[46] Thucydid. l. v.

offered

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offered them during the leſs proſperous current of their fortune.

The Spartans invade Elis. Olymp. xciv. 2. A. C. 403.

While Pauſanias and Lyſander ſettled the affairs of Athens and of Aſia, Agis, the moſt warlike of their princes, levied a powerful army, to inflict a late, but terrible vengeance, on the Elians. That he might attack the enemy unprepared, he led his forces through the countries of Argolis and Achaia, entering the Elian territory by the way of Lariſſa, and intending to march by the ſhorteſt road to the devoted capital. But he had ſcarcely paſſed the river Lariſſus, which gives name to the town, and ſeparates the adjoining provinces of Elis and Achaia, when the invaders were admoniſhed, by repeated ſhocks of an earthquake, to abſtain from ravaging a country which enjoyed the immediate protection of Heaven. Into ſuch a menace, at leaſt, this terrible phænomenon was interpreted by the ſuperſtition of the Spartan king, who immediately repaſſed the river, and, returning home, diſbanded his army. But the hoſtility of the Spartans was reſtrained, not extinguiſhed. Having offered due ſupplications and ſacrifices to ſanctify their impious invaſion, the ephori, next year, commanded Agis again to levy troops, and to enter the Elian territory. No unfavourable ſign checked the progreſs of his arms. During two ſummers and autumns, the country was deſolated; the villages burned or demoliſhed; their inhabitants dragged into captivity; the ſacred edifices were deſpoiled of their moſt valued ornaments; the porticos, gymnaſia, and temples, which adorned

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adorned the city of Jupiter, were many of them reduced to ruins.

The Spartans neither alone incurred the guilt, nor excluſively enjoyed the profits of this cruel devaſtation. The Elian invaſion furniſhed a rich harveſt of plunder to the Arcadians and other communities of Peloponneſus, whoſe rapacious luſt was enflamed by the virgin bloom of a country which had long been protected by religion againſt the ravages of war. When the principal property of the Elians was deſtroyed or plundered, the Spartans at length granted them a peace, on condition that they ſurrendered their fleet, acknowledged the independence of the inferior towns and villages, which were ſcattered along the delightful banks of the Peneus and the Alpheus, and modelled their internal government according to the plan preſcribed by their conquerors [47].

The Spartans drive the Meſſenians from Greece. Olymp. xcv. 4. A. C. 401.

The war of Elis occupied, but did not engroſs, the attention of the Spartans; nor did the puniſhment of that unfortunate republic divert them from other projects of revenge. The Meſſenians were not their accidental and temporary, but their natural and inveterate foes; and might juſtly expect to feel the unhappy conſequences of their triumph. After the deſtruction of Meſſene, and the long wanderings and miſery of its perſecuted citizens, the town of Naupactus, ſituate on the northern ſhore of the Corinthian gulph, furniſhed a ſafe retreat to a feeble remnant of that ancient

47 Xenophon Hellen. l. iii. c. 2. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 404.

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community; which, flouriſhing under the protection of Athens, ſpread along the weſtern coaſt, and planted a conſiderable colony in the neighbouring iſland of Cephalenia. We have already deſcribed the memorable gratitude of the Meſſenians, who were the moſt active, zealous, and, according to their ability, the moſt uſeful, allies of Athens in the Peloponneſian war. But *their* aſſiſtance (and aſſiſtance far more powerful than theirs) proved ineffectual; and the time was now arrived when they were to ſuffer a ſevere puniſhment for their recent as well as ancient injuries. The reſentment of Sparta drove them from Naupactus and Cephalenia. The greater part eſcaped to Sicily; above three thouſand ſailed to Cyrenaica, the only countries inhabited by the Hellenic race, which lay beyond the reach of the Lacedæmonian power[48].

Cauſes which withdrew Cyrenaica and Sicily from the ſphere of Grecian politics.

From the æra of this important migration, the names of Sicily and Cyrenaica will ſeldom occur in the preſent hiſtory; on which account it may not be improper briefly to explain the cauſes which withdrew from the general ſphere of Grecian politics a fruitful and extenſive coaſt, and an iſland not leſs fruitful and extenſive, and far more populous and powerful. The inſulated ſituation of thoſe remote provinces, while it rendered it extremely inconvenient for Greece to interfere in their affairs, peculiarly expoſed them to two evils, which rendered it ſtill more inconvenient for them to interfere in the affairs of Greece. Removed from the

[48] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

pro-

protection of their Peloponneſian anceſtors, both the Cyreneans and Sicilians often endured the oppreſſion of domeſtic tyrants, and often ſuffered the ravages of foreign barbarians. CHAP. XXIV.

The inhabitants of Cyrenaica alternately carried on war againſt the Libyans and Carthaginians [49]. They were actually oppreſſed by the tyrant Ariſton. Soon afterwards they recovered their civil liberty [50]; but were compelled frequently to ſtruggle for their national independence. Though often invaded, their country was never ſubdued by any barbarian enemy; and their liberties ſurvived the republics of their European brethren, ſince they reluctantly ſubmitted, for the firſt time, to the fortunate general of Alexander, who, in the diviſion of his maſter's conqueſts, obtained the fertile and wealthy kingdom of Egypt [51]. Subſequent hiſtory of Cyrenaica.

The revolutions of Sicily are far better known than thoſe of Cyrené, and ſtill more worthy to be remembered. During the latter years of the Peloponneſian war, the aſſiſtance given by Syracuſe to the Lacedæmonians became gradually more faint and imperceptible, and at length it was totally withdrawn. This was occaſioned by the neceſſity of defending the ſafety of the whole iſland, in which that of the capital was involved, againſt the formidable deſcents of the Carthaginians, whom the invitation of Segeſta and ſeveral inferior cities at va- Of Sicily,

49 Ariſtot. Polit. Salluſt. de Bell. Jugurth.
50 Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.
51 Diodor. l. xix. p. 715. & Strabo, l. xvii. p. 836.

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riance with their powerful neighbours, the hopes of acquiring at once thoſe valuable commodities, the annual purchaſe of which drained Africa of ſuch immenſe treaſures, and, above all, the deſire of revenging the death of Hamilcar, and the diſhonour of the Carthaginian name in the unfortunate ſiege of Himera, encouraged to undertake and carry on various expeditions for the entire ſubjugation of Sicily.

which is long haraſſed by the Carthaginians; Olymp. xcii. 3. Olymp. xciv. 1. A.C. 410—404.

Hannibal, the grandſon of Hamilcar, was entruſted with the conduct of the war, which commenced the four hundred and tenth, and continued, with little intermiſſion, till the four hundred and fourth year before the Chriſtian æra. The domeſtic troops of Carthage were reinforced by their African allies. Conſiderable levies were made among the native Spaniards and Italians, who had long envied the ſplendour, and dreaded the power of the Greeks, to whoſe conqueſts and colonies they ſaw no bounds. The united army exceeded an hundred thouſand men, and was conveyed to the ſouthern ſhore of Sicily in a proportionable number of tranſports and gallies [52].

whoſe conqueſts are interrupted by peſtilence.

A.C. 409.

The deſign of Hannibal, as far it appears from his meaſures, was to conquer ſucceſſively the ſmaller and more defenceleſs towns, before he laid ſiege to Syracuſe, whoſe natural ſtrength, recently improved by art, bidding defiance to aſſault, could only be taken by blockade. The firſt campaign was rendered memorable by the conqueſt of Se-

[52] Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. 43, & ſeqq.

linus

linus and Himera; the ſecond by the demolition of Agrigentum; the third by the taking of Gela. The inferior cities of Solas, Egeſta, Motya, Ancyra, Entelta, and Panormus, either invited the Carthaginian arms, or ſurrendered without reſiſtance. The invaders might have proceeded to the ſiege of Syracuſe, the main object of their expedition; but peſtilence followed the bloody havoc of war, and ſwept off, in undiſtinguiſhed ruin, the victors and the vanquiſhed. Not only the general, but the moſt numerous portion of his troops, had fallen a prey to this calamity; and Hamilcar, who ſucceeded to the command, contended himſelf with leaving garriſons in the towns which had been conquered, and returned to Africa with the enfeebled remains of his armament, which communicated the peſtilential infection to Carthage, where it long raged with deſtructive fury [53]. CHAP. XXIV. A.C. 406. A.C. 405.

According to the genius of Grecian ſuperſtition, it was natural to aſcribe the ſufferings of the Carthaginians to the unexampled cruelty and impiety with which, in their ſucceſſive ravages, they had deformed the fair face of Sicily. It would be uſeleſs and diſguſtful to deſcribe the horrid ſcenes of bloodſhed and ſlaughter tranſacted in the ſeveral places which preſumed to reſiſt their power. Whatever atrocities could be invented by the unprincipled licence of the Italians, approved by the ſtern inſenſibility of the Spaniards, and inflicted by the implacable revenge of the Africans, were com- Exceſſive cruelty of the Carthaginians.

53 Diodor. l. xiii. c. 70, & ſeqq.

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mitted in the miſerable cities of Selinus, Himera, Gela, and Agrigentum. After the taking of Himera, Hannibal ſacrificed in one day, three thouſand of its inhabitants to the manes of his grandfather, who, in the firſt Carthaginian invaſion, had periſhed before its walls; and the lot of theſe unhappy victims, dreadful as it was, might juſtly be an object of envy to the long tormented natives of Gela and Selinus.

Ancient magnificence of Agrigentum.

Yet of all Sicilian cities, the fate of Agrigentum ſeemed the moſt worthy to be deplored, from the ſtriking contraſt of its fallen ſtate with its recent ſplendour and proſperity. The natural beauties [54] of Agrigentum were ſecured by ſtrength, and adorned with elegance; and whoever conſidered, either the innumerable advantages of the city itſelf, or the gay cultivation of the ſurrounding territory, which abounded in every luxury of the ſea and land, was ready to pronounce the Agrigentines the moſt favoured inhabitants of the earth. The exuberant fertility of the ſoil, particularly the rich luxuriance of the vines and olives [55], exceeded every thing that is related of the happieſt climates, and furniſhed the materials of a lucrative commerce with the populous coaſt of Africa, which was very ſparingly provided in thoſe valuable plants. The

54 The following particulars in the text, concerning Agrigentum, we learn from Diodorus Siculus, p. 374—379. Valer. Maxim. l. iv. 8. Athenæus, l. i. c. 3.

55 Diodorus celebrates the height of the vines, which we are not uſed to conſider as a proper ſubject of panegyric.

extra-

extraordinary wealth of the Agrigentines was diſplayed in the magnificence of public edifices, and in the ſplendid enjoyment of private fortunes. They had begun, and almoſt completed, the celebrated temple of Jupiter, built in the grandeſt ſtyle of architecture employed by the Greeks on the greateſt and moſt ſolemn occaſions. Its walls were encompaſſed by pillars without, and adorned by pilaſters within; and its magnitude far exceeded the ordinary dimenſions of ancient temples, as it extended three hundred and forty feet in length, ſixty in breadth, and an hundred and twenty in height, without including the lofty and ſpacious dome. The grandeur of the doors and veſtibule correſponded with the ſimple majeſty of the whole edifice, whoſe ſculptured ornaments repreſented, with finiſhed elegance, and with a laborious accuracy that diſtinguiſhed each particular figure, the defeat of the Giants, and the taking of Troy; reſpectively, the moſt illuſtrious exploits of Grecian gods, and Grecian heroes.

The temple of Jupiter.

This noble monument, conſecrated to piety and patriotiſm, might be contraſted, by a philoſophic mind, with others deſtined to a very different purpoſe. Without the walls of Agrigentum an artificial pond, or rather lake, thirty feet deep and near a mile in circumference, was continually repleniſhed with a rare variety of the moſt delicate fiſhes, to furniſh a ſure ſupply to the ſumptuous extravagance of public entertainments. But nothing could rival the elegance and beauty of the

Their luxury.

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tombs and ſepulchres erected by the Agrigentines, to perpetuate the fame of their courſes which had obtained the Olympic prize; and, if we believe the teſtimony of an eye-witneſs [56], to commemorate the quails and other delicate birds, which were cheriſhed with an affectionate and partial fondneſs by the effeminate youth of both ſexes. Such capricious and abſurd abuſes of opulence and the arts might be expected amidſt the mortifying diſcrimination of ranks, and the enormous ſuperabundance of private riches, which diſtinguiſhed the Agrigentines. The labour of numerous and active ſlaves cultivated agriculture and manufactures with extraordinary ſucceſs. From the profit of theſe ſervile hands many citizens attained, and exceeded, the meaſure not only of Grecian, but of modern wealth. A ſhort time before the ſiege of the town, Hexenitus returned in triumph from Olympia, with three hundred chariots, each drawn by two milk-white horſes of Sicilian blood. Antiſthenes had eclipſed this magnificence in celebrating the marriage of his daughter. But every native of Agrigentum yielded the fame of ſplendour to the hoſpitable Gellias, whoſe palace could entertain and lodge five hundred gueſts, who had been clothed from his wardrobe, and whoſe cellars, conſiſting of three hundred ſpacious reſervoirs, cut in the ſolid rock, daily invited the joyous feſtivity of ſtrangers and citizens.

Exceſſive wealth of individuals.

[56] Timæus apud Diodor. l. xiii.

Before

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Before the ſecond Carthaginian invaſion, the Agrigentines, warned by the fate of Selinus and Himera, had prepared whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for their own defence. Their magazines were ſtored with proviſions, their arſenals with arms. Elevated by the confidence of proſperity, they had courage to reſiſt the firſt impreſſions of their enemies; but, corrupted by the vices of wealth and luxury, they wanted fortitude to perſevere. Their allies in Sicily and Italy ſhewed not that degree of ardour which might have been expected in a war which ſo deeply concerned them all: yet, by the partial aſſiſtance of Syracuſe, Gela, and Camerina, as well as ſeveral Grecian allies in Italy, the Agrigentines ſtood the ſiege eight months, during which, the Carthaginians employed every reſource of ſtrength and ingenuity. At length the place was reduced to great difficulties by means of immenſe wooden machines, drawn on wheels, which enabled the beſiegers to fight on equal ground with thoſe who defended the walls. But before any breach was effected, the greater part of the inhabitants determined to abandon the city.

Siege of Agrigentum.

In the obſcurity of night, they departed with their wives and families, and many of them fortunately eſcaped to Gela, Syracuſe, and Leontium. Others, wanting courage for this dangerous reſolution, or unwilling to ſurvive the fate of their country, periſhed by their own hands. A third claſs, more timid, or more ſuperſtitious, ſhut themſelves up in the temples, expecting to be ſaved by the protection

Unhappy fate of its inhabitants.

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tection of the gods, or by the religious awe of the enemy. But the Barbarians no more reſpected what was ſacred, than what was profane. The conſecrated ſtatues, and altars, and offerings, were confounded with things the moſt vile, and plundered or deſtroyed in the promiſcuous ruin. One memorable act of deſpair may repreſent the general horror of this dreadful ſcene. With his numerous friends, and moſt valued treaſure, the humane and hoſpitable Gellias had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva; but when he underſtood the univerſal deſolation of his country, he ſet fire to that ſacred edifice, chuſing to periſh by the flames rather than by the rage of the Carthaginians [57].

Amidſt the tumults of war and faction Dionyſius riſes to eminence. Olymp. xciii. 1. A.C. 408.

Near fourſcore years before the demolition of Agrigentum, Sicily had acquired immortal glory, by defeating more numerous invaders; but, at that time, the efforts of the whole iſland were united and animated by the virtues and abilities of Gelon; whereas, amidſt the actual dangers and trepidation of the Carthaginian war, the Sicilians were diſtracted by domeſtic factions. Syracuſe had baniſhed the only man whoſe conſummate wiſdom, and approved valour and fidelity, ſeemed worthy to direct the helm in the preſent tempeſtuous juncture. In the interval between the ſiege of Himera and that of Agrigentum, the patriotic Hermocrates had returned to Sicily; and, at the head of his numerous adherents, had attempted to gain

57 Diodorus, p. 379.

admiſſion

admiſſion into the capital. But the attempt was immediately fatal to himſelf; and, in its conſequences, deſtructive of the public freedom. His partiſans, though diſcomfited and baniſhed, ſoon found a leader qualified to avenge their cauſe, and to puniſh the ingratitude of Syracuſe. CHAP. XXIV.

This was the celebrated Dionyſius, a youth of twenty-two years; of mean parentage, but unbounded ambition; deſtitute (if we believe hiſtorians) of almoſt every virtue, and poſſeſſed of every talent; and whoſe fortune it was, to live and flouriſh amidſt thoſe perturbed circumſtances of foreign war and civil diſſenſion, which are favourable to the elevation of ſuperior minds. Though eſteemed and entruſted by Hermocrates, who could more eaſily diſcern the merit of his abilities, than diſcover the danger of his ambition, Dionyſius had gained friends in the oppoſite faction, by whoſe intereſt he was recalled from exile. His ſervices in the Carthaginian war raiſed him to eminence. He excelled in valour; he was unrivalled in eloquence; his ends were purſued with ſteady perſeverance; his means were varied with convenient flexibility; the appearance of patriotiſm rendered him popular, and he employed his popularity to reſtore his baniſhed friends. His character.

The gratitude of one party, and the admiration of both, enabled him to attain the command of the mercenaries, and the conduct of the war. But he was leſs ſolicitous to conquer the Carthaginians than to enſlave his fellow-citizens, whoſe factious turbulence rendered them unworthy of liberty. Means by which he uſurped the government of Syracuſe. Olymp. xciii. 4. A.C. 405.

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By the affected dread of violence from his enemies, he obtained a guard for his perſon, which his artful generoſity eaſily attached to his intereſt; and the arms of his troops, the influence and wealth of Philiſtus, the hiſtorian of Sicily, who was honoured with the appellation of the ſecond Thucydides [58], above all his own crafty and daring ambition, enabled him, at the age of twenty-five, to uſurp the government of Syracuſe, which he held for thirty-eight years.

His ſucceſsful reign. Olymp. xciii. 4. A.C. 405. Olymp. ciii. 2. A.C. 367.

During his long and active reign he was generally engaged in war; ſometimes with the Carthaginians, ſometimes with his revolted ſubjects. Yet in both conteſts he finally prevailed, having reduced the Carthaginian power in Sicily, and appeaſed, or intimidated, domeſtic rebellion. His actual condition, however ſplendid, he regarded only as a preparation for higher grandeur. He beſieged and took Rhegium, the key of Italy: nor could the feeble confederacy of the Italian Greeks have prevented the conqueſt of that country, had not the renewed hoſtilities of the Carthaginians, and freſh diſcontents at home, interrupted the progreſs of his arms. This growing ſtorm he reſiſted as ſucceſsfully as before, and tranſmitted, to a degenerate ſon, the peaceful inheritance of the greateſt part of Sicily; after having ſtrengthened, with wonderful art, the fortifications of the capital; enlarged the ſize, and improved the form of the

[58] Cicero de Orator. l. xi.

Syracuſan

Syracuſan gallies; invented the military catapults, an engine of war which he employed, with great advantage, in the ſiege of Motya and Rhegium; and not only defended his native iſland againſt foreign invaſion, but rendered its power formidable to the neighbouring countries. CHAP. XXIV.

His poetical labours were the leaſt uniformly ſucceſsful of all his undertakings. His verſes, though rehearſed by the moſt ſkilful *rhapſodiſts* of the age, were treated with ſignal contempt at the Olympic games. A ſecond time he renewed his pretenſion to literary fame in that illuſtrious aſſembly; but his ambaſſador was inſulted by the moſt humiliating indignities; and the orator Lyſias pronounced a diſcourſe, in which he maintained the impropriety of admitting the repreſentative of an impious tyrant to aſſiſt at a ſolemnity conſecrated to religion, virtue, and liberty [59]. The oration of Lyſias leaves room to ſuſpect that the plenitude of Dionyſius's power, rather than the defect of his poetry, expoſed him to the cenſure and deriſion of the Olympic ſpectators; and this ſuſpicion receives ſtrong confirmation by conſidering, that, in the laſt year of his reign, he deſerved and obtained the poetic crown at Athens; a city renowned for the impartiality of its literary deciſions [60]. His literary ambition. A. C. 387.

It is remarkable, that, with ſuch an active, vigorous, and comprehenſive mind; with ſuch a variety of talents, and ſuch an accumulation of Reaſons why the character of Dionyſius ap-

[59] Life of Lyſias, p. 117. Dionyſ. Halicar. de Demoſth.
[60] Iſocrat. Panegyr.

glory,

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peared so odious to ancient historians.

glory, Dionysius should be universally held out and branded, as the most conspicuous example of an odious and miserable tyrant, the object of terror in his own, and of detestation in succeeding ages. Yet the uncorrupted evidence of history will prove, that the character of Dionysius was not decisively flagitious. His situation rendered it artificial; and he is acknowledged often to have assumed the semblance of virtue. Always crafty and cautious; but by turns, and as it suited his interest, mild, affable, and condescending; or cruel, arrogant, and imperious: nor did the Syracusans feel the rigour of his tyranny, until they had justly provoked it by an insurrection, during which they treated his wife and children with the most barbarous and brutal fury. But there are two circumstances in the character of Dionysius which peculiarly excited the indignation of the moralists of Greece and Rome, and which the moderation or the softness of modern times will be disposed to consider with less severity. He had usurped the government of a free republic; a crime necessarily heinous in the sight of those who held the assassination of a tyrant to be the most meritorious exertion of human virtue; and he professed an open contempt for the religion of his country; a crime of which the bare suspicion had brought to death the most amiable and respected of men. Yet the impiety of Dionysius was only the child of his interest, and sometimes the parent of his wit. He stripped a celebrated statue of Jupiter of a golden robe, observing, that it was too heavy

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in ſummer, and too cold in winter. For a reaſon equally ingenious he deprived Æſculapius of his golden beard; aſſerting, that ſuch a venerable ornament ill became the ſon of the beardleſs Apollo. But if he deſpoiled the altars and ſtatues, he increaſed and improved the fleets and armies, of Syracuſe, which were ſucceſsfully employed againſt the public enemy. And to the general current of ſatire and declamation againſt this extraordinary man [61], may be oppoſed the opinion of Polybius and Scipio Africanus, the moſt illuſtrious characters of the moſt illuſtrious age of Rome: "That none ever concerted his ſchemes with more prudence, or executed them with more boldneſs, than Dionyſius the Elder."

Inglorious reign of Dionyſius the Younger. Olymp. civ. 3. A.C. 362. Olymp. cx. 1. A.C. 340.

His ſon, Dionyſius the Younger, exceeded his vices without poſſeſſing his abilities. The reign of this ſecond tyrant was diſtracted and inglorious. His kinſman Dion, the amiable diſciple of Plato, endeavoured to correct the diſorders of his ungoverned mind. But the taſk was too heavy for Dion, and even for Plato himſelf. The former, unable to reſtrain the exceſſes of the prince, undertook the defence of the people. His patriotiſm interrupted, but did not deſtroy, the tyranny of Dionyſius, which was finally aboliſhed, twenty-two

[61] The authentic hiſtory of the reign of Dionyſius is copiouſly recorded by Diodorus Siculus, l. xiv. & xv. To relate the numerous and improbable ſtories told of him by Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and other moraliſts, would be to tranſcribe what it is not eaſy to believe. The reader may conſult, particularly, Plut. ex edit. Paris, in Moral. pp. 78 & 83. De Garrul. p. 508. In Dion. p. 961; and various paſſages of Cicero de Officiis, & Tuſculan. Quæſt.

years

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years after he firſt mounted the throne, by the magnanimity of Timoleon [62]. This revolution happened only two years before Corinth, the country of Timoleon, as well as the other republics of Greece, ſubmitted to the arms of Philip of Macedon; and, having loſt their own independence, became incapable of aſſerting the freedom of their colonies.

Sicily becomes a province of Rome. Olymp. cxlii. 1. A.C. 212.

New tyrants ſtarted up in Syracuſe, and almoſt in every city of Sicily, and held a precarious ſway under the alternate protection of the Carthaginians and Romans. The citizens of Syracuſe, mindful of their ancient fame, dethroned their uſurpers, and enjoyed conſiderable intervals of liberty. But at length the Romans gained poſſeſſion of the place; the perſevering valour of Marcellus, aſſiſted by the treachery of the garriſon, prevailing, after a ſiege of three years, over the bold efforts of mechanical power, directed by the inventive genius of Archimedes [63]. The reduction of the capital was immediately followed by the conqueſt of the adjoining territory; and Sicily came thus to be regarded as the eldeſt province of Rome, and the firſt country, without the limits of Italy, which had taught that victorious republic to taſte and enjoy the ſweets of foreign dominion [64].

62 Corn. Nepos. Diodorus Sicul. Plut. Dion.

63 Polyb. Excerpt. l. viii. Plut. in Marcell.

64 Livy, l. xxiv. & Cicero in Verrem in few words—Omnium exterarum gentium princeps Sicilia ad amicitiam fidemque, P. R. applicuit; primaque omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii eſt, provincia eſt appellata: prima docuit majores noſtros, quàm præclarum eſſet exteris gentibus imperitare.

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Death of Darius Nothus.—Cyrus diſputes the Succeſſion with his elder Brother Artaxerxes.—Character of Cyrus.—State of Lower Aſia under his Adminiſtration.—His Strength and Reſources.—His Expedition into Upper Aſia.—Deſcries the vaſt Army of his Brother.—Battle of Cunaxa.—Death of Cyrus.—His Grecian Auxiliaries victorious.—Their Treaty with Tiſſaphernes.—Perfidious Aſſaſſination of the Grecian Generals.—Artaxerxes ſends to the Greeks to demand their Arms.—Conference on that Subject.

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Death of Darius Nothus. Olymp. xciv. 1. A.C. 404.

WHILE the operations of war conſpired with the revolutions of government, to detach the Grecian colonies in Italy, Sicily, and Cyrené, from the general intereſts and politics of the mother country, a ſeries of events, not leſs curious than important, connected, in the cloſeſt intimacy, the hiſtory of Greece with the annals of the Perſian empire. The ſame memorable year, which terminated the deſtructive war of Peloponneſus, brought to a concluſion the active and proſperous reign of Darius Nothus. He named as his ſucceſſor Artaxerxes, ſtyled Mnemon, from the ſtrength of his memory; and perſiſted in this choice, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the artful

The ſucceſſion of Artaxerxes is diſputed by his younger brother Cyrus.

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ful and ambitious Paryſatis, who employed her extenſive influence over the mind of an old and uxorious huſband, to obtain the kingdom for Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes, and the peculiar favourite of his mother. The rivalſhip of the young princes, both of whom were at court during the laſt illneſs of Darius, unhappily degenerated into enmity; and a circumſtance, which would be thought immaterial in the preſent age, increaſed the indignation of Cyrus. The birth of Artaxerxes had happened before the acceſſion of his father to the throne, but Cyrus was born the ſon of a king; a diſtinction which, however frivolous it may appear in modern times, had engaged Darius Hyſtaſpes to prefer Xerxes, the younger of his ſons, to his elder brother Artabazanes [a].

Cauſe of his reſentment againſt Artaxerxes.

The precedent eſtabliſhed by ſuch an illuſtrious monarch might have enforced the partial arguments of Paryſatis, and both might have been confirmed by the ſtrong claim of merit, ſince Cyrus early diſcovered ſuch talents and virtues as fitted him to fill the moſt difficult, and to adorn the moſt exalted, ſtation. At the age of ſeventeen, he had obtained the government of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia; and the ſame mandate of Darius which deſtroyed his hopes of ſucceſſion to the Perſian throne, rendered him hereditary ſatrap of thoſe valuable provinces. On the demiſe of that monarch, Cyrus prepared to return to Aſia

[a] Herodot. l. vii. c. ii.

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Minor, attended by the ſame eſcort with which he had come to Suſa; a faithful body of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Xenias, an Arcadian. But when he prepared to leave court, a very criminal and unfortunate incident retarded his departure. The ſelfiſh and perfidious Tiſſaphernes, who expected to divide the ſpoils of the young prince, accuſed him of treaſon. He was apprehended by order of Artaxerxes; but the powerful protection of Paryſatis, who, though ſhe loved only one, was beloved, or at leaſt feared, by both of her ſons, defended his life, vindicated his honour, and reſtored him in ſafety to his government.

Circumſtances favourable to his ambition.

The danger that had threatened his perſon could not much affect the heroic fortitude of Cyrus; but the affront offered to his dignity ſunk deep into his heart; and from the moment that he recovered his freedom, he determined to revenge his injuries [2], or to periſh in the attempt. In the deſpotic countries of the Eaſt, as there is ſcarcely any intermediate gradation between the prince and people, and ſcarcely any alternative but that of dominion or ſervitude, a diſcontented or rebellious ſubject muſt either ſtifle his animoſity, ſubmit to die, or aſpire to reign [3]. The magnanimity of Cyrus na-

[2] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. i. c. i. This was the origin of his reſentment, which Xenophon expreſſes with great delicacy; ὁ δὲ κινδυνευσας και ατιμασθεις, βουλευεται ὁπως μηποτε ετι ᾖ ἀρχων ετι τῳ ἀδελφῳ, &c. He aſſerted independence, the firſt wiſh of every great mind.

[3] "Cyrus determined no longer," ſays Xenophon, "to depend "on his brother; ἀλλα ἡν δυνηται βασιλευσειν αὐτ' ἐκεινου, but, if poſ- "ſible, to reign in his ſtead."

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turally preferred the road of danger and glory; he prepared not only to puniſh the injuſtice, but to uſurp the throne of Artaxerxes, defended as it was by a million of armed men, and protected both by the power of ſuperſtition, and by the ſplendour of hereditary renown. This deſign would have been great, but romantic, if the young prince had not enjoyed very extraordinary reſources in the powers of his own mind, in the affectionate attachment of his Barbarian ſubjects, and, above all, in the fidelity and valour of his Lacedæmonian allies.

Character of Cyrus;

Whether we conſider what he ſaid, or what he did, the teſtimony of his contemporaries, or the more unerring teſtimony of his life and actions, Cyrus appears to have been born for the honour of human nature, and particularly for the honour of Aſia, which, though the richeſt and moſt populous quarter of the globe, has never, in any age, abounded in great characters. From the age of ſeven years, he had been trained, at the gate of the palace, to ſhoot with the bow, to manage the horſe, and to ſpeak truth; according to the diſcipline inſtituted by the great founder of the monarchy, and well adapted, in an age of ſimplicity, to form the princes and nobles of Perſia. But in the courſe of two centuries, the progreſs of refinement and luxury, the infectious example of a corrupt court, and the perfidious leſſons of the world, had perverted, or rendered ineffectual, a very ſalutary ſyſtem of education; and the grandees of Perſia, whatever proficiency they made in their exerciſes, felt

contraſted with that of the Perſian nobles.

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felt ſo little regard for veracity, that (as will abundantly appear in the ſequel) they ſeldom ſpoke but with a view to deceive, and rarely made a promiſe which they did not break, or took an oath which they did not violate. The behaviour of Cyrus was totally the reverſe. He equalled, and ſurpaſſed his companions in all exterior accompliſhments. But while his manly beauty, his bodily activity and addreſs, and the ſuperior courage, as well as ſkill, which he diſplayed in hunting, horſemanſhip, and every military exerciſe, commanded the admiration of the multitude; he himſelf ſeems not to have eſtimated ſuch ſuperficial advantages beyond their real worth. He regarded integrity of heart as the only ſolid baſis of a great character. His probity was uniform, his word ſacred, his friendſhip inviolable. In the giddy ſeaſon of youth, he yielded, with uncommon docility, to the admonitions of experience. Neither wealth, nor birth, nor rank, but age and virtue, were the objects of his reſpect; and his behaviour, equally meritorious and ſingular, was juſtly and univerſally admired.

State of Lower Aſia during his adminiſtration.

His ſubjects in Leſſer Aſia, in particular, were ſeized with the moſt pleaſing aſtoniſhment, when, inſtead of a greedy and voluptuous ſatrap, eager only to ſqueeze, to amaſs, and to enjoy, they beheld a prince who preferred the public intereſt to his own; who alleviated the weight of taxes, that he might encourage the operations of induſtry; whoſe own hands gave the uſeful example of rural

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labour[4]; whoſe deciſions united juſtice and mercy; and whoſe active vigilance introduced (what neither before nor ſince the government of Cyrus has been known in the Aſiatic peninſula) ſuch regularity of police, as rendered intercourſe ſafe, and property ſecure.

His popular acts.

The virtues of juſtice and integrity, when accompanied with diligence and abilities, muſt procure ſuch a degree of reſpect for the adminiſtration, as will naturally be extended to the perſon, of a prince. But ſomething farther is required, not to obtain the public gratitude and eſteem, but to excite the affectionate ardour of ſelect and devoted friends; without the aſſiſtance of whom, it is ſeldom poſſible to accompliſh any great and memorable deſign. Cyrus excelled all his contemporaries in the art both of acquiring and of preſerving the moſt valuable friendſhips. His gratitude overpaid every favour; his liberality was large, yet diſcerning; and his donatives were always enhanced by the handſome and affectionate manner in which they were beſtowed. When he diſcovered a man really worthy of his confidence and eſteem, he was not ſatisfied with giving him a partial ſhare of his affections; he gave his heart entire; and it was his conſtant prayer to the gods, that he might live to requite and ſurpaſs the good offices of his friends, and the injuries of his enemies.

4 Xenoph. ibid. Cic. in Senect. Plut. in Lyſand. have all celebrated this part of his character.

With

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With ſuch ſentiments and character, Cyrus acquired the firm attachment of a few, and the willing obedience of all his Barbarian ſubjects, in the populous provinces which he commanded, whoſe united ſtrength exceeded an hundred thouſand fighting men; who, unwarlike as they were, yet excelled, both in bravery and in ſkill, the effeminate troops of Upper Aſia.

Amount of his Barbarian troops.

They were probably indebted for this advantage to their intercourſe with the Greeks, whoſe diſciplined valour, far more than the numbers of his Barbarians, encouraged Cyrus to undertake an expedition for acquiring the empire of the Eaſt. By the moſt important ſervices he had deſerved the gratitude of the Lacedæmonian republic; which had been raiſed, chiefly by his aſſiſtance, to the head of Greece, and to the command of the ſea. In return for that favour, ſo ineſtimable in the ſight of an ambitious people, the Spartans readily complied with his requeſt, by ſending into Aſia eight hundred heavy-armed men, under the command of the intrepid Cheiriſophus; and they charged their admiral, Samius, who had ſucceeded Lyſander in the government of the Ionian coaſt, faithfully to co-operate with Cyrus, by employing his powerful fleet in whatever ſervice the Perſian prince might think proper to recommend[s]. Had they done nothing more than this, Cyrus might well have approved their uſeful gratitude; eſpecially as their alliance, ſecuring him on the

His chief confidence in the gratitude and valour of the Greeks.

[s] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii.

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Amount of his Grecian troops.

ſide of Europe, enabled him, without danger, to drain his weſtern garriſons, and to augment the ſtrength of his army. But the friendſhip of the Spartans carried them ſtill farther. They allowed him to recruit his forces in every part of their dominions; and the generous munificence of Cyrus had acquired numerous partiſans well qualified to raiſe and to command thoſe valuable levies. Clearchus the Spartan, Menon the Theſſalian, Proxenus the Bœotian, Agias the Arcadian, and Socrates the Acæan, all alike devoted to the intereſt and glory of the Perſian prince, collected, chiefly from their reſpective republics, above ten thouſand heavy-armed men, and near three thouſand archers and targeteers.

Secrecy of his preparations.

Theſe preparations, which were carried on with ſilence and celerity, deceived the haughty indolence of the Perſians; but they could not eſcape the vigilance of Alcibiades, who then reſided at Grynium, a town of Phrygia, under the protection of Pharnabazus. Moved by reſentment againſt the Lacedæmonians, or ambitious of gaining merit with the great king, he deſired an eſcort from the ſatrap, that he might undertake with ſafety a journey to Suſa, in order to acquaint Artaxerxes with the hoſtile deſigns of his brother. Pharnabazus, who poſſeſſed not the merit, coveted the reward of the diſcovery; and therefore (as we formerly had occaſion to relate [6]) readily gratified the requeſt of Lyſander, by the deſtruction of Alcibiades.

[6] See above, p. 112.

But

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Cyrus undertakes his expedition into Upper Aſia. Olymp. xcv. 1. A.C. 400.

But neither the intelligence conveyed by the Perſian governor, nor the repeated ſolicitations of Tiſſaphernes, nor the conſciouſneſs of his own injuſtice and cruelty, could rouſe Artaxerxes from the profound ſecurity of his repoſe. Cyrus completed his levies without moleſtation, and almoſt without ſuſpicion; and prepared, in the beginning of the year four hundred before Chriſt, to march from the Ionian coaſt into Upper Aſia, at the head of an hundred thouſand Barbarians, and above thirteen thouſand Greeks. His journey towards Babylon, his defeat and death in the plain of Cynaxa, the retreat and diſperſion of his followers, and the memorable return of the Greeks to their native country, have been related by the admired diſciple of Socrates (whom the friendſhip of Proxenus, the Bœotian, recommended to the ſervice and eſteem of Cyrus), with ſuch deſcriptive beauty, with ſuch profound knowledge of war and of human nature, and with ſuch inimitable eloquence, as never were re-united in the work of any one man but that of Xenophon the Athenian. The retreat was principally conducted by Xenophon himſelf; which has enabled him to adorn his narrative with ſuch an affecting variety of incidents and characters, as will always ſerve to prove that the force of truth and nature is far ſuperior to the powers of the moſt fertile fancy. It would be an undertaking not only hardy, but preſumptuous, to invade the province of ſuch an accompliſhed writer, if the deſign of the preſent work did not oblige us to ſelect the principal circumſtances which illuſtrate the

Xenophon's account of the expedition.

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the condition of the times, and connect the expedition of Cyrus with the ſubſequent hiſtory of Greece.

Rapidity of his march.

Having aſſembled his forces at Sardis, the Perſian prince was carried, by the activity of his reſentment or ambition, with the utmoſt celerity, towards Upper Aſia. In ninety-three marches he travelled through the central provinces of Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia; traverſed the mountains of Cilicia; paſſed unreſiſted through Syria; croſſed the Euphrates at Thapſacus; and after penetrating the deſert, entered the confines of Babylonia. In a journey of above twelve hundred miles, his numerous army experienced fewer difficulties than might naturally be expected. The fertile territory of Aſia Minor ſupplying them abundantly with proviſions, enabled them to proceed commonly at the rate of fifteen or ſixteen miles a-day; and almoſt every ſecond day brought them to a large and populous city. The dependent ſatraps or vice-roys of Lycaonia and Cilicia were leſs ſolicitous to defend the throne of Artaxerxes, than anxious to protect their reſpective provinces from plunder and devaſtation. But the former experienced the ſeverity of an invader whom he had the weakneſs to oppoſe, without the ſtrength or courage to reſiſt [7].

Cilicia defended by the beauty of Epyaxa.

Syenneſis, governor of Cilicia, had reaſon to fear that his country might be plundered with equal rapacity. He endeavoured, therefore, to avail

7 Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. i. p. 248.

himſelf

himſelf of the natural ſtrength of a province whoſe ſouthern boundaries are waſhed by the ſea, and which is defended on other ſides by the winding branches of Mount Taurus [8]. Towards the weſt is but one paſs, called by Arrian the Gates of Cilicia [9]; ſufficient to admit only one chariot at a time, and rendered dark and difficult by ſteep and almoſt inacceſſible mountains. Theſe were occupied by the troops of Syenneſis, who, had he maintained his poſt, might have eaſily prevented the paſſage of an army. But the timid Cilician had not truſted in arms alone for the defence of his country. By the order, or at leaſt with the permiſſion of her huſband, his queen, the beautiful Epyaxa, had met Cyrus at Cylenæ, on the frontiers of Phrygia; and according to the cuſtom of the Eaſt, preſented her acknowledged liege-lord and ſuperior with gold, ſilver, and other coſtly gifts. But the greateſt gift was her youth and beauty, which ſhe ſubmitted, it is ſaid, to the enamoured prince, who, after entertaining her with the utmoſt magnificence and diſtinction [10]; reſtored CHAP. XXV.

[8] Xenoph. p. 248.

[9] Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. ii. p. 31.

[10] She requeſted Cyrus to ſhew her his troops. He complied; and attended her coach, in an open car. But the curioſity of Epyaxa had almoſt coſt her dear. "When the Barbarians were reviewed, the Greeks were ordered to their arms, and commanded to advance, as to a charge; after which, the ſoldiers, of their own accord, ran with ſhouts to their tents. The Barbarians were thrown into conſternation; Epyaxa quitted her coach; the Greeks returned laughing to their tents; and Cyrus rejoiced at ſeeing the terror with which the Greeks had inſpired the Barbarians." Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. i. p. 247.

her

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her to Cilicia by a near, but difficult road, which led acroſs the mountains.

The Greeks plunder Tarſus.

To the eſcort which accompanied her, Cyrus added a conſiderable body of Greeks commanded by Menon the Theſſalian. The greater part arrived at Tarſus, the capital, before the army of Cyrus reached the gates of Cilicia; but two companies, amounting together to an hundred men, were miſſing, and ſuppoſed to have been deſtroyed by the mountaineers, while they wandered in queſt of booty. Syenneſis was mortified at hearing that the enemy had already entered his province. But when he likewiſe received intelligence that the Peloponneſian fleet had ſailed round from Ionia, in order to co-operate with the army, the diſagreeable news totally diſconcerted the meaſures of his defence. He fled in precipitation, abandoning his tents and baggage to the invaders. Cyrus croſſed the mountains without oppoſition, and traverſed the beautiful irriguous plains of Cilicia, which were adorned with trees and vines, and abounded in ſeſame, panic, millet, wheat, and barley. In four days he arrived at the large and rich city of Tarſus, which was plundered by the reſentment of the Greeks, for the loſs of their companions.

Cyrus exchanges preſents with Syenneſis of Cilicia.

Cyrus immediately ſent for the governor, who had removed from his palace, and, attended by the greater part of the inhabitants, had taken refuge among the faſtneſſes in the neighbouring mountains. By the aſſurances of Epyaxa, her timorous

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timorous [11] huſband was with much difficulty perſuaded to put himſelf in the power of a ſuperior, to whom, as the price of his ſafety, he carried large ſums of money. Cyrus courteouſly accepted the welcome ſupply, which the demands of his troops rendered peculiarly ſeaſonable; and, in return, honoured Syenneſis with ſuch preſents as were deemed of great value by the kings of the Eaſt. They conſiſted in a Perſian robe, a horſe with a golden bit, a chain, bracelets, and ſcimitar of gold, the reſtoration of priſoners, and the exemption of Cilicia from farther plunder [12].

Mutiny in the Grecian camp.

During their luxurious reſidence at Tarſus, the Greeks were corrupted by proſperity. They diſdained to obey their commanders, and refuſed to continue their journey. The deſign of marching to Babylon, though it was not unknown to Clearchus, or to the Spartan ſenate, had been concealed from the ſoldiers, leſt their impatience or their fears might be alarmed by the proſpect of ſuch a long and dangerous undertaking. At Tarſus they firſt diſcovered their ſuſpicions of the deceit, which immediately broke out into licentious clamours. They inſulted the majeſty of Cyrus; they reproached the perfidy of their generals; and their

[11] Pride, as well as fear, ſeems to have actuated Syenneſis; ὁ δε ουδε προτερον ουδενι πω κρειττονι ἑαυτου εις χειρας ελθειν ἐφη, ουδε τοτε Κυρῳ ιεναι ηθελε, πριν ἡ γυνη αυτον επεισε; "Syenneſis declared, that he had never formerly put himſelf in the power of a man in any reſpect ſuperior to himſelf; nor would he then go to Cyrus, till his wife perſuaded him," &c. A true picture of oriental manners, meanneſs varniſhed with pride!

[12] Xenophon. Anabaſ. p. 249.

anger

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Appeaſed by the addreſs of Clearchus.

anger was ready to vent itſelf in open ſedition, when the ferment was appeaſed by the addreſs and prudence of Clearchus. While he privately aſſured Cyrus of his beſt endeavours to make the affair take a favourable turn, he openly embraced the cauſe of the ſoldiers, affected deeply to feel their grievances, and eagerly concurred with every meaſure that ſeemed proper to remove them. His eloquence and his tears diverted the deſign of immediate hoſtility. An aſſembly was ſummoned to deliberate on the actual poſture of affairs. Several, of their own accord, offered their opinion; others ſpoke as they had been directed by Clearchus. One counſellor, who was heard with applauſe, adviſed them to pack up their baggage, and to demand guides or ſhips from Cyrus, to facilitate their return. Another ſhewed the folly of this requeſt from a man whoſe meaſures they had traverſed, and whoſe purpoſe they had endeavoured to defeat [13]. They ſurely could not truſt in guides given

[13] This paſſage is tranſlated as follows by Mr. Spelman: "After him another got up, ſhewing the folly of the man who adviſed to demand the ſhips, as if Cyrus would not reſume his expedition. He ſhewed alſo how weak a thing it was to apply for a guide to that perſon whoſe undertaking we had defeated." If Cyrus reſumed his expedition, it could not be ſaid that his undertaking was defeated; nor is this the proper meaning of the word λυμαινεσθαι, which ſignifies to hurt or weaken. I am ſenſible that by an eaſy tranſition, it ſometimes ſignifies to corrupt, to deſtroy, to defeat; but in the paſſage before us, if a tranſlator ſhould chooſe to explain it by any of thoſe words, he muſt ſay, "whoſe undertaking we had begun, endeavoured, or purpoſed, to defeat; an explanation of λυμαινομεθα, which is juſtified by the analogy of the Greek language, and which the ſenſe

given them by an enemy; nor could it be expected that Cyrus ſhould part with his ſhips, which were evidently ſo neceſſary to the ſucceſs of his expedition. At length it was determined to ſend commiſſioners to treat with Cyrus, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, prevail on them to follow him, or be himſelf prevailed on to allow them to return home; and the difference was thus finally adjuſted, by promiſing each ſoldier a darick and a half, inſtead of a darick, of monthly pay [14].

Cyrus paſſes the Syrian gates.

When this ſtorm was happily appeaſed, the enemy left Tarſus, and marched five days through the fertile plains of Cilicia, till they arrived at Iſſus, the laſt town of the province; large, rich, and populous; and only fifteen miles diſtant from the frontier of Syria. This wealthy province was defended by two fortreſſes, called the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. They extended from the mountains to the ſea. The interval of three furlongs between them contained ſeveral paſſes, narrow and intricate, beſides the rapid Kerſas, which flowed in the middle, one hundred feet in breadth. It was on this occaſion that Cyrus experienced the full advantage of the Lacedæmonian aſſiſtance. A fleet of ſixty ſail, conducted by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had ſucceeded Samius in the naval command, prepared to land the Greeks on the

ſenſe abſolutely requires." This is one of the few minute miſtakes which I have diſcovered in Mr. Spelman's moſt accurate tranſlation.

14 Xenoph. ibid. p. 250, & ſeqq.

eaſtern

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eaſtern ſide of the Gates, which muſt have expoſed the Syrian works to a double aſſault; but the cowardice of Abrocomas, who commanded the numerous forces of Syria and Phœnicia, rendered the execution of this meaſure unneceſſary. The deſign, alone, was ſufficient to terrify him. He abandoned his forts, and fled with precipitation before the approach of an enemy [15].

The army wade the Euphrates.

Cyrus thenceforth proceeded without meeting with any appearance of oppoſition, and in fifteen days march, reached the banks of the Euphrates. At Thapſacus, which in ſome eaſtern languages ſignifies the ford [16], this noble river is above half a mile in breadth, but ſo ſhoaly that the navigation is reckoned dangerous even for boats which draw very little water. The ſhallowneſs increaſes in the autumnal ſeaſon, which happened to be the time that the army paſſed the Euphrates, which no where reached above the breaſt. This favourable circumſtance furniſhed an opportunity to the inhabitants of Thapſacus to flatter Cyrus, that the great river had viſibly ſubmitted to him as its future king [17]. Elevated by this auſpicious prediction, he purſued his journey through Meſopotamia, part of which was anciently comprehended under the name of Syria [18]. While he proceeded through this fertile country he did not forget that a laborious march of ſeventeen days, through a barren

[15] Xenoph. p. 253.
[16] Foſter's Geographical Diſſertation on Xenophon's Retreat.
[17] Xenoph. p. 255.
[18] So it is called by Xenoph. ibid.

deſart,

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desert, must conduct him to the cultivated plains of Babylon.

Traverse the desert, and enter Babylonia.

Having amply provided for this dangerous undertaking, he performed it with uncommon celerity, both in order to avoid risking the want of provisions, and, if possible, to take his enemy unprepared. For several days the army marched, without interruption, through the province of Babylonia; and, on the fifth, came to a deep and broad ditch, which had been recently dug to intercept, or retard, their passage. But as this defence was left altogether unguarded, and the great king had not employed any means for protecting the most valuable portion of his dominions, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of venturing an engagement. The troops of Cyrus, therefore, who had hitherto maintained their ranks with circumspection, no longer observed any regular order of march; their arms were carried in waggons, or on sumpter horses; and their general, in his car, rode in the van with few armed attendants. While they proceeded in this fearless contempt of the enemy, and approached the plain of Cynaxa, which is within a day's journey of Babylon [19], Patagyas, a Persian, and confidential friend

[19] I have used an indeterminate expression to denote the uncertain situation of those places as described by Strabo, l. ii. & Plut. in Artaxerx. Mr. Spelman justly observes, that the error of Xenophon (unnoticed by any former translator), who makes the distance between Babylon three thousand and sixty stadia, is so enormous, that it can only be owing to a mistake of the transcriber.

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of Cyrus, came riding towards them in full ſpeed, his horſe all in a foam, calling aloud ſucceſſively in his own language, and in Greek, that the king was at hand with a vaſt army [20].

Cyrus deſcries the immenſe army of his brother.

The experienced Greeks, who beſt knew the danger of being attacked in diſorder, were moſt ſenſibly alarmed by this ſudden ſurpriſe. Cyrus, leaping from his car, put on his corſlet, mounted his horſe, ſeized his javelin, commanded the troops to arm, and ordered every man to his poſt. His orders were readily obeyed; and the army advanced, ſeveral hours, in order of battle. It was now mid-day; yet no enemy appeared: but in the afternoon, an extended cloud of duſt was perceived, which at firſt faint, gradually thickened into darkneſs, and overſpread the plain. At length the brazen armour flaſhed; the motion, the ranks, and ſpears, were diſtinctly ſeen. In the front were innumerable chariots, armed with ſcythes in a downward, and in an oblique direction. The cavalry, commanded by Tiſſaphernes, were diſtinguiſhed by white corſlets; the Perſians by wicker bucklers; the Egyptians by wooden ſhields reaching down to their feet. Theſe formed the chief ſtrength of Artaxerxes; but the various multitude of nations, marching in ſeparate columns according to their reſpective countries, had ſcarcely any armour of defence, and could annoy the enemy only at a diſtance, with their ſlings, darts, and arrows [21].

[20] Xenoph. p. 263.
[21] Xenoph. p. 263, & ſeqq.

While

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While the hoſtile battalions approached, Cyrus, accompanied by Pigres the interpreter, and a few choſen attendants, all mounted on horſes of extraordinary ſwiftneſs, rode through the intermediate ſpace, obſerving the numbers and diſpoſition of the enemy. He had learned from deſerters, that the troops of the great king amounted to twelve hundred thouſand, divided into four equal bodies of men, reſpectively commanded by the four generals Tiſſaphernes, Gobrias, Arbaces, and Abracomas. The laſt, however, had not yet joined; nor did he reach Babylonia till five days after the battle. But, notwithſtanding this defect, the numbers of Artaxerxes were ſtill ſufficient to perform whatever numbers can accompliſh. According to the cuſtom of the Eaſt, the king, ſurrounded by a choſen body of cavalry, occupied the centre of the army, as the place of greateſt ſecurity, and moſt convenient for iſſuing his orders with promptitude and effect. But ſuch was the extent of ground covered by the various nations whom he commanded, that even his centre reached beyond the left wing of the army of Cyrus; who, therefore, called aloud to Clearchus to advance oppoſite to the king's guard, becauſe, if *that* ſhould be broken, the *work* would be done. But Clearchus was unwilling to withdraw the Greeks from the Euphrates, leſt they ſhould be ſurrounded by the enemy; he therefore kept his poſt, aſſuring Cyrus of his utmoſt care to make all go well.

Its number and diſpoſition.

The diſobedience of Clearchus, and the diſtruſt of Cyrus, threw away the fortune of the day,

The battle of Cynaxa.

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Olymp. xcv. 1. A.C. 400.

which involved the fate of Perſia, and the renown of Greece. For although, by ſkilful evolutions, Clearchus eluded the armed chariots and cavalry of the enemy; though the Greeks, by their countenance and ſhouts alone, put to flight the oppoſing crowd, who could not endure the ſight of their regular array, their burniſhed arms, or hear without terror the martial ſounds of their harmonious Pœans, intermixed with the clanging of their ſpears againſt their brazen bucklers; yet the great king, perceiving the rapid purſuit of the Greeks, and that nothing oppoſed him in front, commanded his men to wheel to the left, and advanced with celerity in order to attack the rear of the enemy. If this deſign had been carried into execution, it is probable that the Greeks, having prevailed on the firſt onſet, would immediately have faced about, and, animated by the joy of victory, and their native ardour, have repelled and routed the troops of Artaxerxes.

Raſh impetuoſity of Cyrus.

But the impatience of Cyrus defeated this favourable proſpect. He obſerved the movement of his brother, and eagerly rode to meet him, at the head of only ſix hundred horſe. Such was the rapid violence of his aſſault, that the advanced guards of the king were thrown into diſorder, and their leader Artageſes fell by the hand of Cyrus, who, with all his great qualities, had not learned to diſtinguiſh between the duties of a ſoldier and a general. By a ſeaſonable retreat, he might ſtill, perhaps, have ſaved his life, and gained a crown. But his eye darting along the ranks, met that of his

his brother. He ruſhed forward, with a blind inſtinctive fury, crying out, "I ſee the man!" and, penetrating the thick globe of attendants, aimed his javelin at the king, pierced his corſlet, and wounded his breaſt. His eagerneſs to deſtroy the enemy prevented proper attention to ſave himſelf. From an uncertain hand, he received a ſevere wound in the face, which, however, only increaſed the fury with which he aſſaulted his brother. Various and inconſiſtent accounts were given of the death of Cyrus, even by thoſe who aſſiſted in this memorable engagement. The crowd of hiſtorians thought it incumbent on them to make him die like the hero of a tragedy, after many viciſſitudes of fortune, and many variations of miſery. Dinon and Cteſias [22], the longer to ſuſpend the curioſity of their readers, kill him as with a blunted weapon; but Xenophon is contented with ſaying, that he fell in the tumultuary conflict of his attendants with the guards of Artaxerxes, who zealouſly defended their reſpective maſters; and that eight of his moſt confidential friends lay dead upon him, thus ſealing with their blood their inviolable fidelity [23].

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His death.

Such was the cataſtrophe of this audacious and fatal enterpriſe; after which the troops of Artaxerxes advanced, in the ardour of ſucceſs, and proceeded, without encountering any reſiſtance, to the hoſtile camp; Ariæus leading off the forces of

The Perſian troops plunder the camp of Cyrus.

[22] Apud Plutarch. in Artaxerx. [23] Xenoph. p. 266.

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Leſſer Aſia, dejected and diſmayed by the loſs of their prince and general. Among the valuable plunder in the tents of Cyrus, the Barbarians found two Grecian women, his favourite miſtreſſes, the elder of Phocæa, the younger of Miletus. The former, whoſe wit and accompliſhments heightened the charms of her beauty, received and deſerved the name of Aſpaſia, from the celebrated miſtreſs of Pericles, whoſe talents ſhe rivalled, and whoſe character ſhe too faithfully reſembled. The young Mileſian likewiſe fell into the hands of the enemy; but while careleſsly guarded by the Barbarians, intent on more uſeful plunder, eſcaped unobſerved, and arrived naked in the quarter of the Greeks, where a ſmall guard had been left to defend the baggage.

The Greeks, victorious in their quarter of the field, purſue the enemy.

Meanwhile Clearchus, at the head of the Grecian phalanx, purſuing the fugitives, had been carried above the diſtance of three miles from Artaxerxes. But when he heard that the Barbarians were in his tent; and perceived that, tired with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear, he faced about in order to receive them. The time was ſpent, till ſun-ſet, in various diſpoſitions made by the cavalry of Artaxerxes; but neither the ſoldiers, nor their commanders, had courage to come within the reach of the Grecian ſpear. They fled in ſcattered diſorder, wherever the Grecians advanced; who, wearied with marching againſt an enemy that ſeemed incapable to fight, at length determined to return to their camp; wondering

that

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that neither Cyrus himſelf appeared; nor any of his meſſengers[24]. They arrived in the beginning of the night; but found their tents in diſorder, their baggage plundered, their proviſions deſtroyed or ſpent. They chiefly regretted the loſs of four hundred carriages filled with wine and flour, which had been provided by the foreſight of Cyrus, as a reſource in time of want. Even theſe were rifled by the king's troops; and the Greeks, whom the ſudden appearance of the enemy had not allowed to dine, were obliged to paſs the night without ſupper; their bodies exhauſted by the fatigue of a laborious day, and their minds perplexed by the uncertain fate of their allies[25].

Behaviour of the Greeks when informed of Cyrus's death.

At the approach of light, they prepared to move their camp, when the meſſengers of Ariæus arrived, acquainting them with the death of Cyrus. The new commander, they ſaid, had aſſembled the troops of Leſſer Aſia in their former encampment, about twelve miles from the field of battle; where he intended to continue that day, that the Greeks might have time to join him; but if they delayed, he would next day proceed without them, towards Ionia, with the utmoſt expedition. When

[24] In relating this battle, I have followed the advice of Plutarch in Artaxerxes, who ſays, "that Xenophon has deſcribed it with ſuch perſpicuity, elegance, and force, as ſets the action before the eyes of his reader, and makes him aſſiſt with emotion at every incident, not as paſt, but as preſent. A man of ſenſe, therefore, will deſpair to rival Xenophon; and, inſtead of relating the action in detail, will ſelect ſuch circumſtances only as are moſt worthy of notice."

[25] Xenoph. p. 270, & ſeqq.

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the Greeks recovered from the conſternation into which they were thrown by theſe unexpected and melancholy tidings, Clearchus replied, "Would to God Cyrus were alive! but ſince he is dead, let Ariæus know, that we have conquered the king; that his troops have every-where fled before us; and that now no enemy appears to reſiſt our arms. You may, therefore, aſſure Ariæus, that if he will come hither, we will place him on the Perſian throne, which is the juſt reward of our victory." With this propoſal the meſſengers departed, and Clearchus led his troops to the field of battle, to collect proviſions, which were prepared by uſing for fuel the wooden bucklers, ſhields, and arrows, of the Barbarians [26].

Their anſwer to the heralds of Artaxerxes, who demanded their armour.

Next morning heralds arrived from Artaxerxes, who entertained a very different opinion from that expreſſed by Clearchus, concerning the iſſue of the battle. Among theſe reſpected miniſters was Philinus, a fugitive Greek, a man eſteemed by Tiſſaphernes, both as a ſkilful captain and as an able negociator. When the chiefs were aſſembled, Philinus, ſpeaking for his colleagues, declared it to be the will of the great king, who had defeated and killed Cyrus, "That the Greeks, who had now become the ſlaves of the conqueror, ſhould ſurrender their arms." The demand was heard with univerſal indignation. One deſired him to tell the king "to come and take them;" another, "that it was better to die, than to deliver up their arms."

[26] Xenoph. p. 272.

Xeno-

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Xenophon ſpoke to the following purpoſe; "We have nothing, as you ſee, O Philinus! but our arms, and our valour. While we keep poſſeſſion of the one, we can avail ourſelves of the other: but, if we deliver up our arms, we alſo ſurrender our perſons. Do not therefore expect that we ſhall throw away the only advantages which we ſtill enjoy; on the contrary, be aſſured, that, relying on our arms and our valour, we will diſpute with you thoſe advantages which you poſſeſs." Clearchus enforced the ſentiments of Xenophon, which were confirmed by the army; and Philinus, after a fruitleſs attempt to diſcover the immediate deſigns of the Greeks, returned with his colleagues to the Perſian camp [27].

Their plan of retreat concerted with Ariæus.

Meanwhile, Ariæus replied to the honourable embaſſy which had been ſent him, "That there were many Perſians of greater conſideration than himſelf who would never permit him to be their king; he repeated his deſire that the Greeks ſhould join him; but if they declined to come, perſiſted in his reſolution of returning with all haſte to Ionia." This propoſal was approved by the propitious indications of the victims: the army marched in order of battle to the encampment of Ariæus; who, with the moſt diſtinguiſhed of his captains, entered into treaty with the Grecian commanders, binding themſelves by mutual oaths to perform to each other the duties of faithful and affectionate allies. Having ratified this engagement by a ſo-

[27] Xenoph. p. 273.

lemn

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lemn ſacrifice, they proceeded to deliberate concerning their intended journey. It was determined, that inſtead of traverſing the deſolated country by which they had arrived at the field of battle, they ſhould direct their courſe towards the north, by which means they would avoid the deſert, acquire proviſions in greater plenty, and croſs the great rivers, which commonly diminiſh near their ſource, with leſs difficulty and danger. They reſolved alſo to perform their firſt marches with all poſſible expedition, in order to anticipate the king's approach; ſince with a ſmall force he would not dare to follow, and with a great army he would not be able to overtake, them [28].

They accept a truce from Artaxerxes.

This plan of retreat propoſed by Ariæus, had the diſhonourable appearance of flight; but fortune proved a more glorious conductor. Such was the effect of the Grecian courage and firmneſs on the counſels of Artaxerxes, that he, who had ſo lately commanded the ſoldiers to ſurrender their arms, ſent heralds to them the day following to treat of a truce. This memorable agreement, the conſequences of which were ſo calamitous, yet ſo honourable to the Greeks, was concluded by the intervention of Tiſſaphernes; who engaged, on the part of his maſter, to furniſh them with a market, to cauſe them to be treated as friends in the countries through which they marched, and to conduct them without guile into Greece. For the Greeks, on the other hand, Clearchus and the generals ſwore,

[28] Xenoph. p. 276.

that

that they ſhould abſtain from ravaging the king's territories; that they ſhould ſupply themſelves with meat and drink only, when, by any accident, the market was not provided; but when it was, that they ſhould purchaſe whatever they wanted for a reaſonable price [29].

Treachery of Tiſſaphernes and Ariæus.

When this buſineſs was tranſacted, Tiſſaphernes returned to the king, promiſing to come back as ſoon as poſſible. But on various pretences, he delayed twenty days; during which the Perſians had an opportunity to practiſe with Ariæus. By the dread of puniſhment, if he perſiſted in rebellion; by the promiſe of pardon, if he returned to his allegiance; and, above all, by the warm ſolicitation of his kinſmen and friends, that unſteady Barbarian was totally detached from the intereſt of his Grecian allies. His conduct gave juſt ground to ſuſpect this diſpoſition, which became fully evident after the return of Tiſſaphernes. From that moment Ariæus no longer encamped with the Greeks, but preferred the neighbourhood of that perfidious ſatrap. Yet, for three weeks, no open hoſtility was committed; the armies, fearing, and feared by each other, purſued the ſame line of march; Tiſſaphernes led the way; and, according to agreement, furniſhed the Greeks with a market; but treacherouſly increaſed the difficulty of their journey, by conducting them by many windings through the canals and marſhes between the Tigris and Euphrates. When they had croſſed the

[29] Xenoph. p. 281, & ſeqq.

former

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former river, they continued to march northward along its eaſtern banks, always encamping at the diſtance of two or three miles from the Barbarians. Yet this precaution was unable to prevent the parties ſent out to provide wood or forage from quarrelling with each other. From reproachful words, they ſoon proceeded to hoſtile actions; and theſe partial encounters were likely to produce the worſt conſequences, by inflaming the latent, but general animoſity, which it had been ſo difficult to ſtifle or conceal [30].

Perfidious ſeizure of the Grecian generals.

At length they arrived at the fatal ſcene, where the river Zabatus, flowing weſtward from the mountains of Media, pours its tributary waters into the broad ſtream of the Tigris. The Grecian generals, and particularly Clearchus, who had long ſeen and lamented the unfortunate jealouſies prevailing among thoſe who had ſworn mutual fidelity, propoſed a conference between the commanders, in order amicably to explain and remove every ground of hatred and complaint. Tiſſaphernes and Ariæus, as well as their colleague Orontes, eagerly deſired the conference, though their motives were very different from thoſe which actuated Clearchus. A meaſure ſo agreeable to both parties was, without difficulty, carried into execution; and the Greeks, on this occaſion alone, forſook that prudence and caution, which, both before and after, uniformly governed their conduct. Five generals, and twenty captains, repaired to the

[30] Xenoph. p. 282.

tent

tent of Tiſſaphernes; only two hundred ſoldiers followed them, under pretence of going to market. Clearchus, with his colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the ſatrap's apartment; the reſt, whether captains or ſoldiers, were not allowed to enter. This ſeparation occaſioned fear and diſtruſt. The appearance of armed Barbarians increaſed the terror. A gloomy ſilence prevailed; when, on a given ſignal, thoſe within the tent were apprehended, and thoſe without cut to pieces. At the ſame time the Perſian cavalry ſcoured the plain, deſtroying whomever they encountered. The Greeks were aſtoniſhed at this mad excurſion, which they beheld from their camp; until Nicarchus, an Arcadian, came, miſerably mangled, and informed them of the dreadful tragedy that had been acted[31].

Artaxerxes ſends to the Greeks to demand their arms.

Upon this intelligence they ran to their arms, expecting an immediate aſſault. But the cowardly Barbarians, not daring to engage in open and honourable war, endeavoured to accompliſh their deſigns by the ſame impious treachery with which they had begun them. Inſtead of advancing in a body to attack the Grecian camp, they ſent Ariæus, Arteazus, and Mithridates, perſons whoſe great credit with Cyrus might prevent their intentions from being ſuſpected by the enemy. They were attended by three hundred Perſians, clad in complete armour. When they drew near to the Greeks, a herald called out, "That if any of

[31] Xenoph. p. 286, & ſeqq.

the

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the generals or captains were preſent, they ſhould advance, in order to be made acquainted with the king's pleaſure." Cheiriſophus the Lacedæmonian, who, next to Clearchus, had hitherto maintained the greateſt influence over the army, happened to be abſent with a party of foragers. But the remaining generals, Cleanor the Orchomenian, and Sophonetus the Stymphalian, proceeded with caution from the camp, accompanied by Xenophon the Athenian, who (though only a volunteer) followed the commanders, that he might learn what was become of his friend Proxenus[32]. When they came within hearing of the Barbarians, Ariæus ſaid, "Clearchus, O Greeks! having violated his oath, and the articles of peace, is puniſhed with juſt death; but Proxenus and Menon, who gave information of his crimes, are rewarded with the king's favour. Of you the king demands your arms, which, he ſays, are now his property, becauſe they belonged to Cyrus, who was his ſlave." Cleanor the Orchomenian, ſpeaking in the name of the reſt, replied to this demand with the utmoſt indignation, reproaching the perfidy of Ariæus, who had betrayed the friends and benefactors of his maſter Cyrus; and who co-operated with the enemy of that maſter, the deceitful and impious Tiſſaphernes. The Perſian endeavoured to juſtify himſelf, by repeating his accuſation of Clearchus. Upon which Xenophon obſerved, "That Clearchus, if guilty of perjury, had been juſtly puniſhed;

Conference on that ſubject.

[32] Xenoph. p. 288, & ſeqq.

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but where are Proxenus and Menon, who are *your* benefactors, and *our* commanders? Let them, at leaſt, be ſent to us, ſince it is evident that their friendſhip for both parties will make them adviſe what is beſt for both." This reaſonable requeſt it was impoſſible to elude; and the Barbarians, after long conferring together, departed without attempting an anſwer[33]. Their mean duplicity in this interview ſufficiently indicated the unhappy treatment of the Grecian commanders, who were kept in cloſe captivity, and afterwards ſent to Artaxerxes, by whoſe order they were put to death.

[33] Xenoph. p. 289.

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Conſternation of the Greeks.—Manly Advice of Xenophon.—Their Retreat.—Difficulties attending it—Surmounted by their Skill and Perſeverance.—Their Sufferings among the Carduchian Mountains.—They traverſe Armenia.—Firſt behold the Sea from Mount Thecbes.—Defeat the Colchians.—Deſcription of the ſouthern Shore of the Euxine.—Tranſactions with the Greek Colonies there.—The Greeks arrive at Byzantium.—Enter into the Service of Seuthes.—His Hiſtory.—Conjunct Expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians.—The Greeks return to the Service of their Country.

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Conſternation of the Greeks.

THE perfidious aſſaſſination of their commanders converted the alarm and terror, that had hitherto reigned in the Grecian camp, into conſternation and deſpair. This dreadful cataſtrophe completed the afflictions of men diſtant above twelve hundred miles from their native land; ſurrounded by craggy mountains, deep and rapid rivers; by famine, war, and the treachery of their allies, ſtill more formidable than the reſentment of their enemies. The ſoldiers reflected, that it was dangerous to depart, yet more dangerous to remain; proviſions could be acquired only by the point of the ſword; every country was hoſtile; though

although they conquered one enemy, another would be ſtill ready to receive them; they wanted cavalry to purſue the Barbarians, or to elude their purſuit; victory itſelf would be fruitleſs; defeat, certain ruin.

Manly advice of Xenophon;

Amidſt theſe melancholy reflections they had ſpent the greater part of the night, when Xenophon the Athenian, inſpired, as he acknowledges, by a favourable dream, and animated, as his conduct proves, by the native vigour of a virtuous mind, roufed and emboldened by adverſity, undertook, amidſt the general dejection and diſmay, the care of his own and of the public ſafety. Having aſſembled the captains belonging to the diviſion of his beloved Proxenus, he faithfully repreſented to them their ſituation, which, dangerous as it was, ought not to ſink brave men to deſpair. Even in the worſt circumſtances, fortitude, and fortitude alone, could afford relief. They had been deceived, but not conquered, by the Barbarians; whoſe perfidious violation of faith, friendſhip, and hoſpitality, rendered them odious and contemptible to men and gods; the gods, who were the umpires of the conteſt, and whoſe aſſiſtance could make the cauſe of juſtice and valour prevail over every ſuperiority of ſtrength and numbers [1].

who, together with Cheiriſophus the Spartan, is

The manly piety of Xenophon was communicated, by a generous ſympathy, to the breaſts of his hearers; who, diſperſing through the various quarters of the camp, ſummoned together the

[1] Xenoph. p. 295.

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named to the chief command.

principal officers in the army. To them Xenophon addreſſed a ſimilar diſcourſe, encouraging them by every argument that religion, philoſophy, experience, and particularly their own experience, and that of the Grecian hiſtory, could afford, to expect ſucceſs from their own bravery, and the favour of Heaven, and to diſdain the offers of accommodation (if ſuch ſhould be made) from their impious foes, whoſe inſidious friendſhip had always proved more hurtful than their open enmity. The hearty approbation of the Spartan Cheiriſophus added weight and authority to the perſuaſive eloquence of the Athenian, who farther exhorted them to ſubſtitute commanders in the room of thoſe whom they had loſt; to diſentangle themſelves from every ſuperfluous incumbrance that might obſtruct the progreſs of their march, and to advance with all expedition towards the ſources of the Tigris and Euphrates, in the form of a hollow ſquare, having the baggage and thoſe who attended it in the middle, and preſenting the valour of their battalions on every ſide to the enemy. Theſe reſolutions were unanimouſly approved by the council, after which they were referred to the aſſembled troops, by whom they were readily confirmed, and carried into immediate execution[a]. Timaſion, Xanthicles, Cleanor, Philyſias, ſucceeded to the late commanders; Xenophon ſupplied the place of Proxenus; and ſo ably was the aſcendant of Spartan and Athenian virtue main-

[a] Xenoph. p. 299.

tained by him and Cheiriſophus, that the names of their unequal colleagues will ſeldom occur in the following narrative of their tetreat. CHAP. XXVI.

The greater part of the day had been employed in theſe neceſſary meaſures; and in the afternoon, the troops having paſſed the Zabatus, purſued their march in the diſpoſition recommended by Xenophon. But they had not proceeded far, before their rear was haraſſed by the Perſian archers and cavalry, which afforded them a very inauſpicious preſage of the hardſhips to which they muſt be continually expoſed in eighteen days journey along the level frontiers of Media. It was difficult to repel theſe light ſkirmiſhers, and impoſſible to attack them without being expoſed to conſiderable loſs; becauſe a detachment of heavy-armed men, or even of targeteers, could not overtake them in a ſhort ſpace, nor could they continue the purſuit without being cut off from the reſt of the army. Xenophon, with more valour than prudence, tried the unfortunate experiment; but was obliged to retreat fighting, and brought back his men wounded, diſheartened, and diſgraced[3]. The Greeks haraſſed in their retreat by the Perſian archers and cavalry.

But this unfortunate event neither diſheartened nor diſgraced the commander. He ingenuouſly acknowledged his error, which, pernicious as it was, had taught the Greeks their wants. They wanted cavalry and light-armed troops; the former of which might be obtained by equipping for war the baggage-horſes which had been taken from They equip their ſumpter horſes for war, and furniſh the Rhodians with ſlings.

3 Xenoph. p. 305, & ſeqq.

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the enemy; and the latter might be ſupplied by the Rhodians (well ſkilled in the ſling), of whom there were great numbers in the army. This advice was approved; a company of fifty horſemen was ſoon raiſed, the men vying with each other to obtain the honour of this diſtinguiſhed ſervice; and two hundred Rhodians were drawn from the ranks, who furniſhed themſelves with ſlings and leaden balls, which they threw twice as far as the ſtones employed by the Barbarians. The horſemen wore buff coats and corſlets; they were commanded by Lycius the Athenian

Their ſucceſs in conſequence of theſe meaſures.

The utility of theſe preparations was diſcovered as ſoon as the enemy renewed their aſſaults, with a thouſand horſe, and four thouſand ſlingers and archers. The newly-raiſed troops advanced with boldneſs and celerity, being aſſured that their unequal attack would be ſuſtained by the targeteers and heavy-armed men. But the Perſians, not waiting to receive them, fled in ſcattered diſorder; the Greeks purſued, took many priſoners, made great ſlaughter, and mangled the bodies of the ſlain, in order to terrify, by ſuch a dreadful ſpectacle of revenge, their cowardly and perfidious enemies [4].

New difficulties with which they had to ſtruggle.

After this advantage, the army continued to march along the banks of the Tigris, and the weſtern boundaries of Media, meeting with many rich and populous villages, from which they were ſupplied with proviſions; and admiring, as they

4 Xenoph. p. 307. 5 Ibid p. 308.

paſſed

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paſſed along, the immenſe walls, the lofty and durable pyramids, the ſpacious but deſerted cities, which teſtified the ancient greatneſs of that flouriſhing kingdom, before the Medes reluctantly ſubmitted to the oppreſſive government of Perſia. The Barbarians ſtill endeavoured to annnoy them, but with very little ſucceſs, unleſs when they paſſed a bridge, or any narrow defile. On ſuch occaſions, the ſquare form, in which they had hitherto marched, was found doubly inconvenient[6]. In order to traverſe ſuch a paſſage, the ſoldiers were obliged to cloſe the wings, and to crowd into a narrow ſpace, which diſordered the ranks, and made them obſtruct each other. When they had croſſed the bridge or defile, they were again obliged to run with all haſte, in order to extend the wings, and reſume their ranks, which occaſioned a void in the centre, and much diſheartened the men, thus expoſed to the ſudden attack of the purſuers.

Surmounted by their military ſkill.

To obviate both inconveniencies, the Greeks ſeparated from the army ſix companies, each conſiſting of an hundred men. Theſe were ſubdivided into ſmaller bodies, of fifty and twenty-five, each diviſion of the company, as well as the whole, commanded by proper officers. When it became neceſſary to cloſe the wings, in order to paſs a defile, theſe troops ſtaid behind, thus diſburdening the army of a ſuperfluous maſs, and thereby enabling them to proceed without confuſion

6 Xenoph. p. 310.

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in their ranks. After the paſſage was effected, the army might again extend the wings, and aſſume the ſame looſe arrangement as before, without expoſing the centre to danger; becauſe the vacuity left there was immediately ſupplied by the detached companies; the opening, if ſmall, being filled up by the ſix diviſions of an hundred men each; if larger, by the twelve diviſions of fifty; and if very large, by the twenty-four diviſions of twenty-five [7]; as the ſame number of men, in proportion to the number of columns into which they were divided, would occupy a wider extent of ground [8].

The Greeks approach the country of the Carduchians.

With this uſeful precaution the Greeks performed a ſucceſsful march to the mountains of the Carduchians, where the enemy's cavalry could no longer annoy them. But here they found new difficulties, far more formidable than thoſe with which they had hitherto been obliged to contend. The Tigris, on their left, was ſo deep and rapid, that the paſſage appeared abſolutely impracticable. Before them roſe the high and craggy mountains, which overſhadowed the river, inhabited by a

7 Xenoph. p. 310.

8 I have explained this matter minutely, becauſe the words of Xenophon are miſtaken by great military writers. Major Mauvillon, a ſkilful engineer and excellent ſcholar, propoſes a tranſpoſition of the words of Xenophon, that the greater gaps may be filled up by the greater diviſions. He juſtly obſerves, that no tranſlator or commentator has taken notice of the difficulty that naturally preſents itſelf on reading the paſſage, which however, I hope, is ſufficiently perſpicuous in the text. See l'Eſſai ſur l'Influence de la Poudre à Canon, &c. a work which, I believe, no military man can read without receiving from it inſtruction and entertainment.

warlike

warlike race of men, whoſe barbarous independence had always defied the hoſtilities [9] of Perſia, as that of their ſucceſſors, the modern Curdes, does the arms of the Turks, to whom they are but nominally ſubject [10]. While the Greeks doubted what courſe to purſue, a certain Rhodian undertook to deliver them from their perplexity, provided they gave him a talent, to reward his labour. "I ſhall want, beſides," continued he, "two thouſand leather bags, which may be obtained by flaying the ſheep, goats, oxen, and aſſes, which the country affords in ſuch numbers as we ſee around us. The ſkins may be blown, tied at the ends, and faſtened together by the girts belonging to the ſumpter horſes, then covered with faſcines, and laſtly with earth. I ſhall uſe large ſtones inſtead of anchors; every bag will bear two men, whom the faſcines and earth will prevent from ſlipping, and whom, with very little labour on their part, the rapidity of the current will waft acroſs the river [11]."

Ingenious contrivance of a Rhodian for paſſing the Tigris.

This ingenious contrivance was commended, but not carried into execution; the Grecians having learned from ſome priſoners recently taken, that the road through the country of the Carduchians would ſoon conduct them to the ſpacious and plentiful province of Armenia. Thither they fearleſsly penetrated, regardleſs of the report, that under a former reign, a Perſian army of an hundred

The ſufferings of the Greeks among the mountains of the Carduchians.

9 Xenoph. p. 315.

10 Rauwolf's Travels.

11 Xenoph. p. 314.

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and twenty thouſand men had been cut off by thoſe fierce Barbarians, whoſe manners were more rude and inhoſpitable than the mountains which they inhabited. At the approach of the Greeks, the Carduchians retired to their faſtneſſes, leaving the villages in the plain at the mercy of the invaders. The troops were reſtrained from injury; but their inoffenſive behaviour, and kind invitations to peace, were regarded with contempt by the common enemies of the Greeks, of the Perſians, and of human kind. They ſeized every opportunity to obſtruct the march of the army; and though unprepared for a cloſe engagement, uſed with extraordinary effect their bows, three cubits long, which they bent by preſſing the lower part with their left foot. The arrows were near as long as the bows; and their irreſiſtible points pierced the firmeſt ſhields and corſlets. The Greeks employed their ſkill in tactics, and their valour, to elude, or to repel, the aſſault of theſe dangerous foes, from whom they ſuffered more in ſeven days than they had done in as many weeks from the braveſt troops of Artaxerxes [12]. At length they arrived at the river Centrites, two hundred feet broad, which forms the ſouthern boundary of Armenia, having juſt reaſon to rejoice that they had eſcaped the weapons of the Carduchians, whoſe poſterity, the Parthians [13], with the ſame arms and addreſs, became formidable to Rome, when Rome was formidable to the world [14].

[12] Xenoph. p. 218—226. [13] Strabo, l. xvi. p. 515.
[14] Plut. in Craſſo & Marc. Anton.

The

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The month of January was employed in traverſing the fruitful plains of Armenia [15], which are beautifully diverſified by hills of eaſy aſcent. Teribazus, the Perſian governor of the province, entered into an agreement with the generals, that if they abſtained from hoſtilities, he would not obſtruct their march, but furniſh them plentifully with proviſions. But this league was perfidiouſly violated. The Greeks had recourſe to arms; purſued Teribazus; aſſaulted and plundered his camp [16]. Next day they were expoſed to a more dangerous conteſt, in which neither ſkill nor valour could avail. The ſnow fell in ſuch quantities during the night, as completely covered the men with their arms. Their bodies were benumbed and parched with the piercing coldneſs of the north wind. Many ſlaves and ſumpter horſes periſhed, with about thirty ſoldiers. The reſt could ſcarcely be perſuaded by Xenophon to put themſelves in motion, which was known to be the only remedy for their diſtreſs; and as the ſeverity of the weather ſtill continued during the remainder of their march through Armenia, ſeveral ſoldiers loſt their ſight by the glare of the ſnow, and their toes and fingers by the intenſeneſs of the cold [17]. The eyes were beſt defended by wearing ſomething black before

They traverſe Armenia.

In danger of periſhing by the intenſe cold of that country.

[15] There the Greeks found παντα τα επιτηδεια, ὁσα εστιν αγαθα, ἱερια, σιτον, οινους παλαιους ευωδεις, ἀσταφιδας, οσπρια παντοδαπα; "all kinds of neceſſaries, and even luxuries, victims, corn, old fragrant wines, dried grapes, and all ſorts of pulſe."

[16] Xenoph. p. 328. [17] Ibid. p. 329, & ſeqq.

them;

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them; the feet were preſerved by conſtant motion in the day, and by ſtripping bare in the night.

Proceed through the territories of the Taochians.

From Armenia they proceeded to the country of the Taochians, who, alarmed by the approach of an unknown enemy, had abandoned the vallies, and taken refuge on the mountains, with their wives, children, and cattle. Hither alſo they had conveyed all their proviſions; ſo that the Greeks were obliged to attack theſe faſtneſſes, otherwiſe the army muſt have been ſtarved. The Barbarians boldly defended them, by letting fly innumerable vollies of ſtones down the precipices. But this artillery was at length exhauſted; the Greeks became maſters of the heights; and a dreadful ſcene followed. The women firſt threw their children down the rocks and then themſelves. The men imitated this frantic example of deſpair; ſo that the aſſailants made few priſoners, but took a conſiderable quantity of ſheep, oxen, and aſſes [18].

The fierce and fearleſs character of the Chalybeans.

From thence the army proceeded with uncommon celerity through the bleak and rocky country of the Chalybeans; marching, in ſeven days, about an hundred and fifty miles. The Chalybeans were the fierceſt nation in all thoſe parts. They wore, for their defence, linen corſlets, greaves, and helmets; they carried a ſhort falchion at their girdles; and attacked with pikes fifteen cubits long. Inſtead of diſcovering any ſymptoms of flight or fear, they ſang, danced, and rejoiced, at the approach of an enemy. They boldly defended

[18] Xenoph. p. 338.

their

their villages, not declining even a cloſe engagement with the Greeks; who could ſupply themſelves with nothing from this inhoſpitable and warlike country, but, in their dangerous march through it, ſubſiſted entirely on the cattle lately taken from the Taochians [19].

The river Harpaſus, four hundred feet broad, ſeparated the territories of the Chalybeans and Scythinians. From the latter the Greeks met with little reſiſtance, in a march of thirteen days, which brought them to the lofty mount Theches, a place held in particular devotion by the inhabitants of the neighbouring territory. The vanguard had no ſooner aſcended this ſacred mountain than the army were alarmed by loud ſhouts, which continued to redouble with increaſing violence. It was imagined that ſome new form of danger had appeared, or that ſome new enemy was ready to aſſail them. The rear advanced with all poſſible expedition to the aſſiſtance of their companions; but having arrived within hearing, were ſeized with the moſt pleaſing aſtoniſhment, when their ears were ſaluted from every quarter with the repetition, "The ſea! the ſea!" the ſight of which, a ſight ſo long wiſhed in vain, at firſt filled them with tranſports of tumultuous joy, and afterwards recalled more diſtinctly the remembrance of their parents, their friends, their country, and every object of their moſt tender concern [20]. The ſoldiers, with tears in their eyes, em-

The Greeks arrive at mount Theches, from which they behold the ſea,

[19] Xenoph. p. 338. [20] Ibid, p. 339.

braced

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braced each other, and embraced their commanders; and then, as by a hidden conſent of ſympathy (for it was never known by whoſe orders), heaped up a mount of ſtones, which they covered with barbaric arms, as a trophy of their memorable journey through ſo many fierce and hoſtile nations.

They paſs through the country of the Macronians.

The diſtant proſpect of the Euxine made them forget that they had not yet attained the end of their labours. A ſpace, indeed, of leſs than ſixty miles intervened; but it was covered by the trackleſs foreſts of the Macronians, and by the abrupt and intricate windings of the Colchian mountains. A fortunate circumſtance enabled them without difficulty to ſurmont the firſt of thoſe obſtacles. Among the Grecian targeteers was a man who underſtood the language of the Barbarians. He had been carried to Athens in his youth, where he had ſerved as a ſlave. At the ſight of the Macronians, he recogniſed his long-forgotten countrymen; and having addreſſed them in terms of friendſhip and reſpect, engaged them to exchange preſents, and to enter into alliance with the Greeks [21], whom they plentifully ſupplied with proviſions, and having cut down the trees that interrupted their paſſage, conducted them in three days to the weſtern frontier of Colchos.

Enter Colchos.

This country, ſo famous in the fables of antiquity [22], was inhabited by an ancient colony of Egyptians, who long preſerved pure from any foreign admixture, not only their original language,

[21] Xenoph. p. 340.

[22] See Vol. I. p. 19. & ſeqq.

but

but the ſingular manners, and the more ſingular rites and ceremonies, of their mother-country[23]. Though diſtinguiſhed in other reſpects from the neighbouring nations, whom they deteſted, and to whom they ſeemed deteſtable, they agreed with them in their jealouſy of the Greeks, whoſe flouriſhing colonies along the ſouthern ſhores of the Euxine threatened the ſafety of their dominions. They aſſembled therefore from all quarters, occupied the heights, and prepared to diſpute the paſſage with obſtinacy. Their numbers, their diſcipline, their arms, but, ſtill more, their ſituation, rendered them formidable. If the Greeks advanced in a phalanx, or full line, their ranks would be broken by the inequalities of the ground, the centre would be diſordered, and the ſuperior numbers of the enemy would outreach either wing[24]. Theſe inconveniencies might partly be remedied by making ſuch parts of the line, as had an eaſy aſcent, wait for the ſlow and difficult progreſs of their companions through more abrupt and inacceſſible mountains; and, by extending the phalanx in length, and leaving very few men in file, their front might be rendered equal to that of the Colchians. But the firſt of theſe operations would have too long expoſed the army to the darts and arrows of the Barbarians, and the ſecond would have ſo much enfeebled the line, as muſt have rendered it liable to be penetrated. Amidſt this choice of difficul-

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[23] Herodot. l. xi. c. civ.

[24] Idem, p. 341.

ties,

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ties, Xenophon propoſed, and the propoſal was readily approved by his colleagues, that the heavy-armed men ſhould be divided into companies of an hundred each, and that each diviſion ſhould be thrown into a ſeparate column. The wide intervals between the columns might thus enable the ſmaller army to extend on the right and left beyond the enemy's line; each company or diviſion might aſcend the mountain wherever they found it moſt convenient; the braveſt men might be led firſt to the charge; the depth of the columns[25] could not poſſibly be penetrated; nor could the enemy fall into the intervals between them, without being cut off by the diviſions on either ſide, which might be arranged in ſuch a manner as to relieve, encourage, and ſupport each other.

Defeat the Colchians.

This judicious diſpoſition was attended with the expected ſucceſs. The heavy-armed men formed eighty companies; the targeteers and archers, divided into three bodies, each of about ſix hundred men, flanked the army on the right and left. Their third diviſion, conſiſting chiefly of Arcadians, occupied a diſtinguiſhed place in the centre. Thus diſpoſed for battle, the wings of the Grecian army, and particularly the targeteers and archers, who were moſt capable of expedition, advanced with

[25] The λοχος οξθιος is defined by Arrian to be a body of men, with the files longer than the ranks; that is, with more men in depth than in front. The φαλαγξ, without any epithet, means the contrary. But the φαλαγξ οξθια is an army, as the ſame author tells us, ὁταν επι κερως πορευηται, that is, having more men in depth than in front, and employing, for ſome extraordinary reaſon, what is naturally the line of march as an order of battle.

celerity

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celerity to the attack. The enemy, who ſaw them approach, and who perceived that on either hand they outreached their line, filed to the right and left in order to receive them. By this movement they left a void in their centre, towards which the Arcadian targeteers, ſupported by the neareſt columns, advanced with rapidity, and ſoon gained the ſummit. They could thus fight on equal terms with the Barbarians, who thinking they had loſt all when they loſt the advantage of the ground, no longer offered reſiſtance, but fled on every ſide with diſordered trepidation, leaving the Greeks maſters of the field of battle, as well as of the numerous villages in that neighbourhood[26], and within two days march of the Euxine ſea, without any other enemy to oppoſe their long-diſputed paſſage thither.

Deſcription of the ſouthern ſhore of the Euxine.

The ſouthern ſhore of the Euxine, which actually preſents one uniform ſcene of effeminate indolence and ſullen tyranny, anciently contained many barbarous but warlike tribes, totally independent on each other, and ſcarcely acknowledging any dependance on the king of Perſia. That part which extends towards the eaſt and the borders of Mount Caucaſus, and which afterwards formed the kingdom of the great Mithridates, was inhabited by the Colchians, Drillians, Myſonæcians, and Tybarenians; the middle diviſion was poſſeſſed by the Paphlagonians, who gloried in the irreſiſtible proweſs of their numerous cavalry; and the weſtern parts, extending two hundred miles from Heraclea

[26] Xenoph. p. 342.

to

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to the Thracian Boſphorus, were occupied by the inhoſpitable Bithynians; a colony of Thrace, who excelled and delighted in war, which, like their anceſtors in Europe, they carried on with a ſavage fury [27].

The Greek colony of Sinopé.

Amidſt the formidable hoſtility of thoſe numerous nations aroſe, at wide intervals, ſeveral Grecian cities, which enlivened the barbaric gloom, and diſplayed the peculiar glory of their arts and arms. Sinopé, the mother and the queen of thoſe cities, was advantageouſly ſituated on a narrow iſthmus which joined its territory, conſiſting in a ſmall but fertile peninſula [28], to the province of Paphlagonia. The foundation of Sinopé remounted to the higheſt antiquity, and was aſcribed to Antolycus, one of the Argonauts [29]. The city was afterwards increaſed by a powerful acceſſion of Mileſians. It poſſeſſed convenient harbours on either ſide of the iſthmus. The peninſula was ſurrounded by ſharp rocks, which rendered it inacceſſible to an enemy; and the ſea abounded with the tunny fiſh, which flow in ſhoals from the Palus Mæotis, where they are ſuppoſed to be bred [30], to the Euxine and Propontis.

27 See Dionyſius Periegetes, and Arrian's Periplus.

28 Tournefort, v. iii. p. 46. ſays, it is about ſix miles in circumference.

29 See the account of the Argonautic expedition, vol. i. p. 29, & ſeqq. Strabo, l. xii. p. 546. who gives us this information, ſays farther, that Lucullus, when he took the town, carried away the ſtatue of Antolycus.

30 Tournefort, Voyage au Levant.

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Such multiplied advantages rendered the Sinopians populous and powerful. They diffuſed their colonies to the eaſt and weſt. It is not improbable that they founded Heraclea[31], on the frontier of Bithynia; and it is certain that they built Cotyora in the territory of the Tybarenians, Ceraſus in that of the Myſonæcians, and Trapezus in that of the Drillians.

The Sinopians found new colonies on that coaſt.

Trapezus, or Trebizond, was the firſt friendly city at which the Grecians arrived, after ſpending more than a twelvemonth in almoſt continual travelling and war. The numerous inhabitants of this flouriſhing ſea-port, which has now decayed into the much-neglected harbour of Platana[32], received them with open arms, generouſly ſupplied their wants, and treated them with all the endearing yet reſpectful hoſpitality of kinſmen, who commiſerated their ſufferings and admired their virtue. The Grecians, on their part, diſplayed a very juſt and becoming ſenſe of the evils which they had eſcaped, and of their actual ſecurity. In the fervour of religious gratitude they paid the ſolemn vows and ſacrifices which they had promiſed to Ju-

The Greeks are hoſpitably received at Trebizond, one of theſe colonies.

[31] Strabo, l. xii. p. 542. calls Heraclea a colony of the Mileſians, by whom we may underſtand the Sinopians, who were themſelves a colony of that people. Xenophon, however, called Heraclea a colony of Megareans. Xenoph. Anabaſ. p. 358.

[32] Tournefort, l. xvii. This place, however, is ſtill large but depopulated; containing more woods and gardens than houſes, and thoſe only of one ſtory; yet the town retains the form of an oblong ſquare, the modern walls being built on the ruins of the ancient, the ſhape of which occaſioned the name of Trapezus, from the Greek word ſignifying a table. Tournefort, ibid.

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piter the preſerver, and the other gods and heroes, whoſe bountiful protection had hitherto conducted them through ſo many known, and ſo many concealed dangers. They afterwards celebrated, with much pomp and feſtivity, the gymnaſtic games and exerciſes: an entertainment equally agreeable to themſelves, to the citizens of Trebizond, and to the divinities whom they both adored. When theſe eſſential duties, for ſuch the Greeks deemed them, had been performed with univerſal ſatisfaction, the ſoldiers, who were unwilling to be burdenſome to their Trebizontian friends, found ſufficient employment in providing for their own ſubſiſtence, and that of their numerous attendants. For ſeveral days they ravaged the neighbouring villages of the Colchians and Drillians; and while they cruelly haraſſed the enemies, they carefully reſpected the allies, of Trebizond. Their repeated devaſtations at length deſolated the country immediately around them, ſo that the foraging parties could no longer ſet out and return on the ſame day; nor could they penetrate deep into the territory, without being endangered by the nocturnal aſſaults of the Barbarians. Theſe circumſtances rendered it neceſſary for them to think of leaving Trebizond; on which account an aſſembly was convened to fix the day of their departure, and to regulate the mode and plan of their future journey [33].

Cheiriſophus fails to the

In this important deliberation the ſoldiers very generally embraced the opinion of Antileon of

[33] Xenoph. 343, & ſeqq.

Thuria,

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Thuria, who told them that, for his part, he was already tired with packing up his baggage, marching, running, mounting guard, and fighting, and now wiſhed, after all his labours, to perform the remainder of the journey like Ulyſſes, and, ſtretched out at his eaſe, to be carried aſleep [34] into Greece. That this pleaſing propoſal might be put in execution, Cheiriſophus ſailed to the Helleſpont, hoping to obtain ſhips from Anaxibius, who commanded the Spartan fleet in that ſea. But in caſe ſuch a requeſt could not be conveniently granted, the ſoldiers determined to demand a few ſhips of war from the inhabitants of Trebizond, with which they intended to put to ſea, and to capture whatever merchantmen they could meet with in the Euxine, in order to employ them as tranſports [35].

Helleſpont to demand tranſports from the Spartan admiral.

Several weeks elapſed without bringing any news of Cheiriſophus, or promiſing any hope of aſſiſt-

Meanwhile the Greeks

34 Thus was Ulyſſes tranſported by the Phæatians, who placed him ſleeping on the ſhore of Ithaca:

Οι δε ευδοιτ' εν νηι θοη επι ποντον αγοντες
Κατθεσαν εν Ιθακηι, &c. Odyſſ. xiii. 133.

The beautiful images which the poet, in the ſame book, gives of the pleaſures of reſt, after immoderate labour, played about the fancy of Antileon:

Και τω νηδυμος υπνος επι βλεφαροισι επιπλε
Νηγρετος ηδιστος θανατω αγχιστα εοικως. v. 80.

And again, "The ſhip cut the waves with a rapidity which the flight of the ſwifteſt hawk could not accompany, carrying a man

Ος πριν μεν μαλα πολλα παθ' αλγεα ον κατα θυμον
Ανδρων τε πτολεμους, αλεγεινα τε κυματα πειρων·
Δη τοτε γ' ατρεμας ευδε, λελασμενος οσσ' επεποιθει."

35 Xenoph. p. 345.

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ance from the Spartan admiral. Meanwhile the Grecian pirates, for they deſerve no better name, infeſted the Euxine ſea. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, with a degree of perfidy worthy of his commiſſion, betrayed his companions, and ſailed off with the galley which he commanded [36]. But Polycrates, the Athenian, behaved with an ardour and fidelity which even robbers ſometimes diſplay in their tranſactions with each other; and his ſucceſsful diligence ſoon collected ſuch a number of veſſels as ſerved to tranſport to Ceraſus the aged, the infirm, the women and baggage; while the ſtrength of the army, conſiſting of men below forty years of age, reached the ſame place in three days march [37].

capture the merchantmen in the Euxine; in which they tranſport their ſick, &c. to Ceraſus.

The colony of Ceraſus, or Cerazunt, was delightfully ſituated near the ſea, among hills of eaſy aſcent, covered in every age [38] with whole woods of cherry-trees, from which, in all probability, the place derived its name [39]. From thence the voluptuous Lucullus, in the ſix hundred and eightieth year of Rome, firſt brought into Italy this delicious fruit, which ancient naturaliſts ſcarcely believed capable of thriving in an Italian ſky; but which actually adorns the bleakeſt and moſt northern re-

Tranſactions of the Greeks at that place.

36 Xenoph. p. 345.

37 Xenoph. p. 349.

38 Tournefort.

39 Κερασος, ceraſus, ceriſe, cherry. For a ſimilar reaſon Tadmor in the deſart was called Palmyra, *à palmis*, the palm tree. Tournefort mentions it as the opinion of St. Jerom, that the place gave name to the fruit. The difference is not material.

gions

gions of our own iſland. At Ceraſus the Greeks remained ten days, diſpoſing of their booty, ſupplying their wants, and reviewing the army, which ſtill amounted to eight thouſand ſix hundred men, the reſt having periſhed by fatigue, war, cold, and ſickneſs [40]. CHAP. XXVI.

They traverſe the territories of the Moſynæcians;

After this neceſſary delay, the leſs active portion again embarked, while the vigorous youth purſued their journey through the romantic country of the Moſynæcians; a barbarous, yet powerful tribe, who received their ſingular denomination from the wooden houſes, or rather towers, which they inhabited [41]; and which, either by chance or deſign, were ſcattered in ſuch a manner among the hills and vallies, that at the diſtance of eight miles, the villages could hear and alarm each other [42]. The army next proceeded through the dark and narrow diſtrict of the Chalybians, who ſubſiſted by the working of iron; and whoſe toilſome labours, rugged mountains, and more rugged manners [43], muſt have formed a ſtriking contraſt with the ſmiling plains, the paſtoral life [44], the innocent and hoſpitable character of their Tyberenian neighbours; who treated the Greeks with every mark of friendſhip and reſpect, and conducted them, with attentive civility, to the city of Cotyora.

Chalybians;

and Tyberenians.

It might be expected, that the army, having reached the country of their friends and kinſmen,

Diſſenſions in the camp,

40 Xenoph. p. 349.

41 Μοσυν & οικεω.

42 Xenoph. p. 351.

43 Idem, p. 354.

44 Dionyſius Periegetes qualifies them by the epithet πολυρρηνες, abounding in ſheep.

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ſhould have been diſpoſed peaceably to enjoy the fruits of their paſt labours and dangers. If they were unwilling to expoſe themſelves to freſh hoſtilities from the warlike inhabitants of Paphlagonia and Bithynia, they might have waited the arrival of ſhips from Sinopé and Heraclea, or from the Spartan admiral in the Helleſpont, who would either retain them in his own ſervice, or tranſport them to the Cherſoneſus, to Byzantium, and to other cities and territories, which, being lately conquered by Sparta, required the vigilant protection of brave and numerous garriſons. But it is more eaſy for men to repel the aſſaults of external violence, than to elude the effects of their own ungovernable paſſions. The Greeks were involved in real danger, in proportion as they attained apparent ſecurity. During the long courſe of their laborious journey, the terror of unknown Barbarians hanging over them, maintained their diſcipline and their union. But the air of a Grecian colony at once diſſolved both. They, who in the remote regions of the Eaſt had acted with one ſoul, and regarded each other as brethren, again felt the unhappy influence of their provincial diſtinctions. The army was divided by ſeparate intereſts, as well as by partial attachments. Thoſe who had acquired wealth, deſired to return home to enjoy it. Thoſe who were deſtitute of fortune, longed to plunder friends and foes, Greeks and Barbarians. The commanders deſpiſed and deceived the troops; the troops clamoured againſt, and inſulted the commanders. Both were really in the wrong; and

ſoon after their arrival in Cotyora.

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and both ſuſpected and accuſed each other of imaginary crimes of which none were guilty.

Xenophon's great views defeated by the mean jealouſy of his enemies.

Xenophon, who, with wonderful addreſs, has juſtified himſelf from every reproach [45] that can reflect either on his underſtanding or his heart, does not deny an imputation to which he was expoſed by diſcovering (ſomewhat, perhaps, unſeaſonably) the juſt and extenſive views of a philoſopher. When he ſurveyed the ſouthern ſhores of the Euxine, covered in ancient times, as well as they are at preſent, with tall and majeſtic foreſt trees, admirably adapted to ſhip-building; when he conſidered the convenience of the harbours, and the productions of the neighbouring territory, conſiſting in flax, iron, and every commodity moſt neceſſary in raiſing a naval power, he was ambitious of eſtabliſhing a new ſettlement, which the numbers, the valour, and the activity of his followers, muſt ſoon render ſuperior to the other Grecian colonies on the Euxine, or perhaps in any part of Aſia. But this noble deſign, which might have proved ſo uſeful and honourable to the army, was blaſted by the mean jealouſy of his enemies. Xenophon was reproached with forming projects equally romantic and dangerous; and accuſed of an intention to keep the ſoldiers from home, that they might continue dependent on himſelf, and that he might increaſe his own fame and fortune at the riſk of the public ſafety [46].

45 Xenoph. p. 367.

46 Idem, p. 359. & ſeqq.

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Sufferings of the Greeks in their march through Bithynia.

The mutinous and diſtracted ſpirit of the troops rendered all their future meaſures weak and wavering. The terror which they inſpired, and their wants, which it was neceſſary to ſupply, made them very unwelcome gueſts at Cotyora, Sinopé, and Heraclea, at which places they continued ſeveral months, under pretence of waiting for tranſports, but meanwhile plundering the neighbouring country, laying the cities under contribution, and threatening them with burdens that exceeded their faculties. The inhabitants of Heraclea, while they affected to conſider thoſe unreaſonable demands, removed their effects from the villages, ſhut the gates of their city, and placed armed men on the walls. Cheiriſophus had by this time returned with veſſels from Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, but not ſufficiently numerous to tranſport ſo great an army. The ſoldiers thus diſappointed of their hopes, and diſcontented with their commanders, and with each other, raſhly undertook, in ſeparate bodies, the dangerous journey through Bithynia, a country extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to Byzantium, and totally inhabited, or rather waſted, by the Thynians, a Thracian tribe, the moſt cruel and inhoſpitable of the human race. In this expedition they loſt above a thouſand men; and the deſtruction muſt have been much greater, had not the generous activity of Xenophon ſeaſonably led his own diviſion to the aſſiſtance of thoſe who had deſerted his ſtandard. Cheiriſophus was ſoon afterwards killed by a medicine which he had taken in a fever. The ſole command de-

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volved on Xenophon; not by appointment, but by the voluntary ſubmiſſion of the troops to his ſuperior mind. He at length taught them to defeat the irregular fury of the Thynians; and, after taking many ſlaves, and much uſeful booty, conducted them in ſafety to Chryſopolis [47], which is now known by the name of Scutari, and conſidered as the Aſiatic ſuburb of Conſtantinople.

After the death of Cheiriſophus, are conducted by Xenophon to Byzantium.

The neighbourhood of a Grecian colony ſeemed infectious to the temper of the troops. At Byzantium their mutinous ſpirits were again thrown into fermentation. Cleander, the governor of that city, who had come down to meet them, narrowly eſcaped death during the fury of a military ſedition. Their behaviour rendered them the objects of terror to all the inhabitants of thoſe parts. The Lacedæmonians dreaded the aſſiſtance of ſuch dangerous allies; and the ſatrap Pharnabazus, alarmed for the ſafety of his province, practiſed with Anaxibius, who commanded in the Helleſpont, to allure them, by fair promiſes, into Europe. Gained by the bribes of the Perſian, not only Anaxibius, but his ſucceſſor Ariſtarchus, made propoſals of advantage to the army, which he had not any intention to fulfil. The troops, enraged at this diſappointment, and ſtill more at the treachery of the Spartan commanders, would have attacked and plundered Byzantium, had they not been reſtrained by the wiſdom and authority of Xenophon, who, ſtruggling like a ſkilful pilot againſt the violence

The mutinous ſpirit of the troops breaks out afreſh at Byzantium.

47 Xenoph. p. 277, & ſeqq.

of

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of a tempeſt, prevented the execution of a meaſure which muſt have expoſed them to immediate danger, and covered them with eternal infamy [48].

Xenophon diſſuades them from plundering that place.

With tears and prayers, he conjured them "not to tarniſh, by the deſtruction of a Grecian city, the glory of a campaign ſignalized by ſo many illuſtrious victories over the Barbarians. What hopes of ſafety could they entertain, if, after unſucceſsfully attempting to dethrone the king of Perſia, they ſhould provoke the reſentment of Sparta? Deſtitute as they were of friends, of money, of ſubſiſtence, and reduced by their miſconduct to a handful of men, could they expect to inſult with impunity the two greateſt powers in the world? The experience of late years ought to correct their folly. They had ſeen that even Athens, in the zenith of her greatneſs, poſſeſſed of four hundred gallies, an annual revenue of a thouſand talents, and ten times that ſum in her treaſury; Athens, who commanded all the iſlands, and occupied many cities both in Aſia and Europe, among which was Byzantium itſelf, the preſent object of their frantic ambition, had yielded to the arms of Sparta, whoſe authority was actually acknowledged in every part of Greece. What madneſs, then, for men in their friendleſs condition, a mixed aſſemblage of different nations, to attack the dominions of a people whoſe valour was irreſiſtible, and from whoſe vengeance it was impoſſible for them to fly, without flying from their country, and taking refuge

[48] Xenoph. p. 399, & ſeqq.

among

among thoſe hoſtile Barbarians, from whom, for near two years paſt, they had met with nothing but cruelty, injuſtice, perſecution, and treachery?" CHAP. XXVI.

The ſeaſonable remonſtrances of Xenophon ſaved Byzantium; but it is probable that neither the weight of argument, nor the power of eloquence, would have long reſtrained the diſcontented and needy troops from attempting other enterpriſes of a ſimilar nature, if an opportunity had not fortunately preſented itſelf of employing their dangerous activity in the ſervice of Seuthes, a bold and ſucceſsful adventurer of Lower Thrace. Mæſades, the father of Seuthes, reigned over the Melandeptans, the Thynians, and the Thranipſans, who inhabited the European ſhores of the Propontis and Euxine ſea. The licentious turbulence of his ſubjects compelled him to fly from his dominions. He took refuge with Medocus, king of the Odryſians, the moſt powerful tribe in Upper Thrace, with whoſe family his own had long been connected by the ſacred ties of hoſpitality. Medocus kindly received, and generouſly entertained, the father; and, after his deceaſe, continued the ſame protection and bounty to his ſon, Seuthes. But the independent ſpirit of the young prince diſdained, as he expreſſes it, to live like a dog at another man's table. He deſired horſes and ſoldiers from Medocus, that he might acquire ſubſiſtence for himſelf. His requeſt was granted; his incurſions were ſucceſsful; the terror of his name filled all the maritime parts of Thrace; and there was reaſon

The Greeks invited into the ſervice of Seuthes;

his hiſtory.

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reaſon to believe that if he could join the Grecian forces to his own, he might eaſily regain poſſeſſion of his hereditary dominions[49].

Their agreement with that prince.

For this purpoſe he ſent to Xenophon Medoſades, a Thracian, who, underſtanding the Greek language, uſually ſerved him as ambaſſador. The terms of the treaty were ſoon agreed on. Seuthes promiſed each ſoldier a Cyzicene (about eighteen ſhillings ſterling), the captains two Cyzicenes, and the generals four, of monthly pay. The money, it was obſerved, would be clear gain, as they might ſubſiſt by plundering the country; yet ſuch of the booty as was not of a periſhable nature, Seuthes reſerved for himſelf, that by ſelling it in the maritime towns, he might provide for the pay of his new auxiliaries[50].

The Grecian commanders entertained in the camp of Seuthes.

Having communicated their deſigns to the army, the Grecian commanders followed Medoſades to the camp of Seuthes, which was diſtant about ſix miles from the coaſt of Perinthus, a city of conſiderable note in the neighbourhood of Byzantium. They arrived after ſun-ſet, but found the Barbarians awake and watchful. Seuthes himſelf was poſted in a ſtrong tower; horſes ready bridled ſtood at the gate; large fires blazed at a diſtance, while the camp itſelf was concealed in darkneſs; precautions, however ſingular, yet neceſſary againſt the Thynians, who were deemed, of all men, the moſt dangerous enemies in the

49 Xenoph. p. 393, & ſeqq. 50 Idem ibid.

night.

night. The Greeks were permitted to enter. Seuthes received them with ruſtic hoſpitality; before entering on buſineſs, challenged them to drink in large horns full of wine; then confirmed the promiſes of his ambaſſador; and ſtill farther allured Xenophon by the hopes of receiving, beſides the ſtipulated pay, lands and cattle, and an advantageous eſtabliſhment on the ſea-ſhore.

The army joins his ſtandard.

Next day the Grecian army joined the camp of their new maſter. The commanders were again entertained with a copious feaſt, in which Seuthes diſplayed all his magnificence. After ſupper, the buffoons and dancers were introduced, the cup went briſkly round, and the whole aſſembly were diſſolved in merriment. But Seuthes knew how far to indulge, and when to reſtrain, the joys of feſtivity. Without allowing his revels to diſturb the ſtillneſs of the night, he roſe with a martial ſhout, imitating a man who avoided a javelin; and then addreſſing the Grecian captains without any ſign of intoxication, deſired them to have their men ready to march in a few hours, that the enemy, who were as yet unacquainted with the powerful reinforcement which he had received, might be taken unprepared, and conquered by ſurpriſe [51].

Conjunct expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians.

The camp was in motion at midnight; it was the middle of winter, and the ground was in many parts covered with a deep ſnow. But the Thracians, clothed in ſkins of foxes, were well prepared for ſuch nocturnal expeditions. The Greeks ſuf-

51 Xenoph. p. 406, & ſeqq.

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fered much [52] by the cold; but the rapidity of their march, animated by the certain proſpect of ſucceſs, made them forget their ſufferings. Whereever they arrived, the villages were attacked and plundered; the houſes were burned, many captives and cattle were taken, and the ravages of that bloody night ſufficiently repreſent the uniform ſcene of cruelty, by which, in the courſe of a few weeks, Seuthes compelled into ſubmiſſion the inhabitants of that fertile and populous ſlip of land that lies between the Euxine and Propontis. But the poſſeſſion of this territory, which formed the moſt valuable portion of his hereditary dominions, could not ſatisfy his ambition. He turned his arms northwards, and over-ran the country about Salmydeſſus, a maritime city ſituate at the mouth of a river of the ſame name, which flows from the ſouthern branch of mount Hæmus into a ſpacious bay of the Euxine. There the allied army repeated the ſame deſtructive havoc which they had already made in the ſouth; and avenged, by their cruel incurſions, the cauſe of violated hoſpitality; for the Barbarians of thoſe parts were ſo much accuſtomed to plunder the veſſels which were often ſhipwrecked on their ſhoaly coaſt, that they had diſtinguiſhed it by pillars, in the nature of

By the aſſiſtance of the Greeks, Seuthes recovers his hereditary dominions.

[52] Ην δε χιων πολλη, και ψυχος ὀντως ωστε το ὑδως ὁ ἐφερετο ἐπι δειπνον, ἐπηγνυτο, και ὁ οινος ἐν τοις ἀγγειοις· και των Ἑλληνων πολλων και ῥινες ἀπεκαησαν ὀντο και ωτα. There was much ſnow, and the cold ſo intenſe, that the water froze as they were carrying it to ſupper, and the wine in the veſſels. Many of the Greeks alſo loſt their ears and noſes. Xenoph. p. 408.

land-

land-marks, to prevent inteſtine quarrels, by aſcertaining the property of the ſpoil[53]. CHAP. XXVI.

In the ſpace of two months after his junction with the Greeks, Seuthes extended his poſſeſſions ſeveral days march from the ſea; his numerous, but unſkilful enemies, fighting ſingly, were ſucceſſively ſubdued; each vanquiſhed tribe encreaſed the ſtrength of his army; the Odryſians, allured by the hopes of plunder, flocked to his ſtandard, and the growing proſperity of his fortune, no longer requiring the ſupport, diſpoſed him to neglect the ſervices, of his Grecian auxiliaries[54]. The ungrateful levity of the Barbarian was encouraged by the perfidious counſels of his favourite Heraclides of Maronea, one of thoſe fugitive Greeks, who having merited puniſhment at home for their wickedneſs, obtained diſtinction abroad by their talents; men ſullied with every vice, prepared alike to die or to deceive, and who having provoked the reſentment of their own countrymen by their intrigues and their audacity, often acquired the eſteem of foreigners by their valour and eloquence, their ſkill in war, and dexterity in negociation. Heraclides ſtrongly exhorted his maſter to defraud the Greeks of their pay, and to deliver himſelf from their troubleſome importunities, by diſmiſſing them from his ſervice. But the fears, rather than the delicacy of Seuthes, prevented him from complying with this advice; he loſt his honour His ſignal ingratitude.

53 Xenoph. p. 408. 54 Idem, p. 414, & ſeqq.

without

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The Greeks return to the ſervice of their country.

without ſaving his money; and the Grecian generals had an early opportunity to reproach his perfidy and ingratitude, being ſoon called to engage in a more honourable war [55], kindled by the reſentment of Artaxerxes againſt the preſumption of the Spartans, who had ſo ſtrenuouſly ſupported the unfortunate rebellion of Cyrus.

55 Xenoph. p. 427.

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Tiſſaphernes makes War on the Greeks, by order of Artaxerxes.—Attacks the Æolian Cities.—Expedition of Thimbron.—He is ſucceeded by Dercyllidas.—His Treaty with Tiſſaphernes.—Ageſilaus King of Sparta.—Cinadon's Conſpiracy.—Ageſilaus Commander of the Grecian Forces in Aſia.—His Succeſs.—Tiſſaphernes ſucceeded by Tithrauſtes—Great Views of Ageſilaus.—War rekindled in Greece.—League againſt Sparta.—Campaign of Lyſander in Bœotia.—His Death.

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Tiſſaphernes prepares to make war on the Lacedæmonian allies in Aſia, by order of Artaxerxes. Olymp. xcv. 2. A.C. 399.

IT does honour rather to the modeſty than to the judgment of Xenophon, that he has excluded, from his general hiſtory of Grecian affairs, the account of an expedition, in which he himſelf acted ſo diſtinguiſhed a part, and which immediately occaſioned very important tranſactions both in Aſia and in Europe. After the downfal of Athenian greatneſs, the Spartans were naturally expoſed to the jealouſy and reſentment of Perſia, by their dominion in Greece, by their conqueſts on the coaſt of Aſia, by the pre-eminence of their naval power, and eſpecially by their open participation in the rebellious deſigns of Cyrus. The former circumſtances rendered their republic the

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rival of the king of Perſia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel rendered them the perſonal enemies of Artaxerxes. His reſolution to chaſtiſe their audacity was communicated to Tiſſaphernes, who, after haraſſing the retreat of the Greeks to the foot of the Carduchian mountains, beyond which he had not courage to follow them, returned with a powerful army towards Lower Aſia, to reſume the government of Caria, his hereditary province, as well as to take poſſeſſion of the rich ſpoils of Cyrus, beſtowed on him by the gratitude of his maſter, in return for his recent and ſignal ſervices againſt that dangerous pretender to the throne.

Attacks the Æolian cities.

Honoured with this magnificent preſent, Tiſſaphernes was farther entruſted with executing the vengeance of the great king againſt the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war, which the late hoſtilities in the Eaſt ſeemed to render unneceſſary, he attacked the Æolian cities; the ſatrap Pharnabazus readily entered into his views, and zealouſly concurred with all his meaſures. The Lacedæmonian garriſon, ſupported by the townſmen, defended themſelves with their uſual courage, earneſtly ſoliciting, however, a reinforcement from home, which might enable them to reſiſt and to ſurmount ſuch an unexpected danger[1].

The Spartans ſend Thimbron

On this important occaſion, the Spartan ſenate and aſſembly were not wanting to the aſſiſtance of

[1] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 480. Diodor. Sicul. l. xiv. p. 416.

their

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their garriſons, or to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thouſand Peloponneſian troops, and demanded a conſiderable ſupply from the Athenians. The latter ſent them three hundred horſemen, who having ſerved under the thirty tyrants, were cheerfully ſacrificed to this dangerous duty by the partiſans of the new democracy. The command of the joint forces was entruſted to the Spartan Thimbron, who had orders [2], as ſoon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, and who were actually employed in the diſhonourable ſervice of an ungrateful Barbarian. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, ſtill retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the propoſal of joining Thimbron extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian ſtandard ſix thouſand men, the venerable remains of an army exhauſted and ennobled by unexampled toils [3], and unexampled and unimitated [4] perſeverance.

with an army to their aſſiſtance;

which is reinforced by the Greeks who had returned from Upper Aſia.

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign againſt the lieutenant of Artaxerxes, at the diſtance of two years after Cyrus had marched from Epheſus to diſpute the crown of Perſia. The firſt impreſſions of the Grecian arms were attended with conſiderable ſuc-

Thimbron opens the campaign with ſucceſs; Olymp. xcv. 3. A.C. 398.

[2] Xenoph. Hellen. p. 550. Diodor. p. 416.

[3] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. vii. p. 427.

[4] In the whole compaſs of hiſtory, ancient and modern, where do we find a parallel, any thing ſimilar or ſecond?

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ceſs. Thimbron took, or regained, the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Haliſarnia, Myrina, Cymé, and Grynium. But the walls of Lariſſa, a ſtrong city in the Troade, defied his aſſault; the vigilant garriſon baffled all his contrivances for depriving them of freſh water; and, aſſiſted by the inhabitants of the place, made a vigorous ſally, repelled the beſiegers, and burned or demoliſhed their works.

fails in the ſiege of Lariſſa;

recalled and diſgraced;

Nothing but continual action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could reſtrain the licentious paſſions of the troops, compoſed of a motley aſſemblage from ſo many different, and often hoſtile communities. Their ſeditious ſpirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Aſia. Their rapacity ſpared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the ſenate, aſcribing the violence of the troops to the weakneſs of the general. In conſequence of this repreſentation, Thimbron was recalled and diſgraced[4], and the command, for which he ſeemed ſo ill qualified, was beſtowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in reſources, who could often vary his conduct without changing his principles; who knew when to relax, and when to enforce the diſcipline of the camp, and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the beſt engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented, or improved, Dercyllidas overcame the obſtinacy of

is ſucceeded by Dercyllidas;

who adminiſters with equal ability the affairs of war and peace.

4 Xenoph. p. 481.

Lariſſa;

Lariſſa; and in the ſpace of eight days, reduced eight other cities in the province of Pharnabazus. The rapidity of his conqueſts recommended him to the Spartan ſenate, and his moderate uſe of victory endeared him to the Aſiatic colonies. He leſſened their taxes, encouraged their induſtry, heard their complaints with candour, and decided their differences with the moſt impartial juſtice. Diſdaining the cruel example of his predeceſſors, he impoſed not any arbitrary exactions on the peaceful citizens and huſbandmen; and leſt the maintenance of his troops ſhould prove burdenſome to the allies and ſubjects of Sparta, he fixed his winter-quarters in Bithynia, where the valour of Xenophon and his followers had lately ſpread the terror of the Grecian name. CHAP. XXVII.

Commiſſioners ſent from Sparta to prorogue his authority. Olymp. xcv. 4. A.C. 497.

Early in the ſpring, commiſſioners were ſent from Sparta to inſpect the affairs of Aſia, and to prorogue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, provided their obſervations and inquiries confirmed the very favourable accounts that had been given of his adminiſtration. On their arrival at Lampſacus, where the army was then aſſembled, they viſited the camp, and aſſured the ſoldiers, that the magiſtrates of the republic as much approved their conduct in the laſt, as they had condemned it in the preceding, year. A captain, expreſſing the ſenſe of the multitude, replied, that the different behaviour of the troops, now and formerly, was yet leſs different than the characters of Thimbron and Dercyllidas. This teſtimony of military approbation was equally flattering to the

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general, and ſatisfactory to the commiſſioners; who afterwards, at his requeſt, viſited the neighbouring towns of Æolis and Ionia, and found them in a condition extremely happy and flouriſhing [5].

Dercyllidas fortifies the Cherſoneſus.

Before taking leave of Dercyllidas, they acquainted him, that the inhabitants of the Thracian Cherſoneſus had lately ſent to Sparta an embaſſy, requeſting aſſiſtance againſt the fierce Barbarians who inhabited the adjoining territory; and that, ſhould circumſtances permit him to afford protection to thoſe induſtrious and diſtreſſed Greeks, he would perform a ſignal ſervice to the ſtate. The inactivity of Tiſſaphernes, who, notwithſtanding the powerful army which he had conducted from Upper Aſia, ſtill expected further reinforcements from the Eaſt, encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this uſeful and meritorious enterpriſe. The Cherſoneſus was one of the moſt fertile [6] and beſt cultivated ſpots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length, and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flouriſhing cities, and ſeveral commodious harbours. The fields, producing the moſt valuable grains, were interſperſed and adorned with delightful plantations and orchards, as well as with lawns and meadows, ſtored with all ſorts of uſeful cattle. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an inſular form, its happineſs would have been complete; but a neck of land, thirty-ſeven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the

5 Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 487.

6 Παμφορωτατην και αριστην. Xenoph. p. 488.

fierceſt

fierceſt tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyllidas could eaſily have repelled their inroads. They might have puniſhed their cruelty by deſtroying their miſerable villages in the open country; but the Barbarians would have found a ſecure refuge in their woods and mountains, and whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpleſs Cherſoneſus with their native fury, heightened by revenge. Dercyllidas afforded a more uſeful aſſiſtance to thoſe unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labour, of his ſoldiers. With inceſſant toil, begun in the ſpring, and continued almoſt to the autumn, they formed a ſtrong wall acroſs the iſthmus; the ſpace was marked out, and the labour diſtinctly apportioned to the ſeparate communities from which the army had been levied; and the ſpur of emulation was ſharpened by the incitement of gain, the general in perſon ſuperintending the work, and beſtowing rewards (laviſhly furniſhed by the wealthy Cherſonites) on the moſt diligent and deſerving [7].

Enters into treaty with Tiſſaphernes.

Dercyllidas had ſcarcely returned from this employment, juſtly ennobled by its utility, when the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tiſſaphernes appeared in the neighbourhood of Epheſus. The general collected his whole ſtrength in order to give them battle; the European ſoldiers diſplayed a noble ardour for action; but the inhabitants of the Aſiatic coaſt, who had flocked to his ſtandard,

7 Xenoph. p. 488.

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were intimidated by the ſight of an enemy whoſe numbers far exceeded their own. This panic might have proved fatal, had not the troops of Tiſſaphernes felt the terror which they inſpired. They recollected the bravery of the ten thouſand who had accompanied Cyrus; they perceived that the forces with whom they now had to contend exceeded that number; but they did not reflect that the army of Dercyllidas was ſwelled by the degenerate Greeks of Æolis and Ionia, whoſe minds had been enfeebled and degraded by a long ſeries of oppreſſion. The cowardice of the Perſians engaged Tiſſaphernes, much againſt the inclination of Pharnabazus, to propoſe a conference; the cowardice of the Ionians engaged Dercyllidas to accept the propoſal. Hoſtilities were thus ſuſpended; mutual hoſtages were given; overtures of peace were made; and meſſengers were diſpatched for inſtructions to the Spartan council, and to the court of Perſia.

The Perſians ſecretly prepare to renew the war.

The deſign of Tiſſaphernes, however, was only to gain time by amuſing the enemy. The moſt ſolemn oaths and engagements had long loſt their power over his perfidious mind. He treacherouſly watched an opportunity to renew the war, waiting with impatience for the promiſed reinforcements from the Eaſt, and eſpecially for the equipment of a fleet, which Artaxerxes was preparing, with ſilence and celerity, in the ports of Phœnicia. Theſe ſecret preparations were communicated to the Spartan magiſtrates by the patriotiſm of Herodas, a Syracuſan, who, animated by the love of Greece,

Greece, betrayed his Phœnician maſter. The Spartans were alarmed with the danger, indignant at the treachery of Tiſſaphernes, and perhaps diſpleaſed with the too eaſy credulity of their general. But the death of king Agis had given them, in the perſon of their firſt magiſtrate, a commander who equalled Dercyllidas in merit, and who has far ſurpaſſed him in renown.

Ageſilaus declared king of Sparta.

The deſtructive expedition againſt the Eleans was the laſt exploit of the long and warlike reign of Agis. On his death-bed he acknowledged for his ſon Leotychides, whoſe legitimacy, the levity or the guilt of his mother Timea had expoſed to juſt ſuſpicion. But this late avowal of a ſucceſſor, whom he had ſo long diſowned, did not ſatisfy the partiſans of Ageſilaus, who was the brother of Agis on the ſide of his father Archidamus, but younger by many years, being born of a different mother, and failing Leotychides, the neareſt heir to the throne. Under a diminutive and ignoble form, Ageſilaus concealed a vigorous and fervid mind, a manly elevation of character, a generous ambition of ſoul. Theſe reſpectable qualities, adorned by the milder virtues of modeſty, candour, condeſcenſion, and unlimited complaiſance for his friends, early attracted the notice, and merited the eſteem, of the firſt names of Sparta; and of none more than Lyſander, who, as his perſonal hopes of grandeur were blaſted by the univerſal jealouſy and reſentment that had been juſtly excited in Sparta againſt his oſtentatious abuſe of power, confined all his projects of ambition to the aggrandiſe-

ment

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ment of his favourite. That eloquence and addreſs[8], which would have been ineffectual if employed for himſelf, ſucceeded in behalf of another; and by the influence and intrigues of Lyſander, ſtill more than by the ſtrong claims of juſtice and of merit, Ageſilaus was declared ſucceſſor to the vacant throne; and at the diſtance of about two years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in Aſia; an office leſs ſplendid in name than that of king of Sparta, but carrying with it more ſubſtantial authority.

Cinadon's conſpiracy,

In the interval of theſe ſucceſſive honours, he approved his attentive vigilance in the ſervice of the republic, of which the ſafety, and even the exiſtence, was endangered by a daring and bloody conſpiracy. A youth named Cinadon, diſtinguiſhed above his companions by extraordinary ſtrength and agility, was not leſs conſpicuous for undaunted courage and ambition. Deſcended of an obſcure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the mortifying partiality of the government under

[8] The partiſans of Leotychides, in pleading his cauſe before the aſſembly, alledged an oracle that exhorted the Spartans to beware of a lame reign. This pointed at Ageſilaus, who limped in walking. But Lyſander, by one of thoſe ready and unexpected turns, which often decide the reſolutions of numerous aſſemblies, directed the battery of the oracle againſt Leotychides, aſſerting, that it was the lameneſs of the title only which Apollo muſt have had in view, ſince it was a matter indifferent to the gods whether the Spartan kings walked gracefully; but a matter of high importance whether they deſcended from Hercules, the ſon of Jupiter, or Alcibiades, an Athenian profligate and exile. Com. Plut. in Ageſil. & Lyſand. & Xenoph. Ageſil. Panegyr. & Hellen. l. iii. p. 493.

which

which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded with the reflection, that whatever abilities his youth might promiſe, and his manhood mature, the unfortunate circumſtances of his birth muſt forever exclude him from the principal dignities of the ſtate, which circulated among a few Spartan families, without the poſſibility of being extended beyond that very limited ſphere. The warmth of his character, and the impetuoſity of his paſſions, prompted him to ſeek juſtice and revenge: nor was his blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the means, however atrocious, that muſt lead to this favourite end. He communicated the horrid deſign to men of his own, and of an inferior condition, exaggerating their cruel oppreſſion under a ſtern ariſtocracy, which he contraſted with the mild equality of the neighbouring communities; and perhaps aſſerting, that if they muſt ſubmit to a maſter, it would be better to have *one* than *many*; that even the ſubjects of a monarchy enjoyed greater equality and liberty than the members of the Spartan republic [9], ſince the former all equally participated in thoſe preferments and honours, to which not only the ſlaves, the Helots, and freedmen, but the whole body of the Lacedæmonian people, were forbidden to aſpire. After this general repreſentation, he neglected not, what was more effectual and important, to arraign the arrogance

9 This language I have often heard from the *ſubjects* of a modern republic, whoſe *citizens* are not more remarkable for their firmneſs in maintaining power, than for their moderation in exerciſing it.

and

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and cruelty of particular ſenators, and to inflame the reſentment of individuals againſt their private and domeſtic foes; nor did he forget to encourage them all with the certain proſpect of ſucceſs, by contraſting their own ſtrength and numbers with the weakneſs of an enemy, who might be taken unarmed, and cut off by ſurpriſe [10].

is diſcovered when ripe for execution.

The time for action approached, and the author of the conſpiracy commanded his aſſociates to ſtay at home that they might be ready at a call. Ageſilaus, meanwhile, performed the accuſtomed vows and ſacrifices for the ſafety of the republic; the appearance of the entrails announced ſome dreadful and concealed danger; a ſecond victim was ſlain, and the ſigns were ſtill more unfavourable; but after examining the third ſacrifice, the prieſt exclaimed, "We ſeem, O Ageſilaus! to be in the midſt of our enemies." Soon afterwards, a perſon, whoſe name has not been thought worthy of record, denounced Cinadon to the magiſtrates, as guilty of a treaſonable deſign, of which he had endeavoured to render himſelf an accomplice. When the informer was deſired to explain his declaration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon having conducted him to the great ſquare of the city, which being deſtined for the public aſſembly and the market, was the uſual place of rendezvous, deſired him to count the number of Spartans whom he ſaw in that ſpacious reſort. That he counted the king, the ephori, the ſenators, and about forty

[10] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 493, & ſeqq.

others,

others, and then aſked Cinadon, for what purpoſe he had required him to take that ſeemingly uſeleſs trouble? Becauſe, replied the conſpirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the reſt, whoſe great numbers you behold in the market-place, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only; in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we ſhall in each houſe and family have one enemy, the maſter, but all the ſervants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted him with the object and cauſe of the conſpiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was ſoon to be communicated to the ſlaves, peaſants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people, whoſe animoſity againſt the Spartans was too violent to be concealed. That the greateſt part of the conſpirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands; that the ſhops of the armourers, the tools of thoſe artificers who wrought in metal, wood, and ſtone, and even the inſtruments of agriculture, might furniſh ſuch weapons to the reſt, as would fully anſwer the purpoſe againſt unarmed men.

Activity and prudence of the Spartan magiſtrates.

This alarming intelligence rouſed the activity, without ſhaking the firmneſs, of the Spartan magiſtrates. It would have been imprudent to ſeize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his reſources, and the number of his aſſociates. On pretence of the public ſervice, they contrived to ſend him to Aulon (for in ſimilar expeditions they had often employed his ready arm and enterpriſing valour), that he might ſeize,

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ſeize, in that licentious city, and bring within the reach of juſtice, ſeveral daring violators of the Spartan laws, among whom was a very beautiful woman, who corrupted the manners of young and old [11]. The ſenate prepared waggons for conveying the priſoners, and furniſhed every thing neceſſary for the journey. A body of choſen horſemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who ſet out without ſuſpecting that this long train of preparation was deſtined againſt himſelf alone. But no ſooner had he reached a proper diſtance from the city, than he was ſeized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were ſent to the ſenate, who inſtantly ſecured their perſons. Cinadon, Tiſamenus, a prieſt, and the other leaders of the conſpiracy, were ſcourged through the city, gored with inſtruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

Cinadon and his accomplices ſeized and puniſhed.

Ageſilaus takes the command of the Greek forces in Aſia. Olymp. xcvi. 1. A.C. 396.

The raſh enterpriſe of Cinadon ſtill filled the Spartans with alarm, when intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes, againſt whom the perſuaſive influence of Lyſander encouraged them to employ the great and ſolid, but as yet unknown abilities, of their young and warlike prince. Since the reign of Agamemnon, Ageſilaus was the firſt Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Aſia; and his expedition, though not leſs im-

[11] Αγαγειν δ' εκελευον την γυναικα ἡ ηαλλιστη μεν ελεγετο αυτοθι ειναι, λυμαινεσθαι δ' εωκει τους αφικνουμενους Λακεδαιμονιων και πρεσβυτερους και νεωτερους. Xenoph. p. 494.

portant

portant than the exploits of the ſons of Atreus and Achilles, is much inferior of renown; becauſe the panegyric of Xenophon, warm and ſplendid as it is, even beyond the uſual colour of his compoſitions, muſt yet, like all the works of man, be for ever eclipſed by the luſtre of the Iliad. But the conqueſts of Ageſilaus, however different in fame, yet ſurpaſſed in misfortune, the war of Troy. Both were pernicious to the intereſts of Greece; but of the two, the victories of Ageſilaus proved the moſt fatal, not indeed in their immediate, but in their remote conſequences. CHAP. XXVII.

Diſgraces Lyſander, who alone rivalled his authority.

In the ſpring of the year three hundred and ninety-ſix before Chriſt, he left Sparta, with three thouſand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a body of foreign troops, amounting to ſix thouſand, chiefly collected from the confederate cities of Peloponneſus. Since the irregular and unjuſtifiable conduct of Agis, in his unfortunate expedition againſt Argos, the Spartan kings were uſually attended in the field by a council of ten ſenators, whoſe concurrence was held neceſſary in all public meaſures. Ageſilaus demanded a council, not of ten, but of thirty Spartans: a refined ſtroke of policy, which ſtrongly indicates that artful dexterity with which, during a long adminiſtration, he uniformly promoted the views of his intereſt and ambition. By augmenting the number of the council, he diminiſhed its importance. Each member, poſſeſſing leſs weight and influence, felt himſelf leſs concerned in the honour of the body; and the whole were more eaſily ſwayed and governed by

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the king. Lyſander alone, whoſe name in Aſia was illuſtrious or terrible, rivalled for a while the power of Ageſilaus. But the colleagues of Lyſander were the firſt to diſpute his pretenſions, and to controul his authority. Ageſilaus availed himſelf of their envy, and liſtened too eaſily to the dictates of ſelfiſhneſs, in humbling the arrogance of a rival who had been the chief author of his own greatneſs. By thwarting the meaſures of Lyſander, by denying his requeſts, by employing him in offices unbecoming his dignity[12], he rendered him contemptible in the eyes of thoſe by whom he had been ſo long feared. This ungenerous treatment of a benefactor, as well as the aſpiring pride of the benefactor himſelf, which could excite ſuch black ingratitude in an otherwiſe virtuous breaſt, doubly prove the inſtability of friendſhip between ambitious minds. After a diſgraceful rupture, which ended in an affected reconciliation, Lyſander was ſent by Ageſilaus and his council to command the Lacedæmonian ſquadron in the Helleſpont, an inactive and ſubordinate ſervice, in which he could not expect an opportunity of performing any thing worthy of his ancient fame. He returned, therefore, in a few months to Sparta, covered with diſgrace, enraged by diſappointment, and vowing implacable revenge againſt the cruel ingratitude of his friend, which

[12] Lyſander was known in the Eaſt as a conqueror; Ageſilaus made him a commiſſary. Vid. Plut. in Ageſil. & Lyſand. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 497.

he

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he felt more deeply than the injuſtice of all his enemies together.

Treachery of Tiſſaphernes.

Ageſilaus fixed his head-quarters at Epheſus, a place recommended by its centrical ſituation, as the moſt convenient rendezvous for the recruits which flocked to his ſtandard from every part of the coaſt; at the ſame time that ſuch a ſtation enabled him to conceal from the enemy which of their provinces was the intended object of his invaſion. Thither Tiſſaphernes ſent an embaſſy, demanding the reaſon of ſuch mighty preparations. Ageſilaus replied, "That the Greeks in Aſia might enjoy the ſame liberty with their brethren in Europe." The meſſengers of Tiſſaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hoſtile intentions againſt either them or the mother-country was totally void of foundation; and that, in conſequence of the recent tranſactions between Tiſſaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambaſſadors might ſhortly be expected from Suſa, impowered to ratify a firm and laſting peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this deſirable work ſhould be completed, Tiſſaphernes earneſtly deſired a continuation of the truce, which, on his ſide, he was ready to ſeal by whatever formalities Ageſilaus thought proper to require. The Spartan king frankly avowed his ſuſpicions of treachery; yet being unwilling to embroil his country in an unneceſſary war, he diſpatched Dercyllidas, with two members of the Spartan council, to renew his late

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engagements with Tiſſaphernes. The perfidious ſatrap ſwore and deceived for the laſt time. No ſooner had he received the long-expected auxiliaries from the Eaſt, than he commanded Ageſilaus to leave Epheſus, and to evacuate the coaſt of Aſia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Perſian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent, or pious Spartan, while his friends were alarmed with this unexpected declaration, aſſumed an unuſual gaiety of countenance, obſerving, that he rejoiced to commence the war under ſuch favourable auſpices, ſince the treachery of Tiſſaphernes muſt render the gods his enemies.

Innocent ſtratagem of Ageſilaus.

Meanwhile he prepared to encounter the inſidious arts of the ſatrap, with equal, but more innocent addreſs. It was induſtriouſly given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favourite reſidence of Tiſſaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and ſtrengthened by a fortreſs, the repoſitory of his treaſures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furniſh a market, and to prepare every thing moſt neceſſary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tiſſaphernes, not doubting that Caria was the intended ſcene of war, eſpecially as the mountainous nature of that province rendered it improper for horſe, in which the Greeks were very poorly provided, encamped with his own numerous cavalry in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the paſſage of the enemy. But Ageſilaus having poſted a ſufficient garriſon in Epheſus, left that city, and turning

He defeats the Perſians, and plunders Phrygia.

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turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his ſoldiers. The ſelfiſh ſatrap was unwilling to relieve the province of Pharnabazus, by weakening the defence of his own; and accordingly remained inactive on the fruitful banks of the Meander, whoſe winding ſtream ſkirts the northern frontier of Caria, ſtill ſuſpecting an invaſion of the Greeks from Epheſus and the neighbouring ſea-ports. During the greateſt part of the ſummer Ageſilaus ravaged Phrygia; the Barbarians were ſhamefully defeated in ſeveral rencounters; at length they ceaſed to reſiſt his arms; nor attempted even to haraſs his retreat, when having gratified the juſt reſentment of his country, he returned, loaded with ſpoil, to winter in Epheſus [13].

Employment of the Greeks during their winter-quarters in Phrygia.

In the Phrygian expedition, Ageſilaus ſhared, and ſurpaſſed the toils of the meaneſt ſoldier, from whom he refuſed to be diſtinguiſhed by his dreſs, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. The inactive ſeaſon of the year was moſt diligently and uſefully employed. Epheſus and the neighbouring towns glowed with the ardour of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of induſtry. Shields, ſpears, ſwords, and helmets, filled every ſhop, and crowded every magazine. The inhabitants of the country were allured by great rewards to form their beſt horſes to the diſcipline of the field; and

[13] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 498, & ſeqq.

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the wealthy citizens were exempted from the ſervice of the enſuing campaign, upon condition only that they furniſhed a horſeman, properly equipped, to perform their vicarious duty. The veteran ſoldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exerciſed within the walls of Epheſus, in thoſe martial amuſements which repreſented a faithful image, and which formed the beſt ſchool, of war. Ageſilaus often condeſcended to diſpute the prize of valour or dexterity; his popular manners endeared him to the troops; the ſuperiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience; they vied with each other in loyalty to their prince; they vied in gratitude to the gods with their prince himſelf, who, as often as he obtained the crown of victory, dedicated the honourable reward in the admired temple of Epheſian Diana. "What then (adds a ſoldier, a philoſopher, and a man of piety) might not be expected from troops who delighted in the exerciſe of war, reſpected their general, and revered the gods[14]?"

Ageſilaus prepares for the enſuing campaign. Olymp. xcvi. 2. A.C. 395.

The expectation of Xenophon, who beheld the intereſting ſcenes at Epheſus, which he has inimitably deſcribed, was fully gratified by the ſucceſs of the enſuing campaign. Agreeably to the annual revolution of offices in the Lacedæmonian republic, a commiſſion of thirty Spartans was ſent early in the ſpring to ſupply the place of Lyſander and his colleagues. Among the members of this new council Ageſilaus diſtributed the various de-

[14] Xenoph. Panegyr. Ageſil.

partments

partments of military command. The ſuperior abilities of Herippidas were entruſted with the veteran army who had ſerved under Cyrus. Xenocles was appointed to conduct the cavalry. Mygdo commanded the Aſiatic levies; Scythes, the Lacedæmonian freedmen; for himſelf, as his peculiar care, the general reſerved the faithful and warlike body of Peloponneſian allies, choſen from the flower and vigour of many flouriſhing republics. With a view to encourage his ſoldiers before taking the field, he ordered the Phrygian priſoners to be brought forth, ſtripped, and expoſed to ſale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteneſs of their ſkins, their flaccid muſcles, their awkward motions, their ſhapeleſs forms, their unwieldly corpulence, and the effeminate ſoftneſs of their whole perſons. Such an enemy they conſidered as nothing ſuperior to an army of women [15].

Attacks the center of the Perſian dominions in Lower Aſia.

Ageſilaus had declared, that he would be no longer ſatisfied with ravaging the extremities, but was determined to attack the center, of the Perſian power. Tiſſaphernes, fearful of being deceived by a ſecond feint, again conducted his ſquadrons to the banks of the Meander, and reinforced with the flower of his infantry the garriſons of Caria, which (as the contrary had been induſtriouſly reported) he concluded to be the main object of approaching hoſtilities. But the Spartan was too able a general to repeat the ſame game. On this

[15] Xenoph. p. 500.

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occaſion, therefore, he carried into execution the deſign which had been made public, marched towards the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without oppoſition. He had acquired much valuable booty, and ſhaken the fidelity of the Lydians, before any enemy appeared to reſiſt his progreſs. That reſiſtance, which was made too late, proved ineffectual. After ſeveral ſucceſsful ſkirmiſhes, he defeated the Perſians in a general engagement on the banks of the Pactolus, ſurrounded and took their camp, in which, beſide other riches, he found ſeventy talents of ſilver.

Death of Tiſſaphernes.

He likewiſe expected to have taken the unrelenting enemy of the Greeks, the perfidious Tiſſaphernes; but that crafty traitor, ſuſpecting the event of the battle, had thrown himſelf, with a conſiderable body of troops, within the ſtrong walls of Sardis, where his cowardice continued to reſide, diſplaying the inglorious pride of pomp and luxury, while the provinces of Artaxerxes fell a prey to the hoſtile invader. The time of his puniſhment, however, was now arrived. His whole life had been diſgraceful to himſelf; but its laſt ſcene had diſgraced the arms of his maſter, who cancelled, by one ſtroke of royal ingratitude, the merit of innumerable perfidies and cruelties committed for his ſervice. Tithrauſtes was ſent from court to take off the head of the obnoxious ſatrap; who, being allured to a conference, was caught by his own arts[16], and met with a juſt fate; although

[16] Polyænus, l. vii. The fact is mentioned with few circumſtances in Diodorus, and with none in Xenophon, p. 501.

the

the author of his death was perhaps the only man in Perſia or in Greece with whom Tiſſaphernes had any claim of merit. CHAP. XXVII.

Tithrauſtes, who had come from Babylon eſcorted by a powerful body of cavalry, poſſeſſed the mandate of the great king for aſſuming the government of Lower Aſia, and the conduct of the war. Having removed the only rival who had intereſt or ability to diſpute this extenſive and honourable commiſſion, his next care was to ſend an embaſſy to Ageſilaus, which, inſtead of indicating the character of a great general (for ſuch Tithrauſtes was eſteemed in the Eaſt), betrayed the mean and temporiſing genius of his worthleſs predeceſſor. The ambaſſadors were inſtructed to declare, "That Tiſſaphernes, the author of thoſe troubles which embroiled Greece and Perſia, had ſuffered a juſt death; and that the king, who had been too long deceived by his artifices, was now ready to acknowledge the independence of the Grecian colonies, on condition that Ageſilaus withdrew his troops from Aſia." The Spartan honeſtly replied, "That the alternative of war or peace depended not on himſelf, but on the reſolution of the aſſembly and ſenate; nor could he remove his forces from the Eaſt without the expreſs command of his republic." The artful ſatrap perceiving that it was impoſſible for him to interrupt, determined at leaſt to divert, the courſe of hoſtilities. None knew better than Tithrauſtes the uſe of money as an inſtrument of negociation. He condeſcended to purchaſe from Ageſilaus, by a very

He is ſucceeded by Tithrauſtes, who purſues the ſame line of conduct.

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large ſum, the tranquillity of Lydia; and as it ſeemed a matter of indifference to the Spartan king whichever part of the Perſian dominions felt the weight of his invaſion, he evacuated that province, and again entered Phrygia.

Ageſilaus entruſted with the command of the Grecian fleet; Olymp. xcvi. 3. A.C. 394.

While he purſued his march northwards, he was overtaken in Ionia by a welcome meſſenger from home, who delivered him a letter, teſtifying the grateful admiration of his countrymen, prolonging the term of his military command, and entruſting him with the numerous fleet, which had ſailed two years before, to counteract the deſigns of the enemy[17]. This fleet, conſiſting of ninety gallies, was actually commanded by Pharax, who, during the glorious career of Ageſilaus's victories, had ſilently performed very uſeful and meritorious ſervice. The naval preparations of Artaxerxes, which, as above mentioned, firſt excited the alarm in Greece, were ſtill carried on with activity. Various ſquadrons were equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, and other maritime provinces, of which the combined ſtrength far exceeded the fleet of Greece. But the vigilant diligence of Pharax prevented their union. His ſhips were victualled by Nephres, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt; with whom, in the name of Sparta, he had contracted an alliance. The ports of Cyprus, Rhodes, and the Greek cities in the Carian Cherſoneſus, were open to his cruiſers. Availing himſelf of thoſe important advantages, he

[17] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 501.

ſteered

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ſteered with rapidity along the hoſtile ſhores; and ſeaſonably dividing or combining his fleet, effectually reſtrained the enemy from making their projected deſcents on Peloponneſus, and even deterred them from ſailing the Aſiatic ſeas[18]. Ageſilaus, unmindful of this eſſential ſervice, which had prevented any diverſion of the Greek forces in the Eaſt, deprived Pharax of the command, and ſubſtituted in his ſtead Piſander, a near relation of his own, who poſſeſſed indeed the ambitious valour and manly firmneſs of the Spartan character, but neither the experience, nor the abilities, ſufficient to qualify him for this weighty truſt.

which he commits to Piſander.

The firſt effects of this fatal error were eclipſed by a momentary blaze of glory. Ageſilaus entered Phrygia; attacked, conquered, and purſued Pharnabazus; who, flying from poſt to poſt, was ſucceſſively driven from every part of his valuable province[19]. The fame of the Grecian victories ſtruck terror into the neighbouring countries. Cotys[20], or Corylas, the proud tyrant of Paphlagonia, who diſdained the friendſhip of the great king[21], ſent humbly to requeſt that the native valour of his numerous and invincible cavalry might be aſſociated with the Spartan arms[22]. The inferior ſatraps, and eſpecially their oppreſſed ſub-

Ageſilaus entertains hopes of conquering the Perſian empire;

[18] Iſocrat. Panegyr. He does not give the name of the admiral, which we find in Xenophon's Gr. Hiſt.

[19] Xenophon compares him to the Scythian Nomades.

[20] He is called Cotys in Xenoph. Gr. Hiſt. Plutarch, and Diodorus; and Corylas in Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. v. p. 370.

[21] Xenoph. ibid. [22] Plut. in Ageſil.

jects,

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jects, courted the protection of Ageſilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Perſia, of which they had long felt and regretted the ſeverity. The deceitful Ariæus, who had ſhared the guilt, without ſharing the puniſhment of Cyrus, could never be heartily reconciled to a maſter againſt whom he had once rebelled. His actual wealth, and ancient honours, gave him a powerful influence over the numerous Barbarians who had followed the ſtandard of Cyrus and his own; and whoſe diſcontented ſpirits might eaſily be inflamed into a ſecond revolt [23]. The commotion was general in Leſſer Aſia; and, as Egypt had already rebelled, Ageſilaus, at the head of about twenty thouſand Greeks, and innumerable Barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation to ſhake the throne of Artaxerxes; eſpecially as the experience of his friend and admirer, Xenophon, who was ſtill the companion of his arms, muſt have powerfully encouraged him to that glorious enterpriſe [24].

which are blaſted by unexpected intelligence from Greece.

But an undertaking of which the ſucceſs, however ſplendid, could not probably have been followed by any ſolid advantages, becauſe the diminutive territory and population of Sparta formed a baſis far too feeble to ſupport ſuch a weight of conqueſt, was blaſted, in the bloom of hope, by intelligence equally unexpected and diſtreſsful. Tithrauſtes, who knew the power of gold over the

23 Plut. in Ageſil. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 439.

24 Diodor. ibid. & Xenoph. Ageſil. Panegyr. & Plut. in Ageſil.

Grecian

Grecian councils, determined, with the approbation of the king his maſter, to give full play to this main-ſpring of politics. The Cretan and Ægean ſeas were careleſsly guarded by the unſuſpecting confidence of the new admiral. Tithrauſtes perceived the neglect; and diſpatched, without any fear of capture, various emiſſaries into Greece, well qualified, by bribes and addreſs, to practiſe with the diſcontented and factious demagogues, the natural enemies of Sparta, of ariſtocratic government, and of the public tranquillity [45].

Means by which the Perſians kindle a war in that country.

The principal inſtrument of theſe ſecret negociations was, Timocrates of Rhodes, a man of an intriguing and audacious ſpirit, who carried with him no leſs a ſum than fifty talents (above nine thouſand pounds ſterling), which he diſtributed, with laviſh promiſes of future bounty, to Cyclon of Argos, to Timolaus and Polyanthes of Corinth, to Androclides Iſmenias and Galaxadorus of Thebes; names for the moſt part obſcure in the annals of war, but important in the hiſtory of domeſtic faction. The tyranny of Sparta was the perpetual theme of theſe venal hirelings, not only in their reſpective communities, but in every quarter of Greece to which they were ſucceſſively carried with a mercenary diligence. They painted in the ſtrongeſt colours the injuſtice, the cruelty, and the immeaſurable ambition of that haughty republic, who had made ſoldiers of her ſlaves,

[45] Xenoph. p. 513, & ſeqq.

that

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that ſhe might make ſlaves of her allies. The deſtructive and impious devaſtation of the ſacred territory of Elis was arraigned with every term of reproach. The ſame calamities, it was propheſied, muſt ſoon overwhelm the neighbouring countries, unleſs they prepared (while it was yet time to prepare) for a vigorous defence; ſince Sparta purſued her conqueſts in Aſia with no other view but to lull the ſecurity, and rivet the chains, of Greece[26].

Motives by which the enemies of Sparta were actuated.

Strong as theſe invectives may appear, and intereſted as they certainly were, they did not exceed the truth; and, what is of more importance, they were addreſſed to men well diſpoſed to believe them. Since the ſubverſion of the Athenian power, the imperious government of Sparta had rendered her almoſt alike odious to her old, and to her new, confederates. The former, and particularly the Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achæans, complained with the warmth which juſtice gives, that, after ſharing the toils and dangers of the Peloponneſian war, they had been cruelly deprived of the fruits of victory. The latter, and eſpecially ſuch communities as had revolted from Athens, lamented that their blood and treaſure had been ſpent in vain. They had fought for freedom and independence; but their valour had been rewarded by a more intolerable ſervitude. Argos had long been the enemy, and Thebes aſpired to become the rival, of Sparta. Above all, the

[26] Xenoph. p. 514.

Athe-

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Athenians, animated by the patriotiſm of Thraſybulus, their deliverer from the Spartan yoke, longed to employ the firſt moments of returning vigour in the purſuit of glory and revenge.

Circumſtances which encouraged their hoſtility.

The corruption of thoſe morbid humours, which muſt ſoon have fermented of themſelves, was accelerated by the mercenary emiſſaries of Tithrauſtes. The occaſion, too, ſeemed favourable for aſſaulting the domeſtic ſtrength of a republic, whoſe arms were ambitiouſly employed in extending her diſtant conqueſts. The conduct of the Thebans had already announced this deſign. They not only refuſed aſſiſtance to Ageſilaus towards carrying on his eaſtern campaign, but treated him without reſpect or decency, while he croſſed their dominions; and, were not ambition blind, he muſt have perceived and reſented their hoſtility, and have delayed to undertake his expedition againſt Aſia, till he had extinguiſhed the ſeeds of war in Greece.

Their caution in beginning the war.

But, notwithſtanding the concurring cauſes which haſtened a rupture, ſuch was the terror of the Spartan name, encreaſed by the recent glory of Ageſilaus, that none of her numerous enemies had courage openly to take arms, and to avow their juſt animoſity. After various, but ſecret conferences, held in the principal cities, it was determined to wound that republic through her allies, the Phocians, who were diſtinguiſhed, amidſt the very general diſcontent, by their unſhaken attachment and fidelity. The Locri Ozolæ, a fierce and

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and inſolent people [27], who lived in the neighbourhood of Phocis, were eaſily perſuaded to levy contributions from a diſtrict on their eaſtern frontier, to which they had not the ſmalleſt claim, and of which the dominion had been long a matter of diſpute between the Phocians and Thebans. Both theſe ſtates ſeem to have been injured, and exactly in the ſame degree, by this aggreſſion; but the Phocians, who were the enemies of the Locri, took arms to revenge, while the Thebans, who were their friends, prepared to abet their injuſtice. They expected, and their expectation was gratified, that the Spartans would quickly interfere in a quarrel that affected the moſt important intereſts of their Phocian allies; a meaſure which tended preciſely to that iſſue which prudence and policy required, ſince the Thebans would be compelled to arm in their own defence, and muſt appear to all the neutral ſtates of Greece, and even to their Lacedæmonian enemies, to be undeſignedly dragged into a war, not from an inclination to commit, but from the neceſſity to repel, injuries [28].

Campaign of Lyſander in Bœotia.

The iraſcible pride of Sparta, ever prone to chaſtiſe the ſmalleſt offences with unbounded ſeverity, conſpired with the moſt ſanguine hopes of Thebes and her allies. Inſtead of condeſcending to remonſtrate, inſtead of demanding ſatisfaction, inſtead of ordering the Thebans to eva-

[27] Thucydid. l. i. p. 4. & p. 47.

[28] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. ad fin. Diodor. xiv. 81. Plutarch. in Lyſand. p. 448, & ſeqq.

cuate

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ſuate the territory of Phocis, and to abſtain from future injury, the Spartans flew to arms, and marched to invade Bœotia. On the firſt rumour of hoſtilities, the activity of Lyſander had been employed to aſſemble their northern confederates, the Maleans, Heracleans, with thoſe who inhabited the villages of Doris and Mount Oeta. He penetrated into the Theban territory, gained Lebadea by force, Orchomenus by addreſs, and prepared to aſſault the walls of Haliartus, which, next to Thebes, was the ſtrongeſt of the Bœotian cities. The difficulty of this enterpiſe made him diſpatch a meſſenger to haſten the arrival of Pauſanias, the Spartan king, who had led forth ſix thouſand Peloponneſians, to co-operate with this experienced commander. The unfortunate meſſenger was taken by the ſcouts of the Thebans, and with him a letter, in which Lyſander had ſignified his purpoſe, and appointed the time of rendezvous with Pauſanias, that they might ſurpriſe Haliartus with their combined forces [29].

The Thebans march in the night to the defence of Haliartus.

At the ſame time that this uſeful intelligence was brought to Thebes, there arrived in that city a powerful reinforcement of Athenian troops, who, though their own capital was unwalled and defenceleſs, had been perſuaded by Thraſybulus to brave the reſentment of Sparta. To theſe generous auxiliaries the Thebans committed their city, their wives, their children, and every object of their moſt tender concern; while the warlike youth,

[29] Xenoph. Hellen. p. 503, & ſeqq.

and

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and almoſt all thoſe of a military age, aſſembled in complete armour, ſet out in the dead of night, and performing a journey of fifteen miles with ſilence and celerity, reached, while it was yet dark, the gates of Haliartus. Their unexpected arrival ſtruck a pleaſing terror into their friends, who were affected ſtill more deeply, when they underſtood the cauſe of this nocturnal expedition. The Thebans diſpelled their fear, and animated their hope, expecting not only to ſave Haliartus, but to obtain a ſignal advantage over the unſuſpecting confidence of the aſſailants.

Stratagem by which they defeat the aſſailants.

For this purpoſe, they ſent a ſtrong detachment to lie in ambuſh without the walls. The reſt, reinforced by the townſmen, formed themſelves in battle array, and ſtood to their arms, behind the gates. Lyſander arrived in the morning; but Pauſanias, who had not received his meſſage, ſtill continued in the neighbourhood of Platæa. The ſoldiers, fluſhed by recent victory, diſdained to depend on the tardy motions of their auxiliaries. They requeſted Lyſander to lead them againſt the place; a meaſure to which he was otherwiſe much inclined, being eager to ſnatch the glory to himſelf, without dividing it with Pauſanias, his rival and enemy.

Battle of Haliartus, and death of Lyſander.

He approached the town, and boldly began the attack, perceiving the walls and battlements to be unguarded. But before any breach was made, the different gates at once flew open, while the Thebans and Haliartians ruſhed forth with one conſent, and with irreſiſtible fury. Lyſander, with a prieſt

prieſt who attended him, was ſlain on the firſt onſet. His men began to rally, but the Thebans, poſted in ambuſh without the city, occaſioned a new terror. The enemy every where gave way; above a thouſand fell in the field of battle, the reſt were routed, put to flight, and purſued with great ſlaughter[30].

The firſt intelligence of this fatal diſaſter brought Pauſanias to the ſcene of action, that he might examine the full extent of the calamity. It would have been fruitleſs to attempt the ſiege of Haliartus; but it was neceſſary to carry off the bodies of the ſlain. Pauſanias held a council of war, to determine whether this pious duty ſhould be effected by force, or whether he might condeſcend to ſolicit the humanity of the victors. Force ſeemed dangerous, as the principal deſtruction had happened immediately under the walls of the place, which it would be impoſſible to approach without ſuffering extremely from the miſſile weapons of the enemy, and without being expoſed to a ſecond attack, perhaps more bloody than the firſt. It was therefore unanimouſly reſolved to ſend a Spartan herald to Haliartus, requeſting leave to bury the dead. The demand was granted, on condition that the Peloponneſian army ſhould immediately evacuate Bœotia. Pauſanias complied, and returned to Sparta. His want of ſucceſs, rather than his demerit, ſubjected him to trial and condemnation. He eſcaped

30 Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, & ſeqq. Plutarch. in Lyſand.

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capital puniſhment by flying to Tegea, where he ſoon afterwards ſickened and died. His ſon Ageſipolis aſſumed the Spartan ſceptre, which, at that juncture, required the direction of more experienced hands [31].

[31] Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, & ſeqq. Plutarch. in Lyſand.

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Recal of Ageſilaus from the Eaſt.—He invades Bœotia.—Views of Evagoras King of Cyprus.—His Friendſhip with Conon.—The latter entruſted with the Perſian Fleet.—He defeats the Lacedæmonians.—Battle of Coronæa.—The Corinthian War.—Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours of Athens.—Conqueſts of Conon and Thraſybulus.—Peace of Antalcidas.

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The league formed againſt Sparta obliges that republic to recal Ageſilaus from the Eaſt. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A.C. 394.

THE defeat at Haliartus, which exaſperated, without humbling, the Spartans, confirmed the courage of their enemies, and haſtened the defection of their allies. The league was openly ratified and avowed by the republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth. The ſpirit of revolt ſeized Eubœa, pervaded the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the rich cities of Chalcis, and the warlike principalities of Theſſaly[1]. The whole fabric of the Spartan power, raiſed and cemented by a war of twenty-ſeven years, was ſhaken to the foundation; their victorious leaders were no more; nor did any reſource remain, but that of recalling Ageſilaus from his Aſiatic victories, that the fortune and valour of

[1] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 443. Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 507.

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this accompliſhed general might ſuſtain the falling ruins of his country. He received the fatal ſcytalé [2], intimating his recal, at the important criſis of his fortune. He had completed his preparations for marching into Upper Aſia, and his heart already beat with the ardour of promiſed conqueſt and glory [3].

He communicates his recal to the troops.

Having aſſembled the confederates, he communicated the revered order of the republic, with which he expreſſed his reſolution immediately to comply. The generous troops, having aſſociated their own honour with the renown of the general, teſtified their grief and their reluctance by tears and entreaties. But Ageſilaus remained firm in his purpoſe, to obey the command of Sparta, to ſet bounds to his triumphs in the Eaſt, and to turn the direction of his arms towards a leſs promiſing field, to which he was ſummoned by the danger of his country [4]. Before croſſing the Helleſpont, he detached four thouſand veteran ſoldiers, to ſtrengthen the Aſiatic garriſons; ſeveral of which he viſited in perſon, every where aſſuring his friends, that it was his moſt earneſt wiſh to rejoin them in Aſia, whenever the troubles of Greece ſhould permit his abſence.

2 See Vol. II. c. xii. p. 60.

3 Plutarch. in Ageſil. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 513.

4 Xenoph. Hellen. & Panegyr. Ageſil. & Plutarch. in Ageſil. beſtow ſeemingly immoderate praiſes on this reſolution; but it is to be conſidered, that in the tumultuary governments of Greece, it was not uncommon to behold a ſucceſsful general, proud of the zeal and ſtrength of his followers, ſet at defiance the feeble authority of his republic.

The

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The greater part of the army, and particularly the new levies of Ionians and Æolians, who had paſſed their apprenticeſhip in arms under his fortunate ſtandard, declared, with tears of affection, that they never would abandon their beloved general. Ageſilaus encouraged this diſpoſition, which was extremely favourable to his views; and leſt it might be nothing but a ſally of temporary enthuſiaſm, artfully ſecured its permanence, by propoſing the diſtribution of valuable rewards, in the Thracian Cherſoneſus, to ſuch officers as brought the beſt companies of foot or cavalry for the ſervice of his intended expedition. He was able to perform his promiſes with a generous magnificence; ſince, after defraying the neceſſary expences of the war, he carried from Aſia above a thouſand talents, or an hundred and ninety-three thouſand pounds ſterling [5].

Their deſire to follow him prudently encouraged by Ageſila

When the whole forces were aſſembled in the Cherſoneſus, they probably amounted to about ten thouſand men. Their neareſt rout into Greece lay through the ſame countries that had been traverſed near a century before by Xerxes; but the activity of Ageſilaus accompliſhed in a month what, to eaſtern effeminacy, had been the journey of a laborious year. In the long interval of time between theſe celebrated expeditions, the Barbarians of Thrace and Macedon, through whoſe countries it was neceſſary to march, ſeem not to have made

His return to Greece.

5 Xenoph. Hellen. & Panegyr. Ageſil. & Plutarch. in Ageſil. & Diodor. p. 441.

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much improvement in the arts of war or peace. They were ſtill undiſciplined and diſunited; and their deſultory arms were alike incapable of oppoſing the Spartan and the Perſian. Ageſilaus deſcended without reſiſtance into the plains of Theſſaly, where his progreſs was ſtopped for a moment by the numerous cavalry of that country, whoſe petty princes had acceded to the alliance formed againſt the ambition of Sparta. By a judicious diſpoſition of his forces, and by evolutions equally ſkilful and rapid, he ſpeedily ſurmounted this obſtacle. To the charge of the Theſſalian cavalry, he oppoſed the weight of his heavy-armed men, by whom the enemy were routed and put to flight. Then with his own horſemen, who would have proved an unequal match for the unbroken vigour of the Theſſalians, he purſued them with great ſlaughter, took many priſoners, and erected a trophy of his victory, between the mountains Prantes and Narthacium [6], which form the weſtern boundary of the extenſive plain of Coronæa.

He defeats the Theſſalian cavalry.

Inſtead of continuing his journey through the hoſtile country of Locris, whoſe weakneſs he diſdained to chaſtiſe, he marched through the friendly territories of Doris and Phocis, that he might turn the ſhock of the war againſt the daring and rebellious Thebans. He found them in arms with their powerful allies, rather provoked, than diſcouraged, by a bloody but undeciſive battle, which, ſoon after the diſaſter at Haliartus, had been

Invades Bœotia,

[6] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 517.

fought

fought againſt the Lacedæmonians at Epiecia, a ſmall town on the common frontier of Corinth and Sicyon. The confederate army was ſtill about twenty thouſand ſtrong; the forces of Ageſilaus fully equalled that number, as he had received conſiderable ſupplies from Sparta and Phocis; and as the ſecondary cities, particularly Orchomenus of Bœotia, and Epidaurus of Argolis, had joined his arms, prompted by their uſual envy and reſentment againſt their reſpective capitals. The hoſtile battalions approached; thoſe of Ageſilaus marching, in good order, from the banks of the Cephiſſus, while the Thebans impetuouſly deſcended from the mountains of Helicon. Before they arrived at the ſcene of action, in the Bœotian plain of Coronæa[7], a city thirty miles diſtant from Thebes, the ſuperſtition of both armies was alarmed by an eclipſe of the ſun, and the wiſdom of Ageſilaus was alarmed, far more juſtly, by moſt unexpected intelligence from the Eaſt[8].

Evagoras recovers his hereditary dominion in Cyprus.

Since his unfortunate partiality had intruſted the Lacedæmonian fleet to the obſtinacy and inexperience of his kinſman Piſander, the Perſian, or rather Phœnician, ſquadrons had been committed to the direction of a far more able commander. After the deciſive engagement at Ægos-Potamos, which was followed by the taking of Athens, and the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, Conon,

7 The places diſtinguiſhed by that name are deſcribed by Strabo, p. 407. 410, 411, and 434.

8 Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 518. Plut. in Ageſil.

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the Athenian admiral, eſcaped with a few gallies into the harbour of Salamis, the capital of the iſle of Cyprus. That city, and a conſiderable part of the iſland, was then ſubject to Evagoras, a man whom the voice of panegyric repreſents as governing, with conſummate wiſdom [9], a kingdom, which he had acquired by heroic valour. This admired prince boaſted a deſcent from Teucer, who, returning from the ſiege of Troy eight hundred years before the reign of Evagoras, had founded the firſt Grecian colony on the Cyprian ſhore. During that long ſpace of time, Salamis had undergone various revolutions. Evagoras was born and educated, under the reign of an uſurper, who fell by the dagger of an aſſaſſin, who in his turn aſſumed the crown. Evagoras fled to Cilicia, obtained the protection of the ſatrap of that province, returned to Salamis with a handful of men, ſurpriſed and dethroned the new tyrant, to whom he was not bound by any tie of allegiance.

His attachment to Athens, and friendſhip for Conon the Athenian.

From the moment that he began to reign, he diſcovered the moſt partial fondneſs for Athens, in whoſe language, arts, and inſtitutions, his youth had been liberally inſtructed; and which afterwards formed the ſtudy and delight of his manhood, the amuſement and conſolation of his declining age. But unfortunately for the ſenſibility and affectionate gratitude of Evagoras towards a country to which he owed his education and his happineſs, he

9 Iſocrates's panegyric of Evagoras may be entitled the picture of a great king; the character is only too perfect.

lived

lived at a period when, before the ſituation of his principality enabled him to afford any effectual aſſiſtance to Athens, he beheld that proud republic deprived of the ſplendour and dominion which ſhe had enjoyed above ſeventy years. He lamented her misfortunes with a filial tenderneſs, and received with the kindeſt hoſpitality her oppreſſed and afflicted citizens. The virtuous and enterpriſing Conon deſerved his affection and eſteem, and ſoon acquired the unlimited confidence of a mind congenial to his own. They acted with the happieſt concert for the ſecurity and aggrandiſement of the little kingdom, alluring new inhabitants from Greece, increaſing their arts and induſtry, extending navigation and commerce; and in a ſhort time, Salamis was able to fit out a conſiderable naval power, and to ſubdue and incorporate with her own ſubjects ſeveral of the neighbouring communities. The great king, who had long been conſidered as lord paramount of Cyprus, interfered not in the domeſtic concerns of the iſland, provided he received from thence his ſmall cuſtomary tribute. The flouriſhing ſtate of Evagoras's affairs might enable him to pay, and to exceed, the ſtipulated ſum; though it is probable that he early meditated, what he afterwards attempted to accompliſh, the deliverance of his country from this mark of bondage.

Evagoras and Conon determine to retrieve the fortune of

But a deſign which actually engaged him more deeply, and to which he was ſtrongly incited by the ardent ſolicitations of Conon, was the reſtoration of Athens (which he conſidered as his adoptive

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that republic.

tive country and parent) to that ſtate of glory and pre-eminence from which ſhe had miſerably fallen. The virtuous and patriotic friends (for as ſuch contemporaries deſcribe them) are repreſented as pilots and mariners watching the tides and currents, and catching every propitious gale that might facilitate the execution of this hazardous enterpriſe. The victories of Ageſilaus in the Eaſt, which threatened to ſhake the throne of Artaxerxes, furniſhed an opportunity too favourable to eſcape their vigilance. Conon had been already recommended to the great king by Evagoras; and the recommendation had been enforced by Pharnabazus, who knew and admired his merit. The experienced ſkill of the illuſtrious Athenian, and of his countrymen Hieronymus and Nicodemus, had aſſiſted in equipping the Barbarian ſquadrons in the Cilician and Phœnician harbours. But the abilities of Pharax, the Spartan admiral, and the cowardice or negligence of the Perſian commanders, hitherto rendered uſeleſs a fleet of near three hundred ſail, which was ill manned, and which often wanted money.

Conon entruſted with the command of the Perſian fleet.

The activity of Conon undertook to remedy theſe evils. He left Cilicia, travelled to Thapſacus, embarked in the Euphrates; and, as his veſſel was moved by the combined impulſe of winds, oars, and ſtream, he deſcended with rapidity along the winding channel to Babylon[10]. The only obſtacle to his intended conference with Artaxerxes

[10] Diodorus, l. xiv. p. 442.

was,

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was, his unwillingneſs to degrade the Athenian character by depreſſing the body, bending the knee, and paying the uſual marks of reſpectful ſubmiſſion, which were readily granted by Barbarians to the monarch of the Eaſt; but which the Greeks refuſed to man, and reſerved for the majeſty of the gods. This difficulty, however, was at length obviated by thoſe whoſe mutual intereſt ſtrongly ſolicited an interview. Conon repreſented to the trembling monarch, who was ſtill agitated by the terror of Ageſilaus's victories, the neceſſity of oppoſing the Spartans vigorouſly by ſea. Their fleet alone had acquired, and maintained, the command of the Aſiatic coaſt. A ſingle defeat at ſea would excite their allies to revolt, and drive their armies from Aſia. But to obtain this advantage, the great king muſt employ an admiral worthy to command, and men willing to obey. In looking for the firſt, the valour of Pharnabazus could not eſcape his notice. The ſecond might be purchaſed by money. And ſhould Artaxerxes entruſt him with the requiſite ſum, he pledged his life that he would ſoon collect ſuch a number of ſailors (chiefly from the Grecian coaſts and iſlands) as would enable him to defeat the fleet of Sparta, and to compel that republic to abandon her eaſtern conqueſts. The propoſal pleaſed Artaxerxes, the money was raiſed, and Conon returned to Cilicia to accompliſh his undertaking.

He defeats the Spartans, and takes

From various ſea-ports of Aſia, from the ſmaller Greek cities, the reluctant ſubjects of Sparta, from ſeveral maritime towns whoſe inhabitants were ready

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fifty gallies. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A.C. 394.

ready to ſerve any maſter for pay, but chiefly from the powerful iſlands of Rhodes and Cyprus; he ſoon collected a naval force exceeding his moſt ſanguine hopes; and which might have enabled him (independent of the Barbarian ſquadrons commanded by Pharnabazus) to contend on nearly equal terms with Piſander. With their combined ſtrength, Conon and Pharnabazus ſailed weſtward in queſt of the hoſtile fleet, perſuaded that the raſh confidence of the Spartan admiral would not decline battle with a ſuperior enemy. As the united armament doubled the northern point of Rhodes, they perceived the Lacedæmonian ſquadron, amounting to near an hundred gallies, in the capacious bay which is formed between the projections of the Dorian ſhore, and the ſmall iſlands called Sporades, from the careleſs irregularity with which they ſeem to have been ſcattered by the hand of nature [11]. The unexpected approach of ſuch a formidable fleet did not ſhake the ſullen obſtinacy of Piſander. He commanded (as it had been foreſeen) his men to prepare for battle. They bore up againſt the enemy, but on a nearer ſurvey were alarmed and terrified with the exceſſive diſproportion of numbers. The greater part turned their prows, and retired towards the friendly ſhore of Cnidus. Piſander advanced in the admiral galley, and died fighting bravely in defence of the

[11] Virgil expreſſes, in few words, the geography deſcribed in the text:

—— Et crebris legimus freta conſita terris.

Virg. Æneid. iii. v. 129.

Spartan

Spartan honour, vainly endeavouring to maintain, by the vigour of his arm, what had been betrayed by the weakneſs of his counſels. The victors purſued; and after deſtroying great numbers of the enemy, took and carried off fifty gallies; a capture ſufficient to decide the fate of any Grecian republic [12].

The battle of Coronæa, Olymp. xcvi. 3. A.C. 394.

It was the intelligence of this battle, of which he anticipated the conſequences, in the loſs of the Spartan dominions from Cnidus to Byzantium, that juſtly alarmed and afflicted the patriotic breaſt of Ageſilaus. He aſſembled the troops, honeſtly confeſſed the death of Piſander, but artfully declared, that, though the admiral was ſlain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himſelf and them to pay the uſual tribute of thanks and ſacrifices to the protecting gods. He then crowned himſelf with a chaplet of flowers, and ſet the example of performing this pious duty.

[12] Polybius ſeems to conſider the battle of Cnidus as the æra at which the Spartans loſt the command of the ſea, which they had acquired by their victory at Ægos-Potamos. He ſays, their dominion laſted twelve years. This number, however, is too large for the interval between thoſe battles, as appears from the text. Other writers ſay, that the Lacedæmonian *empire*, which the Greeks ſpeak of as ſynonymous with the command of the ſea, laſted thirty years, reckoning from the battle of Ægos-Potamos to the defeat at Leuctra. But this number again is too ſmall for the interval between thoſe events; a remarkable proof of the careleſſneſs of Greek writers in matters of chronology. See Iſocrat. de Pace, & Caſaub. ad Polyb. vol. iii, p. 97—99. edit. Gronov.

The

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The devout ſtratagem was attended with a very ſalutary effect; for in a ſkirmiſh between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the Eaſt, defeated and repelled the enemy. Meanwhile the main bodies of either army advanced into the plain of Coronæa, at firſt in awful ſilence; but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raiſed an univerſal ſhout, and ran furiouſly to the charge. Their impetuoſity bore down every thing before them; but the troops immediately commanded by Ageſilaus, repelled the left wing of the enemy, chiefly conſiſting of Argives and Athenians. Already thoſe who ſurrounded his perſon ſaluted him as conqueror, and adorned him with the crown of victory; when it was told, that the Thebans had broke and totally routed the Orchomenians, and were advancing to ſeize the baggage. Ageſilaus, by a rapid evolution, prepared to intercept them, in order to fruſtrate this deſign. The Thebans perceived this movement, wheeled about, and marched in an oppoſite direction, that they might join, and rally their allies, who fled towards the mountains of Helicon. In the rencounter which followed, Xenophon is diſpoſed to admire rather the valour, than the prudence, of the Spartan king. Inſtead of allowing the Thebans to paſs, that he might attack their rear and flanks, he boldly oppoſed their progreſs, and aſſailed their front. The ſhock was terrible; their ſhields meeting, claſhed;

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they fought, ſlew, and were ſlain. No voice was heard, yet none was ſilent; the field reſounded with the noiſe of rage and battle [13]; and this was the moſt deſperate and bloody ſcene of an action, itſelf the moſt deſperate and bloody of any in that age. At length, the firmneſs of the Thebans effected their long-attempted paſſage to Helicon; but could not encourage their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained maſters of the field, the ſight of which ſeems to have deeply affected a ſpectator whoſe mind was habituated to ſuch objects of horror. It was covered with ſteel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes heaped promiſcuouſly together, with transfixed bucklers and broken lances, ſome ſtrewed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others ſtill graſped by the cold and inſenſible hands of the combatants who had lately fought with ſuch impetuous ardour [14].

Ageſilaus himſelf had received ſeveral wounds from various kinds of weapons; yet did he reſtrain his reſentment in the moment of victory. When informed that about fourſcore of the enemy had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple of Minerva, he religiouſly reſpected the right of ſanctuary, or-

[13] Και χραυγη μεν ουδεμια παρην, ουδ' μεν ουδε σιγη· φωνη δε τις ην τοι αυτη, οιαν οργη τε και μαχη παραδοχοιτ' αν. Xenoph. Ageſilaus, c. xii. Such paſſages, inimitable in any other language, ſhew the ſuperiority of the Greek.

[14] Xenoph. Ageſil. c. xii.

dered

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dered his ſoldiers to abſtain from hurting them, and even appointed a body of horſe to conduct them to a place of ſecurity. The next day was employed by the victors in erecting a trophy on the ſcene of this important action; while the enemy acknowledged their defeat, by requeſting the bodies of the ſlain. Notwithſtanding his fatigue and wounds, Ageſilaus then travelled to Phocis, that he might dedicate the tenth of his Aſiatic ſpoil (amounting to above an hundred talents) in the temple of Delphian Apollo. Having returned towards the Peloponneſus, he diſbanded his eaſtern troops, moſt of whom were deſirous to reviſit their reſpective cities; his Peloponneſian, and even Lacedæmonian, forces inclined alſo to return home, that they might reap the fruits of harveſt [15]; and the general, probably to avoid a journey painful to his wounds, ſailed to Sparta, and joined in the celebration of the Hyacinthian feſtival.

The Corinthian war. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A.C. 394. Olymp. xcviii. 2. A.C. 387.

The ſea-fight off Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the moſt important and deciſive actions in the Bœotian or Corinthian war, which laſted eight years. The contending republics ſeem at once to have put forth their ſting; and afterwards to have retained their reſentment when they had loſt the power of gratifying it. Petty hoſtilities indeed were carried on by mutual inroads, and ravages in the ſpring and autumn; the Lacedæmonians iſſuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans

[15] The ſolar eclipſe, mentioned above in the text, fixes the battle of Coronæa to the fourteenth of Auguſt.

from

from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city had eagerly promoted the alliance againſt Sparta; but when their country was made the ſeat of war, they began to repent of this raſh meaſure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had moſt to fear, as they had moſt to loſe, talked of a ſeparate peace; and, as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to ſummon an aſſembly which might confirm this laudable reſolution. But the partiſans of Timolaus and Polyanthes, who, though the mercenaries of a Barbarian ſlave, were the patrons of Corinthian liberty, anticipated a deſign ſo unfavourable to their intereſts, by committing one of the moſt horrid maſſacres recorded in hiſtory. They choſe the Eucleian feſtival[16], a circumſtance which ſeemed to blacken the atrocity of a crime which nothing could aggravate. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themſelves in the market-place, or aſſembled at the dramatic entertainments. The aſſault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were aſſaſſinated in the circles of converſation, ſome in the public walks, moſt in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the prieſts at the altar: nor did thoſe monſters ceaſe from deſtroying, till they had cut off whomever they deemed moſt willing, or moſt able, to oppoſe their meaſures. The great body of the people, who

Maſſacre in Corinth.

[16] Xenophon, with the ſuperſtitious inſenſibility of his age, dwells on the enormous impiety of this choice.

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perceived that even the temples, and adored images of the gods (whoſe knees they graſped), afforded not any protection to the victims of this impious fury, prepared to fly from their country; when they were reſtrained, firſt, by the lamentable cries of their wives and children, and then by the declaration of the aſſaſſins, that they intended nothing farther than to deliver the city from traitors, the partiſans of Sparta and ſlavery. This abominable maſſacre infected Corinth with the plague of ſedition, which ſilently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the ſix following years. The Spartans and Argives aſſiſted their reſpective factions; Corinth was alternately ſubject to the one and the other, but always to a foreign power; and of the two Corinthian harbours, which were conſidered as an important part of the capital, the Lechæum was long garriſoned by the Spartans, while the Cenchreæ remained in poſſeſſion of the Argives.

The Spartans ſucceſsful by land, and the Athenians by ſea.

After the battles of Cnidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement by land or ſea; and it is worthy of obſervation, that the partial actions, which happened on either element, generally followed the bias of thoſe important victories. Succeſs for the moſt part attended the ſailors of Athens, and the ſoldiers of Sparta; though the naval exploits of Teleutias, the kinſman of Ageſilaus, who ſurpriſed the Piræus with twelve gallies, took many merchantmen, deſtroyed ſeveral ſhips of

of war, and ſcoured the coaſt of Attica, formed an exception extremely honourable to that commander; and the military advantages of Iphicrates the Athenian, though unimportant in their conſequences, announced thoſe great talents for war, which afterwards rendered him ſo illuſtrious. But, in general, Ageſilaus and the Spartans maintained their ſuperiority in the field, while Conon, Thraſybulus, and Chabrias, proved ſucceſsful againſt Thimbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy [17]. CHAP. XXVIII.

In the actual ſtate of Greece, the reſpective ſucceſſes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any ſolid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa, unleſs we account as ſuch the gratification of their revenge, in ravaging without reſiſtance the Argive and Bœotian territory; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived them in one day of the fruit of many laborious campaigns, ſince, with the aſſiſtance of a ſuperior naval force, and with the command of the Perſian treaſury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole weſtern coaſt of Leſſer Aſia. This enterpriſe muſt have been effected with uncommon rapidity, and, unleſs the Perſian fleet kept the ſea in the middle of winter (which is not at all probable), could only Conqueſts of Conon.

[17] Diodor. l. xiv. ad Olym. xcvi. 4. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. 5.

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employ about three months. The meaſures taken by the Spartans, either to preſerve or to recover their important poſſeſſions in the Eaſt, have ſcarcely deſerved the notice of hiſtory, if we except their reſiſtance at Abydus, a place leſs famous for this memorable defence (ſuch is the love of fiction, and the contempt of truth!) than for the fabulous amours of Hero and Leander. Dercyllidas had obtained the government of this ſtrong and populous town, as the reward of his military ſervices. Inſtead of imitating the puſillanimity of the neighbouring governors, many of whom, alarmed by the diſaſter at Cnidus, fled in precipitation from the places entruſted to their command, Dercyllidas aſſembled the Abydenians; aſſured them that one naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta [18], who, even before ſhe had attained the ſovereignty of the ſea, now unfortunately loſt, was able to reward her benefactors, and to puniſh her enemies. "The moment of adverſity furniſhed an occaſion to diſplay their inviolable attachment to the republic; and it would be glorious for them alone, of all the inhabitants of the Aſiatic coaſt, to brave the power of Perſia." Having confirmed the courage of the Abydenians, he ſailed to the town of Seſ-

Brave defence of Abydus.

[18] The remarkable expreſſion of Xenophon ſhews the importance of this defeat in the general eſtimation of the Abydenians, and of Dercyllidas himſelf, though he would fain diſſemble it. Ετι δε ουχ ὑτως εχον, ει τῃ ναυμαχια εκρατηθημεν, ὑδεν αρα ετι εσμεν. "The matter ſtands not thus, that becauſe we have been worſted in the ſea-fight, we are therefore nothing."

tos,

tos, acroſs the moſt frequented and narroweſt paſſage of the Helleſpont. Seſtos was the principal place of the Thracian Cherſoneſus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and ſafety to the uſeful labours of Dercyllidas [19]; and this claim of merit enabled him to ſecure their allegiance. The fidelity of theſe towns, amidſt the general defection of the coaſt of Europe and of Aſia, prevented the inconveniencies and hardſhips to which the expelled Spartans, who had been employed in the garriſons of thoſe parts, muſt have been otherwiſe expoſed; and delivered them from the neceſſity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponneſus through the territories of many hoſtile republics. The unfortunate governors and garriſons, who had fled, or who had been driven from the places of their reſpective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Seſtos and Abydus. Their numbers increaſed the ſecurity of thoſe cities, and enabled Dercyllidas, who excelled in the art of fortification, to put them in ſuch a poſture of defence as baffled the attempts of Conon and Pharnabazus.

But the ſucceſs of theſe commanders was ſtill ſufficiently complete; and the importance of their ſervices excited the warmeſt gratitude in the breaſt of Artaxerxes. The merit of the ſatrap was acknowledged ſoon afterwards, by his obtaining in marriage the daughter of the great king.

19 See above, p. 246.

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Conon rebuilds the walls and harbours of Athens. Olymp. xcvi. 4. A.C. 393.

The patriotic Conon neither deſired nor received any perſonal reward; but employed his favour with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the intereſt of which formed the honourable motive that had alone engaged, and that ſtill retained him, in the Perſian ſervice. He inflamed the reſentment which both Pharnabazus and his maſter had juſtly conceived againſt Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the ſpring, to ſend their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the Eaſt by the arms of Ageſilaus. But he inſtructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they muſt raiſe the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The diſburſement of a ſum of money, which would be ſcarcely felt by the treaſury of Perſia, might ſuffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens; a meaſure by which they would inflict the deepeſt wound on the power, as well as on the pride, of their ambitious enemy. The propoſal was heard with approbation; the expence was liberally ſupplied; the Perſian fleet ſet ſail, reduced the Cyclades and Cythera, ravaged the coaſt of Laconia, and, after performing in detached ſquadrons whatever ſeemed moſt uſeful for the Perſian ſervice, aſſembled in the long-deſerted harbours of the Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. There, the important taſk of reſtoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accompliſhed, with extraordinary diligence,

gence. The ready ſervice of the crews belonging to the numerous fleet, aſſiſted the induſtry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurement of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labour of both was ſeconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Bœotians and Argives; but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themſelves, who juſtly regarded their actual employment as the ſecond foundation of their once glorious capital.

Sparta, alarmed by that meaſure, ſolicits peace from Perſia. Olymp. xcvii. 2. A.C. 392.

The work was completed before the return of ſpring; and the mortifying intelligence, when brought to Sparta, affected the magiſtrates of that republic with the cruelleſt anxiety. They were ready to abandon for ever the proſpect of recovering their loſt dominion in the Eaſt; they were deſirous to obtain an accommodation with Artaxerxes on the moſt humiliating terms; they were willing to deprive themſelves of the only advantage yet in their power, to forego even the pleaſure of revenge, and to abſtain from ravaging the territories of their neighbours and enemies, provided only the great king and his ſatraps would grant them a condition, with which it was eaſy to comply, ſince it required nothing but that they ſhould ceaſe to laviſh their own money in raiſing the dangerous power of the Athenians. For effecting this purpoſe, they ſent ſucceſſive embaſſies to the court of Perſia, as well as to Teribazus, who had lately ſucceeded Tithrauſtes in the government of the ſouthern provinces. They induſtriouſly neglected Pharnabazus, from whom they could not reaſonably

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ably expect any favour, as the hoſtilities of Ageſilaus had peculiarly excited the reſentment of that warlike ſatrap.

Employ Antalcidas as their miniſter.

Among the miniſters employed by Sparta, in this negociation, was Antalcidas, a man whoſe prior hiſtory is little known. He appears to have had an intercourſe of hoſpitality with ſeveral noble Perſians[20]; it is not improbable that he had ſerved under the ſtandard of Cyrus, and perhaps continued in the Eaſt during the ſucceſſive expeditions of Thimbron, Dercyllidas, and Ageſilaus. If we except the artful and daring Lyſander, Sparta never employed a more proper agent to treat with the Barbarians. Antalcidas was bold, eloquent, ſubtile, complying, a maſter in all the arts of inſinuation and addreſs, and equally well qualified, by his abilities and vices, to execute an inſidious commiſſion at a corrupt court. The revered inſtitutions of his country were the objects of real or well-feigned contempt; he derided the frugal and ſelf-denying maxims of the divine Lycurgus; but peculiarly delighted the voluptuous, cowardly, and treacherous ſatraps and courtiers, when he directed the poiſoned ſhafts of his ridicule againſt the manly firmneſs, the probity, and the patriotiſm of Leonidas and Callicratidas, names equally glorious to Sparta and diſhonourable to Perſia.

His negociation facilitated by the un-

The ſucceſs of ſuch a miniſter, almoſt enſured by his own character and talents, was haſtened by the imprudent ambition of Conon and the Athe-

[20] Xenoph. Hellen.

nians,

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reasonable ambition of Conon and the Athenians.

nians, too ſoon and too fatally intoxicated by the deceitful gifts of proſperity. When this illuſtrious commander co-operated with Pharnabazus in expelling the Lacedæmonians from the Eaſt, he earneſtly exhorted the ſatrap to confirm the Aſiatic Greeks in the enjoyment of their ancient liberties, leſt the fear of oppreſſion might ſuggeſt the means of reſiſtance, and oblige them to form a general alliance for their own defence, which might prove favourable to Artaxerxes. In this plauſible advice the patriotic Athenian had a farther view than it was poſſible for the Perſian at that time to diſcover. After rebuilding the walls and harbours of Athens, he requeſted Pharnabazus, who prepared to return to his province, that he might be allowed, for a few months longer, to employ a ſquadron of Perſian ſhips, in conjunction with his own, to infeſt the territories of Sparta and her allies. The ſatrap, naturally unſuſpicious, and perhaps betrayed by his reſentment, readily granted this demand. But Conon, unmindful of his promiſed operations againſt the common enemy, thought only of promoting the intereſt of his republic. He ſailed to the Cyclades, to Chios, to Leſbos, and even to the coaſt of Eolis and Ionia, diſplayed the ſtrength of his armament, deſcribed the flouriſhing fortune of Athens, and endeavoured to perſuade or to compel the aſtoniſhed Aſiatics and iſlanders to acknowledge the juſt authority of their ancient metropolis or ſovereign, who having riſen more ſplendid from her ruins, required only the attachment of her former allies and ſubjects, to re-

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ſume her wonted power, and recover her hereditary renown.

Negociations of the adverſe ſtates with Perſia.

The ſucceſs of this extraordinary enterpriſe is not particularly deſcribed, nor is the omiſſion material, ſince this laſt expedition of Conon had not any other permanent effect but that of ruining himſelf. His unjuſtifiable ambition furniſhed powerful weapons to the dexterity of Antalcidas, who repreſented him as guilty of the moſt unexampled audacity, aggravated by the moſt perfidious ingratitude, in attempting to alienate and to conquer the king's dominions, even by the aſſiſtance of the king's forces, to which both his country and himſelf owed ſo many recent and ſignal benefits. The accuſation was probably rendered more welcome to Teribazus, by the jealouſy which he naturally entertained of the neighbouring ſatrap, the friend of Conon, and his own rival. But after the laſt unwarrantable tranſaction of the Athenian, which he could defend only by the obſolete Greek maxim, that every thing is lawful to a man in the ſervice of his country, even his late colleague Pharnabazus ſeems to have withdrawn from him the protection and friendſhip by which he had been ſo long diſtinguiſhed, ſo that the influence of that powerful ſatrap formed not any oppoſition to the negociations and intrigues of Antalcidas. The Athenians, however, ſent Dion, Hermogenes, with other emiſſaries, to watch and counteract his meaſures. Conon was named at the head of this deputation; and as he knew not the full extent of Teribazus's animoſity, inflamed and exaſ-

exaſperated by the addreſs of Antalcidas, he expected that the perſonal preſence of a man, who had formerly ſerved the Perſians with fidelity and ſucceſs, might obtain an eaſy pardon from the ſatrap, and perhaps prove uſeful to the affairs of Athens. The Bœotians and Argives likewiſe ſent their ambaſſadors, who had inſtructions to act in concert with Conon and his colleagues. But *their* overtures were little regarded, while thoſe of Antalcidas met with warm approbation from Teribazus.

The overtures of Sparta moſt acceptable to the Perſian miniſters.

The Lacedæmonian ambaſſador declared that he had been commanded to offer ſuch terms of peace as ſuited equally the dignity and the intereſt of the great king. "The Spartans reſigned all pretenſions to the Greek cities in Aſia, which they acknowledged to be dependencies of the Perſian empire. Why ſhould Artaxerxes, then, continue to laviſh his treaſure in vain? ſince the Spartans not only ceded to him the immediate object of diſpute, but earneſtly deſired to promote the future proſperity of his dominions, by ſettling the affairs of Greece, as beſt anſwered his conveniency. For this purpoſe they were ready to declare all the cities and iſlands, ſmall and great, totally independent of each other; in conſequence of which there would not be any republic ſufficiently powerful thenceforth to diſturb the tranquillity of Perſia." Theſe conditions, which the moſt inſolent miniſter of the great king might himſelf have dictated, were too advantageous not to be liable to ſuſpicion. But Teribazus was ſo blinded

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blinded by partiality for the Spartan miniſter, that he ſeems not to have entertained the ſmalleſt doubt of his ſincerity. The terms of peace were tranſmitted to the court of Suſa, that they might be approved and ratified by Artaxerxes. The ſubtlety of Antalcidas was rewarded by a conſiderable ſum of money; and the patriotiſm of Conon (a patriotiſm which had carried him beyond the bounds of juſtice and propriety) was puniſhed by immediate death [21], or by an ignominious confinement [22]. His fate is variouſly related; but his actions juſtly rank him with the firſt of Grecian names; and the fame of an illuſtrious father was ſupported and rivalled by that of his ſon Timotheus [23].

Death of Conon.

Obſtacles to the concluſion of the treaty of peace. Olymp. xcvii. 3. A.C. 390.

It might have been expected that a plan of accommodation, ſo advantageous and honourable for Perſia, ſhould have been readily accepted by Artaxerxes. But the negociation languiſhed for ſeveral years, partly on account of the temporary diſgrace of Teribazus, who was ſucceeded by Struthas; a man who, moved by ſome unknown motive, warmly eſpouſed the intereſt of the Athenians; and partly by the powerful ſolicitations and remonſtrances of the Bœotian and Argive ambaſſadors, who accuſed the ſincerity, and unveiled the latent ambition, of Sparta.

Military operations.

Meanwhile the war was carried on with unremitting activity. The Lacedæmonians and their

[21] Iſoc. Panegyr. [22] Xenoph. Gr. Hiſt. l. iv.
[23] Dinarch. adv. Demoſth. p. 94. & Corn. Nepos, in Vit. Conon. & Timoth.

allies

allies ſallied from their ſtrong garriſons in Sicyon and the Lechæum, to deſtroy the harveſts and the villages of their Peloponneſian enemies. The Bœotians and Argives retaliated theſe injuries by ſeveral hoſtile incurſions into the territories of Sparta; while the Athenians, as if they had again attained the command of the ſea, bent the whole vigour of their republic towards an element long propitious to their anceſtors. CHAP. XXVIII.

Conqueſts of Thraſybulus.

The recent ſplendour of Conon had eclipſed the ancient and well-merited renown of Thraſybulus, whoſe extraordinary abilities, and more extraordinary good fortune, had twice reſcued his country from the yoke of tyrants. But after the lamented death or captivity of the former, the Athenian fleet, amounting to forty ſail, was entruſted to Thraſybulus; who, having ſcoured the Ægean ſea, ſailed to the Helleſpont, and perſuaded or compelled the inhabitants of Byzantium, and ſeveral other Thracian cities, to aboliſh their ariſtocratic government, and to accept the alliance of Athens. His activity was next directed againſt the iſle of Leſbos, in which the Lacedæmonian intereſt was ſtill ſupported by a conſiderable body of troops. Having landed his men, he joined battle with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Methymna, and obtained a complete victory, after killing with his own hand Therimachus, the Spartan governor and general. The principal cities of the iſland acknowledged the Athenian power, and ſeaſonably reinforced the fleet, by the terror of which they had been ſubdued. Encouraged by this

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this ſucceſs, Thraſybulus ſailed towards Rhodes, in order to aſſiſt the democratic faction, who equally contended for the intereſt of Athens and their own.

He is ſurpriſed and ſlain.

Before proceeding, however, to that important iſland, he determined to multiply the reſources, and to confirm the affections, of the fleet. For this purpoſe he raiſed conſiderable ſupplies of whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for his expedition from the maritime towns of Aſia, and at length entered the mouth of the Eurymedon (the glorious ſcene of Cimon's victories), and levied a heavy contribution on Aſpendus, the principal ſea-port and capital of Pamphylia. But here his good fortune ended [24]. The patient timidity of the Barbarians had endured the public depredation, to which they were long accuſtomed; but even *their* ſervility could not brook the private rapacity and intolerable exactions of the ſailors and troops, which were imputed (not perhaps without reaſon) to the unrelenting avarice of the commander. The reſentment of the Pamphylians overcame their cowardice. They attacked the Grecian tents in the night, and ſurpriſed the ſecurity of Thraſybulus, who thus fell a ſacrifice to a very unjuſtifiable defect, which, if we may believe a contemporary writer, greatly debaſed the dignity of his otherwiſe illuſtrious character [25].

The

24 Corn. Nep. in Vit. Thraſybul.

25 Lyſias againſt Ergocles. This Ergocles was the friend and confidant of Thraſybulus. He had aſſiſted him in expelling the thirty

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Activity of Antalcidas at the Perſian court. Olymp. xcvii. 4. A.C. 389.

The unjuſt treatment of Aſpendus, which had been retorted by ſuch ſignal revenge, would never perhaps have reached the ears of Artaxerxes, had not his voluptuous indolence been beſet by the active importunity of Antalcidas. This vigilant and artful miniſter let ſlip no opportunity to rouſe the jealouſy of the great king againſt the Athenians, his hereditary foes, and to obliterate his reſentment againſt the Spartans, his recent but leſs natural enemies. The ſevere exactions from Pamphylia, a province acknowledging his authority, afforded a powerful topic of perſuaſion, which the Spartan ambaſſador could not fail to employ; but it is uncertain whether even this important argument would have conquered the reluctance of the Perſian monarch to concur with the meaſures of a people, who had enabled the rebellious Cyrus to diſpute his throne, and who had recently invaded and plundered, not a maritime city, but the interior provinces of the empire. His intereſt and inclination were combated by his reſentment and his pride; when his fluctuating irreſolution was at length decided by the Athenians, whoſe mad imprudence crowned the triumph of Antalcidas.

thirty tyrants, and had recently accompanied him in his expedition to the coaſt of Thrace, mentioned in the text. The military exploits of Thraſybulus in Thrace were highly honourable and meritorious; but his private behaviour was the reverſe. He ſtuck at nothing by which he could enrich himſelf or his dependants. 'Ergocles was condemned to death for the ſhare which he had taken in this unjuſtifiable peculation and rapacity. Lyſias's Orations againſt Ergocles and Philocrates. See likewiſe Ariſtophanes Eccleſiaz. v. 356. & Schol. ad locum.

The

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Revolt of Cyprus abetted by the Athenians.

The ſignal victories of Conon and Thraſybulus, and the riſing fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king of Salamis, who had received ſome late cauſe of diſguſt, to execute his long-meditated deſign of revolting from Perſia. Egypt was actually in rebellion; Artaxerxes had undertaken a war againſt the barbarous Carduchians [26], who were by no means a contemptible enemy. Theſe were very favourable circumſtances; but the Perſian fleet, which, after performing the ſervice for which it had been equipped, had continued to lie inactive in the Phœnician and Cilician harbours, was ready to be employed in any new enterpriſe. The ſkilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, ſeconded by the youthful ardour of his ſon Protagoras, obtained an eaſy victory over the firſt ſquadrons that were ſent to invade his iſland. But there was reaſon to dread the arrival of a far ſuperior force. In this danger, Evagoras requeſted, and obtained, the aſſiſtance of the Athenians; who not only enjoyed peace with Perſia, but whoſe ambaſſadors were endeavouring to prevent that court from making peace with their enemies.

The great king dictates the terms of a general peace. Olymp. xcviii. 1. A.C. 388.

This extraordinary meaſure of a people, in preferring their gratitude to their intereſt; a gratitude which they might have foreſeen to be uſeleſs to him whom they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the moſt important intereſts of their republic, finally determined Artaxerxes to eſpouſe

[26] Theſe and the following circumſtances concerning the war of Cyprus are ſcattered through Diodorus, Iſocrates's Panegyric of Athens, and the panegyric of Evagoras.

the

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the cauſe of the Spartans; and to dictate the terms of a general peace, almoſt in the ſame words which had been propoſed by Antalcidas: "That the Greek cities in Aſia, with the iſland of Cyprus, and the peninſula of Clazomené, ſhould be ſubject to Perſia; Athens ſhould be allowed to retain her immemorial juriſdiction in the iſles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; but all the other republics, ſmall and great, ſhould enjoy the independent government of their own hereditary laws. Whatever people rejected theſe conditions, ſo evidently calculated for preſerving the public tranquillity, muſt expect the utmoſt indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, would make war, on their perverſe and dangerous obſtinacy, by ſea and land, with ſhips and money [27]."

Which the Grecian ſtates are compelled to accept. Olymp. xcviii. 2. A.C. 387.

Teribazus and Antalcidas returned from the Eaſt, charged with the definitive reſolutions, or rather the haughty mandate of Artaxerxes, which had been confirmed by the unalterable ſanction of the royal ſignet. There was reaſon, however, to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, and Argos, might ſtill reject the terms of a peace propoſed by their avowed enemies, pernicious to their particular and immediate intereſts, and equally diſadvantageous and diſhonourable to the whole Grecian name. The remembrance of the glorious confederacy, for defending the Aſiatic colonies againſt the op-

[27] The laſt words are literally tranſlated from Xenoph. p. 550. See likewiſe Diodor. l. xiv. c. cx. Plut. Ageſil. p. 608.; and Artaxerx. p. 1022.

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preſſion of Barbarians, could not indeed much influence the degenerate councils of thoſe republics; but the Thebans muſt reſign, with reluctance, their real or pretended authority over the inferior cities of Bœotia; the Argives muſt unwillingly withdraw their garriſon from Corinth, and leave that important capital in the power of the ariſtocratic or Lacedæmonian faction; and the Athenians muſt abandon, with regret, the fruits of their recent victories, and the hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The oppoſition of theſe ſtates had been foreſeen by Antalcidas, who took the moſt effectual meaſures to render it impotent. By the aſſiſtance of Perſian money he equipped a fleet of eighty ſail, from the mercenary ſea-ports of Greece and Aſia, from the intermediate iſles, and even from the coaſts of Italy and Sicily. This armament was independent of the ſquadrons with which Teribazus prepared to attack the iſle of Cyprus, if the preſumption of Evagoras, unaſſiſted and alone, ſhould dare to provoke his hoſtility. The ſatrap alſo had collected a very conſiderable army, which was ready to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with Ageſilaus, who had aſſembled the domeſtic troops and allies of Sparta to march, at the firſt ſummons, againſt any city or republic that might reject the peace of Antalcidas[28]. Theſe vigorous preparations, intimidating the weakneſs of the confederates, compelled them into a reluctant compliance with the terms of the treaty. The

[28] Τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδᾳ εἰρήνης καλουμένης. Xenoph. p. 277.

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Thebans made the ſtrongeſt and moſt obſtinate reſiſtance; but their pretenſions were finally ſilenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the inveterate enemy of their republic. The Bœotian cities were acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as parties in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, which being deſerted by the leaders of the democratical faction, became a faithful ally to Sparta. The military and naval operations ceaſed, tranquillity was reſtored, and the armies and fleets were, on both ſides, diſbanded and diſſolved[29].

Evagoras alone rejects the authority of Perſia.

But amidſt this univerſal and moſt obſequious ſubmiſſion to the court of Perſia, one man avowed his diſcontent, and prepared to maintain his oppoſition. The article reſpecting Cyprus was loudly rejected by Evagoras, who aſſerted the independence of his native iſland; and, with a magnanimity that formed a ſtriking contraſt with the degenerate and diſgraceful ſoftneſs of his Grecian allies, ſet the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. Evagoras truſted to the reſources of his own vigorous mind, to the ſuperior ſkill of his ſeamen, and to the aſſiſtance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous ſquadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. He was diſcomfited in a naval engagement; his territories were invaded and ravaged; he was reduced to his capital Salamis; and even Salamis was threatened with a ſiege. His reſiſtance had already exceeded what his ſtrength warranted, or what his dignity required. His ene-

[29] Διαλυθη μεν τα πεζικα, &c. Xenoph. p. 551.

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Submits to an honourable compromiſe. Olymp. xcviii. 4. A.C. 385.

mies were incapable of perſeverance, or unwilling to drive him to deſpair. He reſigned his numerous and recent conqueſts in Cyprus, but retained poſſeſſion of the ancient principality of Teucer, which his fortunate arms had recovered from an uſurper; and ſubmitted, without diſhonour, to imitate the example of many preceding princes of Salamis, and to acknowledge himſelf the tributary of the king of Perſia [30].

[30] Diodor. l. xv. p. 462.

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Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas.—Ambitious Views of Sparta.—State of Arcadia.—Siege of Mantinæa.—Olynthian Confederacy.—The Spartans make War on Olynthus.—Submiſſion of that Republic.—Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon.—Phœbidas ſeizes the Theban Citadel.—The Meaſure approved by Ageſilaus.—Conſpiracy of the Theban Exiles.—The Theban Democracy reſtored.

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Reflections on the peace of Antalcidas.

THE peace of Antalcidas forms an important and diſgraceful æra in the Grecian hiſtory. The valuable colonies in Aſia, the cauſe, the object, and the ſcene, of ſo many memorable wars, were reſigned and abandoned for ever to the power of a Barbarian maſter. The king of Perſia diſmembered the diſtant dependencies, and controuled the domeſtic arrangements of a people who had given law to his anceſtors[1]. Their ancient confederacies were diſſolved; the ſmaller cities were looſened from dependence on their powerful neighbours; all were diſunited and weakened;

[1] See the articles of the treaty concluded in 449, A. C. Vol. II. c. xii. p. 80.

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and Greece felt the languor of peace, without enjoying the benefits of ſecurity.

But if the whole Grecian name was diſhonoured by accepting this ignominious treaty, what peculiar infamy muſt belong to the magiſtrates of Sparta, by whom it was propoſed and promoted? What motives of advantage could balance this weight of diſgrace? Or rather, what advantage could the Spartans derive from ſuch ignoble condeſcenſion as ſeemed totally unworthy of their actual power, but far more unworthy of their ancient renown? This queſtion, like moſt political queſtions, may be beſt anſwered by facts; and the tranſactions which both preceded and followed the peace of Antalcidas clearly diſcover and aſcertain the ſecret, but powerful, cauſes of that diſhonourable, and ſeemingly diſadvantageous, meaſure.

Motives which engaged the Spartans eagerly to embrace that treaty.

The ambition of making conqueſts in the Eaſt, which it now appeared impoſſible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion, in Greece, acquired by the ſucceſs of the Peloponneſian war, and which they might have reaſonably expected to preſerve and to confirm. Not only their power, but their ſafety, was threatened by the arms of a hoſtile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Perſia. Athens, their rival, their ſuperior, their ſubject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aſpired to command the ſea. Thebes and Argos had become ſenſible of their natural ſtrength, and diſdained

dained to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the ſtandard, of any foreign republic. The inferior ſtates of Peloponneſus were weary of obeying every idle ſummons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan maſters. The valuable colonies in Macedon and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodleſs conqueſts of the virtuous Braſidas, had forſaken the intereſt of Sparta, when Sparta forſook the intereſt of juſtice. Scarcely any veſtige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-ſeven years. The Eaſtern provinces (incomparably the moſt important of all) were irrecoverably loſt; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the courſe of ten years, and had been chiefly occaſioned by the fatal ſplendour of Ageſilaus's victories in Aſia.

Advantages which they derived from it.

About a century before, and almoſt on the ſame ſcene, the Spartans had been firſt deprived of their hereditary fame, and preſcriptive honours [2]. Almoſt every interference, in peace or war, with the Ionian colonies, had hurt the intereſts of their republic. They naturally began to ſuſpect, therefore, that ſuch diſtant expeditions ſuited not the circumſtances of Sparta, an inland city, with a fertile territory, but deſtitute of arts, induſtry, and commerce; and whoſe inhabitants, having little genius for the ſea, were naturally unable to equip, or to maintain, ſuch a naval force as might

[2] See above, Vol. II. p. 58.

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command the obedience of an extenſive coaſt, attached by powerful ties to their Athenian rivals. The abandoning, therefore, of what they could not hope to regain, or, if regained, to preſerve, ſeemed a very prudent and ſalutary meaſure; ſince, in return for this imaginary conceſſion, they received many real and important advantages. They were appointed to ſuperintend and to direct the execution of the treaty; and in order to make their authority effectual, entitled to demand the aſſiſtance of Perſian money, with which they might eaſily purchaſe Grecian ſoldiers. The condition requiring the ſmaller cities to be declared free and independent (although the dexterity of Antalcidas had propoſed it as the beſt means of preventing the future invaſion of Aſia), was peculiarly beneficial to the Spartans. It repreſented them as the patrons of univerſal liberty, and reſtored them that honourable reputation which they had long loſt. From the nature of the condition itſelf, it could only apply to ſuch places as, being kept in a reluctant ſubjection, ſtill poſſeſſed courage to vindicate their freedom. In the ſecondary towns of Meſſenia and Laconia, the ſtern policy of Sparta had cruſhed the hope, and almoſt the deſire, of obtaining this ineſtimable benefit. The authority of other capitals was leſs imperious and impoſing; the ſovereign and ſubject were more on a footing of equality; and it was a maxim in Greece, "That men are diſpoſed to reject the juſt rights of their equals, rather than to revolt againſt the unlawful tyranny

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tyranny of their maſters[3]. But Sparta expected not only to detach the inferior communities from their more powerful neighbours, but to add them to the confederacy of which ſhe formed the head; and by ſuch multiplied acceſſions of power, of wealth, and of fame, to re-eſtabliſh that ſolid power in Greece, which had been imprudently abandoned for the hope of Aſiatic triumphs[4].

Their ambitious deſigns immediately after that event.

That ſuch conſiderations of intereſt and ambition, not a ſincere deſire to promote the public tranquillity, had produced this perfidious treaty, could not long be kept ſecret; notwithſtanding the various artifices employed to conceal it. Thebes and Argos were required to comply with the terms of the peace; but no mention was made of withdrawing the Lacedæmonian garriſons from the places which they occupied. Leſt this injuſtice might occaſion general diſcontent, the Athenians were allowed the ſame privilege. The poſſeſſion of the unimportant iſles of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros, flattered their vain hopes, and lulled them into falſe ſecurity; and, as they expected to reap the fruits of the victories of Conon and Thraſybulus, they were averſe to renew the war for the ſake of their allies, whoſe intereſts were now ſeparated from their own. Meanwhile the Spartan emiſſaries negociated and intrigued in all the ſubordinate cities, encouraging the ariſtocratical fac-

3 Thucydid. paſſim. See particularly the ſpeech of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, Vol. II. c. xv. p. 203.

4 Vid. Iſocrat. de Pace, paſſim.

tions,

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tions, and fomenting the animoſities of the citizens againſt each other, and againſt their reſpective capitals. The jealouſies and complaints, which had been principally occaſioned by theſe ſecret cabals, were uſually referred to the Spartan ſenate; whoſe affected moderation, under pretence of defending the cauſe of the weak and the injured, always decided the conteſt in the way moſt favourable for themſelves. But the warlike diſciples of Lycurgus could not long remain ſatisfied with theſe juridical uſurpations. They determined to take arms, which they probably hoped to employ with ſuch artful dexterity as might prevent any general, or very dangerous, alarm; beginning with ſuch cities as had not entered into the late confederacy againſt them, gradually extending their hoſtilities to the more powerful members of that confederacy; and thus conquering ſucceſſively thoſe, whoſe entire and collective ſtrength it would have been vain to aſſail [5].

State of Arcadia. Olymp. xcviii. 3. A.C. 386.

The firſt victim of this ambitious policy was the flouriſhing republic of Mantinæa, whoſe territory was ſituate almoſt in the center of Arcadia, itſelf the center of the Peloponneſus. The origin of Mantinæa was the ſame with that of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heræa, Orchomenos, and other neighbouring cities, which had grown into populouſneſs and power from the ſcattered villages of ſhepherds inhabiting the vallies and mountains of

5 Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. p. 551. & Diodor. l. xv. p. 448.

Arcadia.

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Arcadia. The exuberant fertility, the inland ſituation, the generous warmth, yet lively verdure [6], together with the picturesque and animating ſcenery of this delightful region, ſeemed peculiarly adapted to inſpire, and to gratify, the love of rural happineſs; and to afford, in all their elegance and dignity, *thoſe ſublime and ſacred joys of the country*, which the genius of ancient poets hath felt, and deſcribed with ſuch affecting ſenſibility. Every diſtrict of Arcadia was marked and diverſified by hills, ſome of which, could we credit the inaccuracy of geographical deſcription, aſcend two miles in perpendicular height [7], and which ſupply innumerable ſtreams, that water and fertiliſe the rich vallies which they incloſe and defend. This ſecure and inſulated poſition of their territory long preſerved the Arcadians ignorant and uncorrupted; and a little before the period of hiſtory now under review, they were diſtinguiſhed by the innocent ſimplicity of their manners, and by their fond attachment to a paſtoral life. But the turbulent ambition of their neighbours had often obliged them to employ the ſword inſtead of the ſheep-hook. They had *reluctantly* taken arms; yet, when compelled by neceſſity, or excited by honour, the mountaineers of Arcadia had diſplayed ſuch ſtubborn valour, and exerted ſuch efforts of vigour and activity, as made their ſervices eagerly deſired,

[6] Theſe circumſtances are common to Arcadia with the other mountainous diſtricts of Greece, as well as with the iſlands of the Archipelago. TOURNEFORT.

[7] Deſcript. Græc. apud Gronov. vol. I.

and

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and purchaſed with emulation, by the ſurrounding ſtates. Nor had they truſted to their perſonal ſtrength and bravery alone for the defence of their beloved poſſeſſions. Having quitted their farms and villages, they had aſſembled into walled towns, from which their numerous garriſons were ready to ſally forth againſt an hoſtile invader. The dangerous vicinity of Sparta had early driven the companions of Pan and the Nymphs from the vocal woods of mount Mænalus [8], into the fortifications of Tegea, formerly the principal city of the province [9], but afterwards rivalled and ſurpaſſed by Mantinæa, which was become an object of jealouſy and envy, not only to the neighbouring cities of Arcadia, but even to Sparta herſelf.

The proud meſſage of the Spartans to the Mantinæans. Olymp. xcviii. 3. A.C. 386.

In the year immediately following the treaty of Antalcidas, Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors were ſent to Mantinæa, to diſcharge a very extraordinary commiſſion. Having demanded an audience of the aſſembly, they expreſſed the reſentment of their republic againſt a people, who, pretending to live in friendſhip with them, had in the late war repeatedly furniſhed with corn their avowed enemies the Argives. That, on other occaſions, the Mantinæans had unguardedly diſcovered their ſecret hatred to Sparta, rejoicing in her misfortunes, and envying her proſperity. That it was time to anticipate this dangerous and unjuſt animoſity; for

[8] Mænalus argutumque nemus pinoſque loquentes
Semper habet; ſemper paſtorum ille audit amores
Panaque, &c. VIRG. Ecl. viii. v. 22.

[9] Herodot. l. vi. c. 105.

which

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which purpoſe the Spartans commanded them to demoliſh their walls, to abandon their proud city, and to return to thoſe peaceful villages in which their anceſtors had lived and flouriſhed[10]. The Mantinæans received this propoſal with the indignation which it merited; the ambaſſadors retired in diſguſt; the Spartans declared war; ſummoned the aſſiſtance of their confederates; and a powerful army, commanded by king Ageſipolis, invaded the hoſtile territory.

Mantinæa beſieged.

But the moſt deſtructive ravages could not bend the reſolution of the Mantinæans. The ſtrength and loftineſs of their walls bade defiance to aſſault; nor could a regular ſiege be undertaken with certain ſucceſs, as the magazines of Mantinæa were abundantly ſtored with various kinds of grain, the crops of the former year having been uncommonly plentiful. Ageſipolis, however, embraced this doubtful mode of attack, and drew firſt a ditch, and then a wall, entirely round the place, employing one part of his troops in the work, and another in guarding the workmen. This tedious ſervice exhauſted the patience of the beſiegers, without ſhaking the firmneſs of the Mantinæans. The Spartans were afraid to detain longer in the field their reluctant confederates; but Ageſipolis propoſed a new meaſure, which was attended with complete and immediate ſucceſs. The river Ophis, formed by the collected torrents from

[10] Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. 2, & ſeqq. Diodor. l. xv. c. 7, & ſeqq.

mount

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mount Anchiſius, a river broad, deep, and rapid, flowed through the plain, and the city of Mantinæa. It was a laborious undertaking to ſtop the courſe of this copious ſtream; which was no ſooner effected, than the lower parts of the walls of Mantinæa were laid under water. According to the uſual practice of the Greeks, the fortifications of this place were built of raw bricks, which being leſs liable to break into chinks, and to fly out of their courſes, were preferred as the beſt defence againſt the battering engines then in uſe. But it is the inconvenience of raw bricks, to be as eaſily diſſolved by water, as wax is melted by the ſun [11]. The walls of Mantinæa began to yield, to ſhake, to fall in pieces. The activity of the inhabitants propped them with wood, but without any permanent advantage; ſo that, deſpairing of being able to exclude the enemy, they ſent to capitulate, requeſting that they might be permitted to keep poſſeſſion of their city, on condition that they demoliſhed their fortifications, and followed, in peace and war, the fortune of Sparta.

The town capitulates.

Hard conditions to which the inhabitants are compelled to ſubmit. Olymp. xcviii. 4. A.C. 385.

Ageſipolis and his counſellors refuſed to grant them any other terms of peace than thoſe which had been originally propoſed by the republic. He obſerved, that while they lived together in one populous city, their numbers expoſed them to the deluſions of ſeditious demagogues, whoſe addreſs

[11] This is the expreſſion of Pauſanias, in Arcad. who mentions the name of the river Ophis, omitted by Xenophon and Diodorus.

and

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and eloquence eaſily ſeduced the multitude from their real intereſt, and deſtroyed the influence of their ſuperiors in rank, in wealth, and in wiſdom, on whoſe attachment alone the Lacedæmonians could ſafely depend. They inſiſted, therefore, that the Mantinæans ſhould deſtroy their houſes in the city; ſeparate into four diſtinct communities [12]; and return to thoſe villages which their anceſtors had inhabited. The terror of an immediate aſſault made it neceſſary to comply with this humiliating demand; but the moſt zealous partiſans of democracy, to the number of ſixty, afraid of truſting to the capitulation, were *allowed* to fly from their country; which is mentioned as an inſtance of moderation [13] in the Lacedæmonian ſoldiers, who might have put them to death as they paſſed through the gates.

The Spartans regulate, with a ſtrong hand, the affairs of Phlius. Olymp. xcix. 1. A.C. 384.

This tranſaction was ſcarcely finiſhed, when the Spartan magiſtrates ſeized an opportunity of the domeſtic diſcontents among the Phliaſians, to diſplay the ſame tyrannical ſpirit, but with ſtill greater exertions of ſeverity. The little republic of Phlius, like every ſtate of Greece in thoſe unfortunate, at leaſt turbulent times, was diſtracted by factions. The prevailing party baniſhed their opponents, the friends of Sparta and ariſtocracy. They were allowed to return from exile, in conſequence of the commands and threats of Ageſi-

[12] Xenophon ſays four, Diodorus five.

[13] Or rather of good diſcipline; *πειθαρχια*. The nobles of the Mantinæans, *οι βελτιστοι των Μαντινεων*, were not ſo temperate; vide Xenoph. p. 552.

laus;

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laus [14]; but met not with that reſpectful treatment which ſeemed due to perſons who enjoyed ſuch powerful protection. They complained, and Ageſilaus again interfered, by appointing commiſſioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious Phliaſians; an odious office, which muſt have been executed with unexampled rigour, ſince the city of Phlius, which had hitherto been divided by a variety of intereſts, thenceforward continued invariably the ſtedfaſt ally of Sparta [15].

Embaſſy of Acanthus and Apollonia to Sparta.

Meanwhile ambaſſadors arrived from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities of the Chalcidicé, requeſting the Lacedæmonian aſſiſtance againſt the dangerous ambition of Olynthus. This city, of which we had occaſion to mention the foundation towards the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, was ſituate nine miles from the ſea, in a fertile and ſecure diſtrict, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the lake Bolyca, a name improperly beſtowed on the inmoſt receſs of the Toronaic gulph. The vexatious government of Athens firſt drove the maritime communities of the Chalcidic region within the walls of Olynthus; the oppreſſive tyranny of Sparta obliged them to ſtrengthen thoſe walls, as well as to provide ſufficient garriſons to defend them; and the ſubſequent misfortunes of theſe domineering republics, together with the weakneſs of Macedon, encouraged and enabled the inhabitants of Olyn-

[14] Xenoph. in Ageſil. & Hellen. l. v. p. 553.
[15] Ibid. l. vii. p. 624.

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thus ſucceſsfully to employ, in offenſive war, the forces which had been raiſed with no other view than to maintain their own independence. The towns which they ſubdued were either incorporated or aſſociated with their own; and Olynthus became the head of a confederacy, whoſe extent, power, reſources, and hopes, occaſioned juſt alarm among the neighbouring communities of Greeks and Barbarians. They had already conquered the ſouthern ſhores of Macedon, which comprehended the delightful regions of Chalcis and Pierea, indented by two great and two ſmaller bays, and affording, in the higheſt perfection, the united benefits of agriculture, paſturage, and commerce. They aſpired at acquiring the valuable diſtrict of mount Pangæus, whoſe timber and mines alike tempted their ambition and avarice; and Olynthus being favourably ſituate in the centre of the Chalcidicé, itſelf the centre of the Macedonian and Thracian coaſts, might have preſerved and extended her dominion, if the ambaſſadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not completely effected the object of their commiſſion at Sparta. They applied to the Ephori, who introduced them to the greater aſſembly, conſiſting, not only of the Spartans and Lacedæmonians, but of the deputies ſent by their confederates. Cleigenes, the Acanthian, ſpoke in the name of his colleagues: "We apprehend, O Lacedæmonians, and allies! that amidſt the multiplied objects of your care and correction, you have overlooked a great and growing diſorder

They petition the aſſiſtance of that republic againſt the Olynthian confederacy.

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diſorder which threatens, like a peſtilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increaſed with their power. By the voluntary ſubmiſſion of the ſmaller cities in their neighbourhood, they have been enabled to ſubdue the more powerful. Emboldened by this acceſſion of ſtrength, they have wreſted from the king of Macedon his moſt valuable provinces. They actually poſſeſs Pella, the greateſt city in that kingdom; and the unfortunate Amyntas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, which he is unable to defend. There is not any community in Thrace capable to ſtop their progreſs. The independent tribes of that warlike but divided country, reſpect the authority, and court the friendſhip of the Olynthians, who will doubtleſs be tempted to extend their dominion on that ſide, in order to augment the great revenues which they derive from their commercial cities and harbours, by the inexhauſtible mines in mount Pangæus. If this extenſive plan ſhould be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring a deciſive ſuperiority by ſea and land? and ſhould they enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (a meaſure actually in contemplation), what will become, we ſay not, of the hereditary pre-eminence of Sparta, but of its independence and ſafety? The preſent emergency, therefore, ſolicits, by every motive of intereſt and of honour, the activity and valour of your republic. By yielding a ſeaſonable aſſiſtance to Acanthus and Apollonia,

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Apollonia, which, unmoved by the puſillanimous example of their neighbours, have hitherto ſpurned the yoke, and defied the threats of Olynthus, you will ſave from oppreſſion two peaceful communities, and check the ambition of an uſurping tyrant. The reluctant ſubjects of the Olynthians will court your protection; and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged to revolt, eſpecially as they are not yet inſeparably linked with the capital by the ties of intermarriage and conſanguinity, and by the interchange of rights and poſſeſſions[16]. When ſuch a connection ſhall take place (for the Olynthians have made a law to encourage it), you will be unable to break the force of this powerful and dangerous confederacy."

The ſpeech of Cleigenes, and the ambitious views of the republic to which it was addreſſed, afford reaſon to conjecture that the ambaſſadors neither aſked any thing in favour of their own communities, nor urged any accuſation againſt Olynthus, which had not been previouſly ſuggeſted by the Spartan emiſſaries in Macedon. The reception given to the propoſal of Cleigenes tends to confirm this concluſion. The Lacedæmonians, with affected impartiality and indifference, deſired the opinion of their allies, before declaring their own. But there was not any occaſion to declare what none could be ſo blind as to miſtake. The confederates with one conſent, but eſpecially thoſe

The Spartans readily liſten to a requeſt probably ſuggeſted by themſelves. Olymp. xcix. 2. A.C. 383.

[16] Επιγαμιαις και εγκτησεσι παραλλαξαι. Xenoph. p. 555.

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Their preparations for the Olynthian war.

who wiſhed to ingratiate themſelves with Sparta [17], determined to undertake the expedition againſt Olynthus. The Spartans commended their reſolution, and proceeded to deliberate concerning the ſtrength of the army to be raiſed, the mode of levying it, and the time for taking the field. It was reſolved, that the whole forces ſhould amount to ten thouſand effective men; and a liſt was prepared, containing the reſpective contingents to be furniſhed by the ſeveral cities. If any ſtate ſhould be unable to ſupply the full complement of ſoldiers, money would be taken in their ſtead, at the rate of half a drachm a day (or three-pence halfpenny) for each man; but if neither the troops nor the money was ſent in due time, the Lacedæmonians would puniſh the diſobedience of the obſtinate or neglectful, by fining them eight times the ſum which they had been originally required to contribute.

The ambaſſadors then roſe up, and Cleigenes, again ſpeaking for the reſt, declared that theſe were indeed noble and generous reſolutions; but, unfortunately, could not be executed with ſuch promptitude as ſuited the urgency of the preſent criſis. The dangerous ſituation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate aſſiſtance. He propoſed, therefore, that thoſe troops which were ready, ſhould inſtantly take the field; and inſiſted

[17] Και μαλιστα οι βουλομενοι χαριζεσθαι τοις Λακεδαιμονιοις. Xenoph. p. 555.

on

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on this meaſure as a matter of the utmoſt importance to the future ſucceſs of the war.

First Campaign against Olynthus. Olymp. xcix. 2. A.C. 383.

The Lacedæmonians acknowledged the expediency of the advice; and commanded Eudamidas, with two thouſand men, to proceed without delay to Macedon, while his brother Phœbidas collected a powerful reinforcement, in order to follow him. A very extraordinary event, which we ſhall have occaſion fully to explain, retarded the arrival of thoſe auxiliaries, until the ſeaſon for action had been nearly ſpent. But Eudamidas, with his little band, performed very eſſential ſervice. He ſtrengthened the garriſons of ſuch places as were moſt expoſed to aſſaults from the enemy; the appearance of a Spartan army encouraged the ſpirit of revolt among the allies and ſubjects of Olynthus; and ſoon after his march into the Chalcidicé, Eudamidas received the voluntary ſurrender of Potidæa, a city of great importance in the iſthmus of Pallené.

Eudamidas defeated and ſlain.

Such was the firſt campaign of a war which laſted four years, and was carried on under four ſucceſſive generals. Eudamidas, too much elated by his firſt ſucceſs, ravaged the Olynthian territory, and unguardedly approached the city. He was intercepted, conquered, and ſlain, and his army diſperſed or loſt [18].

Second campaign under Teleutias, the brother of Ageſilaus.

Teleutias, the brother of Ageſilaus, whoſe naval exploits have been already mentioned with applauſe, aſſumed the conduct of this diſtant ex-

[18] Xenoph. p. 556.

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Olymp. xcix. 3. A. C. 382.

pedition, with a body of ten thouſand men. He was aſſiſted by Amyntas, king of Macedon, and ſtill more effectually by Derdas, the brother of that prince, and the governor, or rather ſovereign, of Elymea, the moſt weſtern province of Macedon, which abounded in cavalry. By the united efforts of theſe formidable enemies, the Olynthians, who had been defeated in various rencounters, were ſhut up within their walls, and prevented from cultivating their territory. Teleutias at length marched with his whole forces, in order to inveſt, or, if he found an opportunity, to aſſault the place. His ſurpriſe and indignation were excited by the boldneſs of the Olynthin horſe, who ventured to paſs the Amnias in ſight of ſuch a ſuperior army; and he ordered the targeteers, who were commanded by Tlemonidas, to repel their inſolence. The cavalry made an artful retreat acroſs the Amnias, and were fiercely purſued by the Lacedæmonians. When a conſiderable part of the latter had likewiſe paſſed the river, the Olynthians ſuddenly faced about and charged them. Tlemonidas, with above an hundred of his companions, fell in the action. The Spartan general beheld with grief and rage the ſucceſsful bravery of the enemy. Graſping his ſhield and lance, he commanded the cavalry, and the remainder of the targeteers, to purſue without intermiſſion; and, at the head of his heavy-armed men, advanced with leſs order than celerity. The Olynthians attempted not to ſtop their progreſs, till they arrived under the walls and battlements. At that moment the

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the townſmen mounted their ramparts, and aſſailed the enemy with a ſhower of darts and arrows, and every kind of miſſile weapon, which greatly added to the confuſion occaſioned by the rapidity of their march. Meanwhile the flower of the Olynthian troops, who had been purpoſely drawn up behind the gates, ſallied forth with irreſiſtible violence; Teleutias, attempting to rally his men, was ſlain in the firſt onſet; the Spartans who attended him gave ground; the whole army was repelled, and purſued with great ſlaughter, while they fled in ſcattered diſorder towards the friendly towns of Acanthus, Apollonia, Spartolus, and Potidæa [19].

Teleutias likewiſe defeated and ſlain.

This mortifying diſaſter did not cool the ardour of the Spartans for gaining poſſeſſion of Olynthus. In the year three hundred and eighty-one before Chriſt, which was the third of the war, they ſent Ageſipolis, with a powerful reinforcement, into Macedon. The arrival of this prince early in the ſpring, revived the hopes of the vanquiſhed, and confirmed the attachment of the Lacedæmonian allies. He invaded and ravaged ſuch parts of the Olynthian territory as had been ſpared in former incurſions, and took by ſtorm the ſtrong city of Torona. But while he prepared to avail himſelf of theſe advantages for rendering his ſucceſs complete, he was ſeized by a calenture, a diſeaſe incident to warm climates, and, as the name expreſſes, affecting the patient with a painful ſenſation of burning heat, which he is eager to extin-

Third campaign under king Ageſipolis; Olymp. xcix. 4. A. C. 381.

who dies of a calenture.

19 Xenoph. p. 561, & ſeqq.

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guiſh by the moſt violent and dangerous remedies [20]. Ageſipolis had lately viſited the temple of Apollo at Aphytis, a maritime town on the Toranic gulph. In the paroxyſm of his diſorder, he longed for the fanning breezes, the ſhady walks and groves, and the cool cryſtalline ſtreams, of that delightful retreat. His attendants indulged his inclination, but could not ſave his life. He died on the ſeventh day of the diſeaſe, within the precincts of the conſecrated ground. His remains, embalmed in honey, were conveyed to Sparta [21]. His brother Cleombrotus ſucceeded to the throne; and Polybiades, a general of experience and capacity, was inveſted with the command in Macedon.

Fourth campaign under Polybiades. Olymp. c. 1. A.C. 380.

Polybiades, imitating the example of his predeceſſors, conducted a powerful reinforcement againſt Olynthus, which was completely ſurrounded by land, while a ſquadron of Lacedæmonian gallies blocked up the neighbouring harbour of Mecyberna. The events of the ſiege, which laſted eight or ten months, have not been thought worthy of record. It is probable that the Olynthians no longer ventured to ſally forth againſt ſuch a ſuperior force: yet they muſt have been exceedingly diſtreſſed by famine before their obſti-

[20] It is ſuppoſed, with great probability, that the ſailors who ſuddenly diſappear in the Mediterranean, during the heat of ſummer, have been attacked in the night by the calenture, and have thrown themſelves into the ſea. Cyclopæd. Par. ad voc. The diſorder is examined by Dr. Shaw, Phil. Tranſ. Abridg. vol. iv.

[21] Xenoph. p. 564.

nacy

nacy could be determined to capitulate. They formally relinquiſhed all claim to the dominion of the Chalcidicé: they ceded the Macedonian cities to their ancient ſovereign; and engaged, by ſolemn oaths, to obey, in peace and war, the commands of their Spartan confederates and maſters[22]. In conſequence of this humiliating treaty, or rather of this abſolute ſubmiſſion of the Olynthians, Polybiades led off his victorious army, and Amyntas forſook the royal reſidence of Ægæ or Edeſſa, and re-eſtabliſhed his court at Pella, a place of great ſtrength and beauty, ſituate on an eminence, which, with an adjoining plain of conſiderable extent, was defended by the rivers Axius and Lydias, and by impervious lakes and moraſſes. The city was diſtant only fifteen miles from the Ægean ſea, with which it communicated by means of the above-mentioned rivers. It had been of old founded by Greeks, by whom it was recently conquered and peopled; but in conſequence of the misfortunes and ſurrender of Olynthus, Pella became, and thenceforth continued, the capital of Macedon.

Olynthus finally ſubmits.

Pella reſtored to Amyntas, and continues thenceforth the capital of Macedon.

The commencement, and eſpecially the concluſion of the Olynthian war, breathed the ſame ſpirit with the peace of Antalcidas, and proved the degenerate ambition of the Spartans, who were prepared to aggrandiſe the Barbarians on every ſide, in order to obtain their aſſiſtance towards extending their own dominion in Greece. This ſelfiſh and

Daring enterpriſe of the Spartan Phœbidas.

[22] Xenoph. p. 565.

cruel

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cruel ſyſtem of policy deſerved the indignation and reſentment of the whole Grecian name, who were at length excited againſt Sparta by a very extraordinary tranſaction, to which we already had occaſion to allude. When Eudamidas undertook the expedition againſt Olynthus, it was intended that his brother Phœbidas ſhould follow him at the head of eight thouſand men. This powerful reinforcement marched from Peloponneſus, and, in their journey northwards, encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, which was then torn by the inveterate hoſtility of contending factions. Iſmenias, whoſe name has already occurred on a very diſhonourable occaſion, headed the democratical party; Leontiades ſupported the intereſt of Sparta and ariſtocracy; and both were inveſted with the *archonſhip*, the chief magiſtracy in the commonwealth. It is not abſolutely certain that Phœbidas had previous orders to interfere in this diſſenſion [23], when he was accoſted by Leontiades, "who exhorted him to ſeize the opportunity, which fortune had thrown in his way, of performing a ſignal ſervice to his country. He then explained to the Lacedæmonian the diſtracted ſtate of Thebes, and the facility with which he might become maſter of the citadel; ſo that while his brother Eudamidas was carrying on the war againſt

[23] Diodorus boldly aſſerts that Phœbidas acted by orders of his republic, and that the feigned complaints againſt him were nothing but a maſk to diſguiſe or to conceal the injuſtice of the community.

Olynthus,

Olynthus, he himſelf would acquire poſſeſſion of a much greater city [24]."

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A contemporary hiſtorian, whoſe known partiality for the Lacedæmonians diſpoſed him to regard this ſingular enterpriſe as an act of private audacity, repreſents Phœbidas as a man of a light and vain mind, who loved the fame of a ſplendid action more than life itſelf, and who embraced, with childiſh tranſports of joy [25], the propoſal of Leontiades. The mode of executing their plan was ſoon ſettled between them. To elude ſuſpicion Phœbidas made the uſual preparations for continuing his journey, when he was ſuddenly recalled by his aſſociate. It was the month of July; the heat was intenſe; and, at mid-day, few or no paſſengers were to be ſeen in the roads or ſtreets. The Theban matrons celebrated the feſtival of Ceres, and prayed that bountiful divinity to preſerve the hope of a favourable harveſt. The appropriated ſcene of their female worſhip was the Cadmæa, or citadel, of which the gates had been purpoſely thrown open, and which was totally defenceleſs, as the males were univerſally excluded from this venerable ceremony. Every circumſtance conſpired to facilitate the deſign of Leontiades, who conducted the Lacedæmonians to the fortreſs, without finding the ſmalleſt oppoſition. He immediately deſcended to the ſenate, which,

In time of peace he ſeizes the Theban citadel. Olymp. xcix. 2. A.C. 383.

[24] Xenoph. p. 297, & ſeqq. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. p. 457.

[25] Ανεκφοβη is the expreſſion uſed by Xenophon.

though

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though it uſually aſſembled in the Cadmæa, was then ſitting in the market-place; declared that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his advice, and without any purpoſe of hoſtility; ſeized Iſmenias with his own hand as a diſturber of the public peace, and ordered the other leaders of the republican faction to be taken into ſafe cuſtody. Many were caught and impriſoned, and about four hundred eſcaped to Athens [26]

The meaſure approved by Ageſilaus.

When the news of this event reached Sparta, the ſenate and aſſembly reſounded with real or well-feigned complaints againſt the madneſs of Phœbidas, who, unprovoked by any injury, had violently ſeized a place in alliance and amity with the republic. Ageſilaus, however, undertook his defence; his ambitious mind had long fomented the domineering arrogance of his country; poſſibly he had prompted the enterpriſe of Phœbidas, which he warmly approved; and his influence being as extenſive as his abilities, he eaſily perſuaded his countrymen to juſtify the fortunate raſhneſs [27] of that commander, by keeping poſſeſſion of the Theban citadel.

The cruelties of Sparta drive the Thebans to deſpair.

During five years the Spartans maintained, in the Cadmæa, a garriſon of fifteen hundred men. Protected by ſuch a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the ſhorteſt warning, the

[26] Xenoph. p. 557.

[27] To ſave appearances, however, Phœbidas was fined. Even his accuſers were offended, not at his injuſtice, but at his acting without orders. Xenoph. ibid. & Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 336.

partiſans

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partiſans of ariſtocracy acquired an abſolute aſcendant in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in ſuch a manner as beſt ſuited their own intereſt, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to deſcribe the baniſhments, confiſcations, and murders, of which they were guilty, it is ſufficient for the purpoſe of general hiſtory to obſerve, that the miſerable victims of their vengeance ſuffered ſimilar calamities to thoſe which afflicted Athens under the thirty tyrants. The ſeverity of the government at length drove the Thebans to deſpair; and both the perſecuted exiles abroad, and the oppreſſed ſubjects at home, prepared to embrace any meaſures, however daring and hazardous, which promiſed them a faint hope of relief[28].

Conſpiracy of the Theban exiles. Olymp. c. 3. A.C. 378.

Among the Theban fugitives, who had taken refuge in Athens, and whoſe perſons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the ſon of Hippocles, a youth whoſe diſtinguiſhed advantages might have juſtly rendered him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he ſurpaſſed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exerciſes ſo much eſteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities ſtill more eſtimable, generoſity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous to the late melancholy revolution, was

28 Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. iv. Plut. in Pelopid. idem de Genio Socratis, p. 322, & ſeqq.

marked

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marked out by his numerous friends and adherents as the perſon moſt worthy of adminiſtering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow-ſufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and reſtoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thraſybulus, who, with a handful of men, had iſſued from Thebes, and effected a ſimilar, but ſtill more difficult, enterpriſe. While they ſecretly deliberated on this important object, Mello, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal aſſembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whoſe enterpriſing activity, ſingular addreſs, and crafty boldneſs, juſtly entitle him to the regard of hiſtory.

Aſſiſted by Phyllidas, ſecretary to the Theban council.

Phyllidas was ſtrongly attached to the cauſe of the exiles; yet, by his inſinuating complaiſance, and officious ſervility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magiſtrates, or rather tyrants [29], of the republic. In buſineſs and in pleaſure, he rendered himſelf alike neceſſary to his maſters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of ſecretary to the council; and he had lately promiſed to Archias and Philip, the two moſt licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the converſation and the perſons of the fineſt women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which theſe magiſterial de-

[29] Τῳ περι Αρχιαν τυραννιδα. Xenoph.

bauchees

bauchees expected with the greateſt impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas ſet out for Athens, on pretence of private buſineſs [30]. CHAP. XXIX.

In Athens, the time and the means were adjuſted for executing the conſpiracy. A body of Theban exiles aſſembled in the Thriaſian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where ſeven [31], or twelve [32], of the youngeſt and moſt enterpriſing, voluntarily offered themſelves to enter the capital, and to cooperate with Phyllidas in the deſtruction of the magiſtrates. The diſtance between Thebes and Athens was about thirty-five miles. The conſpirators had thirteen miles to march through a hoſtile territory. They diſguiſed themſelves in the garb of peaſants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and paſſed the gates without ſuſpicion. During that night, and the ſucceeding day, the houſe of Charon, a wealthy and reſpectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas, and a determined enemy of the ariſtocracy, afforded them a ſecure refuge, till the favourable moment ſummoned them to action. The time and means of execution adjuſted.

The important evening approached, when the artful ſecretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treaſury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the ſenſes, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleaſure. But a ſecret and obſcure rumour, which had ſpread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger, over the voluptuous joys of the feſtivity. It had been darkly Fidelity of the conſpirators to each other.

30 Xenoph. p. 566. 31 Ibid. 32 Plutarch. in Pelopid.

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reported, that ſome unknown ſtrangers, ſuppoſed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the houſe of Charon. All the addreſs of Phyllidas could not divert the terrors of his gueſts. They diſpatched one of their lictors or attendants to demand the immediate preſence of Charon. The conſpirators were already buckling on their armour, in hopes of being immediately ſummoned to execute their purpoſe. But what was their aſtoniſhment and terror, when their hoſt and protector was ſternly ordered to appear before the magiſtrates! The moſt ſanguine were perſuaded that their deſign had become public, and that they muſt all miſerably periſh, without effecting any thing worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban firſt went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant ſon, an only child, and preſented him to Pelopidas and Mello, requeſting them to retain in their hands this deareſt pledge of his fidelity. They unanimouſly declared their entire confidence in his honour, and entreated him to remove from danger an helpleſs infant, who might become, in ſome future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "That his ſon could never aſpire at a happier fortune, than that of dying honourably with his father and friends."

Their diſſimulation and addreſs.

So ſaying, he addreſſed a ſhort prayer to the gods, embraced his aſſociates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treaſury, he was met by Archias

Archias and Phyllidas. The former aſked him, in the preſence of the other magiſtrates, whoſe anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are thoſe ſtrangers ſaid to have arrived the other day, and to be now entertained in your family?" Charon had compoſed his countenance ſo artfully, and retorted the queſtion with ſuch well-diſſembled ſurpriſe, as conſiderably quieted the ſolicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whiſper of Phyllidas, "That the abſurd rumour had doubtleſs been ſpread for no other purpoſe but that of diſturbing their pleaſures." CHAP. XXIX.

The Theban magiſtrates aſſaſſinated.

They had ſcarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if ſhe had taken pleaſure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raiſed up a new and moſt alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haſte and trepidation, deſiring to ſee Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magiſtrate of the ſame name, his ancient friend and gueſt. This letter revealed the conſpiracy; a ſecret not entruſted to the meſſenger, who had orders, however, to requeſt Archias to read the diſpatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmoſt importance. But that careleſs voluptuary, whoſe thoughts were totally abſorbed in the expected ſcene of pleaſure, replied with a ſmile, "Buſineſs to-morrow;" depoſited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient cuſtom, he lay at the entertainment; and reſumed his converſation with Phyllidas concerning the ladies, whom he had promiſed to introduce. Mat-

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ters were now come to a criſis; Phyllidas retired for a moment; the conſpirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing ſwell of female attire, and their countenances overſhadowed and hid by a load of crowns and garlands. In this diſguiſe they were preſented to the magiſtrates intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given ſignal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpoſe [33]. Charon and Mello were the principal actors in this bloody ſcene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult taſk remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, ſtill lived, to avenge the murder of their aſſociates. The conſpirators, encouraged by their firſt ſucceſs, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admiſſion into their houſes ſucceſſively, by means of the unſuſpected ſecretary. On the appearance of diſorder and tumult, Leontiades ſeized his ſword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of deſtroying the principal author of the Theban ſervitude and diſgrace. His aſſociates periſhed without reſiſtance; men whoſe names may be conſigned to juſt oblivion, ſince they were diſtinguiſhed by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppreſſive tyranny.

The priſoners ſet at liberty.

The meaſures of the conſpirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different priſons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary

33 Xenoph. p. 567. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 470.

power.

power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, tranſported with joy and gratitude, increaſed the ſtrength of their deliverers. They broke open the arſenals, and provided themſelves with arms. The ſtreets of Thebes now reſounded with alarm and terror; every houſe and family were filled with confuſion and uproar; the inhabitants were univerſally in motion; ſome providing lights, others running in wild diſorder to the public places, and all anxiouſly wiſhing the return of day, that they might diſcover the unknown cauſe of this nocturnal tumult.

Epaminondas joins the inſurgents.

During a moment of dreadful ſilence, which interrupted the noiſe of ſedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and ſummoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the ſon of Polymnis, a youth of the moſt illuſtrious merit; who united the wiſdom of the ſage, and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valour, and patriotiſm, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendſhip. The principles of the Pythagorean philoſophy [34], which he had diligently ſtudied under Lyſis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averſe to engage in the conſpiracy, leſt he might embrue his hands in civil blood [35]. But when the ſword was once

34 See Vol. II. p. 18—42.

35 Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 279, & paſſim.

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drawn, he appeared with ardour in defence of his friends and country; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domeſtic and foreign tyranny.

The Theban democracy reſtored. Olymp. c. 3. A.C. 378.

The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, from the Thriaſian plain. The partiſans of the conſpirators were continually increaſed by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompaſſed by ſuch an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his aſſociates proceeded to the market-place; ſummoned a general aſſembly of the people; explained the neceſſity, the object, and the extent of the conſpiracy; and, with the univerſal approbation of their fellow-citizens, reſtored the democratic form of government [36].

The revolution communicated to the Athenians, who aſſiſt in expelling the Lacedæmonian garriſon.

Exploits of valour and intrepidity may be diſcovered in the hiſtory of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes diſplayed not leſs wiſdom of deſign, than enterpriſing gallantry in execution. Amidſt the tumult of action, and ardour of victory, the conſpirators poſſeſſed ſufficient coolneſs and foreſight to reflect that the Cadmæa, or citadel, which was held by a Lacedæmonian garriſon of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the firſt intelligence of danger, by the reſentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which muſt have rendered the conſequences of the conſpiracy incomplete and precarious, they com-

[36] Xenoph. Diodor. & Plutarch. ibid.

manded

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manded the meſſenger, whom, immediately after the deſtruction of the tyrants, they had diſpatched to their friends in the Thriaſian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that ſtate, and to ſolicit the immediate aſſiſtance of the Athenians, whoſe ſuperior ſkill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and Barbarians. This meſſage was attended with the moſt ſalutary effects. The acute diſcernment of the Athenians eagerly ſeized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta [37], which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thouſand men were ordered to march; and no time was loſt, either in the preparation, or in the journey, ſince they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-eſtabliſhed the democracy.

The Cadmæa ſurrenders. Olymp. c. 3. A.C. 378.

The ſeaſonable arrival of thoſe auxiliaries, whoſe celerity exceeded the moſt ſanguine hopes of the Thebans, increaſed the ardour of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the ſiege are variouſly related [38]. According to the moſt probable account, the garriſon made a very feeble reſiſtance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthuſiaſm, as well as the increaſing numbers, of the aſſailants, who already amounted to fourteen thouſand men, and received continual acceſſions of ſtrength from the neighbouring cities of Bœotia. Only a few days had elapſed, when the Lacedæ-

37 Dinarch. Orat. contra Demoſth. p. 100.

38 Diodorus differs entirely from Xenophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly followed.

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monians deſired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in ſafety with their arms. Their propoſal was readily accepted; but they ſeem not to have demanded, or at leaſt not to have obtained, any terms of advantage or ſecurity for thoſe unfortunate Thebans, whoſe attachment to the Spartan intereſt ſtrongly ſolicited their protection. At the firſt alarm of ſedition, theſe unhappy men, with their wives and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly periſhed by the reſentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was ſaved by the humane interpoſition of the Athenians [39]. So juſtly had Epaminondas ſuſpected, that the revolution could not be accompliſhed without the effuſion of civil blood.

39 Xenoph. & Plutarch. ibid.

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The Bœotian War.—Unſucceſsful Attempt of Sphodrias againſt the Piræus.—Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that Tranſaction.—Ageſilaus invades Bœotia.—Military Succeſs of the Thebans.—Naval Succeſs of the Athenians.—Congreſs for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes.—Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes.—Cleombrotus invades Bœotia.—Battle of Leuctra.—State of Greece.—Jaſon of Theſſaly.—His Character and Views.—Aſſaſſinated in the Midſt of his Projects.

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The Bœotian war. Olymp. c. 3. A.C. 378.

THE emancipation of Thebes gave a deep wound to the pride and tyranny of Sparta; and the magiſtrates of the latter republic prepared to puniſh, with due ſeverity, what they affected to term the unprovoked rebellion of their ſubjects. The Thebans firmly reſolved to maintain the freedom which they had aſſumed; and theſe diſpoſitions on both ſides occaſioned a memorable war, which having laſted with little interruption during ſeven years, ended with the battle of Leuctra, which produced a total revolution in the affairs of Greece.

First campaign under Cleombrotus.

The ardent mind of Ageſilaus had long inſpired, or directed, the ambitious views of his country.

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He enjoyed the glory, but could not avoid the odium, attached to his exalted ſituation; and fearing to increaſe the latter, he allowed the conduct of the Theban war to be committed to the inexperience of his unequal colleague. In the heart of a ſevere winter, Cleombrotus, with a well-appointed army, entered Bœotia. His preſence confirmed the obedience of Theſpiæ, Platæa, and other inferior communities. He defeated ſome ſtraggling parties of the Thebans, repelled their incurſions, ravaged their territory, burned their villages, but attempted not to make any impreſſion on the well-defended ſtrength of their city. After a campaign of two months, he returned home, leaving a numerous garriſon in Theſpiæ, commanded by Sphodrias, a general of great enterpriſe, but little prudence.

Sphodrias left with a garriſon in Theſpiæ.

Meanwhile the Athenians, alarmed by the nearer view of danger, publicly diſavowed the aſſiſtance which they had given to Thebes; and having diſgraced, baniſhed, or put to death [1], the adviſers of that daring meaſure, renewed their alliance with Sparta. The Thebans felt the full importance of this defection, and left nothing untried to prevent its fatal tendency, a deſign (could we believe tradition) in which they ſucceeded by a very ſingular ſtratagem. The light and raſh character of Sphodrias was well known, we are told, to the Theban chiefs, who employed ſecret emiſſa-

Stratagem of Thebes for widening the breach between Athens and Sparta.

[1] Xenoph. p. 334. I have endeavoured to reconcile Xenophon and Dinarchus, cited above.

ries

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ries to perſuade him, by arguments moſt flattering to his paſſions, to attack by ſurpriſe the imperfectly repaired harbour of Athens. Theſe artful miniſters of deceit repreſented to Sphodrias, that it was unworthy of his dignity, and of his valour, to employ the arms of Sparta in a predatory war, while an object of far more importance and glory naturally ſolicited the activity of his enterpriſing mind. "The Thebans, indeed, were vigilant in guard; and, being animated by the enthuſiaſm of newly recovered freedom, were determined, rather than ſurrender, to bury themſelves under the ruins of their country. But their ſecret and perfidious ally, whoſe aſſiſtance had recently enabled them to throw off the Spartan yoke, was lulled in ſecurity. The moment had arrived for cruſhing the implacable hatred of the Athenians, by ſurpriſing the Piræus, their principal ornament and defence; an action which would be celebrated by poſterity above the kindred glory of Phœbidas, who, during the time alſo of an inſidious peace, had ſeized the Theban citadel [a]."

Unſucceſsful attempt of Sphodrias to ſeize the Piræus.

The diſtance between Thebes and Theſpiæ, which was not more than twenty miles, furniſhed an eaſy opportunity for carrying on theſe ſecret practices; but the diſtance, which exceeded forty miles, between Thebes and Athens, rendered the enterpriſe of Sphodrias abortive. He marched from Theſpiæ with the flower of his garriſon, early in the morning, expecting to reach the Piræus

[a] Xenoph. p. 340. Diodorus, p. 472.

before

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before the dawn of the ſucceeding day. But he was ſurpriſed by the return of light in the Thriaſian plain. The borough of Eleuſis was alarmed; the report flew to Athens, and the citizens, with their uſual alacrity, ſeized their arms, and prepared for a vigorous defence. The mad deſign, and the ſtill greater madneſs of Sphodrias, in ravaging the country during his retreat, provoked the fury of the Athenians. They immediately ſeized the perſons of ſuch Lacedæmonians as happened to reſide in their city. They ſent an embaſſy to Sparta, complaining, in the moſt indignant terms, of the inſult of Sphodrias. The Spartans diſavowed his conduct. He was recalled and tried, but ſaved from death by the authority of Ageſilaus. This powerful protection was obtained by the interceſſion of his ſon Cleonymus, the beloved companion of Archidamus, the ſon and ſucceſſor of the Spartan king. Archidamus pleaded, with the modeſt eloquence of tears, for the father of a friend, his equal in years and valour, with whom he had been long united in the moſt tender affection. Cleonymus declared on this occaſion, that he ſhould never diſgrace the ardent attachment of the royal youth; and illuſtrious as Archidamus afterwards became, Xenophon affirms, that his early and unalterable love of Cleonymus forms not the ſhade, but rather the faireſt light, of his amiable and exalted character [3].

[3] Xenoph. p. 570.

Such

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Such is the account of this tranſaction, given originally by Xenophon, and faithfully copied by other writers, ancient and modern. But there is ſome reaſon to ſuſpect that Ageſilaus was not totally unacquainted with the ambitious and unwarrantable deſign of Sphodrias; that the Spartans would have approved the meaſure, had it been crowned with ſucceſs; and that even the philoſophic Xenophon, a partial admirer of Ageſilaus and the Lacedæmonians, has employed the perſuaſive ſimplicity of his inimitable ſtyle, to varniſh a very unjuſtifiable tranſaction. Such, at leaſt, it appeared to the Athenian aſſembly, who, offended by the crime, were ſtill more indignant at the acquittal, of Sphodrias. From that time they began to prepare their fleet, to enliſt ſailors, to collect and to employ all the materials of war with a reſolution firmly to maintain the cauſe of Thebes and their own.

Doubts concerning Xenophon's account of this tranſaction.

While they were buſied in ſuch preparations, Ageſilaus repeatedly invaded Bœotia, without performing any thing worthy of his former renown. His army amounted to eighteen thouſand foot, and fifteen hundred horſe. The enemy were aſſiſted by a conſiderable body of mercenaries, commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, who finally repelled the Spartan king from Thebes, by a ſtratagem not leſs ſimple than uncommon. The Theban army prepared to act on the defenſive againſt a ſuperior force, and occupied a riſing ground in the neighbourhood of their city. Ageſilaus detached a body of light-armed troops, to provoke

Ageſilaus repeatedly invades Bœotia. Olymp. c. 4. A.C. 377. & Olymp. ci. 1. A.C. 376.

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voke them to quit this advantageous poſt; but the Thebans cautiouſly maintained their ground, and obliged the enemy to draw out their whole forces in order to diſlodge them. Chabrias, waiting their approach, commanded his troops to execute a new movement, which he had recently taught them for ſuch an emergency. They ſupported their advanced bodies on their left knee, extended their ſhields and ſpears, and thus firmly maintained their ranks [4]. Alarmed at the determined boldneſs of an unuſual array, which ſeemed to bid him defiance, Ageſilaus withdrew his army from the capital, and contented himſelf with committing farther ravages on the country.

4 The words, of Nepos, in Chabria, are better explained by reading, "Qui obnixo genu ſcuto, projectaque haſta, impetum excipere hoſtium docuit." This agrees with the ſtatue of Chabrias in the Villa Borgheſe, whoſe ſingular attitude has given ſo much trouble to antiquaries. Winkelmann conjectures this maſter-piece of art to be the moſt ancient ſtatue in Rome, from the form of the letters in the name Agaſias with which it is inſcribed. He obſerves, that it is erroneouſly ſuppoſed to be a gladiator, ſince the Greeks never honoured gladiators with ſuch monuments; and the ſtyle of the workmanſhip proves it more ancient than the introduction of that inhuman ſpectacle into Greece. The body of the ſtatue is advanced, and reſts on the left thigh; the right arm graſps a javelin, or ſpear; around the left is ſeen the leather thong, or handle of a ſhield. It ſeems, ſays Winkelmann, the particular attitude of a warrior on ſome dangerous emergency. What this emergency was, the learned and ingenious Leſſing fortunately diſcovered, by the words of Cornelius Nepos. "Hoc (the ſtratagem of Chabrias) uſque eō tota Græcia famâ celebratum eſt, ut illo ſtatu Chabrias ſibi ſtatuam fieri voluerit, quæ publicè ei ab Athenienſibus in foro conſtituta eſt."

In

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Succeſs of the Thebans. Olymp. ci. 2. A.C. 375.

„In the ſkirmiſhes which happened after his retreat, the Thebans proved repeatedly victorious. He returned home, and continued at Sparta during the following year, to be cured of his wounds; where he ſuffered the mortifying reproaches of his adverſary Antalcidas, " for teaching the Thebans to conquer." The generals who ſucceeded him had not better ſucceſs. Phœbidas, the original author of the war, who had been appointed governor of Theſpiæ, was defeated and ſlain, with the greateſt part of the garriſon of that place. Pelopidas, with his own hand, killed the Spartan commander in the action at Tanagra; and in the pitched battle of Tegyra, the Lacedæmonians, though ſuperior in number, were broken and put to flight; a diſgrace which, they reflected with ſorrow, had never befallen them in any former engagement.

Naval ſucceſs of the Athenians. Olymp. ci. 1. A.C. 376.

While the war was thus carried on by land, the Athenians put to ſea, and gained the moſt diſtinguiſhed advantages on their favourite element. The Lacedæmonian fleet, of ſixty ſail, commanded by Pollis, was ſhamefully defeated near the iſle of Naxos, by the ſkilful bravery of Chabrias, who performed alternately, and with equal abilities, the duties of admiral and general[5]. But the principal ſcene of action was the Ionian ſea, where Timotheus[6] and Iphicrates every where prevailed

5 Xenoph. p. 577. Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. ci. 1.

6 Corn. Nep. in Vit. Timoth. & Dinarch. adv. Demoſth. Such was the good fortune of Timotheus, that the ſatirical artiſts

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prevailed over the commanders who oppoſed them. The fleet of Sparta was totally ruined by the victors, who repeatedly ravaged the coaſts of Laconia [7], and laid under heavy contributions the iſlands of Corcyra, Zacinthus, Leucadia, and Cephalenia. Even the iſles and cities more remote from the ſcene of this naval war, particularly the valuable iſland of Chios, and the important city of Byzantium, deſerted their involuntary connection with the declining fortune of Sparta, and once more accepted the dangerous alliance of the Athenians [8].

The Greeks aſſiſt Artaxerxes in the Egyptian war.

Theſe hoſtile operations, which weakened, without ſubduing, the ſpirit of the vanquiſhed, were interrupted by the ſolicitations and bribes of the king of Perſia, who earneſtly promoted the domeſtic tranquillity of Greece, that he might enjoy the aſſiſtance of its arms in cruſhing a new rebellion in Egypt. His emiſſaries met with equal ſucceſs in Athens and Sparta, which were alike weary of the war, the former having little more to hope, and the latter having every thing to fear, from its continuance. Many of the inferior ſtates, being implicitly governed by the reſolves of theſe powerful republics, readily imitated their example. And ſo precarious and miſerable was the condition of them all, in that diſorderly period, that about twenty thouſand men abandoned

artiſts of the times painted him aſleep, covered with a net, in which the cities and iſlands entangled and caught themſelves. Plutarch. de invid. & odio.

7 Xenoph. p. 578.

8 Id. ibid.

their homes and families, and followed the ſtandard of the Perſians. The merit of Iphicrates juſtly entitled him to the command of his countrymen, which was unanimouſly conferred on him. But the expedition produced nothing worthy of ſuch a general, who in a few months returned to Athens, diſguſted with the ignorant pride, and ſlothful timidity, of the Perſian commanders, who durſt not undertake any important enterpriſe, without receiving the ſlow inſtructions of a diſtant court [a]. CHAP. XXX.

Meanwhile the Thebans, who, elated by a flow of unwonted proſperity, had proudly diſregarded the repreſentations of Artaxerxes, profited of the temporary diverſion made by the Egyptian war, to reduce ſeveral inferior cities of Bœotia. The walls of Theſpiæ were raſed to the ground; Platæa met with the ſame fate; and its inhabitants, after ſuffering the cruelleſt indignities, were driven into baniſhment. It might be expected that the unfortunate exiles ſhould have ſought refuge in Sparta, whoſe authority they had uniformly acknowledged, ſince the diſhonourable peace of Antalcidas. But ſo diſſimilar were the fluctuating politics of Greece to the regular tranſactions of modern times (governed by the lifeleſs but ſteady principle of intereſt), that the Platæans had recourſe to Athens, a city actually in alliance with the people by whom they had been ſo unjuſtly perſecuted. Their eloquence, their tears, the memory of paſt ſervices, and the promiſe of fu- The Thebans raſe Platæa. Olymp. ci. 3. A.C. 374.

[a] Corn. Nepos in Iphicrat. Diodorus, l. xv. ad Olymp. c. iv.

ture

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ture gratitude, prevailed on the Athenian aſſembly, who kindly received them into the boſom of their republic, and expreſſed the warmeſt indignation againſt their inſolent oppreſſors [10].

Congreſs for peace held under the mediation of Artaxerxes. Olymp. cii. 1. A.C. 372.

This affecting tranſaction threatened to deprive the Thebans of an ally, to whom they were in a great meaſure indebted for their proſperity. Their ſubſequent conduct tended ſtill farther to widen the breach. They marched troops into Phocis, with an intention to reduce that country. They heard with equal diſdain, the remonſtrances of their friends, and the threats of their enemies. Their unuſual arrogance totally alienated the Athenians, who ſeemed finally diſpoſed to conclude a laſting peace with Sparta, on the principles of the treaty of Antalcidas, that their reſpective garriſons ſhould be withdrawn from foreign parts, and the communities, ſmall as well as great, be permitted to enjoy the independent government of their own equitable laws. The intereſt of the king of Perſia, who ſtill needed freſh ſupplies to carry on the Egyptian war, induced him to employ his good offices for promoting this ſpecious purpoſe; and a convention of all the ſtates was ſummoned to Sparta, whither the Thebans deigned indeed to ſend a repreſentative; but a repreſentative, whoſe firmneſs and magnanimity were well fitted to ſuſtain and elevate the aſpiring pretenſions of his republic.

10 Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. & Iſocrat. Orat. pro Plat.

In

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In effecting this glorious revolution, which gave freedom to Thebes, as well as in the military operations, which immediately followed that important event, the youthful merit of Pelopidas had acquired the fame of patriotism, valour, and conduct. The nobility of his birth, and the generous use of his riches, increased the ascendant due to his illustrious services. Every external advantage, the manly grace of his person, the winning affability of his deportment, his superior excellence in the martial exercises so highly prized by the Greeks, and especially by the Thebans, gained him the admiration of the multitude; or, in other words, of the legislative assembly of his country. He had been successively elected, during six years, to the first dignity of the republic; nor had the Thebans ever found reason to repent their choice [11]. Yet in the present emergency, when they were required to appoint a deputy for the convention at Sparta (the most important charge with which any citizen could be entrusted), Pelopidas, with all his merit, was not the minister whom they thought proper to employ.

Epaminondas appears as deputy from Thebes.

Epaminondas, naturally his rival, but always his friend, had hitherto been contented with a subordinate station: yet every office which he exercised, whether in the civil or military department, derived new lustre from his personal dignity. His exterior accomplishments were not inferior to those of Pelopidas; but he had learned from the philosophy

His character.

[11] Plut. in Pelopid.

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loſophy of Lyſis the Pythagorean, to prefer the mind to the body, merit to fame, and the rewards of virtue to the gifts of fortune. He reſiſted the generous ſolicitations of his friends to deliver him from the honourable poverty in which he was born; continuing poor from taſte and choice, and juſtly delighting in a ſituation, which is more favourable, eſpecially in a democratical republic, to that freedom and independence of mind which wiſdom recommends as the greateſt good. Nor was he more careleſs of money than avaricious of time, which he continually dedicated to the ſtudy of learning and philoſophy, or employed in the exerciſe of public and private virtue. Yet to become uſeful he was not deſirous to be great. The fame ſolicitude which others felt to obtain, Epaminondas ſhewed to avoid, the dangerous honours of his country. His ambitious temper would have been better ſatisfied to direct, by a perſonal influence with the magiſtrates, the adminiſtration of government from the boſom of his beloved retirement [12], when the unanimous voice of the citizens, and ſtill more the urgency of the times, called him to public life; and ſuch was his contempt for the glory of a name, that had he lived in a leſs turbulent period, his exalted qualities, however admired by ſelect friends, would have probably remained unknown to his contemporaries and poſterity.

[12] The conduct of Epaminondas coincides with, and confirms, the account above given of the Pythagorean philoſophy.

Such

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Conference at Sparta. Olymp. cii. 1. A.C. 372.

Such was the man to whoſe abilities and eloquence the Thebans committed the defence of their moſt important intereſts in the general congreſs of the Grecian ſtates. The Athenians ſent Antocles and Calliſtratus; the firſt a ſubtile [13], the ſecond an affecting orator [14]. Ageſilaus himſelf appeared on the part of Sparta. Matters were eaſily adjuſted between thoſe leading republics, who felt equal reſentment at the unhappy fate of Theſpiæ and Platæa. They lamented their mutual jealouſy, and unfortunate ambition, which had occaſioned ſo many bloody and deſtructive wars; and commemorated the ſhort but glorious intervals of moderation and concord, which had tended ſo evidently to their own and the public felicity. Inſtructed by fatal experience, it was time for them to lay down their arms, and to allow that tranquillity to themſelves and to their neighbours, which was neceſſary to heal the wounds of their common country. The peace could not be uſeful or permanent, unleſs it were eſtabliſhed on the liberal principles of equality and freedom, to which all the Grecian communities were alike entitled by the treaty of Antalcidas. It was propoſed, therefore, to renew that ſalutary contract, which was accepted by the unanimous conſent of Athens, of Sparta, and of their reſpective confederates.

[13] Επιτριφης ρητωρ. Xenoph. l. vi.

[14] The pathetic pleading of Calliſtratus, for the citizens of Oropus, firſt inſpired Demoſthenes with the ambition of eloquence. Plut. in Demoſth.

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Demands of Epaminondas.

Epaminondas [15] then ſtood up, offering to ſign the treaty in the name of the Bœotians. "The Athenians," he took notice, "had ſigned for all the inhabitants of Attica; the Spartans had ſigned not only for the cities of Laconia, but for their numerous allies in all the provinces of the Peloponneſus. Thebes was entitled to the ſame prerogatives over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently ſubmitted to the arms of her citizens." Ageſilaus, inſtead of anſwering directly a demand which could neither be granted with honour, nor denied with juſtice, aſked in his turn, Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit, in terms of the treaty, the independence of Bœotia? Epaminondas demanded, Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia? "Shall the Bœotians," ſaid the king, with emotion, "be free?" "Whenever," replied Epaminondas, with firmneſs, "you reſtore freedom to the Lacedæmonians, the Meſſenians, and the oppreſſed communities of Peloponneſus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in an involuntary and rigorous ſervitude."

[15] The convention of Sparta is noticed by Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos. The firſt writer is ſilent with regard to Epaminondas. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos furniſh the hints which I have made uſe of in the text. It is not impoſſible that there were two conventions, at different times, reſpecting the ſame object. In that caſe, Xenophon muſt have totally omitted one of them.

Then

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He addreſſes the deputies of the allies.

Then turning to the deputies of the allies; he repreſented to them the cruel mockery by which they were inſulted. "Summoned to deliberate concerning the general freedom and independence, they were called to ratify a peace, which, inſtead of eſtabliſhing theſe invaluable and ſacred rights, confirmed the ſtern tyranny of an imperious maſter." That "the cities, ſmall and great, ſhould be free," was the verbal condition of the treaty; but its real drift and import was, that Thebes ſhould give freedom to Bœotia, and thereby weaken her own ſtrength, while Sparta kept in ſubjection the extenſive territories of her confederates, in whoſe name ſhe had ſigned that perfidious contract, and whoſe aſſiſtance ſhe expected, and could demand, towards giving it immediate effect. If the allies perſiſted in their actual reſolution, they conſented to deſtroy the power of Thebes, which was the only bulwark to defend them againſt Spartan uſurpation; they conſented to continue the payment of thoſe intolerable contributions with which they had long been oppreſſed; and to obey every idle ſummons to war, of which *they* chiefly ſuffered the fatigues and dangers, while the advantage and glory redounded to the Spartans alone. If they felt any reſpect for the glorious name of their anceſtors; if they entertained any ſenſe of their own moſt precious intereſts, they would be ſo little diſpoſed to promote the reduction of Thebes, that they would imitate the auſpicious example of that ancient and noble city, which had acquired the dignity of independent go-

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vernment, not by *inſcriptions* [16] and treaties, but by arms and valour.

Permanent effect of his repreſentations.

The juſt remonſtrances of Epaminondas made a deep impreſſion on the deputies. Ageſilaus, alarmed at its effect, anſwered him in a ſtrain very different from that deſpotic brevity [17] which the Spartans uſually affected. His ſpeech was long and eloquent. He reaſoned, prayed, threatened. The deputies were awed into ſubmiſſion, leſs perhaps by the force of his eloquence, than by the terror of the Spartan armies ready to take the field. But the words of Epaminondas ſunk deep into their hearts. They communicated, at their return, the powerful impreſſion to their conſtituents; and its influence was viſible in the field of Leuctra, and in the events which followed that memorable engagement.

Reflections on his conduct;

As the Grecian ſtates were accuſtomed to grant more unreſerved powers to their generals and miniſters, than are allowed by the practice of modern times, we muſt be contented to doubt, whether, in this important negociation, Epaminondas acted merely by the extemporary impulſe of his own mind, or only executed, with boldneſs and dignity, the previous inſtructions of his republic. It is certain, that his refuſal to acknowledge the freedom of Bœotia, not only excluded

[16] The public deeds and tranſactions of the Greeks were *inſcribed* on pillars of marble. Thucyd. & Xenoph. paſſim.

[17] Epaminondas ſaid, or more probably it was ſaid for him, that he had compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monoſyllables. Plut. in Ageſil.

Thebes

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Thebes from the treaty, but expoſed her to the immediate vengeance of the confederates; and according to the received principles of modern policy, there is reaſon to accuſe both the prudence and the juſtice of the admired Theban; his prudence, in provoking the ſtrength of a confederacy, with which the weakneſs of any ſingle republic ſeemed totally unable to contend; and his juſtice, in denying to *ſeveral* communities of Bœotia their hereditary laws and government. Yet the conduct of Epaminondas has never been expoſed to ſuch odious reproaches. Succeſs juſtified his audacity; and the Greeks, animated by an ambitious enthuſiaſm to aggrandiſe their reſpective cities, were taught to dignify by the names of patriotiſm and magnanimity, qualities which, in the ſober judgment of poſterity, would be degraded by very different appellations. There are reaſons, however, not merely ſpecious, by which Epaminondas might juſtify his conduct at an impartial bar. He could not be ignorant that Thebes, unaſſiſted and alone, was unable to cope with the general confederacy of Greece: but he knew that this confederacy would never exiſt but in words, ſince the jealouſy of ſeveral ſtates, and particularly of Athens, would be diſpoſed rather to commiſerate, than to increaſe, the calamities of a people at variance with Sparta[18]. He perceived the effect of his ſpirited remonſtrances on the moſt ſtedfaſt adherents of that republic; and contemplating the circumſtances of

[18] Xenophon hints at this diſpoſition, l. vi. p. 698.

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his country, and of the enemy, he found ſeveral motives of encouragement to the ſeemingly unequal conteſt.

which is juſtified by the ſtate of Sparta.

The Spartans had been weakened by the deſection and loſs of their dominions, and dejected by their unfortunate attempts to recover them. They had been deprived of their preſcriptive honours, and had forſaken their hereditary maxims. Their ancient and venerable laws had in a great meaſure ceaſed to govern them; and the ſeeds of thoſe corruptions were already ſown, which have been cenſured by philoſophers and ſtateſmen with equal juſtice and ſeverity [19]. Nor were they expoſed to the *uſual* misfortunes, only, of a degenerate people; the inſtitutions of Lycurgus formed one conſiſtent plan of legiſlation, which could not be partially obſerved and partially neglected. While the ſubmiſſive diſciples of that extraordinary lawgiver remained ſatisfied with their ſimplicity of manners, their poverty, and their virtue, and had ſcarcely any other object in view, but to reſiſt the ſolicitations of pleaſure, and to repel the encroachments of enemies, the law, which diſcouraged a commercial intercourſe with foreign nations, and which excluded ſtrangers, whatever merit they might poſſeſs, from aſpiring to the rank of citizens, was an eſtabliſhment ſtrictly conformable to the peculiar ſpirit of the Lacedæmonian conſtitution. But when Sparta abandoned the ſimplicity of her primitive maxims, became ambitious, wealthy,

[19] Ariſtot. Politic. l. ii. c. 9.

triumph-

triumphant, and almoſt continually engaged in war, not as the means of defence, but as the inſtrument of power and conqueſt, conſiſtency required that ſhe ſhould have laid aſide her pretenſions to thoſe excluſive honours which ſhe no longer deſerved. When ſhe relinquiſhed the virtuous pre-eminence of her anceſtors, the warlike inhabitants of Peloponneſus were not unworthy to be ranked with her citizens; and by admitting them to this honour, ſhe would have given them an intereſt in her victories, and rendered them willing partners of her danger. But, inſtead of adopting this generous policy, which poſſibly might have rendered her what Rome, with more wiſdom indeed, but not with more virtue or more valour, afterwards became, the miſtreſs of the world, ſhe increaſed her pretenſions in proportion to the decline of her merit; ſpurned the equality of a fœderal union, to which the Peloponneſians were entitled; deprived even the Lacedæmonians of their juſt ſhare in the government, and concentrated all power and authority within the ſenate and aſſembly of Sparta. A long courſe of almoſt uninterrupted hoſtilities had deprived her of the beſt half of her citizens, whoſe numbers were continually diminiſhing, without the poſſibility of ever being repaired; nor could it be difficult to overthrow an empire which depended on the addreſs and bravery of about four thouſand warriors, the ſplendour of a great name, and the reluctant

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reluctant aſſiſtance of inſulted allies and oppreſſed ſubjects [20]

The conſideration of theſe circumſtances, which could not fail to preſent themſelves to the ſagacity of Epaminondas, might have encouraged him to ſet the threats of his adverſaries at defiance, eſpecially when he reflected on the actual condition of Thebes, whoſe civil and military inſtitutions had recently acquired new ſpirit and freſh vigour.

Compared with that of Thebes.

The Thebans, with their ſubjects or neighbours in Bœotia, had been long regarded as an unworthy and faithleſs race, with ſtrong bodies but ignoble ſouls, and infamous among the Greeks, on account of their ancient alliance with Xerxes and the Barbarians. The divine genius of Pindar had not redeemed them from the character of a ſluggiſh and heavy people, noted even to a proverb for ſtupidity [21]. From the age of that inimitable writer, they appear, indeed, to have been little addicted to the purſuit of mental excellence; but they uniformly continued to cultivate, with peculiar care, the gymnaſtic exerciſes, which gave the addreſs and dexterity of art to the ponderous ſtrength of

[20] The condition of Sparta, repreſented in the text, is taken from the hiſtory of the times in Xenophon and Diodorus, from Ariſtotle's Politics, l. ii. c. 9. the Oration of Archidamus, and the Panathanæan Oration of Iſocrates. The laſt writer reduces the number of Spartan citizens to two thouſand; a diminution principally occaſioned by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, which happened a conſiderable time before the compoſition of that diſcourſe.

[21] Bœotum in craſſo jurares aëre natum. Hor. Epiſt. i. l. 11.

their

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their gigantic members. To acquire renown in war, ſuch people only wanted that ſpark of etherial fire which is kindled by a generous emulation. The tyranny of Sparta firſt animated their inactive languor. Having ſpurned an oppreſſive yoke, they boldly maintained their freedom; and, in the exerciſe of defenſive war, gained many honourable trophies over enemies who had long deſpiſed them. Succeſs enlivened their hopes, inflamed their ambition, and gave a certain elevation to their national character, which rendered them as ambitious of war and victory, as they had formerly been anxious for peace and preſervation. They had introduced a ſevere ſyſtem of military diſcipline; they had conſiderably improved the arms and exerciſe of cavalry; they had adopted various modes of arranging their forces in order of battle, ſuperior to thoſe practiſed by their neighbours. Emulation, ardour, mutual eſteem, and that ſpirit of combination, which often prevails in turbulent and diſtracted times, had united a conſiderable number of their citizens in the cloſeſt engagements, and inſpired them with the generous reſolution of braving every danger in defence of each other. This aſſociation originally conſiſted of about three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and commanded by Pelopidas, the glorious reſtorer of his country's freedom. From the inviolable ſanctity of their friendſhip, they were called the Sacred Band, and their valour was as permanent as their friendſhip. During a long ſucceſſion of years, they proved victorious wherever they fought;

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fought; and at length fell together, with immortal glory, in the field of Chæronæa, with the fall of Thebes, of Athens, and of Greece. Such, in general, were the circumſtances and condition of thoſe rival republics[22], when they were encouraged by their reſpective chiefs to decide their pretenſions by the event of a battle.

Cleombrotus invades Bœotia. Olymp. cii. 2. A.C. 371.

In the interval of ſeveral months, between the congreſs at Sparta and the invaſion of Bœotia, Ageſilaus and his ſon Archidamus collected the domeſtic ſtrength of their republic, and ſummoned the tardy aid of their confederates. Sickneſs prevented the Spartan king from taking the field in perſon; but his advice prevailed with the Ephori and ſenate, to command his colleague Cleombrotus (who, in the former year, had conducted a conſiderable body of troops into Phocis, in order to repel the Thebans from that country) to march without delay into the hoſtile territory, with aſſurance of being ſpeedily joined by a powerful reinforcement. The rendezvous was appointed in the plain of Leuctra, which ſurrounded an obſcure village of the ſame name, ſituate on the Bœotian frontier, almoſt at the equal diſtance of ten miles from the ſea and from Platæa. The plain was encompaſſed on all ſides by the lofty ridges of Helicon, Cithæron, and Cynocephalæ; and the village was hitherto remarkable only for the tomb of two Theban damſels, the daughters of Scedaſus, who had been violated by the brutality of three Spartan youths. The diſhonoured females had

The Spartans and their confederates aſſemble in the plain of Leuctra.

[22] Plut. in Pelopid. v. ii. p. 355—366.

ended

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ended their diſgrace by a voluntary death; and the afflicted father had imitated the example of their deſpair, after imploring vengeance in vain from gods and men [23].

The Thebans encamp on the neighbouring mountain.

The Spartans and their confederates joined forces in this neighbourhood, after repelling a few Theban detachments which guarded the defiles of Mount Helicon. Their army amounted to twenty-four thouſand foot, and ſixteen hundred horſe. The Thebans could not muſter half that ſtrength, after aſſembling all their troops, which had been ſcattered over the frontier, in order to oppoſe the deſultory irruptions of the enemy. Their cavalry, however, nearly equalled thoſe of the Spartans in number, and far excelled them in diſcipline and in valour. Epaminondas exhorted them to march, and repel the invaders, if they would prevent the defection of Bœotia, and avoid the dangers and diſgrace of a ſiege. They readily obeyed, and proceeded to the neighbouring mountains, on which having encamped, they obtained a commanding view of the forces in the plain.

Proceedings of Epaminondas before the battle.

Having heard an account of the ſuperior numbers of the enemy, the Thebans ſtill determined to give them battle. But as the eyes are the moſt timorous of the ſenſes, they were ſeized with terror and conſternation at beholding the maſſy extent of the Spartan camp. Several of the colleagues of Epaminondas (for he had no fewer than ſix) were averſe to an engagement, ſtrongly diſſuading the

[23] Xenoph. p. 595.

general

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general from this dangerous meaſure, and artfully increaſing the panic of the troops, by recounting many ſiniſter omens and threatening prodigies. The magnanimous chief oppoſed the dangerous torrent of ſuperſtitious terror, by a verſe of Homer[24], importing, that to men engaged in the pious duty of defending their country, no particular indication was neceſſary of the favourable will of Heaven, ſince they were immediately employed in a ſervice peculiarly agreeable to the gods. At the ſame time, he counteracted the dejection of their imaginary fears, by encouragements equally chimerical. It was circulated, by his contrivance, that the Theban temples had opened of their own accord, in conſequence of which the prieſteſſes had announced a victory; that the armour of Hercules, repoſited in the Cadmæa, had ſuddenly diſappeared, as if that invincible hero in perſon had gone to battle in defence of his Theban countrymen; above all, an ancient oracle was carefully handed about, denouncing defeat and ruin to the Spartans near the indignant tomb of the daughters of Scedaſus. Theſe artifices gained the multitude, while arguments more rational prevailed with their leaders, of whom the majority at length ranged themſelves on the ſide of the general.

His magnanimity ſeconded by fortune.

Before conducting them to battle, Epaminondas diſplayed his confidence of victory, by permitting all thoſe to retire, who either diſapproved his cauſe, or were averſe to ſhare his danger; a permiſſion

[24] Εις οιωνος αριστος αμυνεσθαι περι πατρης. Il. xii. v. 243.

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which the Theſpians, firſt thought proper to embrace. The unwarlike crowd of attendants, whoſe ſervices were uſeleſs in time of action, gradually ſeized the ſame opportunity to leave the camp. The ſwelling multitude appeared as a ſecond army to the Spartans, who ſent a powerful detachment to oppoſe them. The fear of being cut off by the enemy threw them back on the Thebans, whoſe hopes were enlivened by the unexpected return of ſuch a conſiderable reinforcement. Thus encouraged, they determined unanimouſly to ſtand by their admired chief, and either to defend their country, or to periſh in the attempt; and the ardour of the troops equalling the ſkill of the general, the union of ſuch advantages rendered them invincible.

Diſpoſition of the forces on both ſides.

Cleombrotus had diſpoſed his forces in the form of a creſcent, according to an ancient and favourite practice of the Spartans. His cavalry were poſted in ſquadrons along the front of the right wing, where he commanded in perſon. The allies compoſed the left wing, conducted by Archidamus. The Theban general, perceiving this diſpoſition, and ſenſible that the iſſue of the battle would chiefly depend on the domeſtic troops of Sparta, determined to charge vigorouſly with his left, in order to ſeize or deſtroy the perſon of Cleombrotus; thinking that ſhould this deſign ſucceed, the Spartans muſt be diſcouraged and repelled; and that even the attempt muſt occaſion great diſorder in their ranks, as the braveſt would haſten, from every

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every quarter, to defend the ſacred perſon of their king. Having reſolved, therefore, to commit the fortune of the day to the bravery of the left diviſion of his forces, he ſtrengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppoſe the Spartan horſe, whom they excelled in experience and valour. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, flanked the whole on the left; and deeming no particular ſtation worthy of their proweſs, they were prepared to appear in every tumult of the field, whither they might be called, either by an opportunity of ſucceſs, or by the proſpect of diſtinguiſhed danger. The principal inconvenience to which the Thebans were expoſed, in advancing to the charge, was that of being ſurrounded by the wide-extended arms of the Spartan creſcent. This danger the general foreſaw; and in order to prevent it, he ſpread out his right wing, of which the files had only ſix men in depth, and the ranks proceeding in an oblique line, diverged the farther from the enemy, in proportion as they extended in length.

Battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii. 2. A.C. 371.

The action began with the cavalry, which, on the Spartan ſide, conſiſted chiefly of ſuch horſes as were kept for pleaſure by the richer citizens in time of peace; and which, proving an unequal match for the diſciplined valour of the Thebans, were ſpeedily broken, and thrown back on the infantry. Their repulſe and rout occaſioned conſiderable diſorder in the Lacedæmonian ranks, which

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which was greatly heightened by the impetuous onſet of the Sacred Band. Epaminondas availed himſelf of this momentary confuſion, to perform one of thoſe rapid evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of battles. He formed his ſtrongeſt, but leaſt numerous diviſion, into a compact wedge, with a ſharp point, and with ſpreading flanks; expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as ſoon as they had recovered their ranks, would attack the weaker and more extended part of his army, which, from the oblique arrangement in which it had been originally drawn up, ſeemed prepared for a retreat. The event anſwered his expectation. While the Lacedæmonians advanced againſt his right wing, where they found little or no reſiſtance, he ruſhed forward with his left; and darting like the beak of a galley [25] on the flank of the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the poſt occupied by Cleombrotus. The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient principles the degenerate diſciples of Lycurgus. The braveſt warriors flew from every quarter to the aſſiſtance of their prince, covered him with their ſhields, and defended him with their ſwords and lances. Their impetuous valour reſiſted the intrepid progreſs of the Thebans, till the Spartan horſemen, who attended the perſon of Cleombrotus, were totally cut off, and the king himſelf, pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathleſs

[25] Xenophon employs this expreſſion on a ſimilar occaſion, in relating the battle of Mantinæa.

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or expiring bodies of his generous defenders. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, reſentment, and deſpair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the ſuperſtitious ideas of paganiſm, the death of their king appeared to them a ſlight misfortune, compared with the diſgraceful impiety of committing his mangled remains to the inſults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmoſt valour, and their ſtrenuous efforts were ſucceſsful. But they could not obtain any further advantage. Epaminondas was careful to fortify his ranks, and to maintain his order of battle; and the firmneſs and rapidity of his regular aſſault gained a complete and deciſive victory over the deſperate reſiſtance of broken troops. The principal ſtrength of the allies had hitherto remained inactive, unwilling raſhly to engage in a battle, the motives of which they had never heartily approved. The defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of Cleombrotus, decided their wavering irreſolution. They determined, almoſt with one accord, to decline the engagement; their retreat was effected with the loſs of about two thouſand men; and the Thebans remained ſole maſters of the field[26].

The Spartans crave permiſſion to bury their dead.

The care of burying the dead, and the fear of reducing the enemy to deſpair, ſeem to have prevented Epaminondas from purſuing the vanquiſhed to their camp; which, as it was ſtrongly fortified, could not be taken without great ſlaughter of the

[26] Xenoph. p. 596, & ſeqq. & Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, & ſeqq.

aſſailants.

aſſailants. When the Lacedæmonians had aſſembled within the defence of their ditch and rampart, their ſecurity from immediate danger allowed them time to reflect with aſtoniſhment and ſorrow on the humiliating conſequences of their recent diſaſter. Whether they conſidered the number of the ſlain, or reflected on the mortifying loſs of national honour, it was eaſy for them to perceive, that, on no former occaſion, the glory of their country had ever received ſuch a fatal wound. Many Spartans declared their diſgrace too heavy to be borne; that they never would permit their ancient laurels to be buried under a Theban trophy; and that, inſtead of craving their dead under the protection of a treaty (which would be acknowledging their defeat), they were determined to return into the field, and to recover them by force of arms. This manly, but dangerous reſolution, was condemned in the council of war, by the officers of moſt experience and authority. They obſerved, that of ſeven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred had fallen; that the Lacedæmonians had loſt one thouſand, and the allies two thouſand ſix hundred. Their army indeed ſtill outnumbered that of the enemy; but their domeſtic forces formed ſcarcely the tenth part of their ſtrength, nor could they repoſe any confidence in the forced aſſiſtance of their reluctant confederates, who, emboldened by the misfortunes of Sparta, declared their unwillingneſs to renew the battle, and ſcarcely concealed their ſatis-

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faction at the humiliation and diſgrace of that haughty and tyrannical republic. Yielding, therefore, to the neceſſity of this miſerable juncture, the Spartans ſent a herald to crave their dead, and to acknowledge the victory of the Thebans [27].

News of the defeat at Leuctra brought to Sparta.

Before they found it convenient to return home, the fatal tidings had reached their capital; and, on this memorable occaſion, the Spartans exhibited that ſtriking peculiarity of behaviour, which naturally reſulted from the inſtitutions of Lycurgus. Availing himſelf of the extraordinary reſpect which uncultivated nations beſtow on military courage, in preference to all other virtues and accompliſhments, that legiſlator allowed to the man who had loſt his defenſive armour, or who had fled in the day of battle, but one melancholy alternative, more dreadful than death to a generous mind. The unfortunate ſoldier was either driven into perpetual baniſhment, and ſubjected to every indignity which, in a rude age, would naturally be inflicted by the reſentment of neighbouring and hoſtile tribes; or, if he ſubmitted to remain at home, he was excluded from the public aſſemblies, from every office of power or honour, from the protection of the laws, and almoſt from the ſociety of men, without the ſhadow of a hope ever to amend his condition. The influence of this ſtern law, which ſeems to have been forgotten in the field of Leuctra, was illuſtrated in a very ſtriking manner, after that unfortunate battle.

27 Xenoph. p. 596, & ſeqq. & Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, & ſeqq.

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Singular behaviour of the Spartans on that occaſion.

The meſſenger of bad news arrived, while the Spartans, according to annual cuſtom, were celebrating, in the month of July, gymnaſtic and muſical entertainments, and invoking Heaven to preſerve the fruits of the approaching autumn. Being introduced to the Ephori, he informed them of the public diſaſter. Theſe magiſtrates commanded the feſtival to proceed; ſending, however, to each family a liſt of the warriors whom it had loſt, and enjoining the women to abſtain from unavailing lamentations. Next day, the fathers and other relations of ſuch as had periſhed in the field of battle, appeared in the public places, dreſſed in their gayeſt attire, ſaluting and congratulating each other on the bravery of their brethren or children. But the kinſmen of thoſe who had ſaved themſelves by a ſhameful flight, either remained at home, brooding in ſilence over their domeſtic affliction, or, if they ventured abroad, diſcovered every ſymptom of unutterable anguiſh and deſpair. Their perſons were ſhamefully neglected, their garments rent, their arms folded, their eyes fixed immoveably on the ground; expecting, in humble reſignation, the ſentence of eternal ignominy ready to be denounced by the magiſtrate againſt the unworthy cauſes of their ſorrow [28]. But, on this critical emergency, the rigour of the Spartan diſcipline was mitigated by Ageſilaus, whom the number and rank of the criminals deterred from inflicting on them the merited puniſhment. He

[28] Xenoph. p. 596.

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endeavoured to atone for abandoning the ſpirit of the laws, by what may appear a very puerile expedient; "Let us ſuppoſe," ſaid he, "the ſacred inſtitutions of Lycurgus to have ſlept during one unfortunate day, but henceforth let them reſume their wonted vigour and activity:" a ſentence extravagantly praiſed by many writers, as preſerving the authority of the laws, while it ſpared the lives of the citizens. But as, on the one hand, we cannot diſcover the admired ſagacity of Ageſilaus in diſpenſing this act of lenity; ſo, on the other, we cannot condemn as imprudent the act itſelf, which the preſent circumſtances of his country rendered not only expedient, but neceſſary. If Sparta had been the populous capital of an extenſive territory, the lives of three hundred citizens might, perhaps, have been uſefully ſacrificed to the honour of military diſcipline. But a community exceedingly ſmall, and actually weakened by the loſs of four hundred members, could ſcarcely have ſurvived another blow equally deſtructive. No diſtant proſpect of advantage, therefore, could have juſtified ſuch an unſeaſonable ſeverity.

Deciſion of Ageſilaus reſpecting the vanquiſhed in the field of Leuctra.

When the intelligence was diffuſed over Greece, that the Thebans, with the loſs of only three hundred men, had raiſed an immortal trophy over the ſtrength and renown of Sparta, the importance of this event became every-where conſpicuous. The deſire, and hope, of a revolution in public affairs, filled the Peloponneſus with agitation and tumult. Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, every people

State of Greece after the battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii. 2. A.C. 371.

people who had been influenced by Spartan councils, or intimidated by Spartan power, openly aſpired at independence. The leſs conſiderable ſtates expected to remain thenceforth unmoleſted, no longer paying contributions, nor obeying every idle ſummons to war. The more powerful republics breathed hatred and revenge, and gloried in an opportunity of taking vengeance on the proud ſenators of Sparta, for the calamities which they had ſo often inflicted on their neighbours.

Affected moderation of Athens.

But amidſt this general ferment, and while every other people were guided rather by their paſſions and animoſities, than by the principles of juſtice or ſound policy, the Athenians exhibited an illuſtrious example of political moderation[29]. Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, a Theban herald, adorned with the emblems of peace and victory, had been diſpatched to Athens, in order to relate the particulars of the engagement, and to invite the Athenians to an offenſive alliance againſt a republic, which had ever proved the moſt dangerous, as well as the moſt inveterate enemy of their country. But the aſſembly of Athens, governed by the magnanimity, or rather by the prudence, of Timotheus and Iphicrates, determined to humble their rivals, not to deſtroy them.

Views of that republic.

The ancient and illuſtrious merit of the Spartans, their important ſervices during the Perſian war, and the fame of their laws and diſcipline, which ſtill rendered them a reſpectable branch of the Gre-

[29] Xenoph. p. 598.

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cian confederacy, might have a conſiderable influence in producing this reſolution. But it chiefly proceeded from a jealouſy of the growing power of Thebes, the ſituation of whoſe territories might ſoon render her a more formidable opponent to Athens, than even Sparta herſelf. This political conſideration for once prevailed over a deep-rooted national antipathy. The Theban herald was not received with reſpect, nor even with decency. He was not entertained in public, according to the eſtabliſhed hoſpitality of the Greeks; and although the ſenate of the Five Hundred (who uſually anſwered foreign ambaſſadors) was then aſſembled in the citadel, he was allowed to return home without receiving the ſmalleſt ſatisfaction on the ſubject of his demand. But the Athenians, though unwilling to ſecond the reſentment, and promote the proſperity of Thebes, prepared to derive every poſſible advantage from the misfortunes and diſtreſs of Sparta. Convinced that the inhabitants of Peloponneſus would no longer be inclined to follow her ſtandard, and ſhare her danger and adverſity, they eagerly ſeized the opportunity of delivering them for ever from her yoke; and, leſt any other people might attain the rank which the Spartans once held, and raiſe their own importance on the ruins of public freedom, ambaſſadors were ſent ſucceſſively to the ſeveral cities, requiring their reſpective compliance with the treaty of Antalcidas. Againſt ſuch as rejected this overture, war was denounced in the name of Athens and her allies; which was declaring to all

Greece.

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Greece, that the battle of Leuctra had put the balance of power in her hands, and that ſhe had determined to check the ambition of every republic whoſe views were too aſpiring [30].

The Thebans court the alliance of Jaſon of Theſſaly.

Diſappointed of the aſſiſtance of Athens, the Thebans had recourſe to an ally not leſs powerful. The extenſive and fertile territory of Theſſaly, which had been ſo long weakened by diviſion, was fortunately united under the government of Jaſon of Pheræ, a man whoſe abilities and enterpriſing ambition ſeemed deſtined to change the face of the ancient world [31]. To the native virtues of hoſpitality and magnificence, which peculiarly diſtinguiſhed his country, Jaſon added indefatigable labour and invincible courage, with a mind capable to conceive the loftieſt deſigns, and a character ready to promote them by the meaneſt artifices [32]. His family deſcended from the ancient kings of the heroic ages, and formed the wealthieſt houſe in Pheræ, which had already attained conſiderable pre-eminence over the neighbouring cities of Theſſaly. By contrivances extremely unworthy of that greatneſs to which they frequently conduct, Jaſon deceived his brothers and kinſmen, and appropriated almoſt the ſole uſe of his domeſtic opulence. With this he hired a well-appointed body of mercenaries, by whoſe aſſiſtance he acquired greater authority in Pheræ, than any former general or king had ever enjoyed [33]. But the go-

His character, and fortunes.

30 Xenoph. p. 602.
31 Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. & ſeqq.
32 Polyæn. Stratagem.
33 Plut. Polit. & ſan. tuend.

vernment

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vernment of a ſingle city could not ſatisfy his aſpiring mind. By ſtratagem, by ſurpriſe, or by force, he extended his dominion over the richeſt parts of Theſſaly, and was ready to graſp the whole, when his deſigns were obſtructed by the powerful oppoſition of Polydamas the Pharſalian [34].

His ambition oppoſed by Polydamas.

Next to Pheræ and Lariſſa, Pharſalus was the largeſt and moſt flouriſhing city in that northern diviſion of Greece. But the inhabitants, diſtracted by factions, exhauſted their ſtrength in civil diſcord and ſedition, until a ray of wiſdom illuminating both parties, they committed their differences, and themſelves, to the probity and patriotiſm of Polydamas, which were equally reſpected at home and abroad. For ſeveral years Polydamas commanded the citadel, and adminiſtered juſtice and the finances with ſuch diligence and fidelity, as might reaſonably have entitled him to the glorious appellation of Father of his country. He firmly oppoſed and counteracted the ſecret practices, as well as the open deſigns of Jaſon, who eagerly ſolicited his friendſhip by every motive that could actuate a mind of leſs determined integrity.

Conference between them.

At a conference which was held between them at Pharſalus, where Jaſon had come alone and unattended, the better to gain the confidence of a generous adverſary, the Pheræan diſplayed the

34 Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. & ſeqq.

magnitude of his power and reſources, which it ſeemed impoſſible for the weakneſs of Pharſalus to reſiſt; and promiſed, that, on ſurrendering the citadel of that place, which muſt otherwiſe ſoon yield to force, Polydamas ſhould enjoy in Theſſaly the ſecond rank after himſelf; that he would regard him as his friend and colleague; nor could there remain a doubt that their united labours might raiſe their common country to that ſtation in Greece which it had been long entitled to hold. That the ſubjugation of the neighbouring ſtates opened vaſter proſpects, which forced themſelves irreſiſtibly on his mind, when he conſidered the natural advantages of Theſſaly, the fertility of the ſoil, the ſwiftneſs of the horſes, the diſciplined bravery and martial ardour of the inhabitants, with whom no nation in Europe, or in Aſia, was able to contend.

Determined integrity of Polydamas.

Polydamas heard with pleaſure the praiſes of his native land, and admired the magnanimity of Jaſon. But he obſerved, that his fellow-citizens had honoured him with a truſt which it was impoſſible for him ever to betray; and that their community ſtill enjoyed the alliance of Sparta, from which the neighbouring cities had revolted. That he was determined to demand the protection of that republic; and if the Lacedæmonians were willing and able to afford him any effectual aſſiſtance, he would defend to the laſt extremity the walls of Pharſalus. Jaſon commended his integrity and patriotiſm, which, he declared, inſpired

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ſpired him with the warmer deſire to obtain the friendſhip of ſuch an illuſtrious character.

Jaſon declared leader of the Theſſalians. Olymp. cii. 3. A.C. 370.

Soon afterwards Polydamas went to Sparta, and propoſed his demand in the council; exhorting the magiſtrates not only to undertake the expedition, but to undertake it with vigour; for if they expected to oppoſe the forces of Jaſon by their undiſciplined peaſants, or half-armed ſlaves, they would infallibly bring diſgrace on themſelves, and ruin on their confederates. The Lacedæmonians were deeply engaged in the Theban war, which had been hitherto carried on unſucceſsfully. They prudently declined, therefore, the invitation of Polydamas; who, returning to Theſſaly, held a ſecond conference with Jaſon. He ſtill refuſed to ſurrender the citadel, but promiſed to uſe his beſt endeavours for making the Pharſalians ſubmit of their own accord; and offered his only ſon as a pledge of his fidelity. Jaſon accepted the offer, and, by the influence of Polydamas, was ſoon afterwards declared captain-general of Pharſalus and all Theſſaly; a modeſt appellation, under which he enjoyed the full extent of royal power [35]

His admirable diſcipline;

He began his reign by adjuſting, with equity and preciſion, the proportion of taxes, and the contingent of troops, to be raiſed by the ſeveral cities in his dominions. The new levies added to his ſtanding army of mercenaries, amounted to eight thouſand horſe, twenty thouſand heavy-

35 Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. 1. & ſeqq. & Diodor. Sicul. l. xv. p. 488.

armed foot, and ſuch a body of targeteers, as no nation of antiquity could match [36]. But numbers formed the leaſt advantageous diſtinction of the army of Jaſon. Every day he exerciſed his troops in perſon; diſpenſed rewards and puniſhments; caſhiered the ſlothful and effeminate; honoured the brave and diligent with double, and ſometimes treble pay, with large donatives in money, and with ſuch other preſents as peculiarly ſuited their reſpective taſtes. By this judicious plan of military adminiſtration, the ſoldiers of Jaſon became alike attached to their duty, and to the perſon of their general, whoſe ſtandard they were ready to follow into any part of the world [37]. CHAP. XXX.

He began his military operations by ſubduing the Dryopes [38], the Dolopians, and the other ſmall but warlike tribes, inhabiting the long and intricate chain of mounts Oeta and Pindus, which form the ſouthern frontier of Theſſaly. Then turning northwards, he ſtruck terror into Macedon, and compelled Amyntas to become his ally, and moſt probably his tributary. Thus fortified on both ſides, he retaliated the inroads of the Phocians, who had long profited of the diviſions, and inſulted the weakneſs, of his country; and by conquering the ſmall and uncultivated diſtrict of Epirus, which then formed a barbarous princi- and rapid ſucceſs.

[36] Xenophon expreſſes it more ſtrongly; πελταστικον γε μην ικανον προς παντας ανθρωπους αντιταχθηναι, p. 600.

[37] Xenoph. p. 600. [38] Strabo, l. viii. p. 299.

pality

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pality under Alcetas[39], an anceſtor of the renowned Pyrrhus, he extended the dominion of Theſſaly from the Ægean to the Ionian ſea, and encompaſſed, as with a belt, the utmoſt breadth of the Grecian republics.

His views on Greece.

It cannot be doubted that the ſubjugation, or at leaſt the command, of thoſe immortal commonwealths, was the aim of the Theſſalian prince, who declared to his friends, that he expected, by the aſſiſtance of Greece, to imitate the glorious example of Cyrus and Ageſilaus, and to effect, by the united ſtrength of the confederacy, what theſe generals had nearly accompliſhed by a body of ten or twelve thouſand ſoldiers[40]. While the Spartans, however, preſerved their long-boaſted pre-eminence, and regarded it as their hereditary and unalienable right to conduct their confederates to war, Jaſon could not hope to obtain the principal command in an Aſiatic expedition. As the natural enemy of that haughty people, he rejoiced in their unproſperous war againſt the Thebans; nor could he receive ſmall ſatisfaction from beholding the ſouthern ſtates of Greece engaged in perpetual warfare, while he himſelf maintained a reſpected neutrality, and watched the firſt favour-

39 In ſpeaking of Arrybas (the ſon of Alcetas, and the grandfather of Pyrrhus), who received his education at Athens, Juſtin ſays, "Quanto doctior majoribus ſuis, tanto et gratior populo fuit. Primus itaque leges & ſenatum annuoſque magiſtratûs & reipublicæ formam compoſuit. Et ut a Pyrrho ſedes, ſic vita cultior populo ab Arryba ſtatuta."

40 Xenoph. p. 600.

able

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able occaſion of interfering, with deciſive effect, in the final ſettlement of that country.

His alliance with Thebes.

He ſeldom ventured indeed into the Peloponneſus; but, in order to examine matters more nearly, he undertook, upon very extraordinary pretences, ſeveral journeys to Athens and Thebes. From policy, and perhaps from inclination, he had formed an intimate connection with the moſt diſtinguiſhed characters of thoſe republics, and particularly with Pelopidas and Timotheus. The latter, after ſerving his country with equal glory and ſucceſs, was, according to the uſual fortune of Athenian commanders, expoſed to a cruel perſecution of his rivals and enemies, which endangered his honour and his life. On the day of trial, the admirers and friends of that great man appeared in the Athenian aſſembly, in order to intercede with his judges; and, among the reſt, Jaſon, habited in the robe of a ſuppliant, humbly ſoliciting the releaſe of Timotheus, from a people who would not probably have denied a much greater favour to the ſimple recommendation of ſo powerful a prince[41]. In a viſit to Thebes, he endeavoured to gain or ſecure the attachment of Epaminondas, by large preſents and promiſes; but the illuſtrious Theban, whoſe independent and honourable poverty had rejected the aſſiſtance of his friends and fellow-citizens, ſpurned with diſdain the inſolent generoſity of a ſtranger[42]. Yet, by the intervention of Pelopidas, Jaſon contracted

[41] Demoſthenes, & Cornel. Nepos in Timoth.
[42] Plut. Apophtheg.

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an engagement of hoſpitality with the Thebans, in conſequence of which he was invited to join their arms, after their memorable victory at Leuctra.

Rapidity of his movements.

The Theſſalian prince accepted the invitation, though his deſigns reſpecting Greece were not yet ripe for execution. He was actually engaged in war with the Phocians, of which, whatever might be the pretence, the real object was to obtain the ſuperintendence of the Delphic oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure. To avoid marching through a hoſtile territory, he ordered his gallies to be equipped, as if he had intended to proceed by ſea to the coaſt of Bœotia. His naval preparations amuſed the attention of the Phocians, while Jaſon entered their country with a body of two thouſand light horſe, and advanced with ſuch rapidity that he was every where the firſt meſſenger of his own arrival.

His views in mediating a truce between Thebes and Sparta.

By this unuſual celerity, he joined, without encountering any obſtacle, the army of the Thebans, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Leuctra, at no great diſtance from the enemy. Inſtead of an auxiliary, Jaſon thought it more ſuitable to his intereſt to act the part of a mediator. He exhorted the Thebans to reſt ſatisfied with the advantages which they had already obtained, without driving their adverſaries to deſpair; that the recent hiſtory of their own republic and of Sparta, ſhould teach them to remember the viciſſitudes of fortune. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, he reminded of the difference between a victorious

victorious and vanquiſhed army. That the preſent criſis ſeemed totally adverſe to the re-eſtabliſhment of their greatneſs; that they ſhould yield to the fatality of circumſtances, and watch a more favourable opportunity to reſtore the tarniſhed luſtre of their arms. His arguments prevailed; hoſtilities were ſuſpended; the terms of a peace were propoſed and accepted: but it is remarkable, that the Spartans and their allies had ſo little confidence in this ſudden negociation, that they decamped the night following, and continued to march homeward, with the diligence of diſtruſt and fear, until they got entirely beyond reach of the Thebans[43].

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Jaſon had not, probably, more confidence in a treaty haſtily concluded between enemies, whoſe reſentments were irritated and inflamed by ſo many mutual injuries offered and retorted. Nothing could have been more contrary to his views than a ſincere and laſting peace between theſe powerful republics; but as this was not to be apprehended, he wiſhed to obtain the reputation of appeaſing the diſſenſions of Greece; a circumſtance of great importance to the accompliſhment of his ambitious deſigns.

In his return home, he demoliſhed the walls of Heraclea, a town ſituate near the ſtraits of Thermopylæ; not fearing, ſays his hiſtorian[44], that any of the Greek ſtates ſhould invade his dominions from that ſide, but unwilling to leave a

He is aſſaſſinated in the midſt of his projects. Olymp. cii. 3. A. C. 370.

43 Xenoph. p. 600. 44 Ibid. p. 599.

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place of ſuch ſtrength on his frontier, which, if ſeized by a powerful neighbour, might obſtruct his paſſage into Greece. Thither he determined to return at the celebration of the Pythian games, at which he meant to claim the right of preſiding, as an honour due both to his piety and to his power. He commanded, therefore, the cities and villages of Theſſaly to fatten ſheep, goats, ſwine, and oxen, and propoſed honourable rewards to ſuch diſtricts as furniſhed the beſt victims for the altars of Apollo. Without any burthenſome impoſition on his ſubjects, he collected a thouſand oxen, and, of ſmaller cattle, to the number of ten thouſand. At the ſame time, he prepared the whole military ſtrength of his kingdom, by whoſe aſſiſtance, ſtill more effectually than by the merit of his ſacrifices, he might maintain his pretenſions to the ſuperintendence of the games, the direction of the oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure, which he regarded as ſo many previous ſteps to the conqueſt of Greece and Aſia. But, amidſt theſe lofty projects, Jaſon, while reviewing the Pheræan cavalry, was ſtabbed by ſeven youths, who approached him, on pretence of demanding juſtice againſt each other. Two of the aſſaſſins were diſpatched by his guards. Five mounted fleet horſes, which had been prepared for their uſe, and eſcaped to the Grecian republics, in which they were received with univerſal acclamations of joy, and honoured as the ſaviours of their country from the formidable power of a brave but ambi-

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tious tyrant [45]. The projects and the empire of Jaſon periſhed with himſelf; Theſſaly, as we ſhall have occaſion to explain, relapſed into its former ſtate of diviſion and weakneſs: but it is the buſineſs of hiſtory to relate not only great actions, but great deſigns; and even the deſigns of Jaſon announce the approaching downfal of Grecian freedom.

45 Xenoph. & Diodor. ibid. & Valerius Maximus, l. ix.

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Tumults in the Peloponneſus.—Invaſion of Laconia.—Epaminondas rebuilds Meſſené.—Foundation of Megalopolis.—Archidamus reſtores the Fortune of Sparta.—Affairs of Theſſaly and Macedon.—Negociations for Peace.—The Pretenſions of Thebes rejected.—Epaminondas invades the Peloponneſus.—Revolutions in Achaia.—Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council.—Deſigns of Thebes.—Diſconcerted by Athens.—Pelopidas's Expedition in Theſſaly.—The Arcadians ſeize the Olympic Treaſure.—Battle of Mantinæa.—Ageſilaus's Expedition into Egypt.

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History of the laſt ſtage of Grecian freedom.

THE death of Jaſon removed the terror of Greece; but of a country which owed its ſafety to the arm of an aſſaſſin, the condition may juſtly be regarded as extremely unſtable and precarious. There elapſed, however, thirty-three years of diſcord and calamity, before the Greeks finally experienced, in Philip of Macedon, ſuch ambition and abilities as enabled him fully to accompliſh the lofty deſigns of the Theſſalian. The hiſtory of this laſt ſtage of tumultuous liberty comprehends the bloody, but indeciſive wars, which exhauſted Greece during eleven years that intervened between the battle of Leuctra, and the acceſſion of Philip to the Macedonian throne, together with the active reign of that prince; a memorable period of twenty-two years, illuminated by the

the ſucceſs and glory of Macedon, and clouded by the diſgrace and ruin of the Grecian republics. CHAP. XXXI.

The unexpected iſſue of the battle of Leuctra was doubly prejudicial to the Spartans, by weakening their own confederacy, and ſtrengthening that of their enemies. In leſs than two years after that important event, the alliance in Peloponneſus, over which Sparta had ſo long maintained an aſcendant, was totally diſſolved, and moſt cities had changed not only their foreign connections, but their domeſtic laws and government. During the ſame period, the confederacy, of which Thebes was the head, had, on the contrary, been very widely extended. Many communities of the Peloponneſus courted her protection; and, in the north of Greece, the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, the whole breadth of the continent, from the Ionian to the Ægean ſea, and even the iſle of Eubœa, increaſed the power, and in ſome meaſure acknowledged the dominion of Thebes. The hiſtory of theſe revolutions is very imperfectly related by ancient writers; but their conſequences were too remarkable not to be attended to and explained. The Peloponneſians, after being delivered from the oppreſſion of the Spartan yoke, were ſubjected to the more deſtructive tyranny of their own ungovernable paſſions[1]. Every ſtate and every city was torn by factions, which frequently blazed forth into the moſt violent ſeditions. The exiles from ſeveral republics were nearly as numerous as thoſe who

Tumults and ſeditions in the Peloponneſus after the battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii. 3. A.C. 370.

[1] Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, & ſeqq. Iſocrat. in Archidam. & de Pace.

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had expelled them. Fourteen hundred were baniſhed from Tegea; two thouſand[2] were ſlain in Argos; in many places the contending factions alternately prevailed; and thoſe who, in the firſt encounter, had got poſſeſſion of the government and the capital, were ſometimes attacked[3] and conquered by the numerous fugitives, who formed a camp in the adjoining territory. The Mantinæans alone ſeem to have acted wiſely. With one accord, and with equal diligence, they laboured to rebuild their walls, which the inſolence of Sparta had demoliſhed. The work was ſoon brought to a concluſion; and the Mantinæans, united in one democracy, fully determined thenceforth to preſerve the ſtrength of their city, which appeared neceſſary to maintain their political independence.

The exiles fly to Sparta.

Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans immediately interfered in this ſcene of diſorder. The former found ſufficient employment for their arms and negociations in the northern parts of Greece; and the latter were ſo much humbled by their defeat at Leuctra, that they contented themſelves with preparing to defend the banks of the Eurotas, and to repel the expected aſſault of their capital. For this purpoſe they had armed the aged and infirm, who were legally exempted from military

[2] This number is made out by comparing different authors, and uniting in one view the different ſcenes of the ſedition, which is called the Scytaliſm by Diodorus (ubi ſupra), and Pauſanias (Corinth), from the Greek word σκυταλη, ſignifying a club, which, it ſeems, was the principal inſtrument of ſlaughter.

[3] Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, & ſeqq.

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ſervice [4]. They had commanded into the field even thoſe citizens who were employed in ſuch ſacred and civil offices as are deemed moſt uſeful in ſociety; and, as their laſt reſource, they talked of giving arms to the Helots. But the convulſions of Peloponneſus ſoon ſupplied them with leſs dangerous auxiliaries [5]. The incenſed partiſans of ariſtocracy, who had been expelled from Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, had recourſe to the moſt ancient and diſtinguiſhed patrons of their political principles. Encouraged by this ſeaſonable reinforcement, the Spartans ſet at defiance the Theban invaſion, by which they had been ſo long threatened, and ſent a conſiderable detachment to recover their loſt authority in Arcadia. But it was the fate of Sparta, to regain neither in that, nor in any other ſtate of the Peloponneſus, the influence which ſhe had loſt in the field of Leuctra. Polytropos, who commanded her allies in this expedition, was defeated and ſlain in the firſt rencounter with the Arcadians and Lycomedes, their intrepid and magnanimous leader. Nor did Ageſilaus perform any thing deciſive againſt the enemy. He was contented with ravaging the villages and delightful fields of Arcadia, in which he met with little reſiſtance from the inhabitants, who declined an engagement, until they ſhould be joined by the Theban confederacy, whoſe aſſiſtance they had ſent to ſolicit, and had juſt reaſon to expect [6].

That republic attempts in vain to recover her authority in Arcadia.

4 Xenoph. l. vi. p. 597. 5 Id. p. 603. 6 Id. p. 605.

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The Thebans take the field at the head of their allies. Olymp. cii. 4. A.C. 369.

At length the far-renowned Thebans took the field, having carefully pondered their own ſtrength, and collected into one body the flower and vigour of their numerous allies. They were accompanied by the warlike youth of the towns and villages of Bœotia, by the Acarnanians, Phocians, Locrians, and Eubœans, and by a promiſcuous crowd of needy fugitives, who were attracted to their camp by the allurement of plunder. They had no ſooner arrived on the frontier of Arcadia, than they were joined by the inhabitants of that country, as well as by the Elians and Argives. This united maſs of war exceeded any numbers, that either before or afterwards ever aſſembled in Greece under one ſtandard, amounting to fifty, ſome ſay to ſeventy thouſand men [7]. The Thebans, and the reſt of the Bœotians, were commanded by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to whom the generous admiration of their colleagues had voluntarily reſigned their authority. Appriſed of the march of ſuch a formidable army, conducted by generals of ſuch unqueſtionable merit, Ageſilaus prepared to evacuate Arcadia, a meaſure which he fortunately effected, before his ſoldiers beheld the fires kindled in the hoſtile camp, and thus avoided the diſgrace of retiring before the enemy [8]. His unreſiſted devaſtation of the territory which he had invaded, as well as his ſucceſsful retreat, gave freſh ſpirits to his followers, and made them return with better

The Spartans evacuate Arcadia.

7 The numbers differ in Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. Pauſan. Bœotic. Diodorus, l. xv. & Plut. in Pelopid.

8 Xenoph. p. 606.

hopes

hopes to defend their own country, which was now threatened with invaſion. CHAP. XXXI.

Invaſion of Laconia.

The Thebans, though they had no longer any occaſion to protect the Arcadians from inſult, were determined[9], by many powerful motives, to employ the vaſt preparations which they had collected. Their particular reſentment againſt Sparta was heightened by the general voice of their allies, who exhorted them to embrace an opportunity which, perhaps, might never return, utterly to deſtroy a people who neither could enjoy tranquillity, nor allow their neighbours to enjoy it. The inhabitants of Carya, and of ſeveral other towns in Laconia, declared their reſolution to revolt from Sparta, as ſoon as the enemy ſhould enter their boundaries. In a council of war ſummoned by the Theban generals, it was therefore determined to march without farther delay into the Lacedæmonian territories, to lay waſte the country, and, if poſſible, to take poſſeſſion of the capital.

Brave defence of the diſtrict Sciritis.

That this reſolution might be executed with the greater celerity and effect, the army was thrown into four diviſions, deſtined, by ſeparate roads, to break into the devoted province, to join forces at Sellaſia, and thence to march in one body to Sparta. The Bœotians, Elians, and Argives, penetrated, without oppoſition, by the particular

9 They at firſt oppoſed the eagerneſs of the Arcadians, Elians, and Argives, for invading Laconia, conſidering ὁτι δυσιμβαλωτατη μεν ἡ Λακωνικη ελεγετο ειναι, φρουρας δε καθιστασθαι νομιζον επι τοις ευπροσοδωτατοις. "That it would be difficult to penetrate into a country defended by the natural ſtrength of its frontier, or by vigilant garriſons." Xenoph. p. 607.

routes

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routes which had been aſſigned them. But when the Arcadians, who formed the fourth diviſion of the army, attempted to traverſe the diſtrict Sciritis, the brave Iſchilas, who guarded that important paſs, determined to repel them, or to periſh. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ kindled a generous enthuſiaſm in the breaſt of this gallant Spartan. The number of the Arcadian levies ſo far exceeded his own, that death ſeemed the ſure reward of his courage. Yet he exhorted all thoſe to decline danger who were not ambitious to ſhare it. He even *commanded* the youth to leave his camp before the engagement, deeming their lives too precious to be riſked in ſo deſperate an enterpriſe. He, with the old ſoldiers who followed him, choſe the preſent opportunity to meet a glorious death in defence of their country. But their lives were ſold dearly. The action was long doubtful; the loſs of the Arcadians great; nor did the battle ceaſe till the laſt of the Spartans had periſhed [10].

Deva-ſtation of Laconia.

The confederates having ſoon after aſſembled at Sellaſia, the place of rendezvous, marched forward to Sparta, burning and deſtroying all before them. During five hundred years Laconia had not experienced a ſimilar calamity. The guards who defended the city were thrown into conſternation. The women were terrified by the ſmoke and tumult raiſed by the invaders; a ſpectacle, con-

10 Xenoph. l. vi. p. 607. & Diodor. l. xv. p. 376. The former indeed adds, ει μη τις αμφιγνοηθεις διεφυγε, "Unleſs, perhaps, ſome one eſcaped unknown through the enemy."

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cerning which it had been their uſual boaſt, that they alone of all the Grecian females, had never beheld it in their native land. Alarmed by the danger which threatened them, and which they were ſenſible of their own inability to repel, the Spartans embraced the doubtful expedient of giving arms to their peaſants and ſlaves, whom they commonly treated with ſuch an exceſs of cruelty. Not leſs than ſix thouſand of theſe unhappy men were engaged, by threats or promiſes, to undertake the reluctant defence of the proud tyrants, whom they deteſted. Their formidable numbers increaſed the general panic, which had ſeized the magiſtrates and citizens, and which did not finally ceaſe until the arrival of a powerful body of men from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Pallené; cities which, though they had ever oppoſed the *deſpotiſm*, were unwilling to permit the *deſtruction* of Sparta.

Vigilant intrepidity of Ageſilaus.

This ſeaſonable reinforcement not only removed the conſternation of the Spartans, but made them paſs with rapidity from the depths of deſpondency to the joys of ſucceſs. The kings and magiſtrates could ſcarcely reſtrain their impetuoſity from ruſhing into the field: and this martial enthuſiaſm, guided by the conſummate prudence of Ageſilaus, enabled them to repel the firſt aſſaults of the enemy, and to convince them that every ſucceeding attempt to get poſſeſſion of the city, muſt be attended with ſuch fatigue, and danger, and loſs of men, as could not be compenſated by the ſucceſs of that enterpriſe. The conduct of Ageſilaus, during this critical emergency, has been highly extolled by all writers,

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writers [11], and never beyond its merit. By a well-contrived ambuſh in the temple of the Tyndaridæ [12], he defeated the deſigns of the aſſailants: by very uncommon preſence of mind [13], he quelled a dangerous inſurrection; and while, by force or ſtratagem, he overcame the united efforts of domeſtic and foreign enemies, he negociated the moſt powerful aſſiſtance for the relief of his country.

The Spartans and their allies negociate at Athens a treaty of defence.

Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians had declared their reſolution to renew and confirm the treaty of Antalcidas, which, though it diminiſhed the grandeur, yet ſecured the tranquillity of Greece, and prevented the weakneſs of any one republic from falling a prey to the ambition of another. But notwithſtanding this declaration, which was univerſally approved by their neighbours, they had, either from reſentment or from policy, remained above two years ſpectators of the decline of the Lacedæmonian, and the growth of the Theban league. Whatever uneaſineſs might be occaſioned by the increaſing ſtrength of their

[11] Xenoph. & Plut. in Ageſilao. Diodorus, l. xv. & Pauſanias Lacon.

[12] Caſtor and Pollux, ſo called from their mother Tyndaris, or Leda.

[13] The mutineers had entered into a conſpiracy to ſeize an important poſt in the city. Ageſilaus obſerved them as they marched thither, and immediately ſuſpecting their deſign, called out, that they had miſtaken his orders; adding his meaning to be, that they ſhould ſeparate into different diviſions, and repair to the ſeveral poſts which he named. The conſpirators naturally concluded that he knew nothing of their purpoſe, and ſeparating, as he commanded, could never afterwards find an opportunity to unite in ſuch numbers as rendered them dangerous.

new

new rival, was ſufficiently balanced by the decay and downfal of their ancient and inveterate enemy. But though, doubtleſs, they ardently deſired the ruin of the Spartan power, they could not ſincerely approve the cruel deſtruction of their perſons, and of their city. When informed of the terrible devaſtation of Laconia, they naturally felt a return of compaſſion for a people, whoſe exploits, on many memorable occaſions, had done ſuch ſignal honour to the Grecian name. CHAP. XXXI.

The emiſſaries of Ageſilaus, whoſe ſuperior mind had aſſumed dictatorial power amidſt the diſtreſs of his country, ſeized the favourable opportunity to urge, with the Athenians, many motives of action, which ſeldom operate amidſt the cold lifeleſs politics of modern times. They took notice that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had often mutually aſſiſted each other in ſeaſons of diſtreſs, and that the moſt glorious æra of their ſtory was that in which the two republics had united their councils and meaſures againſt a common enemy. That when the ſpirit of rivality and ambition had unhappily divided Greece, and the Athenians were expoſed to the calamities of a long and unfortunate war, they had been protected by the humanity of Sparta againſt the implacable rage of the Thebans, who wiſhed to demoliſh the city of Athens, and to reduce its territory to the barren ſolitude of the Criſſean plain. That by the moderation of Sparta, the Athenians had not only been ſaved from the vengeance of foreign enemies, but deliveted from the yoke of domeſtic tyrants, and the cruel tyranny of Arguments which they employed for this purpoſe.

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of the Piſiſtratidæ. The merit of theſe ſervices deſerved the reward of gratitude; the hereditary renown of Athens urged her to protect the miſerable; and juſtice demanded that ſhe ſhould aſſert, and maintain, the conditions of a recent treaty, which ſhe herſelf had propoſed, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had ſo manifeſtly violated.

How received by the Athenians.

A loud and diſcordant murmur ran through the aſſembly. Some approved the demand, others obſerved that the Spartans changed their language with their fortune; that they had formerly, and probably would again, whenever they became powerful, aſſume a very different tone, and, inſtead of colouring by falſe diſguiſes, diſplay in its native force, their inveterate enmity to Athens. That the late treaty of peace could not entitle them to any aſſiſtance, ſince they themſelves had begun the war by the invaſion of Arcadia; a war undertaken from the unjuſt motive of ſupporting the tyrannical uſurpation of the nobles of Tegea over the rights of their fellow-citizens.

Speech of Cleiteles the Corinthian.

Together with the Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors, had come thoſe of Corinth and Phlius, cities eminently diſtinguiſhed by an unſhaken fidelity to their ancient confederate and protector. Cleiteles the Corinthian, obſerving what turn the debate was likely to take, ſtood up and ſaid, "Were it a matter of doubt, Athenians! who are the aggreſſors, the melancholy experience of *our* ſtate would remove the difficulty. Since the renovation of the peace of Antalcidas, the Corinthians, ſurely, have not

not committed hoſtilities againſt any power in Greece. Yet the Thebans have entered our territory, cut down our trees, burned our houſes, plundered our cattle and effects. How, then, can you refuſe your aſſiſtance to thoſe who have been ſo manifeſtly injured, in direct violation of the treaty, to which, at your expreſs deſire, they acceded and ſwore?" The aſſembly loudly approved the diſcourſe of Cleiteles, which was ſupported and confirmed by the arguments and eloquence of Patrocles the Phliaſian.

Of Patrocles the Phliaſian.

" It is manifeſt, I think, to all of you, Athenians! that ſhould Sparta be deſtroyed, Athens muſt be the next object of the hoſtility of Thebes, ſince that city alone would then ſtand in the way of her ambition. The cauſe of the Lacedæmonians therefore is, in fact, your own. You muſt embrace it with ardour, as the laſt opportunity which the gods perhaps will afford you, of defending the general freedom at the head of your allies, and of preventing the dangerous domination of the Thebans; the effects of which, you, who are their neighbours, would feel with peculiar ſeverity. By taking this reſolution, which is equally generous and ſalutary, you will acquire a fund of merit, not only with the Spartans, than whom none were ever more mindful of favours, or more ambitious of honeſt fame, but alſo with us their allies, who, ſince we have continued faithful to our friends in their adverſity, cannot be ſuſpected of ingratitude to our proſperous benefactors. I have heard with admiration how, in ancient times, the injured and afflicted

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afflicted always had recourſe to Athens, and were never diſappointed of relief. I now no longer hear, but ſee, the Lacedæmonians, with their faithful allies, ſoliciting your protection againſt the Thebans, whoſe unrelenting cruelty could not perſuade Sparta, in the height of her reſentment and of her power, to deſolate your country, and to reduce you into ſervitude. Your anceſtors acquired juſt renown by ſaving the dead bodies of the Argives, to whom the impiety of Thebes denied the ſacred rites of burial[14]. How much greater renown will redound to you, when the Lacedæmonians, by your generous aſſiſtance, ſhall be ſaved from death. It was deemed meritorious in *them* to have defended the children of Hercules againſt the unnatural perſecution of Euryſtheus; but it will be far more glorious for *you* to have defended not only the deſcendants of that hero, the hereditary kings of Lacedæmon, but, along with them, the ſenate, the magiſtrates, the people; in one word, to have delivered the whole nation from a danger dreadful in itſelf, and otherwiſe inevitable. During the proſperity of their empire, the Lacedæmonians prevented your deſtruction by a decree, which diſplayed their humanity, without expoſing their ſafety. You are called to defend the Lacedæmonians, not by inactive decrees, but by arms and courage. Arm, then, in their behalf; and, forgetful of recent animoſities, repay the important

[14] See vol. i. c. i. p. 26. The facts alluded to in the text are related in all the panegyrics of Athens, by Plato, Lyſias, Iſocrates, and Thucydides.

ſervices

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ſervices which, in the Barbarian war, the valour of Sparta rendered to Athens and to all Greece."

The aſſembly was ſo deeply affected by the perſuaſive diſcourſe of the Phliaſian, that they refuſed to hear any thing in oppoſition to it, and determined, almoſt unanimouſly, to take the field. Iphicrates was named general; twelve thouſand men were ordered to repair to his ſtandard; the ſacrifices were propitious; the troops took a ſhort repaſt; and ſuch was their ardour to meet the enemy, that many of them marched forth without waiting the orders of their commander [15].

Iphicrates, with twelve thouſand men, ſent to defend Laconia.

Epaminondas, meanwhile, had committed dreadful devaſtation in Laconia. His repulſe from the capital had exaſperated his hoſtilities againſt the country. He had deſolated the fertile banks of the Eurotas, which were thick planted with houſes, and abounding in all the conveniencies of life known to the auſtere ſimplicity of Sparta. He had aſſaulted Helos and Gythium; and, traverſing the whole province, had deſtroyed the villages by fire, and the inhabitants by the ſword. Even theſe terrible ravages did not ſatisfy his reſentment; he determined, that the invaſion of Laconia ſhould not be a temporary evil, which the labour of years might repair; and for this purpoſe employed an expedient, which, even after he might evacuate their country, muſt leave the Lacedæmonians expoſed to the rage of an implacable enemy.

Epaminondas continues his ravages in that province.

We have had occaſion to relate the various fortunes of the Meſſenians. About three centuries

Rebuilds Meſſené. Olymp. cii. 2. A. C. 369.

[15] This whole tranſaction is explained in Xenoph. p. 609—613.

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before the period now under review, their city had been demoliſhed by the Spartans; their territory had been ſeized, and divided among that people; the ancient inhabitants had been reduced into ſervitude, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of cruel maſters; or diſperſed in miſerable baniſhment, over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. After two centuries of humiliation and calamity, the humanity, or perhaps the policy of Athens, took compaſſion on this unfortunate race, and ſettled them in the territory of Naupactus, and the neighbouring iſland of Cephalenia. The Meſſenians diſplayed their gratitude by important ſervices during the Peloponneſian war; but their moſt vigorous exertions could not long retard the declining fortune of Athens. The event of that war rendered Sparta the arbiter of Greece; and the Meſſenians were the firſt objects of her memorable tyranny, being univerſally enſlaved, baniſhed, or put to death. It is probable that the ſcattered remains of this miſerable community would flock from every quarter to the ſtandard of Epaminondas, rejoicing in an opportunity to retaliate the unrelenting perſecution of a people who now ſuffered the calamities which they had ſo often inflicted. But the general voice of hiſtory aſcribes to Epaminondas the merit of aſſembling the Meſſenians[16]. It is certain, that he rebuilt their city, and put them in poſſeſſion of their territory; an act of generous compaſſion which inflicted a moſt unex-

16 Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 491. Pauſan. Meſſen. p. 265.

pected

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pected and cruel puniſhment on the Spartans, who beheld the aſhes of a nation, which they had twice endeavoured to extinguiſh, revive and flouriſh in their neighbourhood; continually increaſe by the acceſſion of Spartan ſubjects and ſlaves; and, encouraged by a Theban garriſon, and their own inveterate hoſtility, watch every favourable occaſion to exert the full power of their vengeance[17].

The Athenians take the field.

Epaminondas had accompliſhed this extraordinary enterpriſe, when he received intelligence of the motions of the Athenian army commanded by Iphicrates. That illuſtrious general had allowed the ardour of his troops to evaporate, by purſuing a conduct which it is impoſſible, at this diſtance of time, to explain, but which the military hiſtorian[18] condemns, as highly unworthy of his former renown. When celerity was of the utmoſt importance, he waſted ſeveral precious days at Corinth, without any neceſſity, or even pretence, for this unſeaſonable delay. His ſoldiers loudly demanded to meet the enemy, or even to aſſault the walls of Argos, the ſtrongeſt and moſt populous city in Peloponneſus, and not inferior to Thebes itſelf in active animoſity againſt their common foe. Iphicrates, however, embraced none of thoſe meaſures, but led his army towards Arcadia; expecting, perhaps, what actually happened, that the news of his arrival there would deliver Laconia from the hoſtile invader.

The Thebans evacuate Laconia.

It cannot be imagined, indeed, that Epaminondas feared the iſſue of an engagement with the

[17] Diodor. l. xv. c. 16. [18] Xenoph. l. vi. verſus finem.

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Athenians. But he was juſtly alarmed with the intereſt which even that people had taken in the danger of Sparta. The indignation and reſentment which they, the rivals and enemies of the injured, diſcovered on this occaſion, taught him what ſentiments his conduct muſt excite in more impartial ſtates, ſhould he perſiſt in his original plan, deſtroy the Lacedæmonian capital, and, as the orator Leptines expreſſed it, "pluck out an eye of Greece[19]." Many concurring cauſes tended alſo to accelerate his departure. The Arcadians were called home to defend their houſes and families. The Elians and Argives were anxious to ſecure their booty by an expeditious retreat. Even the Thebans were weary of an expedition which had conſumed ſeveral winter months, a ſeaſon in which they were not accuſtomed to keep the field. Proviſions likewiſe grew ſcarce; and Epaminondas, preſſed by difficulties on every ſide, prepared to evacuate the Lacedæmonian territories; but not (in the words of Xenophon) until "every thing of value had been conſumed or plundered, poured out, or burned down[20]."

The Thebans and Athenians reſpectively accuſe their commanders.

At the ſame time that the Thebans left Laconia, Iphicrates withdrew the Athenians from the country which they had invaded. The two armies filed off, as by mutual conſent, and returned to their reſpective cities by ſeparate roads, without any attempt to interrupt the progreſs of each other. Iphicrates was blamed for allowing an enemy, heavy with plunder, and exhauſted by the fatigue

[19] Ariſtot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 10. [20] Xenoph. p. 612.

of

of a winter's campaign, to paſs unmoleſted through the Iſthmus of Corinth. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were accuſed and tried before the Theban aſſembly, for protracting the term of their command beyond the time limited by law. The former diſcovered leſs courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the ſword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his inſolent accuſers. But Epaminondas diſplayed, on this occaſion, the ſuperiority of philoſophical firmneſs, ſeated in the mind, to that conſtitutional courage which is the reſult of blood and ſpirits. The latter is ſufficient for a day of battle; but the former alone can yield ſupport in every viciſſitude of fortune.. CHAP. XXXI.

Epaminondas defends his conduct.

Inſtead of obſerving the formality of a regular defence, the illuſtrious Theban undertook the invidious taſk of pronouncing his own panegyric [21]. After relating his exploits, without amplification, and without diminution, he concluded by obſerving, "that he could ſubmit to death without reluctance, ſecure of immortal fame, earned in the ſervice of his country." The ſeditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the aſſembly againſt himſelf and his colleague diſſolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra.

[21] Plutarch. de ſui Laude, p. 540.

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Intricacy of the ſubſequent events.

From the invaſion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinæa, there elapſed ſix years of indeciſive war and tumultuous activity; battles loſt and gained, conqueſts made and abandoned, alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace propoſed, accepted, and violated, by thoſe who felt the unhappy effects of diſſenſions which their rancorous animoſity was unwilling to terminate. In examining the hiſtory of this period, we may perceive the ſame confuſion in the relation, which appears at firſt ſight to have been in the events themſelves. It is neceſſary, however, to reduce them into the form of a regular narrative. In important concerns, numerous bodies of men, however they may act without effect, cannot be ſuppoſed to act *entirely* without deſign: their motives, unſteady and capricious as they often are, form the inviſible chain which it is the buſineſs of the hiſtorian to inveſtigate and to follow; ſince it is otherwiſe impoſſible that the tranſactions which he deſcribes, ſhould afford either real inſtruction, or any rational entertainment.

The alliance between Athens and Sparta confirmed and extended. Olymp. ciii. 1. A.C. 368.

Early in the enſuing ſpring, the Lacedæmonians, with the few allies who ſtill adhered to their cauſe, diſpatched an embaſſy to Athens, in order to ſtrengthen the bands of amity and union with that republic. In the conference held for that purpoſe, it appeared that the Spartans were either very deeply affected by the recent obligations conferred on them, or that they very earneſtly deſired the continuance of ſimilar favours. They acknowledged that the experience, the bravery, the naval victories and

and fortune of Athens, juſtly entitled her to the ſovereignty of the Grecian ſeas; and when this conceſſion, which had hitherto been withheld with ſuch diſdain, could not ſatisfy the more patriotic, or rather the leſs generous, members of the aſſembly, they condeſcended to grant another acknowledgment ſtill more inconſiſtent with the pride of their hereditary pretenſions; that in ſuch military expeditions as were undertaken by the joint forces of both republics, the command ſhould be equal and alternate; ſo that an army of Lacedæmonians (a thing hitherto unexampled) would be commanded during half the campaign by Athenian generals. Patrocles the Phliaſian, whoſe eloquence and addreſs had been diſtinguiſhed in the former negociation, was not leſs active in the preſent; chiefly by *his* intervention, matters were finally adjuſted; an alliance of the moſt intimate kind was concluded between the two republics; and, by the aſſiſtance of the generous Phliaſian, the Spartans obtained this important advantage, without the diſgrace of many ineffectual overtures, or the mortification of long ſupplicatory ſpeeches, which they deemed of all things the moſt grievous [22].

The Spartans negociate treaties with Dionyſius and Artaxerxes.

The Spartan negociations, ſo fortunate in Athens, were equally ſucceſsful with Dionyſius tyrant of Sicily, and Artaxerxes king of Perſia. The former, himſelf a Dorian, naturally lamented the humiliation and diſtreſs of a people, who, during ſeven hundred years, had formed the

[22] Xenoph. p. 613—616.

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principal ornament and defence of the Dorian race; and the latter purſued his ordinary ſyſtem of politics, of aſſiſting the weaker party, in order to balance the contending powers, and to perpetuate the hoſtilities of Greece.

Military operations.

While the Lacedæmonians gained ſtrength by theſe important alliances, their enemies took the field. The Arcadians began the campaign by entering the territory of Pallené, an Achæan republic, which ſtill remained faithful to Sparta. The country was laid waſte, the villages burned, the city taken by ſtorm, and the garriſon, conſiſting of three hundred men, partly Lacedæmonians, put to the ſword. Soon after this ſucceſs, the Arcadians were joined by the Elians and Argives. Epaminondas likewiſe marched ſouthward at the head of the Thebans, their foot amounting to ſeven thouſand, and their cavalry to five hundred. Before he reached the Iſthmus, the Lacedæmonians had been reinforced by a body of two thouſand Sicilian troops, agreeably to their treaty with Dionyſius; and the Athenians had taken the field, under the command of Chabrias, actually the moſt reſpected, or at leaſt the moſt popular, of their generals. It was naturally the object of the Spartan and Athenian commanders, to prevent the junction of Epaminondas with his ſouthern allies. For this purpoſe they ſtrongly guarded, and even fortified the Iſthmus; an expedient which had not been put in practice ſince the expedition of Xerxes. The Thebans, however, broke through, took Sicyon, and aſſaulted Corinth.

But

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But Chabrias, who happened at this time to enjoy the alternate command, repulſed them with ſuch loſs, that Epaminondas judged proper to retire homeward; on which account he was blamed and diſgraced by his countrymen, who, inſolent with proſperity, thought themſelves entitled always to conquer.

Retreat of the Thebans.

The unexpected retreat of the Thebans, of which it is not eaſy to conjecture the real cauſe [23], occaſioned much diſſatisfaction among their confederates, particularly the Arcadians. This ſimple, but warlike people, had obtained diſtinguiſhed honour in ſeveral recent expeditions. They were uſually conducted by the Mantinæan Lycomedes, a man gallant in enterpriſe and perſevering in execution; rich, noble, eloquent, generous, and affable. Under a commander equally reſpected and beloved, the Arcadians found nothing too arduous for their courage. In regular engagements, they commonly proved victorious whereever they fought. But their principal merit was diſplayed in ambuſhes and ſurpriſe, and all the dangerous ſtratagems of deſultory war. When a favourable occaſion ſummoned their activity, neither length of way, nor difficult mountains, nor ſtorms, nor darkneſs, could interrupt their courſe, or prevent their unexpected aſſault [24]. Unaſſiſted and alone, they had often defeated ſuperior ſtrength

Pretenſion of the Arcadians.

[23] The Theban demagogues, as we learn from Diodorus and Plutarch, accuſed Epaminondas of treacherous correſpondence with the enemy, or at leaſt of ſecretly favouring their cauſe; but this is altogether improbable.

[24] Vid. Xenoph. 618, & ſeqq.

and

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and numbers; and when, together with their Peloponnesian allies, they served under the Theban standard, their prowess had been acknowledged and admired by the united army.

Encouraged by Lycomedes.

The repulse and retreat of Epaminondas gave relief and splendour to the recent glory of Arcadia, and inspired Lycomedes with an ambition which he easily communicated to his countrymen. He told them, "That they were the most ancient, the most populous, and surely not the least warlike community in Peloponnesus; but that they had hitherto neglected to profit of the advantages which they possessed. In the memorable war of twenty-seven years, they had joined with the Lacedæmonians, whom they had raised to an authority, of which the Arcadians, as well as the rest of Greece, felt the intolerable oppression. That of late years they had acted with the Thebans, who, by *their* assistance chiefly, had attained a very alarming degree of power, which they occasionally exerted or remitted, as suited their own convenience, without the smallest regard to the interest of their confederates. If this power should be increased, might not the yoke of Thebes become as grievous as that of Sparta? It was time for the Arcadians to know their own worth; to disdain following the standard of any foreign state, and not only to vindicate their freedom, but to claim their just pre-eminence." The assembly applauded the manly [25] resolution of Lycomedes;

[25] Xenophon's expression is lively; και μονον ανδρα ηγουμενοι, "thinking him the only man." L. vii. p. 618.

and,

and, in order to render it effectual, determined to keep poſſeſſion of ſuch places as they had taken from the Lacedæmonians or their allies in Elis and Achaia, and to complete their conqueſts in theſe and the neighbouring provinces of Peloponneſus. CHAP. XXXI.

For ſeveral months they met with little interruption in this deſign, the Spartans, after the departure of their auxiliaries, not venturing to take the field until the beginning of the enſuing year, when they received a new ſupply of troops from Dionyſius, and both troops [26] and money from Artaxerxes. The Theban arms were actually employed in Theſſaly and Macedon, as we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to relate; ſo that every circumſtance conſpired to haſten the march of Ageſilaus and the Lacedæmonians. But the infirmities incident to old age made him decline the command, which was entruſted to his ſon Archidamus; his colleague Ageſipolis not poſſeſſing great abilities either for war or government. The Spartans take the field to oppoſe the deſigns of the Arcadians. Olymp. ciii. 2. A.C. 367.

The rapid ſucceſs of Archidamus, who ſeemed deſtined to reſtore the declining fortune of Sparta, juſtified the prudent choice of the magiſtrates and people. He expelled the hoſtile garriſons from the inferior cities of Laconia, ſtormed Caryæ, and put the rebellious inhabitants to the ſword. From thence he haſtened to Arcadia, laid waſte the ſouthern frontier of that province, and prepared to attack the populous city of Parrhaſia, when the united ſtrength of the Arcadians, com- Glorious campaign of the Spartans under Archidamus.

[26] Theſe were not Perſians, but ξενικοι, "Greek mercenaries." Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619.

manded

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manded by Lycomedes, and reinforced by the Argives, approached to its relief. Their arrival made Archidamus withdraw to the hills that overhang the obſcure village of Midea. While he encamped there, Ciſſidas, who commanded the Sicilians, declared that the time limited for his abſence was expired, and, without waiting an anſwer, ordered his forces to prepare their baggage, and to march towards Laconia. But the neareſt paſſage into that country had been ſeized by the Meſſenians. In this difficulty Ciſſidas applied to Archidamus, who haſtened to his defence. The Arcadians and Argives at the ſame time decamped. The hoſtile armies encountered near the joining of the two roads which led towards Sparta, from Midea and Eutreſios. As ſoon as Archidamus beheld the enemy prepared for an engagement, he commanded the Spartans to form, and when they were ready to advance, addreſſed them as follows: "Fellow-citizens and friends! if we are ſtill brave, we may look forward with confidence; we may yet retrieve our affairs, and deliver down the republic to poſterity as we received it from our anceſtors. Let us ſtrive, then, by one glorious effort, to recover our hereditary renown; and let us ceaſe being the reproach (inſtead of what the Spartans once were, the ornament and defence) of our friends, our parents, our families, and our country."

Battle of Midea won by the Spartans

While he yet ſpoke, it thundered on the right, though the day was clear and ſerene. The ſoldiers, rouſed by the noiſe, looked towards the direction from

from which it came, and beheld, in a conſecrated grove at no great diſtance, an altar and ſtatue of Hercules, the great progenitor of Archidamus and the Spartan kings. Animated by the wonderful concurrence of ſuch auſpicious circumſtances, they were tranſported with an enthuſiaſm of valour, and impetuouſly ruſhed againſt their opponents, in full confidence of victory. The enemy, who thought that they had to do with a vanquiſhed and ſpiritleſs people, were aſtoniſhed at their mien and aſpect as they advanced to the attack. The few who waited their approach were totally deſtroyed; many thouſands periſhed in the purſuit; it is ſaid by ancient hiſtorians [27], that the Spartans loſt not a man. Archidamus erected a trophy, and diſpatched a meſſenger to Sparta. The people were aſſembled, when he communicated his extraordinary intelligence. The aged Ageſilaus ſhed tears of joy. The Ephori and ſenators ſympathiſed with the emotions of their king. The patriotic weakneſs was communicated from breaſt to breaſt; the amiable contagion ſpread; the ſterneſt members of this numerous aſſembly diſſolved in ſoftneſs, and melted in ſenſibility [28].

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without the loſs of a man.

The Spartans were prevented from reaping the full fruits of this victory, by a conſiderable reinforcement which the Arcadians ſoon afterwards received from Thebes. By the aſſiſtance of theſe troops, the Menalians and Parrhaſians, who, from

Foundation of Megalopolis.

27 Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620. Diodor. & Plut. ubi ſupra.

28 Xenoph. ibid. He obſerves, ὅτω κοινον τι αρα χαρα και λυπη, δακρυα ἐστιν. "So common are tears to joy and ſorrow."

their

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their ſituation on the ſouthern frontier of Arcadia, were moſt expoſed to the incurſions of the enemy, found means to execute a deſign ſaid to have been formerly ſuggeſted by Epaminondas. They abandoned twenty ſtraggling and defenceleſs villages; and chooſing an advantageous ſituation in the centre of their territory, erected a fortreſs there, which they ſurrounded with a ſtrong wall. The benefit of ſecurity attracted new inhabitants; the walls were extended; the place acquired the magnificent name of Megalopolis [29], the laſt city built by the Greeks, while they preſerved the dignity of independent government [30].

Revolutions in Theſſaly.

The temporary ſucceſs of the Spartans under Archidamus, which is generally aſcribed to the valour of that commander, was principally occaſioned by the withdrawing from Peloponneſus, at a very critical juncture, the numerous army of Thebes, which was at that time called northward, in order to take an importrnt and honourable part in the affairs of Macedon and Theſſaly. Since the atrocious murder of the heroic Jaſon, the latter kingdom had been afflicted by a continued train of crimes and diſorders. Juſt gratitude and reſpect towards the memory of their generous and warlike chief, engaged the Theſſalians to perpetuate the honours of his family. He was ſucceeded by his brothers Polydore and Polyphron; of whom the latter, not

29 "The great city."

30 I have melted together Pauſanias in Bœotic. and Diodorus, l. xv. p. 384. but followed the chronology of the latter.

being able to endure the reſtraint of a limited, much leſs of a divided rule, attained, by the aſſaſſination of his colleague, the ſole dominion of Theſſaly. His ſtern deſpotiſm was aboliſhed by the hand of Alexander, who avenged the blood of his kinſman[31] Polydore, the only meritorious action of his life. For Alexander (as his character is repreſented to us) exceeded the cruelties of Polyphron, and of all the deteſted tyrants that have ever been condemned to the infamy of hiſtory. The Theſſalians were delivered from ſuch a monſter by the domeſtic conſpiracy of his wife Thebé, the daughter of Jaſon, and her brothers Tiſiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron; who governed with precarious ſway, till the power and addreſs of Philip deſtroyed their uſurpation, and rendered their diſtracted country, which ſeemed incapable of freedom, a province of Macedonia. Such, in few words, were the revolutions of Theſſaly; but the bloody reign of Alexander demands more particular attention, being connected with the general revolutions of Greece.

Tyranny of Alexander.

A cautious reader will always receive, with ſome diſtruſt, the accounts tranſmitted by ancient republicans of the lives and actions of tyrants[32]

[31] His brother, uncle, or father, according to different authors.

[32] The acceptation of the word tyrant in Greek hiſtory is well known. The Greeks called τυραννοι, "tyrants," thoſe who had acquired ſovereignty in ſtates formerly republican. Theſſaly, Sicily, Corinth, &c. were governed, not by βασιλεις, but τυραννοι, "not by kings, but tyrants;" whereas Macedonia, which had never been ſubject to any ſpecies of popular government, was ruled, not by τυραννοι, but βασιλεις, "not by tyrants, but kings."

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The popular hiſtories of Alexander remind us of the fanciful deſcriptions of Buſiris or Pygmalion. Yet it cannot be doubted, that the tyrant of Theſſaly was cruel to his ſubjects, perfidious to his allies, implacable to his enemies, a robber by land, and a pirate at ſea [33]: but that it was his uſual diverſion to bury men alive, to incloſe them in the ſkins of wild beaſts, as a prey to ravenous dogs, to mutilate and torture children in the preſence of their parents [34], can ſcarcely be reconciled with his ſhedding tears for the imaginary ſufferings of Hecuba and Andromaché, during the repreſentation of the Troades [35]. It is true, that he is ſaid to have been aſhamed of this weakneſs, and to have left the theatre with confuſion; but what could have engaged a monſter, ſuch as Alexander is deſcribed, to liſten to the pathetic ſtrains of the tender Euripides? What pleaſure, or what pain, could a tyger, thirſting for human blood, receive from ſuch an entertainment? Although we abſtract from his ſtory many incredible fictions, Alexander might well deſerve the reſentment of the Theſſalians. His injured ſubjects took arms, and ſolicited the protection of Thebes, whoſe juſtice or ambition readily embraced their cauſe. As Epaminondas ſtill continued under the diſpleaſure of his country, the Theban army was conducted by Pelopidas and Iſmenias. Their arrival ſtruck terror into the conſcious breaſt of the tyrant, who,

The affairs of Theſſaly ſettled by Pelopidas.

33 Theſe are the words of Xenophon, p. 601.

34 Plut. in Pelopid. 35 Id. de Fort. Alexand.

without

without daring to truſt his defence to the numerous guards and mercenaries by whom his uſurpation was ſupported, implored the clemency of the Theban generals, ſubmitting to the moſt humiliating conditions which their wiſdom might judge proper to exact for the future ſecurity of his ſubjects [36].

Pelopidas eſtabliſhes Perdiccas on the throne of Macedon, and receives Philip as an hoſtage. Olymp. ciii. 2. A.C. 367.

This tranſaction was ſcarcely ended, when the Thebans, whoſe reputation and ſucceſs rendered them the moſt proper mediators in the affairs of their neighbours, were invited into Macedon, which, ſince the death of Amyntas II. had been a prey, during ſix years, to all the calamities of a diſputed ſucceſſion. Amyntas left three legitimate ſons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and a natural ſon, Ptolemy, whoſe intrigues chiefly had created the diſorders of the kingdom. He could not prevent the acceſſion of Alexander to the throne, as that prince had attained the age of manhood at the time of his father's death. But he embittered and ſhortened his reign, which laſted only one year; after which Ptolemy aſſumed the reins of government, as guardian of the minority of Perdiccas, and protector of Macedon. It ſoon appeared, however, that his ambition would not reſt ſatisfied with the borrowed power of a regent. He gained a conſiderable party to his intereſt, baffled the oppoſition of Perdiccas's partiſans, and boldly uſurped the ſovereignty. The friends of that unfortunate prince had recourſe to the juſtice

[36] Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. & Plut. in Pelopid.

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and power of Thebes. Pelopidas entered Macedon at the head of his army; reſtored the numerous exiles whom Ptolemy had baniſhed; aſſerted the juſt rights of Perdiccas to the throne; and, after receiving hoſtages from the contending factions, among whom was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, afterwards king of Macedon, and conqueror of Greece, returned towards Theſſaly, having finally re-eſtabliſhed the tranquillity of the neighbouring kingdom [37].

Is treacherouſly ſeized and impriſoned by Alexander, in his journey through Theſſaly. Olymp. cii. 2. A.C. 367.

In his journey through a country where he had ſo lately acted the part of a judge and maſter, it ſeemed as if little danger could reaſonably be apprehended. Pelopidas had ſent before him a conſiderable detachment of his army, to conduct the Macedonian hoſtages towards Thebes. With the remainder he marched ſecurely through the territory of his Theſſalian confederates, when he was informed that Alexander had come to meet him at the head of his mercenaries. Even this ſuſpicious circumſtance could not undeceive the ſanguine credulity of the Theban chief. He imagined that the tyrant had taken this meaſure in order to ſhew him reſpect, and to juſtify himſelf againſt ſome recent complaints of his injured ſubjects. With an imprudence which all hiſtorians agree to condemn [38], both Pelopidas and Iſmenias threw them-

37 Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. & Plut. in Pelopid.

38 Beſides Diodorus and Plutarch, the ſage Polybius ſeverely arraigns the imprudent confidence of Pelopidas. Polyb. Caſaub. t. ii. p. 93. Polybius in that paſſage ſpeaks of the expedition as an embaſſy. I have carefully compared the different writers, and adopted the account that ſeemed moſt probable and conſiſtent.

ſelves

ſelves into the hands of a traitor, who gloried in deſpiſing laws human and divine. They were inſtantly ſeized by his order, carried to Pheræ, bound, impriſoned, and expoſed to the inſulting eyes of an invidious multitude.

Delivered by Epaminondas.

It might be expected that the Theban ſoldiers ſhould have been animated with indignation and rage at the unexampled treatment of their beloved chiefs. But their numbers were too ſmall to contend with the Theſſalian mercenaries; and when a powerful reinforcement arrived from Bœotia, they fatally experienced, in the firſt encounters with the enemy, the abſence of Pelopidas, and the degradation of his magnanimous friend. The army was reduced to the utmoſt difficulties, encompaſſed on every ſide, unwilling to fight, and unable to fly. The troops juſtly accuſed the inexperience of their commanders, remembering their glorious campaigns in the Peloponneſus, where they contended with far more formidable enemies. Epaminondas, who had commanded them on thoſe memorable occaſions, actually ſerved in the ranks. The ſoldiers with one accord ſaluted him general. The ſingular abilities of this extraordinary man ſoon changed the poſture of affairs; the tyrant was defeated in his turn, and compelled to retire. Epaminondas, inſtead of puſhing him to extremity, which might have turned his deſperate fury againſt the valuable lives of the Theban priſoners, hovered round with a victorious army, oſtentatiouſly diſplayed the advantages of military ſkill and conduct; and while he kept Alexander in continual

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reſpect and fear, yet left him ſufficient time for repentance and ſubmiſſion. This judicious plan of operations was attended with ſucceſs. The tyrant implored peace; but he only received a truce of thirty days, on condition of reſtoring the perſons of Pelopidas and Iſmenias[39].

Interview of Pelopidas, during his confinement, with Thebé, queen of Theſſaly.

Thoſe who love to find in hiſtory events extraordinary and romantic, would not eaſily excuſe my omitting to mention the interview of Pelopidas, during his impriſonment, with the Theſſalian queen. The daughter of the heroic Jaſon united the beauty of the one ſex with the courage of the other, and was beloved by her huſband with ſuch love as a tyrant can feel, which is always corrupted by ſuſpicion. At her earneſt and repeated entreaties, Thebé was permitted to ſee, and converſe with, the Theban general, whoſe merit and fame ſhe had long admired. But his appearance did not anſwer her expectation. At beholding his neglected and ſqualid figure, ſhe was ſeized with an emotion of pity, and exclaimed, "How much, Pelopidas, do I lament your wife and family." "*You*, Thebé, are more to be lamented," replied the Theban hero, "who, without being a priſoner, continue the voluntary ſlave of a perfidious and cruel tyrant." The expreſſion is ſaid to have ſunk deep into the heart of the queen, who remembered the reproach of Pelopidas, when, ten years afterwards, ſhe ſupported the courage, and urged the hand, of the aſſaſſins of Alexander[40].

39 Plut. in Pelopid. & Diodorus, ibid.

40 Xenoph. p. 601.

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But this moral narrative, however ſtrongly authenticated, cannot be attentively read without occaſioning ſome degree of ſcepticiſm concerning the hiſtory of Alexander. Had he been the monſter which reſentment or credulity have taken pleaſure to delineate, who never entered the apartment of his wife without an armed attendant, who ſlept in a lofty inacceſſible tower, to which he mounted by a ladder, and which was guarded by a fierce dog[41], it is incredible that he ſhould have permitted an interview between a ſecret and open enemy.

Anecdote of Pelopidas and Alexander.

Nor will it be eaſy to reconcile with the fierceneſs of the Theſſalian, another anecdote, which has probably been invented to diſplay the magnanimity of Pelopidas, but which diſplays ſtill more ſtrongly the patience of Alexander. During the confinement of the former at Phĕræ, the latter is ſaid to have exceeded his uſual cruelties towards the inhabitants of that city. Pelopidas conſoled their affliction, and encouraged them to hope for vengeance. He even ſent to reproach the abſurdity of the tyrant, in deſtroying daily ſo many innocent men, from whom he had nothing to fear, while he allowed an enemy to live, who would employ the firſt moment of freedom to puniſh his manifold enormities. "And is Pelopidas ſo deſirous to die?" was the anſwer of the Theſſalian. "Yes," replied the priſoner, "that *you* may the

[41] Cicero de Offic. l. 2. Plut. in Pelopid. But the ſtory, as related by Xenophon, is diveſted of ſuch improbable fictions; and Xenophon ſeems hardly to believe all that he relates. He ſays, λεγεται ὑπο τινων,—and repeats that it was a hearſay, a few ſentences below.

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ſooner periſh, having rendered yourſelf ſtill more obnoxious to gods and men[42]." The reſentment of Pelopidas, if ever it was expreſſed, proved an empty boaſt; for immediately after his deliverance, the Theban army was, for very urgent reaſons, withdrawn from Theſſaly.

Congreſs of Grecian deputies in Perſia. Olymp. ciii. 2. A.C. 367.

The Theban expedition in the north had allowed the Spartans, in ſome degree, to recover their influence in the ſouth of Greece. Archidamus had obtained a complete victory over the Arcadians, the braveſt and moſt powerful of the confederates. The crafty[43] Antalcidas, with Euthycles[44], a Spartan of abilities and intrigue, had been ſent as ambaſſadors to Perſia, in order to haſten the ſupplies of troops, or money, expected from that country. It was time for Thebes to aſſert her intereſt in the Peloponneſus, and to counteract the dangerous negociations of her enemies with Artaxerxes. Epaminondas, whoſe recent and illuſtrious merit had ſilenced the unjuſt clamours of faction, was confirmed in his military command; and Pelopidas, whoſe unfortunate adventure in Theſſaly was aſcribed leſs to his own imprudence than to the treachery of Alexander, was diſpatched to the Eaſt, as the perſon beſt qualified to conduct a negociation with the miniſters of the great king. He was accompanied by the ambaſſadors of Elis, Argos, and Arcadia; thoſe of Athens followed ſoon afterwards; ſo that there appeared, for the firſt time, a general congreſs of the Grecian ſtates, to ſettle

42 Plutarch. in Pelopid.
43 Plut. in Artaxerx.
44 Xenoph. Hellen.

and

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and adjuſt their intereſts at the court of a foreign prince. It might be expected, that a ſcene ſo new and intereſting ſhould have excited the attention of hiſtorians; yet they have left us ignorant in what city of his dominions Artaxerxes received the Greeks. At their arrival, the king treated Antalcidas with that partial kindneſs due to an ancient gueſt and favourite; but at their public audience, the appearance, the fame, and the eloquence of Pelopidas, more majeſtic than that of Athens, more nervous than that of Sparta[45], entitled him to a juſt preference, which the king, whoſe rank and temper alike diſdained reſtraint, was at no pains to conceal.

Repreſentations of Pelopidas to the Perſian monarch.

The Theban repreſented, that in the battle of Platæa, fought above a century ago, and ever ſince that memorable engagement, his countrymen had uniformly adhered to the intereſt of Perſia, at the riſk of loſing whatever men hold moſt precious. That the dangerous war in which they were actually engaged, had been occaſioned by their open and ſteady oppoſition to the meaſures of the Spartans, previous to their deſtructive invaſions of Aſia. The imperious pride of Ageſilaus could never forget the affront offered him at Aulis, when, in imitation of Agamemnon, he intended to offer ſacrifice before his embarkation. He had begun hoſtilities without juſtice, and carried them on without ſucceſs. The field of Leuctra had been alike fatal to the ſtrength and glory of Sparta; nor would that ambitious republic have reaſon to

45 Plut. in Pelopid.

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boaſt of its recent ſucceſs in Arcadia, if, at that unfortunate juncture, the Thebans had not been prevented, by reaſons equally important and honourable, from aſſiſting their Peloponneſian confederates. Timagoras the Athenian, guided by motives which ancient [46] hiſtory has not condeſcended to explain, ſeconded, with vigour and addreſs, the arguments of the illuſtrious Theban. In vain did Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, remonſtrate againſt his perfidy. The other deputies were confounded by his impudence; and before they had time to expreſs their aſtoniſhment and indignation, the king deſired Pelopidas to ex-

Behaviour of the other deputies.

[46] The extraordinary behaviour of Timagoras deſerves attention. He co-operated with the enemy of his country, and the ambaſſador of a ſtate actually at war with it. We may gueſs his motives by his reward. He received from the king of Perſia, at his departure, gold and ſilver, and other valuable preſents, particularly a bed of curious conſtruction, with Perſian ſlaves to make it, the Greeks being little acquainted with that operation; and he was carried in a ſedan to the ſea-ſhore at the king's expence. Yet this man had the effrontery to return to Athens, and to appear in the public aſſembly. He knew the force of eloquence and intrigue over the capricious minds of his countrymen; he knew that the practice of receiving bribes was ſo uſual, that the Athenians had loſt the proper ſenſe of its baſeneſs. He perhaps remembered the pleaſant propoſal of Epicrates, that inſtead of nine Archons, the Athenians ſhould annually elect nine ambaſſadors, choſen from the pooreſt citizens, who might return rich from Perſia. Epicrates had acquired a very undue proportion of wealth by this infamous means, as we learn from an oration of Lyſias. Yet the Athenians were leſs indignant at his guilt, than delighted with his humour. Timagoras, however, was not ſo fortunate; he was accuſed by his colleague Leon, and condemned to death, not, if we may credit Plutarch, becauſe he had betrayed his truſt, and accepted bribes, but becauſe the Athenians were extremely diſpleaſed that Pelopidas had effected the object of his commiſſion at the Perſian court, Plut. in Pelopid.

plain

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plain the object of his commiſſion, and the demand of his countrymen. The Theban replied, that he had been ſent to propoſe and ratify a treaty between his republic and Perſia, on conditions equally advantageous to both, ſince the carrying of them into execution would deſtroy the power of thoſe ſtates which had hitherto occaſioned ſo much diſturbance and danger to all their neighbours. His propoſals were, that the Athenians ſhould be commanded to lay up their fleet, and that the fertile country of Meſſenia ſhould be declared totally independent of Sparta. If any oppoſition to the treaty were made by theſe powers, that war ſhould be levied againſt them by Perſia, Thebes, and their allies; and if the inferior cities of Greece declined to engage in ſo juſt a cauſe, that their obſtinacy ſhould be puniſhed with an exemplary ſeverity. The king approved theſe articles, which were immediately conſigned to writing, confirmed by the royal ſeal, and read aloud to the ambaſſadors. On hearing the clauſe which related to Athens, Leon exclaimed, with the freedom peculiar to his country, "The Athenians, it ſeems, muſt look out for ſome other ally, inſtead of the king of Perſia." After this daring threat, the ambaſſadors took leave, and returned to Greece with all poſſible expedition [47].

Overtures of the Perſians and Thebans rejected in a conven-

Pelopidas was accompanied by a Perſian of diſtinction, intruſted with the inſtrument containing the treaty. On his arrival in Thebes, the people were immediately aſſembled, and being ac-

47 Xenoph. p. 621, & ſeqq.

quainted

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tion of the Grecian ſtates;

quainted with the happy fruits of his embaſſy, they commended his diligence and dexterity. Without loſing a day, meſſengers were diſpatched to demand the attendance of repreſentatives from the Grecian ſtates, whoſe intereſts were all alike concerned in the late important negociation. It does not appear that either Athens or Sparta condeſcended to obey the ſummons. The convention, however, was very numerous. The Perſian read the treaty, ſhewed the king's ſeal, and, in the name of his maſter, required the agreement to be ratified with the formality of oaths uſually employed on ſuch occaſions. The repreſentatives almoſt unanimouſly declared that they had been ſent to hear, not to ſwear; and that before the treaty could be ratified by general conſent, its conditions muſt be previouſly diſcuſſed in the particular aſſembly of each independent republic. Such was the firm, but moderate anſwer of the other deputies; but the high-ſpirited Lycomedes went farther than his colleagues. His friend and countryman, Antiochus, who had lately acted as the ambaſſador of Arcadia at the Perſian court, returned diſguſted by the contempt ſhewn towards his country by the great king, who heſitated not to prefer Elis to Arcadia. In giving an account of his embaſſy to the Ten thouſand (the name uſually beſtowed on the Arcadians ſince the re-union of their tribes in Mantinæa and Megalopolis), he indulged himſelf in many contumelious expreſſions againſt Artaxerxes and his ſubjects, which were greedily liſtened to by the reſentment and envy of his hearers. "Neither

the wealth nor the power of the great king were ſo great in reality as flattery and falſehood repreſented them. The golden plane-tree, which had often been ſo oſtentatiouſly deſcribed, could ſcarce afford ſhade to a graſhopper. He himſelf had been an attentive obſerver; yet all he could find in Perſia was the idle retinue of vice and luxury, bakers, butlers, and cooks, a uſeleſs and ſervile train; but men fit to contend with the Greeks, he neither himſelf ſaw, nor thought it poſſible for others to diſcover." The proud diſdain of Antiochus had been communicated entire to the breaſt of Lycomedes. He declared, that Arcadia needed not any alliance with the great king; and that were ſuch a matter in agitation, Thebes would not be the proper place to determine it, ſince every convention tending to a general peace ought to be held in that country which had been the principal ſcene of war.

and by each republic in particular.

The Theban magiſtrates diſcovered the mingled ſymptoms of diſappointment, indignation, grief, and rage. They accuſed Lycomedes as a traitor to Thebes, and an enemy to his country; but he deſpiſed their empty clamours, and, without deigning an anſwer, walked from the aſſembly, and was followed by all the deputies of Arcadia. Notwithſtanding this ſevere mortification, the Thebans did not abandon the ambitious project at which they had long aimed. Nothing favourable, they perceived, could be expected in the general congreſs of the ſtates, ſo that they allowed the aſſembly to break up, without inſiſting farther on their demands.

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mands. But at the diſtance of a ſhort time, they renewed the ſame propoſal to the ſeveral republics, beginning with Corinth, one of the weakeſt, yet moſt wealthy, in hopes that whatever oppoſition the overtures of the king of Perſia, and their own, had found in the united ſtrength and confidence of the aſſembled confederacy, few ſingle ſtates at leaſt would venture to provoke the indignation of ſuch powerful adverſaries. But in this, too, they were diſappointed. The Corinthians declined entering into any alliance with the king of Perſia, and ſet his power at defiance. The magnanimous example was imitated by their neighbours; the ſecret practices of the Thebans were equally fruitleſs with their open declarations and demands.

Epaminondas invades the Peloponneſus. Olymp. ciii. 3. A.C. 366.

Epaminondas encouraged his countrymen to acquire, by arms, that pre-eminence which they had vainly expected to obtain by negociation. His renown, juſtly increaſed by the recent tranſactions in Theſſaly, rendered his influence irreſiſtible. He was again intruſted with the command of a powerful army, with which, for the third time, he invaded the Peloponneſus. The Elians and Arcadians, though hoſtile to each other, were alike diſpoſed for rebellion againſt Thebes; but inſtead of marching into their territories, a meaſure which might have engaged them to ſettle their private differences, and to unite againſt the common enemy, Epaminondas endeavoured to quaſh their diſaffection, by the rapid conqueſt of Achaia, which, ſtretching along the Corinthian gulph, ſkirted the northern frontiers of Elis and Arcadia.

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Compels the Achæans to accept the Theban alliance.

From the nature of their government, the Achæans uſually enjoyed more tranquillity than their neighbours. They poſſeſſed not any great town, whoſe needy and turbulent inhabitants, ſeduced by popular demagogues, could rouſe the whole province to arms and ambition. Towards the eaſt and the iſthmus of Corinth, the cities of Sicyon and Phlius had long been regarded as ſeparate republics, unconnected with the general body of the Achæan nation. Ægium enjoyed the prerogative of conſtituting the uſual place of convention for the ſtates of Achaia: but Dymé, Tirtæa, and Pellené, ſcarcely yielded to Ægium in populouſneſs and power, and ſeem, with ſeveral places of inferior note, to have formed ſo many ſeparate and independent communities, all alike ſubject to the ſame equitable ſyſtem of Achæan laws. Immediately before the Theban invaſion, the ariſtocracy had acquired an undue weight in the conſtitution of Achaia, ſo that the principal nobles and magiſtrates were no ſooner informed of the approach of an enemy, than they flocked from all quarters of the province to meet Epaminondas, ſoliciting his favour and friendſhip, and little anxious about the independence of their country, provided they might preſerve their perſonal privileges and private fortunes. The people perceiving themſelves betrayed by thoſe who ought to have been their protectors, abandoned all thoughts of reſiſtance. Epaminondas accepted the ſubmiſſion of the magiſtrates, and received pledges of their engagement, that Achaia ſhould thenceforth adhere to the intereſt

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tereſt of Thebes, and follow the ſtandard of that republic [48].

Revolutions in Achaia.

This conqueſt, which was effected without ſtriking a blow, and without producing any internal revolution of government, was deſtructive and bloody in its conſequences. Epaminondas, for reaſons not ſufficiently explained, returned with his army to Thebes; but before he arrived there, various complaints againſt his conduct had been made in the Theban aſſembly. The Arcadians and Argives complained that a people, who knew by their own recent experience the inconveniencies of ariſtocracy, ſhould have confirmed that ſevère form of government in a dependent province. The democratic faction in Achaia ſecretly ſent emiſſaries to ſecond the complaint. The enemies of Epaminondas ſeized the favourable opportunity of accuſing and calumniating that illuſtrious commander, and the capricious multitude were perſuaded to condemn his proceedings, and to ſend commiſſioners into Achaia, who, with the aſſiſtance of the populace, as well as of a conſiderable body of mercenaries, diſſolved the ariſtocracy, baniſhed or put to death the nobles, and inſtituted a democratic form of policy. The foreign troops had ſcarcely left that country, when the exiles, who were extremely numerous and powerful, returned with common conſent, and, after a bloody and deſperate ſtruggle, recovered their ancient influence in their reſpective cities. The leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or ex-

[48] Xenoph. p. 622.

pelled;

pelled; the ariſtocracy was re-eſtabliſhed; and the magiſtrates, knowing that it was dangerous to depend on the unſteady politics of Thebes, craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted them. The Achæans approved their gratitude by ravaging the northern, while the Lacedæmonians infeſted the ſouthern frontier of Arcadia; and that unhappy province felt and regretted the inconvenience of its ſituation between two implacable enemies [49].

Euphron uſurps the government of Sicyon. Olymp. ciii. 3. A.C. 366.

Sicyon, though governed by the Achæan laws, did not follow, on this occaſion, the example of its neighbours. That unfortunate city, which had long been the ſeat of luxury and the arts, was reſerved for peculiar calamities. Euphron, a bold, crafty, and ambitious demagogue, having already acquired great credit with the Lacedæmonians, was deſirous of obtaining equal conſideration among the enemies of that people, hoping, by ſo many foreign connexions, to render himſelf abſolute maſter of his little republic. For this purpoſe he ſecretly reminded the Arcadians and Argives, that "Sicyon, having the ſame laws and government, would naturally embrace the ſame alliance with the neighbouring cities; but the danger of this event he would undertake to remove, with very ſlender aſſiſtance from Argos and Arcadia." The admonition was not loſt; a body of armed men arrived at Sicyon; Euphron aſſembled the people; the government was changed; new magiſtrates were appointed, and Euphron was entruſted with the command of the national force, conſiſting chiefly

[49] Xenoph. p. 623.

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of mercenaries. Having obtained this, he obtained all. By careſſes, bribes, and flattery, the troops were gained over to his party, and became attached to his perſon. His colleagues in the government were removed by ſecret treachery or open violence. His private enemies were held the enemies of the ſtate, accuſed, condemned, and baniſhed; and their confiſcated eſtates augmented the wealth of Euphron, whoſe rapacity knew no bounds, ſparing neither the property of individuals, nor the public treaſury, nor the conſecrated gold and ſilver which adorned the temples of Sicyon. The ſums amaſſed by ſuch impious means enabled him to confirm his uſurpation. He augmented the number of his mercenary guards, who, while they oppreſſed the republic, were uſeful auxiliaries to the Argives and Arcadians. Whatever theſe nations thought proper to command, the ſoldiers of Euphron were ready to obey; and partly by this alacrity in their ſervice, partly by bribing [50] the principal men in Argos and Arcadia, the crafty tyrant expected to prevent thoſe neighbouring communities from interfering in the domeſtic affairs of Sicyon.

His uſurpation overturned by Æneas the Stymphalian.

Such was the venality and corruption of the Greeks, that this deteſtable policy was attended with ſucceſs, until Æneas, the Stymphalian, obtained the command of the Arcadians. This man, availing himſelf of the vicinity of Sicyon to Stymphalus, the place of his birth and reſidence, had formed a connexion with the oppreſſed citizens

50 Τα μεν τοι και χρημασι διεπραττετο. Xenoph. p. 624.

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of the former. Æneas, perhaps, had not ſufficiently ſhared the largeſſes of Euphron; perhaps the humanity of his nature [51] lamented the ſufferings of the Sicyonians. Whatever was his motive, it is certain that he endeavoured to expel their tyrant, and to reſtore their liberty.

Euphron is aſſaſſinated at Thebes.

Euphron, however, had the dexterity to engage ſucceſſively in his favour the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Thebans. He ſpared neither pains, nor promiſes, nor bribes. He was commonly his own ambaſſador; and his activity and abilities muſt have riſen far above the ordinary pitch, to engage the principal ſtates of Greece, one after another, to ſupport, in direct oppoſition to their principles, the tyranny of a ſingle man. Inſurrections at home, and hoſtilities from abroad, at length occaſioned his downfal. He eſcaped to Thebes with the greateſt part of his treaſure. His enemies ſent proper perſons to counteract his intrigues there. The money, however, and the addreſs of Euphron, prevailed with the Theban magiſtrates, and he expected to be reſtored in triumph by the Thebans, as he had already been by the Athenians. But the Sicyonians, who followed him to Thebes, perceiving his familiarity [52] with the principal men of that city, had recourſe to the only expedient that ſeemed capable of fruſtrating his deſigns, and aſſaſſinated Euphron in the Cadmæa, while the Theban archons and

[51] Xenophon ſeems to approve this reaſon. He ſays Æneas, the Stymphalian, νομισας αν ανεκτως εχειν τα εν Σικυωνι. "Thinking the grievances of the Sicyonians intolerable."

[52] Ως δε ἑωρων αυτον οικειως τοις αρχουσι συνοντα. Xenoph. p. 630.

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ſenators were aſſembled within the walls of that edifice [53].

This action publicly juſtified.

The murderers were ſeized, and the atrocity, as well as the indignity of their crime, was ſtrongly repreſented to the ſenate by one of the archons, who probably regretted the death of Euphron, as the loſs of a wealthy client. The criminals denied the fact, till one, bolder than the reſt, not only avowed, but juſtified the aſſaſſination, as equally lawful, advantageous, and honourable. And ſo little horror do men feel at the perpetration of crimes which prevail in their own age, and with which their fancies are familiar, that the aſſaſſins were unanimouſly acquitted by the Theban ſenate, whoſe award was approved by the aſſembly [54].

The allies of Sparta aſk permiſſion of that republic to negociate a peace with Thebes. Olymp. ciii. 3. A. C. 366.

Meanwhile, the war languiſhed on both ſides, and the hoſtile confederacies were on the point of being diſſolved. The Athenians and Arcadians, equally diſguſted with their reſpective allies, concluded a treaty of peace and mutual defence, by the intervention of Lycomedes the Mantinæan, who was ſlain in his return from Athens by a party of Arcadian exiles. This negociation gave general alarm; the Arcadians, who had entered into treaty with Athens, were the allies of Thebes; and the united ſtrength of theſe three republics was at that time ſufficient to ſubdue and enſlave the reſt of Greece. The terror was increaſed when it appeared that the Athenians had little inclination to evacuate ſeveral places in the Corinthian territory which they had undertaken to defend againſt the

53 Xenoph. l. vii. p. 630.

54 Id. ibid. p. 631, & ſeqq.

Arca-

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Arcadians and Thebans. By ſeaſonable vigilance the Corinthians anticipated a deſign, too unjuſt to be publicly avowed; they cautiouſly diſſembled their fears; graciouſly thanked Chares, who had arrived with an Athenian fleet on pretence of offering them his ſervice, but took care not to admit him within their harbours; and by extreme kindneſs and condeſcenſion, accompanied with warm profeſſions of gratitude for the protection hitherto afforded them, they got rid of the foreign garriſons, without coming to an open rupture with the Athenians. But the narrow eſcape which they had made, and the dread of being expoſed in future to any ſimilar danger, made them extremely ſolicitous to promote a general peace on the terms propoſed by Artaxerxes and the Thebans. Motives of the ſame kind influenced the cities of Achaia, and the little republic of Phlius, which, together with Corinth, were the only allies that remained faithful to Sparta. A ſimilarity of intereſts occaſioned a cloſe communication of views and meaſures among all thoſe communities; who agreed, by common conſent, to diſpatch an embaſſy to Sparta, requeſting that ſhe would accept the conditions of peace lately offered by Thebes, or if ſhe thought it inconſiſtent with honour to cede her juſt pretenſions to Meſſené, that ſhe would allow her faithful but helpleſs allies to enter into a ſeparate negociation with the Theban republic.

Reaſonableneſs of this demand.

The reaſonableneſs, and even modeſty, of this requeſt muſt have been apparent to the Spartans, when

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when they reflected on the uſeful ſervices of the allies, and conſidered how much they had already ſuffered in their cauſe. The Phliaſians, in particular, had, during five years, given ſuch illuſtrious proofs of their unſhaken adherence to Sparta, as ſtand unrivalled in the hiſtory of national honour and fidelity. Situated in the midſt of enemies, they had continually, ſince the battle of Leuctra, ſuffered the invaſions and aſſaults of the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives. Their territory was totally waſted; their city cloſely beſieged; their citadel, more than once, ſurpriſed and taken; their wealth, public and private, was exhauſted, and they ſubſiſted precariouſly on proviſions brought from Corinth, for the payment of which they had pledged their beaſts of burden and inſtruments of agriculture. Yet, under the preſſure of theſe multiplied calamities, they had preſerved their fidelity inviolate; they had diſdained to accept the peace which the Thebans offered them on condition of their forſaking Sparta; even, at laſt, they were determined to negociate with Thebes for neutrality alone; nor had they humbly ſolicited permiſſion to embrace this meaſure, until Corinth, the only ſource of their ſubſiſtence, ſeemed ready to forſake them [55].

The Spartans deliberate on that ſubject.

The ſtrength of ſuch arguments, urged by the eloquence of Patrocles the Phliaſian, might have ſoftened, if any thing could have ſoftened, the inflexible temper of the Spartan ſenate, and diſ-

[55] Xenoph. 624. & 634.

ſofed

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poſed that aſſembly to prefer the intereſt of their allies, and their own immediate ſafety, to the doubtful proſpect of recovering Meſſené. But the pretenſions of this extraordinary people ſeem to have become more lofty, in proportion to their inability to ſupport them; and, on that particular occaſion, the proud obſtinacy, natural to the Spartans, was increaſed by an animated ſpeech of Archidamus, full of the moſt confident hopes, and glowing with all the warmth of his age and character.

Speech of Archidamus.

He ſpoke with contempt concerning the defection of the confederates. "The Phliaſians, the inhabitants of Corinth and Achaia, may, without exciting ſurpriſe, expreſs an anxiety for peace; ſafety, not glory, is their aim. But the Spartans have a character to ſuſtain, which it would be diſhonourable to relinquiſh. They expect not barely to exiſt, but to enjoy glory and renown, the true ſweeteners of exiſtence; and, if that be impoſſible, they muſt periſh! Yet is not their ſituation deſperate: a nation can never be reduced to any condition of diſtreſs, in which a warlike genius, and a well-regulated government, may not afford relief. But in military experience and abilities, we are ſtill unrivalled; and ſuch a ſyſtem of policy as we enjoy, no other people can boaſt. We enjoy, beſides, temperate and laborious habits, the contempt of pleaſure and wealth, an ardour for martial glory, and an ambition for honeſt fame. Theſe are powerful auxiliaries, when protected by the

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immortal gods, whoſe oracles anciently approved our juſt conqueſt of Meſſené. Nor, though the Corinthians and Achæans forſake us, ſhall we be deſtitute of warlike allies. The Athenians, ever jealous of Thebes, their moſt formidable neighbour, will again take arms in our cauſe. Dionyſius, the tyrant of Sicily, gives us hope of farther aſſiſtance; the king of Egypt, and many princes of Aſia, declared enemies of Artaxerxes, are all naturally our friends. We poſſeſs, beſides, though not the perſons and actual ſervice, the hearts and affections at leaſt, of whatever is moſt eminent in Greece. In all the republics, whoever is diſtinguiſhed by his fame, his wealth, or his virtues, though he may not accompany our ſtandard, ſecretly wiſhes ſucceſs to our arms. I am of opinion too, that the crowd [56] of Peloponneſus, that mob on which we at firſt too vainly relied, will at length return to their duty. They have obtained none of thoſe advantages, the vain proſpect of which urged them to revolt. Inſtead of acquiring the independent government of their own laws, they have fallen a prey to lawleſs anarchy, or been ſubjected to the inhuman cruelty of tyrants. The bloody ſeditions, of which they once knew the nature by report only, they have long experienced; and there are actually more exiles from particular cities, than were formerly from all Peloponneſus. But even baniſhment is happineſs to thoſe who,

[56] Ὄχλος. Iſocrat. in Archid. He means the Arcadians, Elians, &c. formerly allies of Sparta.

while

while they remained at home, butchered each other at the altars; and who, inſtead of that peaceful abundance which they enjoyed under the Spartan government, periſhed for want of bread. Such is the condition of the Peloponneſians, whoſe lands have been laid waſte, their cities deſolated, and that conſtitution and thoſe laws, under which they once lived the happieſt of men, overturned from the foundation. We might ſubdue them by force; but *that* is not neceſſary; they will voluntarily return to their allegiance, and ſolicit our protection, as alone capable to alleviate their miſery, and prevent their total ruin.

"But had we nothing of this kind to expect, and were the one half of Greece not more diſpoſed to injure us, than the other to abet their injuſtice, I have ſtill one reſolution to propoſe, harſh indeed and ſevere, but becoming thoſe ſentiments which have ever animated the Spartans. Proſperity, that conceals the infamy of cowardice, robs fortitude of half its glory. It is adverſity alone that can diſplay the full luſtre of a firm and manly character. I propoſe, therefore, that rather than cede a territory, which your anceſtors acquired by the blood and labour of twenty victorious campaigns, you ſhould remove from Sparta your wives, children, and parents, who will be received with kindneſs in Italy, Sicily, Cyrené, and many parts of Aſia. Thoſe who are fit to bear arms muſt alſo leave the city, and carry nothing from thence that may not eaſily be tranſported. They muſt, then, fix on ſome poſt well fortified by nature, and which art

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may render ſecure againſt every hoſtile aſſault. This, thenceforth, muſt be their city and country; and from this, as a centre, they muſt on all ſides infeſt the enemy, until either the Thebans remit their arrogance, or the laſt of the Spartans periſh [57]."

The Spartans determine to perſevere in the war.

The ſpeech of Archidamus expreſſed the general ſenſe of his country. The allies were diſmiſſed with permiſſion to act as beſt ſuited their convenience, but with aſſurance that Sparta would never liſten to any terms of accommodation while deprived of Meſſene. With this anſwer the ambaſſadors returned to their reſpective cities. Soon afterwards they were diſpatched to Thebes, where, having propoſed their demands, they were offered admiſſion into the Theban confederacy. They anſwered, that this was not peace, but only a change of the war; and at length, after various propoſitions and reaſonings, they obtained the much-deſired neutrality [58].

Ambitious views of Epaminondas and the Thebans. Olymp. civ. 1. A. C. 364.

The Spartans, thus deſerted on every ſide, would probably have been the victims of their pride and obſtinacy, if circumſtances, unforeſeen by Archidamus, had not prevented the Thebans and Arcadians from carrying on the war with their uſual animoſity. Projects of glory and ambition had diſarmed the reſentment of Epaminondas. That active and enterpriſing leader, who thought that nothing was done, while any thing was neglected, had ſet himſelf to render Thebes miſtreſs

57 Iſocrat. in Archidam. 58 Xenoph. ubi ſupra.

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of the ſea. The attention and labour of the republic were directed to this important object; preparations were made at Aulis with ſilence and celerity; and when the deſign ſeemed ripe for execution, Epaminondas ſailed to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, to concert meaſures with thoſe maritime ſtates, which had already begun to feel the ſevere yoke of the Athenians, and become eager to ſhake it off. But the vigilance of the latter, who had ſent out a ſtrong fleet under Laches, a commander of reputation and ability, prevented the dangerous conſequences of this defection; and the Theban arms were, at the ſame time, ſummoned to a ſervice which more immediately concerned their intereſt and honour.

Diſconcerted by the activity of Athens.

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, began once more to diſplay the reſources of his fertile genius, and the inhuman cruelty of his temper. His numerous mercenaries, whom he collected and kept together with ſingular addreſs, and the ſecret aſſiſtance of Athens, enabled him to overrun the whole territory, and to gain poſſeſſion of all the principal cities of Theſſaly[59]. The oppreſſed Theſſalians had recourſe to Thebes, whoſe powerful protection they had ſo happily experienced on former occaſions, and whoſe ſtandard they had uniformly followed, with an alacrity which afforded a ſufficient pledge of their gratitude. The Thebans decreed to aſſiſt them with ten thouſand men, and the command was en-

Laſt expedition of Pelopidas into Theſſaly. Olymp. civ. 1. A.C. 364.

59 Plutarch. in Pelopid.

truſted

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truſted to Pelopidas, the perſonal enemy of Alexander. But the day appointed for the march was darkened by an eclipſe of the ſun, which greatly diminiſhed the army, as Pelopidas was unwilling to exact the reluctant ſervices of men diſpirited by the imaginary terrors of ſuperſtition. Such only as, deſpiſing vain omens, deſired to follow their beloved general, were conducted into Theſſaly; and being joined by their allies in that country near the town of Pharſalus, they encamped at the foot of the mountains of Cynoſcephalæ.

He is ſlain in the battle of Cynoſcephalæ.

The tyrant approached with an army twenty thouſand ſtrong, boldly offering them battle. Nor did Pelopidas decline the engagement, though his foot were, in number, inferior to the enemy. The action began with the cavalry, and was favourable to the Thebans; but the mercenaries of Alexander having gained the advantage of the ground, preſſed with vigour the Theban and Theſſalian infantry. In this emergency, Pelopidas rode up, and encouraging the retiring troops with his voice and action, gave them ſuch freſh ſpirits, that Alexander did not doubt their having received a conſiderable reinforcement. The mercenaries were preſſed in their turn, and thrown into diſorder. Pelopidas, darting his eye through their broken ranks, eſpied Alexander in the right wing, rallying his men, and preparing to advance with his uſual intrepidity. At this ſight the Theban was no longer maſter of his paſſion. Naturally a foe to tyrants, he beheld a perſonal foe in the tyrant Alexander. Accompanied by a few horſemen, he impe-

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impetuouſly ruſhed forward, calling aloud to his adverſary, and challenging him to ſingle combat. Alexander, fearing to meet the man whom he had injured, retired behind his guards, who received, firſt with a ſhower of javelins, and then with their ſpears, the little band of Pelopidas; who, after producing ſuch carnage [60] as Homer aſcribes to the rage of Diomed or Achilles, fell a victim to the blindneſs of his own ungovernable fury. Meanwhile, his troops advancing to the relief of their general, the guards of the tyrant were repelled; the Thebans, with their allies, proved victorious in every part of the battle; the enemy were diſperſed in flight, and purſued with the loſs of three thouſand men.

Honours paid to his memory.

But the death of Pelopidas threw a gloom over the victory. He was lamented by the Thebans and Theſſalians with immoderate demonſtrations of ſorrow. Accompanied by an innumerable crowd of real mourners, his body was carried in proceſſion to Thebes. The Theſſalians, in whoſe ſervice he had fallen, requeſted the honour of ſupplying the expences of his funeral, which was celebrated with every circumſtance of ſad magnificence. The multitude recollected the eclipſe which preceded his departure, and which, as they believed, announced his misfortune; and, in alluſion

[60] Diodorus ſays, that the bodies of thoſe whom he ſlew covered a long tract of ground. Plutarch is equally hyperbolical. The battles of Homer rendered the marvellous in military deſcription too familiar to the Greek hiſtorians, I mean Diodorus, Plutarch, Pauſanias; Thucydides and Xenophon knew their duty better.

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to that fatal omen, exclaimed, "that the ſun of Thebes was ſet, and her glory departed for ever." The Thebans appointed Malcitas and Diogeiton to the command in Theſſaly. The tyrant was again defeated, and ſtripped of all his conqueſts. But what appears extraordinary, he was allowed to live and reign in Pheræ[61], while the neighbouring cities entered into a cloſe alliance with Thebes.

The tyrant ſtripped of all his conqueſts.

The foreign expeditions which have been deſcribed, were not the only cauſes that diverted the attention of the Thebans from the affairs of Peloponneſus. While Epaminondas was employed abroad in the fleet, and Pelopidas in Theſſaly, the government of Thebes was on the point of being overturned by an ariſtocratical faction. The inhabitants of Orchomenus, the ſecond city in Bœotia, and anciently the rival of Thebes[62], entered into this conſpiracy, which was to be executed at the annual review of the Orchomenian troops. But the plot was diſcovered by the fears or the repentance of ſome accomplices, who became informers. The cavalry of Orchomenus, to the number of three hundred, were ſurrounded and cut to pieces in the Theban market-place. Nor did this vengeance ſatisfy the enraged multitude, who marched in a body to Orchomenus, beſieged and took the city, raſed it to the ground, put the men of full age to the ſword, and dragged their wives and children into captivity[63].

The Thebans demoliſh Orchomenus.

61 Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.
62 Pauſanias Bœotic.
63 Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

While

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The Arcadians ſeize Olympia, and prepare to celebrate the games. Olymp. civ. 1. A.C. 364.

While operations, deſtructive or fruitleſs, employed the activity of Thebes, her allies in Arcadia were occupied with deſigns ſtill more blameable. Their own ſtrength and numbers, together with a confidence in Athens, their new confederate, encouraged the Arcadians to give full ſcope to their ambition, by which they had been long animated. To pave the way for the total conqueſt of the Peloponneſus, in which they had already obtained a dangerous aſcendant, they began by wreſting ſeveral places from the Elians, the leaſt warlike, and moſt wealthy, of their neighbours. The Elians, worſted in every encounter with the enemy, craved the aſſiſtance of Sparta, which being reinforced by the Achæans (notwithſtanding the neutrality ſo recently ſtipulated), made ſeveral vigorous, but unſucceſsful efforts, for the defence of the Elian territory. The Arcadians ſtill puſhed their conqueſts in that country, gaining one town after another, and at length Olympia itſelf, the moſt precious jewel of the Elians, and the greateſt ornament of the Peloponneſus. As poſſeſſors of the ſacred city, and by virtue of a pretended right derived from the inhabitants of Piſa, an ancient but decayed place in the neighbourhood of Olympia, the Arcadians prepared to celebrate the hundred and fourth Olympiad, the time of which was at hand. At the approach of this auguſt ſolemnity, the concourſe, as uſual, was great from every part of Greece; hoſtilities were ſuſpended; and all parties united in common amuſements, and common ceremonies of religion.

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Which are interrupted by the arrival of the Elians in arms.

The prayers and ſacrifices were performed, and the military games had begun, when the performers and ſpectators were alarmed by the ſudden claſhing of armour, and the ſight of a *real* battle. The Elians had marched forth with their whole forces, and ſurpriſed the Arcadians, who, with two thouſand Argives, and a body of Athenian cavalry amounting to four hundred, guarded the ſacred groves and temples of Olympia. The vigour of their unexpected aſſault ſucceſſively repelled theſe intruders, who fled in diſorder through the ſtreets, and were purſued by the Elians with an *inſpired* valour, "ſince," ſays Xenophon, "Heaven alone can do, in one day, what no other power can accompliſh but in great length of time; make cowards courageous[64]." The Arcadians, however, recovering from their conſternation, began to rally. The aſſailants were reſiſted with obſtinacy; but did not retire, till having loſt Stratolas their commander, with other brave men, they retreated in good order, after giving a conſpicuous proof of their courage and intrepidity to thoſe who had long deſpiſed the ſoftneſs of their unwarlike character. The Arcadians renewed the guard with double vigilance; fortified the avenues that led to the Stadium and Hippodrome; and having taken theſe neceſſary precautions againſt a ſecond ſurpriſe, proceeded with the remaining ceremonies of the feſtival, which, though brought to an undiſturbed

[64] Τοιουτοι γενομενοι οιους την αρετην θεος μεν αν εμπνευσας δυναιτο και εν ημερᾳ αποδειξαι· ανθρωποι δε αν εν πολλῳ χρονῳ τους μη οντας αλκιμους ποιησειαν. P. 639.

conclu-

concluſion, was never acknowledged in the records of the Elians [65].

The Arcadians ſeize the Olympic treaſure.

After celebrating the Olympic games, the mixed concourſe of people returned to their reſpective homes, and the Arcadians found themſelves ſole maſters of the city and temple of Jupiter, containing the collected treaſures of many centuries, the rich gifts of vanity and ſuperſtition. Opportunity, joined to want, is naturally the mother of injuſtice. The Arcadians, who, to promote their ambitious deſigns, had raiſed a body of ſtanding troops called Eparitoi, laid hold of the ſacred treaſure, in order to pay thoſe mercenaries, whoſe demands they were otherwiſe incapable of ſatisfying, without great inconvenience. The Mantinæans firſt proteſted againſt this unwarrantable rapacity. Inſtead of accepting their proportion of the plunder, they impoſed, for the payment of the mercenaries, a tax on themſelves, of which they tranſmitted the produce to the archons, or magiſtrates, appointed by the Ten Thouſand to adminiſter the general concerns of the Arcadian nation. The archons, who had themſelves freely handled the ſacred money, repreſented to their conſtituents the affected delicacy of the Mantinæans, as an obſtinacy extremely dangerous to the ſtates of Arcadia, and inſinuated that this unſeaſonable regard for juſtice and piety moſt probably concealed ſome very criminal deſign.

The Mantinæans proteſt againſt this impiety.

65 Xenoph. l. vii. p. 638, & ſeqq. & Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

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The Ten Thouſand, or, as we ſhould ſay, the States-General, liſtened to this inſidious accuſation; and ſummoned the municipal magiſtrates of Mantinæa to appear and anſwer for their conduct. They refuſed to obey; a detachment of the Eparitoi was ſent to bring them by force; the Mantinæans ſhut their gates; this firmneſs rouſed the attention of the States; and many members of weight in that aſſembly began to ſuſpect that the Mantinæans muſt poſſeſs ſome ſecret ground of confidence, that encouraged them to ſet at defiance an authority which they were bound to revere. They reflected firſt on the alarming conſequences to which Arcadia might be expoſed by plundering the ſhrines of Jupiter; and then on the injuſtice and impiety of the deed itſelf. Theſe ſentiments, enforced by the ſuperſtition of the age, ſpread with rapidity in the aſſembly; it was determined thenceforth to abſtain from a conſecrated fund, the violation of which might prove dangerous to themſelves, and entail a curſe on their poſterity; and, to prevent the bad conſequences of the deſertion of the Eparitoi, whoſe pay muſt thereby be diminiſhed, many wealthy Arcadians, who could ſubſiſt on their private incomes, enrolled themſelves in their ſtead.

The States-General of Arcadia approve the reſolution of the Mantinæans;

and reſtore Olympia to the Elians.

Theſe meaſures, though approved by the States, gave great uneaſineſs to the archons, to the mercenaries, and to all who had ſhared the Olympic ſpoil, leſt they might be called to account for their rapacity, and compelled to refund the ſums which they

they had embezzled. To prevent this danger, they had recourſe to the Thebans, from whom they requeſted immediate aſſiſtance, on pretence that the States of Arcadia were ready to revolt to Sparta. The States, on the other hand, ſent an embaſſy requeſting the Thebans not to paſs the Iſthmus, until they ſhould receive farther invitation. Nor were they ſatisfied with barely counteracting the negociations of their enemies. Having determined not to derive any benefit from the wealth of Olympia, they thought proper to reſtore that city, as well as the direction of the games, to thoſe who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed both, and to conclude a peace with the Elians, who ſolicited it with much earneſtneſs, as a meaſure highly conducive to the general intereſt of the Peloponneſus.

Thoſe who had embezzled the Olympic treaſure ſeize their opponents by aſſiſtance of the Thebans.

The congreſs, aſſembled for this beneficial purpoſe, was held at Tegea, and conſiſted of deputies from Elis, and from many cities of Arcadia. When matters were ſeemingly adjuſted to the ſatisfaction of all parties, entertainments, as uſual, were prepared; and the deputies, except thoſe of Mantinæa, moſt of whom were invited home by the vicinity of their city, remained at Tegea to celebrate the feaſt of peace. While they were employed in drinking and merriment, the archons, and ſuch others as dreaded the conſequences of this haſty accommodation, addreſſed themſelves to a Theban general, who commanded a conſiderable body of Bœotian troops that had long garriſoned Tegea, in order to ſecure the fidelity of that place and the adjacent territory. The Theban had himſelf

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ſelf made free with the ſacred treaſure, and was therefore eaſily prevailed on to embrace any meaſure that might prevent an inquiry into that enormous crime. Nothing appeared ſo proper for this purpoſe as to ſeize and detain the unſuſpecting deputies, who conſiſted of the leading men from moſt cities of Arcadia. This ſcheme was no ſooner propoſed, than carried into execution. The gates of Tegea were ſecured; a body of armed men ſurrounded the place of entertainment; the deputies, who had prolonged to a late hour the joys of feſtivity, were taken unprepared, and conducted to various places of confinement, their number being too great for one priſon to contain [65].

The priſoners ſet at liberty.

Next day, the Mantinæans, being appriſed of this unexpected event, diſpatched meſſengers, demanding ſome few of their citizens who happened to remain at Tegea, after the departure of their companions; and at the ſame time acquainting the magiſtrates of that place, the archons, and the Theban general, that no Arcadian could be put to death without a fair and open trial. They likewiſe, without loſs of time, diſpatched an embaſſy to the ſeveral cities of Arcadia, rouſing them to arms in their own defence, and exhorting them to reſcue their impriſoned citizens, and to avenge the inſult offered to the general body of their nation. When thoſe who had committed the outrage, and eſpecially the Theban general, were acquainted with the vigour of theſe proceedings, they began

[65] Xenoph. p. 640.

to

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to be more alarmed than before. As they had ſeized but few Mantinæans, they could derive little advantage from the hoſtages of that city, whoſe reſentment they had moſt reaſon to fear. They were ſenſible of deſerving the indignation of Arcadia; and that the general voice of Greece muſt condemn the irregularity and violence of their meaſures. Intimidated by ſuch reflections, the Theban commander at once ſet the priſoners at liberty; and, appearing next day before an aſſembly as numerous as could be collected in ſuch troubleſome times, endeavoured to excuſe his conduct, by ſaying, that he had heard of the march of the Lacedæmonian army towards the frontier, and that ſeveral of the deputies, whom he had ſeized, were prepared to betray Tegea to the public enemy. The Arcadians were not the dupes of this ſhallow artifice; yet they abſtained from puniſhing their own wrongs, and ſent ambaſſadors to Thebes, who might deſcribe the injury that had been committed, and impeach the criminals[67].

Upon hearing the accuſation, Epaminondas, who was then general of the Bœotians, declared, that his countrymen had done better in ſeizing, than in diſcharging the Arcadians, whoſe conduct was highly blameable in making peace without the advice of their confederates. "Be aſſured," continued he to the ambaſſadors, "that the Thebans will march into Arcadia, and ſupport their friends in that province." This reſolution, which ex-

Epaminondas prepares to march into the Peloponneſus, at the head of the Bœotians and their confederates. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

[67] Xenoph. p. 641.

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preſſed the general ſenſe of the republic, was heard with great indignation by the Arcadian ſtates, and their allies of Elis and Achaia. They obſerved, that the Thebans could not have felt, much leſs have expreſſed, any diſpleaſure at the peace of Peloponneſus, if they had not deemed it their intereſt to perpetuate the diviſions and hoſtilities of a country which they wiſhed to weaken and to ſubdue. They entered into a ſtricter alliance with each other, and prepared for a vigorous defence; ſending ambaſſadors to Athens and Sparta, that the former might be ready to thwart the meaſures of a neighbouring and rival ſtate, and that the latter might take arms to maintain the independence of that portion of Greece, of which the valour of Sparta had long formed the ſtrength and bulwark.

His laſt expedition into that country. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

During theſe hoſtile preparations, Epaminondas took the field with *all* the Bœotians, with the Eubœans, and with a ſtrong body of Theſſalians, partly ſupplied by Alexander, and partly raiſed by the cities which Pelopidas had recently delivered from the yoke of that cruel tyrant. Upon his arrival in the Peloponneſus, he expected to be joined by the Argives, the Meſſenians, and ſeveral communities of Arcadia, particularly the inhabitants of Tegea and Megalopolis. With theſe hopes, he proceeded ſouthward to Nemea, an ancient city in the Argive territory, diſtinguiſhed by the games celebrated in honour of Hercules. There he encamped for ſeveral days, with an intention to intercept the Athenians, whoſe neareſt route into

Pelo-

Peloponneſus lay through the diſtrict of Nemea; convinced that nothing could more contribute, than an advantage over that people in the beginning of the campaign, to animate the courage, as well as to increaſe the number of the Theban partiſans in every part of Greece. But this ſcheme was defeated by the prudence of the Athenians, who, inſtead of marching through the Iſthmus, ſailed to the coaſt of Laconia, and proceeded from thence to join their confederates at Mantinæa. Appriſed of this deſign, Epaminondas moved his camp, and marched forward to Tegea, which being ſtrongly fortified, and enjoying a lofty and central ſituation, was judiciouſly choſen as the place of rendezvous for his Peloponneſian confederates. Having continued ſeveral weeks at Tegea, he was much diſappointed that none of the neighbouring towns ſent to offer their ſubmiſſion, and to ſolicit the protection of the Theban arms. This waſte of time gave him the more uneaſineſs, as his command was limited to a ſhort term. The ſtrength of the enemy at Mantinæa was continually increaſing. Ageſilaus had already conducted the Lacedæmonians to the frontier of Arcadia. If *they* likewiſe ſhould join, the combined forces would prove ſuperior to the army of Epaminondas, which amounted to thirty thouſand in number, and of which the cavalry alone exceeded three thouſand. Conſidering theſe circumſtances, he ſuddenly determined on an enterpriſe, which, if crowned with ſucceſs, would render the preſent

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hitherto fruitleſs expedition not unworthy of his former fame.

Fails in his attempt to ſurpriſe Sparta;

Having decamped with his whole army in the night, he performed a haſty march of thirty miles, in order to ſurpriſe Sparta; and had not the extraordinary ſwiftneſs of a Cretan deſerter appriſed Ageſilaus of the danger, that city would have been taken unprepared, and totally incapable of defence[68]. The bulk of the Lacedæmonian army had proceeded too far on the road to Mantinæa, to anticipate the deſign of the enemy; but the aged king, with his ſon Archidamus, returned, with a ſmall but valiant band, to the defence of Sparta. The engagement which followed, as related by Xenophon, appears one of the moſt extraordinary that hiſtory records. Epaminondas had employed every precaution which his peculiar ſagacity could ſuggeſt; he did not approach Sparta by thoſe narrow roads, where a ſuperiority of numbers would afford him ſmall advantage; he did not draw up his forces in the plain, in which, while entering the town, they might have been annoyed with miſſile weapons; nor did he allow an opportunity of ſurpriſing him by ſtratagem or ambuſcade, in the management of which the Spartans were at all times ſo dexterous. Seizing an eminence which commanded the town, he determined to deſcend into it with every advantage on

68 Xenophon ſays, ὥσπερ νοτίαν παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνομένων. Xenophon, p. 644. "As a neſt quite deſtitute of its defenders."

his

his ſide, and without the ſeeming poſſibility of being expoſed to any inconvenience. But the iſſue of ſo well-concerted an enterpriſe, the hiſtorian heſitates whether to refer to a particular providence of the gods, or to aſcribe to the invincible courage of men actuated by deſpair. Archidamus, with ſcarcely an hundred men, oppoſed the progreſs of the enemy, cut down the firſt ranks, and advanced to aſſault the remainder. Then, ſtrange to relate! thoſe Thebans, ſays Xenophon, who breathed fire, who had ſo often conquered, who were far ſuperior in number, and who poſſeſſed the advantage of the ground, ſhamefully gave way. The Spartans purſued them with impetuoſity, but were ſoon repelled with loſs; for the divinity, whoſe aſſiſtance had produced this extraordinary victory, ſeems alſo to have preſcribed the limits beyond which it was not to extend [69]. CHAP. XXXI.

Epaminondas, foiled in an attempt which promiſed ſuch a fair proſpect of ſucceſs, did not ſink under his diſappointment. As he had reaſon to believe that the whole forces at Mantinæa would be withdrawn from that place to the defence of Sparta, he immediately ſounded a retreat, returned and in that againſt Mantinæa;

[69] Plutarch tells a ſtory on this occaſion, of a young Spartan named Iſadas, who ſtripped naked, anointed himſelf with oil, ſallied forth with a ſpear in one hand, and a ſword in the other, and traced his path in blood through the thickeſt of the enemy. He returned unhurt, was crowned for his valour, but fined for fighting without his ſhield. Plut. in Ageſil. To a modern reader, Xenophon's account of the battle will appear a pompous deſcription of the effect of panic terror with which the Thebans were inſpired, by finding, inſtead of νοσσιαν ερημον, "a defenceleſs neſt," the vigorous oppoſition of men in arms.

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to Tegea with the utmoſt expedition, and allowing his infantry to take time for reſt and refreſhment, he, with admirable preſence of mind, ordered the horſe to advance forward to Mantinæa (which was diſtant only twelve miles), and to maintain their ground until his arrival with the reſt of the army. He expected to find the Mantinæans totally unprepared for ſuch a viſit; and as it was then autumn, he doubted not that moſt of the townſmen would be employed in the country, in reaping and bringing in the corn. His plan was wiſe, and well executed. The ſituation of the Mantinæans correſponded to his hopes. But it ſeemed as if fortune had delighted to baffle his ſagacity. Before the Theban forces arrived at Mantinæa, a numerous and powerful ſquadron of Athenian cavalry entered that place, commanded by Hegelochus, who then firſt learned the departure of the allies to protect the Lacedæmonian capital. He had ſcarcely received this intelligence, when the Theban appeared, and, advancing with great rapidity, prepared to effect the purpoſe of their expedition. The Athenians had not time to refreſh themſelves; they had eat nothing that day; they were inferior in number; they knew the bravery of the Theban and Theſſalian cavalry, with whom they muſt contend; yet, regardleſs of every conſideration but the ſafety of their allies, they ruſhed into the field, ſtopped the progreſs of the aſſailants, and, after a fierce and bloody engagement, which diſplayed great courage on both ſides, obtained an acknowledged victory. The enemy craved the bodies of their

which is ſaved by the Athenian cavalry.

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their dead; the victors erected a trophy of their useful valour, which had saved the corn, cattle, slaves, women, and children[70] of Mantinæa from falling a prey to the invaders.

Epaminondas determines to risk a general engagement.

The repeated misfortunes, which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary commander, only determined Epaminondas to a general engagement, in which he might either wipe off the memory of his late disgrace, or obtain an honourable death, fighting to render his country the sovereign of Greece. The confederates had re-assembled at Mantinæa, strengthened by considerable reinforcements. Fresh succours had likewise arrived to the Thebans. Never had such numerous armies[71] taken the field during the perpetual wars in which those unhappy republics were engaged. But battles become really interesting, not so much by the number of the troops, as by the conduct of the generals. It is worth while, says the military historian[72], to observe the operations of Epaminondas on this memorable occasion. Having ranged his men in battalions, he led them, not along the plain, which was the nearest road to Mantinæa, but turning to the left, conducted them by a chain of hills which joined that city and Tegea, and skirted the eastern extremity of both. The enemy, apprised of his march, drew up their forces before the walls of Mantinæa; the Lacedæmonians, and such Arcadians as had embraced the more honourable cause, in the right wing, the

His movements preceding the battle of Mantinæa.

70 Xenoph. l. vii. p. 644.
71 Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.
72 Xenoph. p. 645.

Athenians

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Athenians in the left, the Achæans and Eleans forming the main body. Meanwhile Epaminondas marched ſlowly along, extending his circuit, as if he wiſhed to decline the engagement. Having approached that part of the mountain which faced the hoſtile army, he ordered his men to halt, and to lay down their arms. His former movements had occaſioned great doubt and perplexity; but now it ſeemed evident that he had laid aſide all thoughts of fighting that day, and was preparing to encamp. This opinion, too lightly conceived, proved fatal to the enemy. They abandoned their arms and their ranks, diſperſed in their tents, and loſt not only that external arrangement, but that inward preparation[73], that martial ardour of mind, which ought to animate ſoldiers at the near proſpect of an engagement. Epaminondas ſeized the deciſive moment of attack. Facing to the right, he converted the column of march into an order of battle. His troops were thus diſpoſed inſtantaneouſly in the ſame order in which he meant to fight. At the head of his left wing, which conſiſted of the flower of the Bœotians, and which, as at the battle of Leuctra, he formed into a firm wedge, with a ſharp point, and with ſpreading flanks, he advanced againſt the Spartans and Mantinæans; and truſting the event of the battle to the rapid impulſe of this unexpected onſet, he commanded the centre and right wing, in which

[73] Ελυσε μεν των πολεμιων την εν ταις ψυχαις προς την μαχην παρασκευην· ελυσε δε την εν ταις συνταξεσιν. Xenoph. p. 645.

he

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he placed leſs confidence, to proceed with a ſlow pace, that they might not come up and grapple with the oppoſing diviſions of the enemy, until the victory of his left wing had taught them to conquer.

Battle of Mantinæa. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

This judicious deſign was crowned with merited ſucceſs. The enemy, perceiving the dreadful ſhock to which they were expoſed, flew to their arms, put on their bucklers and helmets, bridled their horſes, and ſuddenly reſumed their ranks; but theſe different operations were performed with the trepidation of ſurpriſe and haſte, rather than with the ardour of hope and courage; and the whole army had the appearance of men prepared rather to ſuffer, than to inflict, any thing cruel or terrible [74]. The Spartans and Mantinæans, drawn up in firm order, ſternly waited the firſt brunt of the aſſailants. The battle was fierce and bloody, and after their ſpears were broken, both parties had recourſe to their ſwords. The wedge of Epaminondas at length penetrated the Spartan line, and this advantage encouraged his centre and right wing to attack and repel the correſponding diviſions of the enemy. The Theban and Theſſalian cavalry were equally ſucceſsful. In the intervals of their ranks Epaminondas had placed a body of light infantry, whoſe miſſile weapons greatly annoyed the enemy's horſe, who were drawn up too deep. He had likewiſe taken the precaution to

74 Παντες δε πεισομενοις τι μαλλον η ποιησουσιν ἰωικεσαν. Xenoph. p. 646.

occupy

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occupy a riſing ground on his right with a conſiderable detachment, which might take the Athenians in flank and rear, ſhould they advance from their poſt. Theſe prudent diſpoſitions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound[75], and was carried to an eminence, which was afterwards called the Watch-tower[76], probably that he might the better obſerve the ſubſequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader was withdrawn the ſpirit which animated the Theban army. Having impetuouſly broke through the hoſtile ranks, they knew not how to profit of this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the field, and prevailed in ſeveral partial encounters. All was confuſion and terror. The light infantry, which

75 Pauſanias, in Arcad. ſays, that Epaminondas was killed by Gryllus, the ſon of Xenophon the Athenian; and, as a proof of his aſſertion, mentions a beautiful picture of the battle of Mantinæa in the Ceramicus of Athens, as well as the monument of Gryllus, erected by the Mantinæans on the field of battle; both exiſting in the time of Pauſanias, and both aſcribing to this Athenian the honour of killing Epaminondas. Plutarch, in Ageſilao, ſays that Anticrates, a Spartan, killed Epaminondas with a ſword that his poſterity were thence called Machairionides; and that, as late as the days of Plutarch, they enjoyed certain immunities and honours as a recompence for the merit of their anceſtor Anticrates in deſtroying the worſt enemy of Sparta. Gryllus the ſon of Xenophon fell in the battle of Mantinæa; and the words, or rather the ſilence of his father, is very remarkable concerning the death of Epaminondas: "The Theban column broke the Spartans, *but when Epaminondas fell*, the reſt knew not how to uſe the victory." What ſublimity in this paſſage, if Gryllus really ſlew Epaminondas!

76 Pauſan. ubi ſupra.

had

had been poſted amidſt the Theban and Theſſalian horſe, being left behind in the purſuit, were received and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry, commanded by Hegelochus. Elated with this ſucceſs, the Athenians turned their arms againſt the detachment placed on the heights, conſiſting chiefly of Eubœans, whom they routed and put to flight, after a terrible ſlaughter. With ſuch alternations of victory and defeat ended this memorable engagement. Both armies, as conquerors, erected a trophy; both craved their dead, as conquered[77]; and this battle, which being certainly the greateſt, was expected to have proved the moſt deciſive, ever fought among the Greeks, produced no other conſequence but that general languor and debility long remarkable in the ſubſequent operations of thoſe hoſtile republics. CHAP. XXXI.

When the tumult of the action ceaſed, the moſt diſtinguiſhed Thebans aſſembled around their dying general. His body had been pierced with a javelin, and the ſurgeons declared, that it was impoſſible for him to ſurvive the extraction of the weapon. He aſked whether his ſhield was ſafe? which being preſented to him, he viewed it with a languid ſmile of melancholy joy. He then demanded, whether the Thebans had obtained the victory? Being anſwered in the affirmative (for the Lacedæmonians indeed had firſt ſent to demand the bodies of their ſlain), he declared himſelf ready to quit life without regret, ſince he left his Death of Epaminondas.

77 Xenoph. l. vii. ad fin.

country

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country triumphant. The ſpectators lamented, among other objects of ſorrow, that he ſhould die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You miſtake," ſaid he with a cheerful preſence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters, the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, who will tranſmit my renown to the lateſt ages." So ſaying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful ſolemnity of his death correſponded with the dignified ſplendour of an active and uſeful life. He is uſually deſcribed as a perfect character[78]; nor does the truth of hiſtory oblige us to detract any thing from this deſcription, except that in ſome inſtances, and particularly in his laſt fatal invaſion of the Peloponneſus, he allowed the blaze of patriotiſm to eclipſe the mild light of juſtice and benevolence. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument ſtill exiſted, after four centuries, in the time of Pauſanias, with an inſcription in elegiac verſe, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then maſter of the Roman world, added a ſecond column, with a new inſcription[79], in honour of a character, whom that unſteady emperor had genius to admire, but wanted firmneſs to imitate.

An elegant Roman writer gives a brief but comprehenſive panegyric of Epaminondas, that during

78 Cicero Acad. Quæſt. l. i. & paſſim. Plutarch. Corn. Nepos, Pauſan.

79 Vid. Pauſan. in Arcad. & Bœotic.

his

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his lifetime Thebes was the arbiter of Greece; whereas both before and afterwards, that republic continually languiſhed in ſervitude or dependence[80]. But this obſervation betrays the inaccurate partiality of a biographer, who often exalts the glory of a favourite hero, at the expence of hiſtoric truth. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes was deprived of her principal ornament and defence, the ſource of her confidence, and the ſpring of her activity; and her councils were thenceforth leſs ambitious, and her arms leſs enterpriſing[81]. But ſix years after that event, ſhe controuled the deciſions of the Amphictyonic council, and, inſtead of being reduced to a condition of dependence, her power was ſtill formidable to the moſt warlike of her neighbours.

Ageſilaus's expedition into Egypt. Olymp. civ. 3. A. C. 362.

Soon after the battle of Mantinæa, a general peace was propoſed under the mediation of Artaxerxes, who wanted Grecian auxiliaries to check the inſurrections in Egypt and Leſſer Aſia, which diſturbed the two laſt years of his reign. The only condition annexed to this treaty was, that each republic ſhould retain its reſpective poſſeſſions. The Spartans determined to reject every accommodation until they had recovered Meſſenia; and as Artaxerxes had uniformly oppoſed this demand, they tranſported forces into Egypt, to foment the

[80] Hujus de virtutibus vitaque ſatis erit dictum, ſi hoc unum adjunxero, *quod nemo erat infitias*; Thebas & ante Epaminondam natum, & poſt ejus interitum, perpetuo alieno paruiſſe imperio; contra ea, quamdiu ille præfuerit reipublicæ, caput fuiſſe totius Græciæ. Corn. Nepos, in Epam.

[81] Vid. Polyb. Hiſt. l. vi. c. xli.

defection

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defection of that province. At the head of a thouſand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, and ten thouſand mercenaries, Ageſilaus ſupported one rebel after another, having ſucceſſively ſet on the throne Taches and Nectanebus[82]. In this diſhonourable war he amaſſed conſiderable wealth, by means of which he probably expected to retrieve the affairs of his country. But returning home by Cyrenaica, he died on that coaſt, in the eighty-fourth year of his age, and forty-firſt of his reign[83]. His character has been ſufficiently illuſtrated in the courſe of this work. He was the greateſt, and the moſt unfortunate of the Spartan kings. He had ſeen the higheſt grandeur of Sparta, and he beheld her fall. During the time that he governed the republic, his country ſuffered more calamities and diſgrace than in ſeven centuries preceding his reign. His ambition and his obſtinacy, doubtleſs, contributed to her diſaſters; yet ſo natural were the principles from which he acted, ſo probable his hopes of ſucceſs, and ſo firm and manly his ſtruggles for victory, that a contemporary writer, who could ſee through the cloud of fortune, ventured to beſtow on Ageſilaus a panegyric[84], which exalts him beyond the renown of his moſt illuſtrious predeceſſors.

His death. Olymp. civ. 4. A. C. 361.

[82] Plut. in Ageſilao. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xxi.

[83] Diodor. l. xv. c. xxii.

[84] Ὁ λογος εἰς Ἀγεσιλάον, by Xenophon.

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State of Greece after the Battle of Mantinæa.—The Amphictyonic Council.—Returning Proſperity of Athens.—Vices reſulting from its Government.—Abuſes of the judiciary Power.—Of the Theatre.—Degeneracy of Grecian Muſic.—Extreme Profligacy of the Athenians.—The Vices of Chares render him the Idol of the Multitude.—The Social War.—Baniſhment of Timotheus and Iphicrates.—Diſgraceful Iſſue of the War.—Philoſophy.—Statuary.—Praxiteles.—The Cnidian Venus.—Painting.—Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis.—Literature.—Xenophon.—His Military Expeditions.—Religious and Literary Retreat.—Lyſias.—Iſocrates.—Plato.—His Travels.—He ſettles in the Academy.—His great Views.—Theology.—Coſmogony.—Doctrine of Ideas.—Of the Human Underſtanding.—The Paſſions.—Virtues.—State of Retribution.—Genius, and Character.

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State of Greece after the battle of Mantinæa.

WITH the battle of Mantinæa ended[1] the bloody ſtruggle for dominion, which had long exalted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had loſt their ableſt

[1] Xenophon's Greek hiſtory likewiſe ends with that battle. Henceforth we follow Plutarch and Diodorus, from whom we learn the principal circumſtances of great events, which the orators

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ableſt generals, and the flower of their troops. No Theban aroſe to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the deſigns of that illuſtrious patriot. Archidamus, who ſucceeded to the Spartan throne, imperfectly juſtified the high opinion conceived of his early wiſdom and valour. Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitleſs, thoſe republics ſunk into ſuch weakneſs, as encouraged pretenſions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

The Amphictyonic council reſumes its ancient authority. Olymp. civ. 4. A.C. 361.

During the *ſuperiority*, or, in the language of ancient writers, during the *empire* of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the majeſty of the Amphictyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of mere form; it regulated ſome ceremonies of ſuperſtition; it ſuperintended games and ſpectacles; it preſerved peace and good order among the crowd of ſtrangers who aſſembled, at ſtated times, to conſult the oracle of Apollo. But for more than a century paſt, the public meaſures of the Greeks had been directed by councils held, not at Delphi, the reſidence of the Amphictyons, but in Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in one or other of which the allies convened on every important emergency, acknowledging, by their preſence there, the reſpective authority of thoſe capitals which were regarded as the heads of their ſeveral confederacies. But when firſt the Peloponneſian, then the Bœotian

orators Iſocrates and Demoſthenes, Ariſtotle's Treatiſe of Politics, and Xenophon's Diſcourſes on the Revenues and Government of Athens, will enable us more fully to explain.

war,

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war, and laſt of all the battle of Mantinæa, had levelled the greatneſs, and overthrown the proud tyranny of thoſe domineering republics, the Amphictyonic council once more emerged from obſcurity; and the general ſtates of Greece having aſſembled according to their national and hereditary forms, ſpurned the imperious dictates of any ſingle community.

The Athenians recover many of their maritime poſſeſſions. Olymp. cv. 1—cv. 2. A. C. 360—358.

While this event ſtrengthened the fœderal union, and tended to reſtore the primitive equality of the Grecian ſtates, various circumſtances concurred to revive the aſpiring ambition of Athens. During the Bœotian war, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only; without making ſuch efforts as enfeebled their ſtrength, their arms had acquired great luſtre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhauſted; experience had taught them the danger of attempting to ſubdue, and the impoſſibility of keeping in ſubjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous iſlands of the Ægean and Ionian ſeas, the remote coaſts of Thrace and Aſia, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conqueſts, fearleſs of domeſtic envy. It appears, that ſoon after the death of Epaminondas, Eubœa again acknowledged the authority[2] of Athens; an event

[2] Comp. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 513. & Demoſthenes de Cherſoneſo, ſub fine, & Æſchines in Cteſiphont. It appears, however, from theſe authors, that the Thebans ſoon afterwards endeavoured to recover Eubœa. The Athenians again reſcued it from their power, at the exhortation of Timotheus, whoſe pithy ſpeech is commended by Demoſthenes: "What, my countrymen, the

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event facilitated by the deſtruction of the Theban partiſans belonging to that place, in the battle of Mantinæa. From the Thracian Boſphorus to Rhodes, ſeveral places along both ſhores ſubmitted to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; men, who having ſurvived Ageſilaus and Epaminondas, were far ſuperior, in abilities and in virtue, to the contemporary generals of other republics. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendſhip of a people capable to interrupt their navigation and to deſtroy their commerce. Byzantium had become their ally, and there was reaſon to hope that Amphipolis would ſoon be rendered their ſubject. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the ſea, with a fleet of near three hundred ſail, and employed the beſt half of her citizens and ſubjects in ſhips of war or commerce [3].

The vices aſcribed to the ſuppoſed degeneracy of the Athenians, reſulted from the nature of

This tide of proſperity, which flowed with moſt apparent force immediately after the battle of Mantinæa [4], has been ſuppoſed productive of very important conſequences. While Epaminondas lived, the Athenians, it is ſaid, were kept vigilant in duty through jealouſy and fear; but after the death of this formidable enemy, they ſunk into

Thebans in the iſland, and you ſtill deliberating! Why not already in the harbour? why not embarked? why is not the ſea covered with your navy?" Demoſthen. ubi ſupra.

3 Xenoph. Hellen. l. vii. p. 615. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xi. Iſocrat. Panegyr. & de Pace.

4 Juſtin. l. vi. c. ix. firſt made this obſervation, which has been ſo frequently repeated.

thoſe

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their government.

thoſe vices which occaſioned their ruin. This ſpecious remark is not founded in truth. Two centuries before the birth of Epaminondas, the injuſtice, the avarice, the total corruption of the Athenians, is forcibly deſcribed by one of the moſt reſpectable of their countrymen[5], who compoſed a ſyſtem of wiſe laws, in order to aſcertain their rights, and to reform their manners. But it was difficult to correct abuſes that ſeem inherent in the nature of democracy, which, even as regulated by Solon, but ſtill more as new-modelled by Pericles, left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and ſlaves in another. The diviſion of the executive power of government among the archons, the ſenate, aſſembly, and even various committees of the aſſembly, rendered it impoſſible to perceive, or prevent, the hand of oppreſſion. Men knew not from what quarter their ſafety might be aſſailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, inſtead of making united oppoſition to the injuſtice of their magiſtrates, contented themſelves with inflicting the ſame injuries which they had either previouſly ſuffered, or ſtill apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the paſſions of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to exerciſe power will commonly be attended with a

5 See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 107. and the elegiac verſes of Solon preſerved in Demoſthenes Orat. περὶ παραπρεσβείας; a title that can only be tranſlated by a paraphraſe, "the miſconduct of Æſchines in his embaſſy."

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ſtrong inclination to abuſe it. Unleſs power, therefore, be counteracted by liberty; unleſs an impervious line of ſeparation be drawn between prerogative and privilege, and that part of the conſtitution which ſuſtains its political life, be kept ſeparate and diſtinct from that which tends to corruption, it is of little conſequence whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thouſand; in both caſes alike, the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law.

This ſubject illuſtrated:

This radical defect in the Grecian policies produced many ruinous conſequences in affairs foreign and domeſtic, which were commonly directed by the ſelfiſh paſſions of a few, or the fluctuating caprices of the multitude, rather than by the rational and permanent intereſt of the community. But as diſeaſes and other accidents often bring to light the latent weakneſs and imperfections of the body, ſo the vices of the Athenian government firſt appeared in their full magnitude after the unfortunate war of Peloponneſus; and, although the exceſs of the malady ſometimes checked itſelf, and returns of eaſe and proſperity ſometimes concealed its virulence, yet the deep-rooted evil ſtill maintained its deſtructive progreſs, till it wrought the ruin of the conſtitution.

in the abuſes of the judiciary power;

In the tumultuary governments of Greece, where the judiciary power frequently prevailed over the legiſlative, the ſources of diſſenſion were innumerable; while the feeble reſtraint of laws, ill adminiſtered, was unable to counteract their force. Although hereditary diſtinctions were little known

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or regarded, the poor and rich formed two diſtinct parties, which had their particular views and ſeparate intereſts. In ſome republics the higher ranks bound themſelves, by oath, to neglect no opportunity of hurting their inferiors[6]. The populace of Athens commonly treated the rich as if they had entered into an engagement not leſs atrocious[7]. During the intervals of party rage, private quarrels kept the ſtate in perpetual fermentation. Beſide the ordinary diſputes concerning property, the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honours, or eluding puniſhments or burthens, opened an ever-flowing ſource of bitter animoſity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himſelf a friend[8]. Hereditary reſentments were perpetuated from one generation to another; and the ſeeds of diſcord being ſown in ſuch abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal proſecutions. The uſual employment of ſix thouſand Athenians conſiſted in deciding law-ſuits, the profits of which afforded the principal reſource of the poorer citizens. Their legal fees amounted annually to an hundred and fifty talents; the bribes which they received, ſometimes exceeded that ſum; and, both united, formed a ſixth part of the Athenian revenues[9], even in the moſt flouriſhing times.

6 Ariſtot. Polit. Iſocrat. & Lyſias, paſſim.

7 Xenoph. de Rep. Athen.

8 See Lyſias paſſim. & Xenoph. Memorab. l. ii. p. 748, & ſeqq.

9 Ariſtoph. Veſp.

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As the moſt numerous but moſt worthleſs claſs of the people commonly prevailed in the aſſembly, ſo they had totally ingroſſed the tribunals; and it was to be expected that ſuch judges would always be more ſwayed by favour and prejudice, than by law and reaſon. The law puniſhed with death the man guilty of giving bribes; but "we," ſay the Athenian writers [10], "advance him to the command of our armies; and the more criminal he becomes in this reſpect, with the higher and more lucrative honours is he inveſted." Thoſe who courted popular favour, laviſhed not only their own, but the public wealth, to flatter the paſſions of their adherents; an abuſe which began during the ſplendid adminiſtration of Pericles [11], extended more widely under his unworthy ſucceſſors; and, though interrupted during the calamities of the republic, revived with new force on the firſt dawn of returning proſperity [12].

and in thoſe of the theatre.

In the licence of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themſelves alike entitled to enjoy every ſpecies of feſtivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expence, and of paying for the admiſſion of the populace. At the period of which we write, a conſiderable portion of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre, and ſome years afterwards [13], a law was propoſed by the demagogue Eubulus, and enacted by the

[10] Iſocrates de Pace, & Demoſthenes paſſim.
[11] Thucydides, p. 108, & ſeqq. [12] Plut. in Pericle.
[13] Before Chriſt 349, according to S. Petitus, de Leg. Attic. p. 383

ſenate

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ſenate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propoſe diverting, the *theatrical* money to any other end or object [14].

Circumſtances which rendered the Grecian theatre peculiarly liable to abuſe.

Of all amuſements known in poliſhed ſociety, the Grecian theatre was, doubtleſs, the moſt elegant and ingenious; yet ſeveral circumſtances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuſe. The great extent of the edifices in which plays were repreſented, naturally introduced maſques, the better to diſtinguiſh the different *perſons* [15], or characters, of the drama; ſince the variations of paſſion, with the correſpondent changes of countenance, which form the capital merit of modern performers, could ſcarcely have been obſerved by an immenſe crowd of people, many of whom muſt have been placed at a great diſtance from the ſcene. The ſame cauſes, together with the inimitable harmony of the Greek language, gave riſe to muſical declamation [16], which might ſometimes fortify paſſion, but always rendered ſpeech more flow and articulate, and therefore more eaſily heard by the remote part of the audience. In combining the different parts of a tragic fable, the poet naturally rejects ſuch incidents as are improper for repre-

[14] Plutarch. in Pericle, & Demoſthen. Oration. paſſim.

[15] It is well known that the word *perſona* originally ſignified a maſque, from *perſonare*, becauſe the ancient maſques, both Greek and Roman, were ſo made as to increaſe and invigorate ſound.

[16] Notwithſtanding the aſſertions of Caſaubon, Gravina, &c. the Greeks in ancient times ſeem not to have been acquainted with the abſurd practice of dividing the acting and ſpeaking between two perſons. This is mentioned by Livy, as the invention of Titus Andronicus, who flouriſhed 240 years before Chriſt.

ſentation.

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ſentation. Theſe, if neceſſary for carrying on the action of the piece, are ſuppoſed to be tranſacted elſewhere, and barely related on the theatre. The time required for ſuch events, when they are not ſimultaneous with thoſe exhibited on the ſtage, neceſſarily interrupts the repreſentation, and leaves room for the choral ſongs, which being incorporated with the tragedy, heightens its effect, and increaſes the ſpectator's delight; conſequences extremely different from thoſe attending the act tunes and detached airs of modern plays and operas, univerſally condemned by good judges, as ſuſpending the action, and deſtroying the intereſt of the drama, and only affording opportunities to effeminate throats to ſhine in trills and diviſions, at the expence of poetry and good ſenſe. But in ancient, as well as modern times, the corrupt taſte of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the diſcerning judgment of the wiſe and virtuous. The form and arrangement of the Grecian tragedy was exactly imitated in the extravagant pieces of Ariſtophanes, and his profligate contemporaries and ſucceſſors [17]. Theſe pernicious productions formed the favourite entertainment of the populace. The maſque, diſguiſing the countenance of the performer, allowed him to indulge in the moſt unbluſhing licence of voice and geſture; the declamation was effeminate and vicious; above all, the muſic became glaring, rawdry, voluptuous, and diſſolute in the higheſt degree, and ſuited only that perverſe debauchery of

[17] See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 146.

ſoul,

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ſoul from which it originally ſprung, and which it ſerved afterwards to inflame and nouriſh [18].

Extreme profligacy of the Athenians.

A myſterious cloud [19] hangs over the Grecian muſic, to which effects are aſcribed far tranſcending the actual power of that art. Yet we cannot refuſe our aſſent to the concurring teſtimony of ancient writers, who refer to this principle the extreme degeneracy and corruption which almoſt univerſally infected the Athenians at the period now under review. Cauſes which operate on the many, are not eaſily miſtaken; but ſhould we ſtill doubt the cauſe, the effect at leaſt cannot be denied. The Athenian youth are ſaid to have diſſipated their fortunes, and melted the vigour of mind and body, in wanton and expenſive dalliance with the

[18] Ariſtotle, l. viii. de Republ. ſays ironically, "Every kind of muſic is good for ſomething; that of the theatres is neceſſary for the amuſement of the mob; being well ſuited to the perverſion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it." Plato, Ariſtoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of muſic, as the main ſource of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been uſed as the vehicle of religious and moral inſtruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and diſſolute paſſion. Plato de Legibus, l. iii. Ariſtoxenus, quoted by Athenæus, l. xiv. & Plutarch. de Muſica. In ſpeaking of the vices of London, a writer, who had the ſpirit of an ancient legiſlator, ſays, "That were a man permitted to make all the ballads of a nation, he needed not care who ſhould make its laws." Fletcher of Saltoun's Works, p. 266.

[19] Yet that cloud may be diſpelled, if we admit what is ſaid in chap. v. vol. i. p. 233, & ſeqq. that the ancients, when they ſpeak of muſic, mean muſic combined with poetry. The preciſion of *words* is neceſſary to determine the vague expreſſion of *tone* and *time*; and the chromatic and enharmonic intervals of the Greek muſicians, which ſo nearly approach the ſliding flexions of ſpeech, prove that the former was imitative of the latter.

female

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female performers on the theatre[19]. Weary and faſtidious with exceſs of criminal indulgence, they loſt all capacity or reliſh for ſolid and manly occupations; and at once deſerted the exerciſes of war, and the ſchools of philoſophers. To fill up the vacuities of their liſtleſs lives, they, as well as perſons more advanced in years, loitered in the ſhops of muſicians, and other artiſts[20]; or ſauntered in the forum and public places, idly enquiring after news, in which they took little intereſt, unleſs ſome danger alarmed the inſipid uniformity of their pleaſures[21]. Dice, and other games of chance, were carried to a ruinous exceſs; and are ſo keenly ſtigmatiſed by the moral writers of the age, that it ſhould ſeem they had begun but recently to prevail, and prove fatal[22]. The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the ſenſual gratifications of the table; and, might we believe a poet quoted by Athenæus, had lately beſtowed the freedom of their city (once deemed an honour by princes and kings[23]) on the ſons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery[24].

Their idleneſs, poverty, and ignorance.

Idleneſs, indulgence, and diſſipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to

[19] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. who gives a general deſcription of Athenian profligacy.

[20] Iſocrat, in Areopag. and Lyſias's defence of a poor man accuſed before the ſenate, tranſlated in the Life of Lyſias, p. 114.

[21] Demoſthen. Philipp. paſſim.

[22] Athenæus, l. xii. Lyſias in Alcibiad.

[23] Demoſthen. de Republic. ordinand.

[24] Athenæus, l. iii. p. 119.

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extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally deſtitute of *immoveable* poſſeſſions [25]. Their dreſs was frequently ſo mean and dirty, that it was difficult, by their external appearance, to diſtinguiſh them from ſlaves; a circumſtance which aroſe not from ſlovenlineſs, but from poverty, ſince we are aſſured that ſuch as could afford the expence ſpared no pains to adorn their perſons; and that many who danced during ſummer in embroidered robes, ſpent the winter in places too ſhameful to be named [26]. And how is it poſſible (to uſe the words of their own authors [27]) that wretches, deſtitute of the firſt neceſſaries of life, ſhould adminiſter public affairs with wiſdom? We find accordingly, that they were extremely ill qualified for executing thoſe offices with which they were intruſted. As the lower ranks had in a great meaſure ingroſſed the adminiſtration of juſtice, it was not uncommon to

25 See the Diſcourſe of Lyſias upon a propoſal for diſſolving the ancient government of Athens. Lyſias's orations were chiefly written in the ſpace of twenty years, between 404 and 384 before Chriſt. They afford an uniform picture of the poverty, miſery, and vices of his contemporaries; which the reader will find abridged in the introduction to my tranſlation of that writer. The Athenian affairs became more flouriſhing after the fall of Thebes and Sparta. Their reſources were again exhauſted by the war with their allies. The revenues were greatly raiſed by the conqueſts of Timotheus, Phocion, &c. and the good management of Lycurgus and Demoſthenes. Plut. in Lycurg. in lib. de Dec. Orator.

26 Iſocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

27 Iſocrat. & Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

bribe

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bribe the clerks employed in tranſcribing the laws of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. What is ſtill more extraordinary, ſuch a groſs artifice frequently ſucceeded; nor was the deceit diſcovered until litigant parties produced in court contradictory laws [28]. When their negligence could not be ſurpriſed, their avarice might be bribed; juſtice was ſold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always expoſed to danger, and often ended in diſgrace [29]. For thoſe needy Athenians, who formed the moſt numerous claſs in the republic, endeavoured to alleviate their miſery by a very criminal conſolation; perſecuting their ſuperiors, baniſhing them their country, confiſcating their eſtates, and treating them on the ſlighteſt provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmoſt injuſtice and cruelty [30]. Though occaſionally directed by the equity of an Ariſtides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the moſt part, liſtened to men of an oppoſite character. He who could beſt flatter and deceive them obtained moſt of their confidence. With ſuch qualifications, the turbulent, licentious, and diſſolute, in a word, the orator who moſt reſembled his audience, commonly prevailed in the aſſembly; and ſpecious or hurtful talents carried off the rewards due to real merit. Iſocrates [31] aſſures us of the fact; and Xenophon [32]

[28] Life of Lyſias, prefixed to his Orations, p. 116.

[29] See Lyſias's pleadings throughout.

[30] Iſocrates de Pace; and the numerous examples of that kind, which have already occurred in this hiſtory.

[31] In his oration on reforming the government of Athens.

[32] In his treatiſe de Republic. Athen.

affirms,

affirms, that it is perfectly conformable to the nature and principles of the Athenian form of government. CHAP. XXXII.

With ſuch principles and manners, the Athenians required only a daring and profligate leader, to involve them in deſigns the moſt extravagant and pernicious. Such a perſonage preſented himſelf in Chares, whoſe ſoldier-like appearance, blunt addreſs, and bold impetuous valour, maſked his ſelfiſh ambition, and rendered him the idol of the populace. His perſon was gigantic and robuſt, his voice commanding, his manners haughty; he aſſerted poſitively, and promiſed boldly; and his preſumption was ſo exceſſive, that it concealed his incapacity not only from others, but from himſelf. Though an enterpriſing and ſucceſsful partiſan, he was unacquainted with the great duties of a general; and his defects appear the more ſtriking nd palpable, when compared with the abilities of phicrates and Timotheus, his contemporaries, ho prevailed as often by addreſs as by force, and hoſe conqueſts were ſecured to the republic by ıe moderation, juſtice, and humanity, with which ıey had been obtained, and with which they conınued to be governed. Chares propoſed a very ifferent mode of adminiſtration; he exhorted his ountrymen to ſupply the defects of their treaſury, nd to acquire the materials of thoſe pleaſures hich they regarded as eſſential to their happineſs, y plundering the wealth of their allies and coloies. This counſel was too faithfully obeyed; ıe vexations, anciently exerciſed againſt the tributary

The vices of Chares render him the favourite of the multitude.

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butary and dependent ſtates, were renewed and exceeded[33]. The weaker communities complained, and remonſtrated, againſt this intolerable rapacity and oppreſſion; while the iſlands of Chios, Coos, Rhodes, as well as the city of Byzantium, prepared openly to revolt, and engaged with each other to repel force by force, until they ſhould obtain peace and independence[34].

The ſocial war. Olymp. cv. 3. A. C. 358.

Chares, probably the chief inſtrument, as well as the adviſer, of the arbitrary meaſures which had occaſioned the revolt, was ſent out with a powerful fleet and army, to quaſh at once the hopes of the inſurgents. He ſailed towards Chios, with an intention to ſeize the capital of that iſland, which was ſuppoſed to be the centre and prime mover of rebellion. The confederates, informed of his motions, had already drawn thither the greateſt part of their force. The city of Chios was beſieged by ſea and land. The iſlanders defended themſelves with vigour. Chares found it difficult to repulſe their ſallies. His fleet attempted to enter their harbour without ſucceſs; the ſhip of Chabrias alone penetrated thus far; and that able commander, whoſe valour and integrity merited a better fortune, though deſerted by the fleet, yet forſook not the ſhip intruſted to him by the republic. His companions threw away their ſhields, and ſaved themſelves by ſwimming to the Athenian ſquadron, which was ſtill within their reach.

33 Diodor. l. xvi. & Iſocrat. de Pace.

34 Diodor. l. xvi. pp. 413. 423.

But

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But Chabrias, fighting bravely, fell by the darts of the Chians, preferring an honourable death to a diſgraceful life [35].

Encouraged by advantages over an enemy who had at firſt affected to deſpiſe them, the inſurgents augmented their fleet, and ravaged the iſles of Lemnos and Samos. The Athenians, indignant that the territories of their faithful allies ſhould fall a prey to the depredations of rebels, fitted out, early in the next year, a new armament under the command of Mneſtheus, the ſon of Iphicrates, and ſon-in-law of Timotheus, expecting that the new commander would reſpectfully liſten to the advice of thoſe great men, who perhaps declined acting as principals in an expedition where Chares poſſeſſed any ſhare of authority. That general had raiſed the ſiege of Chios, and now cruiſed in the Helleſpont; where, being joined by Mneſtheus, the united ſquadrons amounted to an hundred and twenty ſail. It was immediately determined to cauſe a diverſion of the enemy's forces from Samos and Lemnos, by laying ſiege to Byzantium. The deſign ſucceeded; the allies withdrew from theſe iſlands, collected their whole naval ſtrength, and prepared vigorouſly for defending the principal city in their confederacy.

Chares accuſes Timotheus and Iphicrates.

The hoſtile armaments approached each other, with a reſolution to join battle, when a ſudden and violent ſtorm aroſe, which rendered it impoſſible for the Athenians to bear up to the enemy, or even to keep the ſea, without being expoſed to

35 Nepos in Chabr. & Diodor. l. xvi. p. 423, & ſeqq.

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ſhipwreck. Chares alone confidently inſiſted on commencing the attack, while the other commanders, more cautious and experienced, perceived the diſadvantage, and declined the unequal danger[36]. His impetuoſity, thus over-ruled by the prudence of his colleagues, was converted into reſentment and fury; he called the ſoldiers and ſailors to witneſs their oppoſition, which he branded with every odious epithet of reproach; and, with the firſt opportunity, diſpatched proper meſſengers to Athens, to accuſe them of incapacity, cowardice, and total neglect of duty. The accuſation was ſupported by venal orators in the pay of Chares.

Their trial;

Timotheus and Iphicrates were tried capitally. The former truſted to his innocence and eloquence; the latter uſed a very extraordinary expedient to ſway the judges, conformable, however, to the ſpirit of that age, when courts of juſtice were frequently inſtruments of oppreſſion, governed by every ſpecies of undue influence, eaſily corrupted and eaſily intimidated. The targeteers, or light infantry, who had been armed, diſciplined, and long commanded, by Iphicrates, enjoyed the ſame reputation in Greece, which the *Fabian* ſoldiers afterwards did in Italy. They were called the *Iphicratenſian* troops, from the name of their commander, to whom they owed their merit and their fame, and to whoſe perſon (notwithſtanding the ſtrictneſs of his diſcipline) they were ſtrongly at-

36 We are not informed by Diodorus or Nepos, why the diſadvantage and danger were on the ſide of the Athenians; probably, being better ſailors, they expected to profit of their ſkill in *manœuvre*, which the ſtorm rendered uſeleſs and unavailing.

tached

tached by the ties of gratitude and eſteem. The youngeſt and braveſt of this celebrated band readily obeyed the injunctions of their admired general; ſurrounded, on the day of trial, the benches of the magiſtrates; and took care ſeaſonably to diſplay the points of their daggers[37].

and baniſhment.

It was the law of Athens, that, after preliminaries had been adjuſted, and the judges aſſembled, the parties ſhould be heard, and the trial begun and ended on the ſame day; nor could any perſon be twice tried for the ſame offence. The rapidity of this mode of procedure favoured the views of Iphicrates. The magiſtrates were overawed by the imminence of a danger, which they had neither ſtrength to reſiſt nor time to elude. They were compelled to an immediate deciſion; but, inſtead of the ſentence of death, which was expected, they impoſed a fine[38] on the delinquents, which no Athenian citizen in that age was in a condition to pay. This ſeverity drove into baniſhment thoſe able and illuſtrious commanders. Timotheus ſailed to Chalcis in Eubœa, and afterwards to the iſle of Leſbos, both which places his valour and abilities had recovered for the republic, and which, being choſen as his reſidence in diſgrace, ſufficiently evince the mildneſs of his government, and his

37 It was probably during this trial, that Iphicrates being reproached with betraying the intereſts of his country, aſked his accuſer, "Would you, on a like occaſion, have been guilty of that crime?" "By no means," replied the other. "And can you then imagine," replied the hero, "that Iphicrates ſhould be guilty?" Quintilian. l. v. c. xii.

38 One hundred talents, about twenty thouſand pounds.

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moderation in proſperity. Iphicrates travelled into Thrace, where he had long reſided. He had formerly married the daughter of Cotys, the moſt conſiderable of the Thracian princes; yet he lived and died in obſcurity[39]; nor did either he or Timotheus thenceforth take any ſhare in the affairs of their ungrateful country[40]. Thus did the ſocial war deſtroy or remove Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, the beſt generals whom Greece could boaſt; and, the brave and honeſt Phocion excepted, the laſt venerable remains of Athenian virtue[41]

Chares entruſted with the ſole conduct of the war; Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

By the removal of thoſe great men, Chares was left to conduct, uncontrouled, the war againſt the allies; and to diſplay the full extent of his worthleſſneſs and incapacity. His inſatiable avarice rendered him intolerable to the friends of Athens; his weakneſs and negligence expoſed him to the contempt of the inſurgents. He indulged his officers and himſelf in a total neglect of diſcipline; the reduction of the rebels was the leaſt matter of his concern; he was attended by an effeminate crowd of ſingers, dancers, and harlots[42], whoſe

39 Diodorus only ſays, that he was dead before the battle of Chæronæa, which happened twenty years after his baniſhment.

40 Nepos ſays, that after the death of Timotheus, the Athenians remitted nine parts of his fine; but obliged his ſon Conon to pay the remaining tenth, for repairing the walls of the Piræus, which his grandfather had rebuilt from the ſpoils of the enemy.

41 *Military* virtue. Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Athenienſium, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus; neque poſt illorum obitum quiſquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria. Nepos in Timoth. The biographer forgets Phocion.

42 Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

luxury

luxury exhauſted the ſcanty ſupplies raiſed by the Athenians for the ſervice of the war [43]. In order to ſatisfy the clamorous demands of the ſoldiers, Chares, regardleſs of the treaties ſubſiſting between Athens and Perſia, hired himſelf and his forces to Artabazus, the wealthy ſatrap of Ionia, who had revolted from his maſter Artaxerxes Ochus, the moſt cruel and deteſtable tyrant that ever diſgraced the throne of Cyrus. The arms of the Greeks ſaved Artabazus from the implacable reſentment of a monſter incapable to pity or forgive; and their meritorious ſervices were amply rewarded by the laviſh gratitude of the ſatrap.

which ends diſgracefully for the Athenians. Olymp. cvi. 1. A. C. 356.

This tranſaction, how extraordinary ſoever it may appear to the modern reader, neither ſurpriſed nor diſpleaſed the Athenians. They were accuſtomed to allow their commanders in foreign parts to act without inſtructions or controul; and the creatures of Chares loudly extolled his good management in paying the Grecian troops with Perſian money. But the triumph of falſe joy was of ſhort duration. Ochus ſent an embaſſy to remonſtrate with the Athenians on their unprovoked infraction of the peace; and threatened, that unleſs they immediately withdrew their forces from Aſia, he would aſſiſt the rebels with a fleet of three hundred ſail. This juſt menace, want of ſucceſs againſt the confederates, together with a reaſon ſtill more important, which will ſoon come to be fully explained, obliged the Athenians to recal

43 Demoſthen. Philipp. 1.

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their armament from the Eaſt, and to terminate the ſocial war, without obtaining any of the purpoſes for which it had been undertaken. The confederates made good the claims which their boldneſs had urged; regained complete freedom and independence[44]; and lived twenty years exempt from the legal oppreſſion of ſubſidies and contingents, till they ſubmitted, with the reſt of Greece, to the arms and intrigues of Philip, and the irreſiſtible fortune of the Macedonians.

State of philoſophy.

Notwithſtanding the decay of martial ſpirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners, which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and ſciences were ſtill cultivated with ardour and ſucceſs. During the period now under review, the ſcholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philoſophy with many important diſcoveries[45]. The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and aſtronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxus[46] of Cnidus, Timæus[47] of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, and Meton of Athens[48]. The Megaric ſchool flouriſhed under Stilpo, the moſt learned and acute of that diſputatious ſect, which, from its continual wranglings, merited the epithet of contentious[49]. The doctrines of Ariſtippus were maintained by his daughter Areté,

44 Diodor. p. 424.
45 Galenus de Natur. Facultat. & Hippocrat. Περι αρχων, &c.
46 Laert. l. viii. ſect. 86. & Suid. in Eudox.
47 Jambl. de Pythagor.
48 Cenſorin. de Die natal.
49 Eριστικη. Laert. l. vi. ſect. 107.

and

and improved by Hegeſias and Anneceris, who paved the way for Epicurus[50]. The ſevere philoſophy of Antiſthenes had fewer followers[51]. But Diogenes alone was equal to a ſect[52].

Of the fine arts. Statuary.

Statuary was cultivated by Polycletus and Canachus of Sicyon, by Naucydes of Argos, and by innumerable artiſts in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The works of Polycletus were the moſt admired. His greateſt work was the coloſſal ſtatue of Argive Juno, compoſed of gold and ivory. Bronze and marble, however, ſtill furniſhed the uſual materials for ſculpture. The Grecian temples, particularly thoſe of Delphi and Olympia, were enriched with innumerable productions of this kind, during the period to which our preſent obſervations relate. One figure of Polycletus acquired peculiar fame. From the exactneſs of the proportions[53], it was called the rule, or ſtandard. Even Lyſippus, the contem-

50 Laertius & Suidas. 51 Ælian. Var. Hiſtor. l. x. c. xvi.

52 We ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more fully of Diogenes hereafter.

53 Winckelmann, p. 653. and his tranſlator Mr. Huber, vol. iii. p. 34. differ from Pliny, l. 35. c. 19. They confound the ſtatue, called the Rule, or Canon, with another called the Doryphorus, becauſe graſping a ſpear. Pliny's words are, "Polycletus Sicyonius Diadumenum fecit molliter juvenem, centum talentis nobilitatum; idem et Doryphorum viriliter puerum. Fecit et quem canona artifices vocant, lineamenta artis ex eo petentes, velut a lege quadam; ſoluſque hominum artem ipſe (forſe ipſam) feciſſe, artis opere judicatur." They have followed Cicero de Clar. Orator. c. 86.—yet Cicero, ſpeaking incidentally on the ſubject, might more naturally miſtake than Pliny, writing expreſsly on ſculpture.

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porary and favourite of Alexander, regarded it as a model of excellence, from which it was imprudent to depart.

The works of Praxiteles. Olymp. cv. 1. A. C. 460.

Between Polycletus and Dyſippus flouriſhed Praxiteles, whoſe works formed the intermediate ſhade between the ſublime ſtyle, which prevailed in the age of Pericles, and the beautiful, which attained perfection under Lyſippus and Apelles, in the age of Alexander. The ſtatues of Praxiteles bore a ſimilar relation to thoſe of Phidias, which the paintings of Guido and Correggio bear to thoſe of Julio Romano and Raphael. The works of the earlier artiſts are more grand and more ſublime, thoſe of the later more graceful and more alluring; the firſt claſs being addreſſed to the imagination, the ſecond to the ſenſes. The works of Praxiteles were in the Ceramicus of Athens; but neither in the Ceramicus, nor in any part of the world, was a ſtatue to be ſeen equal to his celebrated Venus, which long attracted ſpectators from all parts to Cnidus. Praxiteles made two ſtatues of the goddeſs at the ſame time, the one cloathed, the other naked. The decent modeſty of the Coans preferred the former; the latter was purchaſed by the Cnidians, and long regarded as the moſt valuable poſſeſſion of their community. The voluptuous Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, languiſhed after this ſtatue; to purchaſe ſuch unrivalled charms he offered to pay the debts of Cnidus, which were immenſe; but the Cnidians determined not to part with an ornament from which their republic derived ſo much celebrity. "Having conſidered,"

ſays

ſays an ancient author[54], "the beautiful avenues leading to the temple, we at length entered the ſacred dome. In the middle ſtands the ſtatue of the goddeſs, in marble of Paros. A ſweet ſmile ſits on her lips; no garment hides her charms; the hand only, as by an inſtinctive impulſe, conceals thoſe parts which modeſty permits not to name. The art of Praxiteles has given to the ſtone the ſoftneſs and ſenſibility of fleſh. O Mars, the moſt fortunate of the gods!" But it is impoſſible to tranſlate his too faithful deſcription into the decency of modern language; a deſcription more animated and voluptuous than even the chiſel of Praxiteles.

The Cnidian Venus.

The honour which Polycletus and Praxiteles acquired in ſculpture, was, during the ſame age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus of Sicyon, by Euphranor of Corinth, by Apollodorus and Nicias of Athens; above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes[55]. The works of Eupompus

The ſtate of painting.

54 Lucian, Amor.

55 Pliny, in his 35th book. I have paid little attention to his pretended Epochs of Art, when inconſiſtent with the information of more ancient authors. The Greek hiſtorians, from whom he copied this part of his work, found it convenient, at every pauſe in their narrative, to give ſome account of men who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the arts and ſciences, of whom they had no opportunity to make mention in relating public tranſactions, and deſcribing wars and negociations. The æra of every peace furniſhed a proper reſting-place to the hiſtorian; from which he looked back, and collected the names worthy to be handed down to poſterity. Every ſuch æra, therefore, Pliny, and after him Winckelmann, have conſidered as an epoch of art; not reflecting, that arts do not ſuddenly ariſe and flouriſh, and

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pompus are now unknown, but in his own times his merit and celebrity occaſioned a new diviſion of the ſchools, which were formerly the Grecian and the Aſiatic; but after Eupompus, the Grecian ſchool was ſubdivided into the Athenian and Sicyonian. Pamphilus, and his ſcholar Apelles, gave freſh luſtre to the latter ſchool, which ſeems to have flouriſhed longer than any other in Greece, ſince the paintings exhibited at the celebrated proceſſion of Ptolemy Philadelphus were all the productions of Sicyonian maſters [56].

Works of Pamphilus.

Few works of Pamphilus are deſcribed by ancient authors. His picture of the Heraclidæ, carrying branches of olive, and imploring the aſſiſtance of the Athenians, has not, however, eſcaped the vigilant eye of national vanity [57]. He was by birth a Macedonian, but well verſed in literature and ſcience, which he thought indiſpenſably neceſſary to a painter. He received about two hundred pounds from each of his ſcholars, and ſeems to have been the firſt who put a high price on his works. He lived to enjoy his fame, and rendered his profeſſion ſo faſhionable, that it became cuſtomary in Sicyon, and afterwards in other parts of Greece, to inſtruct the ſons of wealthy families in the arts of deſign. This liberal profeſſion was forbidden to ſlaves; nor, during the

and when once they flouriſh, do not ſuddenly decay; ſince the mind long retains the impulſe which it has received; and the active powers of man, when once directed to their proper objects, are not eaſily lulled to repoſe.

56 Athen. Deipn. l. v. p. 196.

57 Ariſtoph. Plut. v. 385.

exiſtence

exiſtence of Grecian freedom, did any celebrated production in ſculpture or painting come from ſervile hands[58].

Euphranor the Corinthian excelled both in painting and ſtatuary. The dignity of his heroes was admired. He painted the twelve gods. He ſaid that *his* Theſeus had fed on fleſh, that of Parrhaſius on roſes. He wrote on colours and ſymmetry. Apollodorus the Athenian was deemed the firſt who knew the force of light and ſhade[59]. His prieſt in prayer, and his Ajax ſtruck with lightning, were held in high eſtimation. Nicias, his fellow-citizen, excelled in female figures, and in all the magic of colouring. His Calypſo, Iö, and Andromeda, claimed juſt fame; but his greateſt compoſition was the Necromanteia of Homer[60].

Of Euphranor.

Apollodorus.

Nicias.

58 Plin. l. xxxv. c. xxxvi. ſect. 8.

59 This is the commendation of Plutarch. Pliny ſpeaks more highly of Apollodorus. "Feſtinans ad lumina artis, in quibus primus refulſit Apollodorus Athenienſis . . . . neque ante eum tabula ullius oſtenditur, quæ teneat oculos." Pliny's praiſes often claſh with each other. He frequently calls different perſons the firſt in the art, and even in the ſame branch of it. The warmth of his fancy leaves him no time for calculating the weight of his expreſſions. His credulity, love of wonder, and inaccuracy, cannot be defended. Yet his judgments on pictures and ſtatues are not without their merit; ſince the perfection of thoſe works of art conſiſts in making a deep impreſſion, in tranſporting and elevating the affections, and in raiſing that glow of ſentiment, which Pliny is ſo happy in communicating to his readers.

60 Long before all the celebrated works of art, Homer had viewed nature with a picturesque eye. For the innumerable pictures copied from him, ſee Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. vi. p. 345. Homer gave the idea of what is grand and pathetic in intellect, which painters and ſtatuaries tranſlated into what is touching and awful to the eye.

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Attalus king of Pergamus (for Nicias lived to a great age) offered twelve thouſand pounds for this picture; but the artiſt, who was extremely wealthy, gave it in a preſent to his native country. Praxiteles, when aſked which of his ſtatues he moſt valued, anſwered, "Thoſe of which the models were retouched by Nicias."

Zeuxis.

Zeuxis is ſaid to have been born at Heraclæa, but it is uncertain in which of the cities known by that name. He acquired great wealth by his works; at length he refuſed money, boaſting that no price could pay them. The modeſty of his Penelopé was equal to a leſſon of morality. He painted Hercules ſtrangling the ſerpents in the preſence of the aſtoniſhed Amphitryon and Alcmena. His picture dedicated in the temple of Juno Lucina, at Agrigentum, has been often mentioned. Being allowed to view the naked beauty of that populous city, it is known that he choſe as models five virgins, whoſe united charms were expreſſed in this celebrated piece. His greateſt work was Jupiter ſitting on his throne, and ſurrounded by the gods [61].

Timanthes

61 Valerius Maximus, l. iii. c. vii. ſpeaks of his Helena painted for the city of Crotona. On his naked Helen Zeuxis inſcribed the following lines of Homer:

Ου νεμεσις, Τρωας και ευκνημιδας Αχαιους
Τοιη δ' αμφι γυναικι πολυν χρονον αλγεα πασχειν
Αινως αθανατησι θεης εισωπα εοικεν. Il. iii. v. 154.

"They cry'd, No wonder ſuch celeſtial charms
For nine long years have ſet the world in arms:
What winning graces! what majeſtic mien!
She moves a goddeſs, and ſhe looks a queen." Pope.

Pope

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Timanthes.

Timanthes reached the higheſt perfection of his art; but his genius ſurpaſſed the art itſelf. In his ſacrifice of Iphigenia, a gradation of ſorrow was ſeen in the faces of the ſpectators. It was carried to the utmoſt height, conſiſtent with beauty, in the countenance of her uncle Menelaus. But Agamemnon, who was ſtill more deeply afflicted with the unhappy fate of his daughter, veiled his face with his robe. In ſeveral others of his pieces,

Pope has paraphraſed the laſt line, "For ſhe is wonderfully like to the immortal gods." This muſt have ſounded nobly to the Greeks, who would doubtleſs have conſidered "looking a queen," as a ſinking in poetry. But I have cited the lines, to ſhew by what different means poetry and painting attain the ſame end. Both Homer and Zeuxis convey an high idea of Helen's beauty; but Homer does it by the effects of this beauty, which could animate the cold age of Priam, Panthoos, &c. whom he has juſt inimitably deſcribed:

Γηραι δη πολεμοιο πεπαυμενοι, αγλ' αγορηται
Εσθλοι, τεττιγεσσι ἐοικοτες οἵτε καθ' ὑλην
Δενδρεῳ ἐφεζομενοι οπα λειριοεσσαν ἱεισι.

When the Greek monk, Conſtantinus Manaſſes (Chron. p. 20.) deſcribes the beauty of Helen,

Ην ἡ γυνη περικαλλης ευοφρυς ευχαιτατη
Ευπαρειος ευπροσωπος βοωπις χιονοχρως;

and ſo on, through a dozen of lines, the imagination of the reader cannot follow him; each epithet of beauty drives the preceding from the memory; and we fancy that we ſee a man laboriouſly rolling ſtones up one ſide of a hill, which immediately roll down the other. Arioſto's deſcription of the beauty of Alcina (cant. viii.) is in the ſame bad taſte. How different is Virgil's "Pulcherrima Dido." Virgil knew the difference between poetical and pictureſque images. Our Engliſh romances abound with examples of this ſpecies of bad taſte, ariſing from miſtaking the boundaries of diſtinct, though kindred, arts. See above, vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 178.

Timanthes

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Timanthes diſcovered the power of tranſporting the mind beyond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works, as in the deſcriptions of Homer and Milton, more was underſtood than expreſſed.

Expreſſion of Greek painting.

The power of expreſſion was carried to a degree of perfection which it is not eaſy to believe, and ſcarcely poſſible to comprehend. The civil and military arrangements of the Greeks gave, doubtleſs, great advantages to their artiſts in this reſpect. Ariſtides, a Theban painter, repreſented the ſacking of a town; among other ſcenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breaſt of its wounded mother, who, "*felt and feared*[62], that after ſhe was dead the child ſhould ſuck blood inſtead of milk." Parrhaſius of Epheſus, in an earlier age, perſonified the people of Athens, in a figure that characteriſed them as at once cruel and compaſſionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean. Such diſcriminations, as well as ſuch complications of paſſion, are unqueſtionably beyond the reach of modern art, and will therefore, by many, be pronounced impoſſible. It is worthy of remark, that the ſame Parrhaſius, who ſeems to have united the excellencies of Dominichino, Raphael, and Correggio, was diſtinguiſhed by the gliding motion of his outline, and the ſweetneſs with which it melted into the ground[63].

Ideal

62 Theſe are the words of Pliny.

63 Pliny conſiders this as the perfection of art. "Hæc eſt in pictura, ſumma ſublimitas. Corpora enim pingere, et media rerum,

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Colouring.

Ideal beauty, juſt proportion, natural and noble attitudes, an uniform greatneſs of ſtyle, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and ſtatuaries. But the vanity or envy of modern times is unwilling to allow any merit to the former, which the remains of the latter do not juſtify and confirm. The Greek painters, therefore, have been ſuppoſed deficient in colouring; and this ſuppoſition has been ſupported by the words of Pliny: "With four colours only, Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus produced thoſe immortal works, which were ſingly purchaſed by the common wealth of cities and republics." The colours were white, red, yellow, and black. It has been often ſaid that with theſe only on his palette, a painter cannot colour like nature, far leſs attain the magic of the *clair obſcure*. Yet a great artiſt of our own country thinks that four colours are ſufficient for every combination required. "The fewer the colours, the cleaner, he obſerves, will be their effect. Two

rerum, eſt quidem magni operis; ſed in quo multi gloriam tulerint. Extrema corporum facere, & definentis picturæ modum includere, rarum in ſucceſſu artis invenitur. Ambire enim debet ſe extremitas ipſa, & ſic definere, ut promittat alia poſt ſe; oſtentatque etiam quæ occultat." Ibid. c. xxxvi. ſect. 5. Mr. Falconet, in his obſervations on this paſſage, is of a different opinion. He thinks it more difficult to paint the middle parts, than the ſhades and tones which round the extremities of objects; becauſe the former, though expoſed to the light, muſt have their form, relief, depth, and all the tints of nature. He inſtances the heads painted by Rubens and Vandyck ſeen in front. Pliny, had he lived in later times, might have inſtanced, in his turn, the ſweet outlines and inimitable ſoftneſs of Correggio.

colours

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colours mixed together will not preſerve the brightneſs of either of them ſingle, nor will three be as bright as two [64]." Pliny ſays, that Apelles ſpread over his pictures, when finiſhed, a tranſparent liquid like ink, which increaſed the clearneſs and brilliancy of the whole, while it ſoftened the glare of too florid colours. This, according to the ſame excellent painter, is a true and artiſt-like deſcription of ſcambling or glazing, as practiſed by the Venetian ſchool, and by Correggio, in whoſe works, as well as thoſe mentioned by Pliny, it was perceptible only to ſuch as cloſely examined the picture. He very reaſonably concludes, therefore, that if the maſter-pieces of ancient painting remained, we ſhould probably find them as correctly drawn as the Laocoon, and as admirably coloured as the glowing productions of Titian.

Clair obſcure.

That the Greeks were acquainted with the effect of the clair obſcure, or the diſtribution of all the tones of light and ſhade relatively to the different plans of the picture, has been denied by thoſe who allow them the higheſt excellence in colouring ſingle figures. They might excel, it has been ſaid, in a ſolo, but were incapable of producing a full piece for a concert of different inſtruments. Whether this obſervation be well founded can only be diſcovered by carefully examining ancient authors, from whom it would appear that even

64 See Sir Joſhua Reynolds's notes on Mr. Maſon's tranſlation of Freſnoy's Art of Painting.

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in this branch the Greek painters were not deficient[65].

Literary compoſition.

Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than compoſition in proſe. The hiſtory of Thucydides was continued by Xenophon; but we ſhould form a very imperfect notion of this amiable writer were we to judge him by his Grecian hiſtory, to which he ſeems not to have put the laſt hand. Yet in this, as well as in his more finiſhed works, we ſee the ſcholar of Socrates; and, of all others, the ſcholar who moſt reſembled his maſter in his ſentiment and expreſſion[66], in the excellencies as well as in the reſpectable weakneſſes[67] of

Xenophon.

His character.

65 In ſpeaking of Nicias, Pliny ſays, "Lumen et umbras cuſtodivit, atque ut eminerent è tabulis picturæ maxime cuſtodivit." Unleſs the *clair obſcure* be meant, the ſecond member of this ſentence is a pleonaſm. Another paſſage is highly to the purpoſe, l. xxxv. c. xi. "Tandem ſe ars ipſa diſtinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentia colorum alterna via ſeſe excitante. Deinde adjectus eſt ſplendor, alius hic quam lumen: quem, quia inter hoc & umbram eſſet, appellaverunt tonon; commiſſuras verò colorum et tranſitus, harmogen." *Clair obſcure* in painting is ſomething like counterpoint in muſic; and if the ancients cultivated neither of them, perhaps the more ſubſtantial parts of the arts loſt nothing by the neglect. In melody and deſign, effect and expreſſion, they probably excelled the moſt boaſted productions of later ages.

66 See the deſcription which Alcibiades gives of Socrates's eloquence, in Plato's Symposium.

67 It is remarkable that the ſuperſtitious belief of Xenophon in celeſtial warnings, of which ſee innumerable examples, particularly Anabaſ. l. iii. c. i. l. v. c. viii. and l. vi. c. i. never encouraged him to any thing imprudent or hurtful, and never reſtrained him from any thing uſeful or virtuous. The admonitions likewiſe of Socrates's dæmon were always the ſame with the dictates of right reaſon.

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his character: the ſame undeviating virtue, the ſame indefatigable ſpirit, the ſame erect probity, the ſame diffuſive benevolence, the ſame credulity, the ſame enthuſiaſm, together with that unaffected propriety of thought and diction, whoſe native graces outſhine all ornaments of art.

His military expeditions.

This admirable perſonage, who, had he lived before the Athenians were grown too conceited to learn, and too corrupt to mend, might have proved the ſaviour of his country, reached his fiftieth year in a happy obſcurity, enjoying the confidential ſociety of Socrates and a few ſelect friends. Of theſe Proxenus, an illuſtrious Theban exile, who well knew the worth of Xenophon, invited him to Sardis, from a deſire to introduce him to Cyrus, the brother of Artaxerxes, and governor of Lower Aſia, whoſe friendſhip he himſelf had found more valuable than the precarious honours of his capricious and ungrateful republic. Xenophon communicated the propoſal to Socrates, who, ſuſpecting that the Athenians might not reliſh his friend's deſign, becauſe the Perſians were then allied with Sparta, deſired him to conſult the oracle of Delphi[68]. This counſel was but partially followed; for Xenophon, who ſeems to have been fond of the journey, aſked not the oracle whether it ought to be undertaken, but only by virtue of what prayers and ſacrifices it might be rendered ſucceſsful. Socrates approved not this precipitation; yet as the god had anſwered, he thought it

[68] Anabaſ. l. v. p. 356, & ſeqq.

neceſſary

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neceſſary for Xenophon to obey. The important conſequences of this reſolution to the Ten thouſand Greeks who followed the ſtandard of Cyrus, have been related in a former part of this work. After his glorious retreat from Upper Aſia, Xenophon remained ſeveral years on the weſtern coaſt, and ſhared the victories of his admired Ageſilaus, with whom he returned to Greece, and conquered in the battle of Coronæa.

His religious and literary retreat.

Meanwhile a decree of baniſhment paſſed againſt him in Athens. But having acquired conſiderable riches in his Aſiatic expedition, he had depoſited them at Epheſus with the Sacriſtan of Diana's temple, with this injunction, that if he periſhed in battle, his wealth ſhould be employed in honour of the goddeſs. Having ſurvived the bloody engagement of Coronæa, which he afterwards ſo affectingly deſcribed in his Hellenica, he ſettled in the town of Scilluns, a new eſtabliſhment formed by the Lacedæmonians, ſcarce three miles diſtant from Olympia. Megabyzus, the Sacriſt of Diana, came to behold the games, and faithfully reſtored his depoſit, with which Xenophon, as enjoined by an oracle, purchaſed in that neighbourhood a beautiful ſpot of ground, watered by the Sellenus, a name which coincided with that of the river near Epheſus. On the banks of Elian Sellenus, Xenophon erected a temple, incomparably ſmaller indeed, yet ſimilar in form to the great temple of Diana. His image of the goddeſs reſembled that at Epheſus, as much as a figure in cypreſs could reſemble a ſtatue of gold. The banks of the river

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were planted with fruit trees. The ſurrounding plains and meadows afforded excellent paſture. The adjoining foreſts and mountains abounded in wild boar, red deer, and other ſpecies of game. There Xenophon's ſons often hunted with the youth of the neighbouring towns and villages; and the whole inhabitants of the country round were invited and entertained by him at an annual feſtival ſacred to Diana. A modeſt inſcription on a marble column, erected near the temple, teſtified the holineſs of the place. "This ſpot is dedicated to Diana. Let him, whoever ſhall poſſeſs it, employ the tenth of its annual produce in ſacrifice, and the remainder in keeping in repair, and in adorning the temple. His neglect will not be overlooked by the goddeſs[69]." By this inſcription, wherein Xenophon ventures not to mention the name of the founder, his mind ſeems to forebode the calamities which at laſt befel him. In the war between the Lacedæmonians and Elians, the town of Scilluns, together with the circumjacent territory, was ſeized by Elian troops; and the amiable philoſopher and hiſtorian, who had, in this delightful retreat, compoſed thoſe invaluable works, which will inſpire the laſt ages of the world with the love of virtue, was compelled, in the decline of life, to ſeek refuge in the corrupt and licentious city of Corinth.

His works.

His Expedition, his Grecian Hiſtory, his deſcription of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian govern-

[69] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. v. p. 356, & ſeqq.

ments,

ments, have been noticed in their proper place. The Cyropædeia, or inſtitutions of the elder Cyrus, is a philoſophical romance, intended to exemplify the doctrines taught by Socrates in the Memorabilia, and to prove the ſucceſs which naturally attends the practice of wiſdom and virtue in the great affairs of war and government. The higheſt panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have miſtaken it for a true hiſtory, and, deceived by the inimitable *naïveté* and perſuaſiveneſs of the narrative, have believed it poſſible that, during the various ſtages of a long life, Cyrus ſhould have invariably followed the dictates of the ſublimeſt philoſophy. In his Oeconomics, Xenophon undertakes the humbler but not leſs uſeful taſk, of regulating the duties of domeſtic life. The dialogue, intituled Hiero, paints the miſery of tyrants contraſted with the happineſs of virtuous princes, in colours ſo lively, and in lines ſo expreſſive, that an admirer of the ancients might challenge the ingenuity of modern ages to add a ſingle ſtroke to the picture. In ſpeaking of the works of Xenophon, we muſt not forget his treatiſe on the Revenues of Athens. It was written long after his baniſhment. Inſtead of reſenting the obdurate cruelty of his countrymen, he gave them moſt judicious and ſeaſonable advice concerning the improvement of the public revenues, which, there is reaſon to believe, was in part adopted.

The orators Lyſias and Iſocrates flouriſhed in the period now under review. The former was diſtinguiſhed by the refined ſubtilty of his pleadings;

The orators Lyſias and Iſocrates.

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ings; the latter by the poliſhed elegance of his moral and political orations[70]. Iſocrates ventured not to ſpeak in public, neither his conſtitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions neceſſary for that purpoſe. His ſchool of oratory and compoſition was frequented by the nobleſt youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes; and as his maxims were borrowed from the Socratic ſchool, his long and honourable labours tended to keep alive ſome ſparks of virtue among his degenerate countrymen[71].

Plato. His birth and education.

But the man of learning in that age, whoſe abilities, if properly directed, might have moſt benefited his contemporaries, was the celebrated Plato, a man juſtly admired, yet more extraordinary than admirable. The ſame memorable year which produced the Peloponneſian war gave birth to Plato. He was deſcended from the Codridæ, the moſt illuſtrious as well as the moſt opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnaſtic formed and invigorated his body; his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the ſtudies of poetry[72] and geometry, from which he derived that acuteneſs of judgment, and that warmth of fancy, which, being both carried to exceſs, render him at once the moſt ſubtile and the moſt flowery writer of antiquity[73]. In his twentieth year

[70] See the lives of Lyſias and Iſocrates, prefixed to my tranſlation of their works. [71] Idem, ibid. [72] Diogen. Laert. l. ii.

[73] Plato's Dialogues are ſo different from each other, in point of thought and expreſſion, that, if we knew not the verſatility of

year he became acquainted with Socrates; and having compared his own poetical productions with thoſe of his immortal predeceſſors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himſelf to philoſophy. During eight years he continued an aſſiduous hearer of Socrates; an occaſional[74] indiſpoſition prevented him from aſſiſting at the laſt converſations of the ſage, before he drank the fatal hemlock. Yet theſe converſations, as related to him by perſons who were preſent, Plato has delivered down to the admiration of poſterity; and the affecting ſenſibility with which he minutely deſcribes the inimitable behaviour of Socrates, on this trying occaſion, proves how deeply the author was intereſted in his ſubject. CHAP. XXXII.

Fear or diſguſt removed the ſcholar of Socrates from the murderers of his maſter. Having ſpent ſome time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, where he enjoyed the converſation of ſeveral of his fellow-diſciples, the love of knowledge carried him His travels.

of his genius, it would be difficult to believe them the works of one man. He is over-refined, wire-drawn, and trifling, in the Cratylus, Parmenides, Meno, Theætetus, and Sophiſtes. He is flowery, pompous, and tumid, in his Timæus, Panegyric, Sympoſium, and Phædrus. But in thoſe invaluable writings, the Apology, Crito, Alcibiades, Gorgias, Phædo, and the greater part of his books of laws, in which he adheres to the doctrines of Socrates, and indulges, without art or affectation, the natural bent of his own genius, his ſtyle is inimitably ſweet and attractive, always elegant, and often ſublime. His Republic, which is generally conſidered as his greateſt work, abounds in all the beauties, and in all the deformities, for which he is remarkable. See Dionyſ. Halicarn. de Platon.

74 Πλατων δε (οιμαι) ησθενει. Phædo, 2.

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to Magna Græcia; from thence he ſailed to Cyrené, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus; Egypt next deſerved his curioſity, as the country to which the ſcience of Theodorus owed its birth, and from which the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia derived ſeveral tenets of their philoſophy.

He ſettles in the academy.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. The days were paſt when the virtues of a Solon, or of a Lycurgus, could reform the manners of their countrymen. In early periods of ſociety, the example and influence of one able and diſintereſted man may produce a happy revolution in the community of which he is a member. But in the age of Plato, the Athenians had fallen into dotage and imbecility. His luxuriant fancy compares them ſometimes to old men, who have outlived their ſenſes, and with whom it is vain to reaſon; ſometimes to wild beaſts, whom it is dangerous to approach; ſometimes to an unfruitful ſoil, that choaks every uſeful plant, and produces weeds only[75]. He prudently withdrew himſelf from a ſcene, which preſented nothing but danger or diſguſt, and purchaſed a ſmall villa in the ſuburbs near the academy, or gymnaſium, that had been ſo elegantly adorned by Cimon[76]. To this retirement, his fame attracted the moſt illuſtrious characters of the age: the nobleſt youths of Athens daily frequented the ſchool of Plato; and here he

75 Republic, l. vi. p. 38.

76 See above, vol. ii. p. 73.

continued

continued above forty years, with little interruption except from his voyages into Sicily, inſtructing his diſciples, and compoſing his Dialogues, to which the moſt diſtinguiſhed philoſophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted, without excepting thoſe who reject his doctrines, and affect to treat them as viſionary.

General character of his philoſophy.

The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of ſcience. The objects of human thought had, previouſly to his age, been reduced, by the Pythagoreans, to certain claſſes or genera[77]; the nature of truth had been inveſtigated; and men had diſtinguiſhed the ralations[78], which the predicate of any propoſition can bear to its ſubject. The ſciences had already been divided into the natural and moral; or, in the language of Plato, into the knowledge of divine and human things. The frivolous art of ſyllogiſm was not as yet in-

77 Many leſs perfect diviſions had probably been made before Archytas of Tarentum diſtinguiſhed the ten Categories. Simplicius & Jamblichus apud Fr. Patricium, Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. t. ii. p. 182. This diviſion, the moſt perfect of any that philoſophers have yet been able to diſcover, Plato learned from Archytas. It conſiſted in ſubſtances and modes. The former are either primary, as all individual ſubſtances, which neither are in any other ſubject, nor can be predicated of it; or ſecondary, which ſubſiſt in the firſt, and can be predicated of them, to wit, the genera and ſpecies of ſubſtances. Of modes there are nine kinds, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, having, doing, and ſuffering. Ariſtot. de Categor.

78 Theſe are called by logicians the five Predicables, or more properly, the five claſſes of Predicates. They are the genus, ſpecies, ſpecific difference, property, and accident. The uſe of theſe diſtinctions is univerſal in every ſubject requiring definition and diviſion; yet if meant to comprehend whatever may be affirmed of any ſubject, the enumeration is doubtleſs incomplete.

vented;

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vented; and the logic of Plato[79] was confined to the more uſeful ſubjects of definition and diviſion, by means of which he attempted to fix and aſcertain not only the practical doctrines of morals and politics, but the abſtruſe and ſhadowy ſpeculations of myſtical theology. It is much to be regretted that this great and original genius ſhould have miſtaken the proper objects as well as the natural limits of the human underſtanding, and that moſt of the enquiries of Plato and his ſucceſſors ſhould appear extremely remote from the public tranſactions of the times in which they lived. Yet the ſpeculations in which they were engaged, how little ſoever they may be connected with the political revolutions of Greece, ſeem too intereſting in themſelves to be entirely omitted in this hiſtorical work, eſpecially when it is conſidered that the philoſophy of Plato and his diſciples has been very widely diffuſed among all the civilized nations of the world; that during many centuries, his writings governed with uncontrouled ſway the opinions of the ſpeculative part of mankind; and that the ſame philoſophy ſtill influences the reaſonings, and divides the ſentiments, of the learned in modern Europe.

Difficulty of explaining and abridging his doctrines.

The lively, but immethodical, manner in which the doctrines of Plato are explained by himſelf, renders it difficult to collect and abridge them. The great number of interlocutors in his dia-

79 The ſcience properly called Logic was invented by Ariſtotle; the diviſion of the ſciences into Logic, Phyſics, and Ethics, was firſt given by his contemporary Xenocrates. Vid. Brucker. de Ariſtot. & Xenocrat. Of Ariſtotle more hereafter.

logues,

logues, the irony of Socrates, and the continual intermixture of Plato's own ſentiments with thoſe of his maſter, encreaſe the difficulty, and make it impoſſible, from particular paſſages, to judge of the ſcope and tendency of the whole. The works of Xenophon, however, may enable a diligent ſtudent to ſeparate the pure ore of Socrates from the adventitious matter with which it is combined in the rich vein of Platoniſm; and by carefully comparing the different parts of the latter, he may with certainty determine the principal deſigns of its author.

The great views of that philoſopher.

From this view of the ſubject, it would appear that Plato aimed at nothing leſs, than to reconcile the appearances of the natural and moral world with the wiſe government of a ſelf-exiſtent unchangeable cauſe; to explain the nature and origin of the human mind, as well as of its various powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and, on principles reſulting from theſe diſcoveries, to build a ſyſtem of ethics, which, in proportion as it were followed by mankind, would promote not only their independence and ſecurity in the preſent world, but their happineſs and perfection in a future ſtate of exiſtence.

His theology.

Let us look where we will around us, we ſhall every-where, ſaid Plato, perceive a paſſing proceſſion[80]: the objects which compoſe the material

[80] This was borrowed from Heraclitus, who expreſſed the ſame idea, by ſaying, that all corporeal things were in a perpetual flux. Vid. Platon. in Theætet. p. 83. & in Sophiſt. p. 108.

world,

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world, ariſe, change, periſh, and are ſucceeded by others, which undergo the ſame revolutions[81]. One body moves another, which impels a third, and ſo forwards in ſucceſſion; but the firſt cauſe of motion reſides not in any of them. This cauſe acts not fortuitouſly; the regular motions of the heavenly bodies[82], the beautiful order of the ſeaſons, the admirable ſtructure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author[83]. It is difficult by ſearching to find out the nature of the Divinity, and impoſſible by words to deſcribe it; yet the works which he has done, atteſt his power, his wiſdom, and his goodneſs, to be greater than human imagination can conceive[84]. In the ſelf-exiſtent cauſe, theſe attributes muſt unite. He is therefore unchangeable[85], ſince no alteration can increaſe his perfections, and it would be abſurd to ſuppoſe him ever inclined to diminiſh them[86].

Coſmogony.

Impelled by his goodneſs, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all poſſible exiſtence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the univerſe from that rude indigeſted matter, which, exiſting from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of

81 Timæus, ſub initio.

82 By theſe he meant the fixed ſtars; the motions of the planets he aſcribed to another cauſe, as will appear below.

83 Plato de Legibus, l. x. p. 609.

84 Timæus, p. 477. & de Repub. l. ii. p. 144.

85 For the immutability of the Deity, Plato, contrary to his general cuſtom, condeſcends to uſe an argument from induction: "Even of material things, the moſt perfect leaſt feel the effects of time, and remain longeſt unaltered." De Repub. p. 150.

86 Ibid. p. 150.

motion,

motion[87]. This principle, which Plato calls the irrational ſoul of the world, he thought ſufficiently atteſted, in the innumerable deviations from the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, in the extravagant paſſions of men, and in the phyſical and moral evil, which, in conſequence of theſe deviations and paſſions, ſo viſibly prevail in the world. Without admitting a certain ſtubborn intractability, and diſorderly wildneſs, eſſential to matter, and therefore incapable of being entirely eradicated or ſubdued, it ſeemed impoſſible to explain the origin of evil under the government of Deity[88].

Plato's doctrine of ideas.

From theſe rude materials, God, according to the fanciful doctrine of Plato, formed the four elements, and built the beautiful ſtructure of the heavens and the earth, after the model of thoſe eternal exemplars[89], or patterns, which ſubſiſt in the

[87] Politic. p. 120, & ſeqq. & Timæus, paſſim.

[88] De Legibus, l. x. p. 608. Philem. p. 160.

[89] Theſe exemplars, or παραδειγματα, are the *ideas* of Plato, which were ſo much miſrepreſented by many of the later Platoniſts, or Eclectics. He names them, indifferently, ιδεας, ειδη, ειικονας, τα καθ' αυτα, & ὁσαυτως ἐχοντα. The two laſt expreſſions are uſed to diſtinguiſh them from the fleeting and periſhable forms of matter. Plato repreſents theſe ideas as exiſting in the divine intellect, as beings entirely mental, not objects of any of the ſenſes, and not circumſcribed by place or time. By the firſt univerſal Cauſe, theſe ideas were infuſed into the various ſpecies of created beings, in whom (according to Ammonius, in Porphyr. Introduct. p. 29.) they exiſted, as the impreſſion of a ſeal exiſts in the wax to which it has been applied. In its pre-exiſtent ſtate, the human mind viewed theſe *intelligible* forms in their original ſeat, the field of truth. But ſince men were impriſoned in the body, they receive theſe ideas from external objects, as explained in the text. Such is the doctrine of Plato. But many of the later Platoniſts, and even ſeveral writers

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the divine Intelligence [90]. Conſidering that beings poſſeſſed of mental powers were far preferable to thoſe deſtitute of ſuch faculties, God infuſed into the corporeal world a rational ſoul, which, as it could not be immediately combined with body, he united to the active, but irrational principle, eſſentially inherent in matter [91]. Having thus formed and animated the earth, the ſun, the moon, and the other viſible divinities, the great Father of ſpirits proceeded to create the inviſible gods and dæmons [92], whoſe nature and hiſtory Plato deſcribes with a reſpectful reverence for the religion

writers of the preſent age, have imagined that he aſcribed to ideas a ſeparate and independent exiſtence. Vid. Brucker. Hiſtor. Philoſoph. p. 695, & ſeqq. Gedike Hiſtor. Philoſoph. ex Ciceron. Collect. p. 183, & ſeqq. Monboddo, Origin of Language, vol. i. c. ix. Of all the abſurdities embraced by philoſophers, this doubtleſs would be the greateſt, to believe eternal unchangeable patterns of the various genera and ſpecies of things exiſting apart, and independent of the mind by which theſe abſtract notions are conceived. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that many writers of the Alexandrian ſchool, whoſe extravagent fancies could fix and embody metaphyſical abſtractions, and realiſe intellectual ideas, ſhould animate and perſonify the λογον τȣ θεȣ, the divine intellect, in which, according to Plato, theſe ideas reſided, and from which they were communicated to other intelligences. The ſame viſionary fanatics who diſcovered, in the λογος of Plato, the ſecond perſon of the Trinity, recogniſed the Holy Spirit in his Soul of the World; but as this irrational principle of motion ill correſponded to the third perſon of the Godhead, they invented an hyper-coſmian ſoul, concerning which Plato is altogether ſilent. See the Encyclopedie, article *Eclectique*. Brucker. Hiſt. Philoſoph. vol. i. p. 712, & ſeqq. & Meiner's Beytrag zur geſchichte der denkart der erſten Jahrhunderte nach Chriſti geburt in einigen betrachtungen über die neu Platoniſche Philoſophie.

[90] Timæus, Polit. l. vi.

[91] Ib; p. 477, & ſeqq.

[92] Timæus, p. 480.

of

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of his country [93]. After finiſhing this great work, the God of gods, again contemplating the ideal forms in his own mind, perceived there the exemplars of three ſpecies of beings, which he realiſed in the mortal inhabitants of the earth, air, and water. The taſk of forming theſe ſenſible, but irrational beings, he committed to the inferior divinities; becauſe, had this laſt work likewiſe proceeded from his own hands, it muſt have been immortal like the gods [94]. The ſouls of men, on the other hand, he himſelf formed from the remainder of the rational ſoul of the world. They firſt exiſted in the ſtate of dæmons, inveſted only with a thin æthereal body. Having offended God by neglecting their duty, they were condemned to unite with the groſs corporeal maſs, by which their divine faculties are ſo much clogged and encumbered [95].

Plato's morals.

It was neceſſary briefly to explain the metaphyſical theology of Plato, how viſionary ſoever it may appear, becauſe the doctrine of ideal forms, together with that of the pre-exiſtent ſtate of the human mind, are the main pillars of his philoſophy. Before their incarceration in the body, the ſouls of men enjoyed the preſence of their Maker, and contemplated the unchangeable ideas and eſſences of things in the field of truth. In viewing and examining theſe eternal archetypes of order, beauty, and virtue, conſiſted the nobleſt energy, and higheſt perfection of celeſtial ſpirits [96], which,

93 Apolog. Socratis.
94 Timæus, p. 480, & 481.
95 Ibid.
96 Republ. vi. Phædrus, Philebus, &c.

being

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being emanations of the Deity, can never reſt ſatisfied with objects and occupations unworthy their divine original. But in their actual ſtate, men can perceive with their corporeal ſenſes, only the fleeting images and imperfect repreſentations of theſe immutable eſſences of things, in the fluctuating objects of the material world, which are ſo little ſteady and permanent, that they often change their nature and properties, even while we view and examine them[97]. Beſide this, our ſenſes themſelves are liable to innumerable diſorders; and unleſs we are conſtantly on the watch, never fail to deceive us[98]. Hence the continual errors in our judgments of men and things; hence the improper ends we purſue; hence the very inadequate means by which we ſeek to attain them; hence, in one word, all the errors and miſery of life. Yet even in this degraded ſtate, to which men were condemned for paſt offences, their happineſs ceaſes not to be an object of care to the Deity. As none can riſe ſo high, none can ſink ſo low, as to eſcape the eye and arm of the Almighty[99]. The divine Providence obſerves and regulates the meaneſt, as well as the greateſt, of its productions. But the good of the part being ſubordinate to that of the whole, it is neceſſary that each individual ſhould be rewarded or puniſhed, in proportion as he fulfils the taſk aſſigned him. It is by the performance of his duty alone, that man can regain the favour of his Maker[100]; for

97 Phædo, Timæus, &c.
98 Phædo, p. 31. & Repub. l. v.
99 De Legibus.
100 Eutyphron.

it is ridiculous to think that this ineſtimable benefit can be purchaſed by rich preſents and expenſive ſacrifices. Religion cannot be a traffic of intereſt [101]. What can we offer to the gods, which they have not firſt beſtowed on us? Will they thank us for reſtoring their own gifts? It is abſurd to think it. To pleaſe the Divinity, we muſt obey his will concerning us; nor can we comply with the purpoſe of our creation, and fulfil our deſtiny, without aſpiring at thoſe noble powers with which we were originally endowed [102]; and which, even in our preſent degenerate ſtate, it is ſtill poſſible, by proper diligence, to recover [103].

His account of the origin of human knowledge.

Our ſenſes give us information of external objects, which are ſtored up in the memory, and variouſly combined by the imagination [104]. But it is remarkable that thoſe ideas, thus acquired and retained, have the power of ſuggeſting others far more accurate and perfect than themſelves, and which, though excited by material objects, cannot be derived from them, unleſs (which is impoſſible) the effect were more beautiful and perfect than the cauſe. That we poſſeſſed, in a pre-exiſtent ſtate, thoſe ideas which modern philoſophers refer by an eaſy ſolution to the powers of generalization and abſtraction [105], Plato thought evident from the facility

101 Repub. l. ii. p. 100, & ſeqq.

102 Minos, p. 510. Timæus, p. 500.

103 Repub. l. v.

104 Theatet. p. 85, & ſeqq. & Philem. 184, & ſeqq.

105 The ancients were not ignorant of this philoſophy. Simplicius, ſpeaking of the origin of intelligible forms, or ideas, in

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facility with which we recalled them [106]. Of this he gave an example in Meno's ſlave, who, when properly queſtioned by Socrates, eaſily recollected and explained many properties of numbers and figures, although he had never learned the ſciences of arithmetic and geometry [107]. According to Plato, therefore, all ſcience conſiſted in reminiſcence, in recalling the nature, proportions, and relations of thoſe uniform and unchangeable eſſences, about which the human mind had originally been converſant, and after the model of which all created things were made [108]. Theſe intellectual forms, comprehending the true eſſences of things, were the only proper objects of ſolid and permanent ſcience [109]; their fluctuating repreſentatives

the human mind, ſays, ἡμεις αφελοντες αυτα εν ταις ἡμετεραις ενοιαις κατα ἑαυτα υπεςησαμεν: "We ourſelves, abſtracting them in our thoughts, have, by this abſtraction, given them an exiſtence in themſelves." Simp. in Præd. p. 17.

106 Menon. p. 344.

107 Ibid.

108 Repub. l. vi.

109 Επιςημη, ſcience, in oppoſition to δοξα, opinion. The material world he called το δοξαςον, that of which the knowledge admitted of probability only. Repub. l. v. The *ideas* of Plato, which, according to that philoſopher, formed the ſole objects of real and certain knowledge, were powerfully combated by his ſcholar and rival Ariſtotle. Yet the latter, who was ſo ſharp-ſighted to the faults of Plato, never accuſes him of maintaining the ſeparate and independent exiſtence of intellectual forms. The obſcure paſſage in Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, p. 201, which has been conſtrued into ſuch an accuſation, means nothing more, than that Socrates regarded the τα καθ' ὁλε, general ideas, as differing in no reſpect from our notions of the genera and ſpecies of things; whereas Plato made a diſtinction between them, aſſerting theſe ideas to have exiſted in the divine

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tatives in the material world, the actions and virtues of men, the order and beauty visible in the universe, were only so far real and substantial as they corresponded to their divine archetypes[110]; but as this correspondence never became complete, the examination of the perishing objects of sense could only afford us unsteady and uncertain notions, fleeting and fugitive like themselves[111]. From these observations, Plato thought it evident, that the duty and happiness of men consisted in withdrawing themselves from the material, and approaching

Of the powers of perception and intellect.

divine intellect before the creation, &c. as explained in the text. Aristotle discusses the doctrine of ideas more perspicuously in his Ethics to Nichomachus, l. i. c. vi. He regards them as mere fictions of the fancy, and the knowledge founded on them as altogether visionary. "The idea of good," he observed, "might be applied to substances, as the Deity, the mind of man; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as mediocrity; to time, as the juncture or nick of time; in short, through all the categories. There is not, therefore, any one general idea of good common to all these. Were there one idea, the same in all, there could be but one science respecting it. But there are many, physic, gymnastic, the military art, &c. which all have some good in view. Things are good in themselves, or good as means to an end. But even those things which are ultimately good, as wisdom, honour, pleasure, are not comprehended under any one definition of good, though distinguished by the same epithet from some analogy or resemblance, as the understanding is called the eye of the mind. If there is any such general idea, it is surely incapable of being applied to any practical use; not as a model, otherwise the arts and sciences, all of which have some good in view, would continually have this model before them. Yet they all neglect it, and justly; for what benefit could they derive from this abstract idea? A physician, for instance, contemplates not health in that general manner, but the health of man, or rather of a particular man, who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only his art is concerned."

[110] Parmen. p. 140.

[111] Repub. l. vii.

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proaching the intellectual world [112], to which their own natures were more congenial. To promote this purpoſe was the great aim of his philoſophy. If we were deceived by the ſenſes, he obſerved, that we were ſtill more fatally endangered by the paſſions, thoſe flimſy ſails of the mind, which were expanded and agitated by every varying guſt of imagined good or evil [113]. The pains and pleaſures of the body were all of a mixed kind, and nearly allied to each other. The God who arranged the world, deſirous to unite and incorporate theſe ſeemingly oppoſite natures, had at leaſt joined their ſummits; for pleaſure was nothing elſe but a rapid ceſſation of pain; and the livelieſt of our bodily enjoyments were preceded by uneaſineſs, and followed by languor [114]. To illuſtrate the neceſſity of governing with a ſtrong hand the appetites and paſſions, Plato compared the ſoul to a little republic, compoſed of different faculties or orders [115]. The judging or reaſoning faculty, juſtly entitled to the ſupremacy, was ſeated, as in a firm citadel, in the head; the ſenſes were its guards and ſervants; the various deſires and affections were bound to pay it obedience.

Of the paſſions.

Of theſe deſires, which were all of them the natural ſubjects of the ruling faculty, Plato diſtinguiſhed two orders, ever ready to rebel againſt their

[112] Repub. p. 134. & Phæd. p. 26.
[113] Phædrus.
[114] Phæd. Philem. & Repub. l. ii. p. 262, & ſeqq.
[115] Repub. l. iv.

maſter.

maſter. The firſt conſiſted of thoſe paſſions which are founded in pride and reſentment, or in what the ſchoolmen called the iraſcible part of the ſoul[116]; and were ſeated in the breaſt. The ſecond conſiſted of thoſe paſſions which are founded in the love of pleaſure, or in what the ſchoolmen called the concupiſcible[117] part of the ſoul, and were ſeated in the belly, and inferior parts of the body. Theſe different orders, though commonly at variance with each other, were alike dangerous to the public intereſt, and unleſs reſtrained by the wiſdom and authority of their ſovereign, muſt inevitably plunge the little republic of man into the utmoſt diſorder and miſery[118]

Of the virtues; and wiſdom the greateſt virtue.

Yet, according to Plato, both theſe ſets of paſſions were, in the preſent ſtate of things, neceſſary parts of our conſtitution; and, when properly regulated, became very uſeful ſubjects. The iraſcible aſſerted our rank and dignity, defended us againſt injuries, and when duly informed and tempered by reaſon, taught us with becoming fortitude to deſpiſe dangers and death, in purſuit of what is honourable and virtuous. The concupiſcible provided for the ſupport and neceſſities of the body; and, when reduced to ſuch ſubmiſſion as to reject every gratification not approved by reaſon, gave riſe to the virtue of temperance. Juſtice

116 The To θυμοειδες of Plato.

117 The To επιθυμητικον of Plato. Both are included under what Plato and Ariſtotle call the ορεκτικον, the ſeat of the deſires and paſſions.

118 Ibid. p. 254.

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took place, according to Plato, when reaſon directed and paſſion obeyed, and when each paſſion performed its proper office, and acknowledged due reſpect towards its ſuperior. In the ſtrength, acuteneſs, and perfection of the ruling faculty, conſiſted the virtue of prudence, the great ſource and principle of all other virtues, without which temperance, fortitude, and even juſtice itſelf, were nothing but empty ſhadows, that deluded the ignorant vulgar. In the exerciſe of prudence or wiſdom, man reſembled his Maker, and contemplated thoſe intellectual forms, which taught him to diſcern with certainty the ends proper to be purſued, and the means neceſſary to attain them. The wiſe man compares the mind with the body, eternity with time, virtue with pleaſure. He thus learns to deſpiſe the inferior parts of his nature, to defy its pains, to diſdain its pleaſures. Without attaining this true elevation of mind, he never can be virtuous or happy, ſince whoever depends on the body, muſt conſider death as an evil, the fear of which can only be overcome by ſome greater terror; ſo that in him who is not truly wiſe, fortitude itſelf muſt be the child of timidity [119]. In the ſame manner, his pretended moderation and temperance will ſpring from the impure ſource of the oppoſite vices. He will deny himſelf ſome pleaſures, to attain others which he regards as more valuable, and will ſubmit to ſmall pains to avoid the greater [120]. He thus continues through life,

119 Repub. l. vi.

120 Phædo, p. 26, & ſeqq.

exchan-

exchanging one trifle for another; a traffic which never can enrich him, while he rejects wiſdom, the only precious merchandiſe.

Cauſes of the diverſity of moral character.

But the temple of wiſdom is, according to Plato, ſituate on a rock, which few men have the ſtrength to aſcend [121]. This difference of ability proceeds from various cauſes: 1. At their creation, all minds were not alike excellent and perfect [122]. 2. They were not alike criminal during their pre-exiſtent ſtate [123]. 3. The groſs bodies which they now inhabit are variouſly moulded, ſome being too ſtrong, others too weak, and very few in juſt harmony with the divine principle by which they are animated [124]. 4. Early inſtitution and example occaſion great differences among them. Such, indeed, is the power of education and habit, that the errors and crimes of men are leſs chargeable on thoſe who commit them, than on their parents, guardians, and inſtructors [125]; and it ſeems hardly poſſible for thoſe who have the misfortune to be born in a licentious age and country, to attain wiſdom and virtue. Even when the moſt favourable circumſtances unite, the mind muſt ſtill, however, have a tendency to degenerate, while united with matter [126]. The body, therefore, muſt be continually exerciſed and ſubdued by the gymnaſtic, the ſoul muſt be purified and ennobled by philoſophy. Without ſuch attention, men can neither reach the perfection of

121 Repub. l. vi. p. 74. 122 Phædrus.
123 Ibid. 124 Timæus. 125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. p. 484. & Repub. paſſim.

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their nature, or, when they have reached it, maintain that elevated poſt, from which they look down with compaſſion on the errors and miſery of their fellow-creatures [127].

Plato's ſage.

In the deſcription of his imaginary ſage, Plato employs the colours which were afterwards borrowed by the Stoics and Epicureans. But neither of theſe ſects, as will appear hereafter, were ſo well entitled as the Platoniſts, to boaſt their philoſophical happineſs, and to aſſert their ſuperiority to the viciſſitudes of time and fortune. Plato was the firſt philoſopher who ſupported the doctrine of a future ſtate, by arguments that ſeemed ſufficient to convince intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind, he inferred the ſimplicity and indeſtructibility of the ſubſtance in which they reſide [128]. He deſcribed the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero [129] and Buffon [130] have not been able to ſurpaſs. And ſince he regarded the ſoul as the principle of life and motion, he thought it abſurd to ſuppoſe that the diſeaſes and death of the body ſhould take from this principle ſuch qualities as it eſſentially poſſeſſed in itſelf, and accidentally communicated to matter [131]. It was his firm perſuaſion, that according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the ſoul, after its ſeparation from the body, would be raiſed

Immortality of the ſoul.

State of retribution.

[127] Timæus, p. 484, & Repub. paſſim.

[128] Phædo, p. 25, & ſeqq.

[129] See Cicer. de Offic. l. i. & paſſim.

[130] Buffon ſur l'Homme. [131] Phædo.

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to a higher, or depreſſed to a lower ſtate of exiſtence [132].

His republic.

This belief, which raiſed his hopes to a higher ſcene, gave him not, however, that contempt, affected by a very different claſs of philoſophers, for the periſhing affairs [133] of the preſent world. Like ſome others of the ſcholars of Socrates, he traced the plan of a perfect commonwealth; though his work, known by that title, as has been juſtly obſerved by a great genius [134], is rather a treatiſe of education than a ſyſtem of policy. The real republic of Plato is contained in his books of laws, in which he explains, with no leſs acuteneſs than elegance, the origin and revolutions of civil ſociety, and traces the plan of a republic nearly reſembling the Spartan model.

Genius and character of Plato.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profuſely ſcattered through his dialogues; and in his own times, Plato was not conſidered as that viſionary ſpeculatiſt which he has appeared to later ages. His ſcholars, Ariſtonymus, Phormio, and Eudoxus, were ſucceſſively ſent by him to regulate the republics of the Arcadians, Elians, and Cnidians [135], at the earneſt requeſt of thoſe communities. From Xenocrates, another of his diſciples, Alexander deſired rules for good government [136]. The fame of Ariſtotle

[132] Phædrus, & Phædo, paſſim.

[133] The Epicureans.

"Non res humanæ, perituraque regna." GEORG.

Of this more below.

[134] Rouſſeau in his Emile.

[135] Plutarch. adverſ. Colot. Epicur.

[136] Idem. ibid.

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is well known; and it will afterwards appear how much he was indebted to a writer, whoſe opinions he often combated with ſeeming reluctance, and real ſatisfaction. Plato united warmth of fancy with acuteneſs of underſtanding, and is equally eminent for the power of combining images, and that of diſtinguiſhing ideas. Yet, when compared with his maſter Socrates, his genius will appear more ſubtile and ſagacious. He wanted that patient ſpirit of obſervation which diſtinguiſhed the illuſtrious ſage, who in all his reaſonings kept facts ever in his view, and at every ſtep he made, looked back with wary circumſpection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod ſecurely the paths of truth and nature; but his adventurous diſciple, truſting to the wings of fancy, often expatiates in imaginary worlds of his own creation.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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